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Abstract
The thesis deals with pricing strategies for multichannel retailers, espe-
cially traditional stores which additionally manage an online shop. The
problem of integrating two sales channels and applying a well-suited
pricing strategy is still an emergent question. This work develops a
stochastic model to represent consumer behavior on pricing. On the
one hand the model contains two probability functions which render
consumers’ reservation prices for each individual channel. On the other
hand the stochastic model is based on numerous distributions which rep-
resent switching probabilities from and to each separate channel. The
various distribution functions will be estimated from the results of a sur-
vey. To highlight differences of pricing strategies due to several product
categories a cross comparisons of books, clothes and digital cameras
will be presented.
The results show that there are differences in multichannel pricing of the
various products. These inequalities stem from consumers’ perceptions
of the sales channels. For each product a separate sales channel is pre-
ferred by consumers. Therefore, one channel exhibits some advantage
versus the alternative channels. This advantage is reflected in different
pricing strategies. Further appropriate marketing strategies could help a
firm to counter discounting by its competitors. So firms should keep an
eye on the reservation price structure of its consumers as well as their
demanded marketing activities.
Zusammenfassung
Diese Arbeit bescha¨ftigt sich mit der Preispolitik im Mehrkanalvertrieb,
im Speziellen werden traditionelle Ladengescha¨fte die auch einen Onli-
neshop betreiben untersucht. Die Integration mehrerer Vertriebskana¨le
und die Realisierung einer entsprechenden Preisstrategie stellt noch im-
mer eine kritische Frage dar. In dieser Arbeit wird ein stochastis-
ches Modell entwickelt, dass das Einkaufsverhalten der Konsumenten
darstellt. Das Modell besteht aus zwei Wahrscheinlichkeitsfunktionen,
die die Reservationspreise der Konsumenten in jedem Vertriebskanal
repra¨sentieren. Ferner basiert das Modell auf mehreren Wahrschein-
lichkeitsfunktionen, die die Wechselwahrscheinlichkeiten zwischen den
verschiedenen Kana¨len darstellen. Die unterschiedlichen Wahrschein-
lichkeiten werden mithilfe einer Umfrage gescha¨tzt. Differenzen in der
Preispolitik werden anhand von Bu¨chern, Kleidung und Digitalkameras
erschlossen.
Die Unterschiede in der Preispolitik stammen von unterschiedlichen
Wahrnehmungen der Vertriebskana¨le durch die Konsumenten. Fu¨r
jedes Produkt wird ein anderer Kanal von den Konsumenten bevorzugt.
Diese Vorliebe ermo¨glicht unterschiedlichen Preisstrategien. Des Weit-
eren kann durch eine angepasste Marketingstrategie besser auf Preisat-
tacken von Mitbewerbern reagiert werden. Daher sollten Unternehmen
sowohl die Reservationspreise ihrer Kunden beobachten als auch deren
geforderten Marketinghandlungen anbieten.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
Pricing decisions are becoming more and more relevant. Higher pressure from
competitors and better informed consumers1 are some ingredients which demand
better and faster pricing decisions (Monroe and Bitta 1978). Further, pricing is
known to have the deepest impact of all marketing activities a firm could con-
duct (Simon 1992). With the approach of the new sales channel via the Internet
decisions may not become easier for firms doing business in both channels. To-
day online marketing is becoming more and more important. In some industries
it has already become a “must have” feature. An additional online sales channel
possibly reduces costs in various ways. Some authors argue that firms can add
information to online offerings at low costs and thus achieve costs savings of up
to 25 %, others state that firms could conduct channel integration to save oper-
ational costs (e.g., Alba et al. 1997, Adelaar et al. 2004). The unique features
of the online channel allow firms to expand their offerings in a cheap way, which
thereby help to serve consumers’ needs better, and thus increase profits (e.g., Alba
et al. 1997). Furthermore, since menu costs are considerably low, firms are able to
change prices more frequently and to a much finer extent than in their traditional
channel. This price segmentation allows skimming consumer surplus better (e.g.,
Lee and Gosain 2002). Furthermore, the online channel may lower transaction
costs (e.g., Ward 2001, Liang and Huang 1998).
1Both genders are attributed by consumers. For better readability, in the remainder of the work
gender neutral notations will be omitted.
2 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Through the online channel new consumer groups could be accessed (e.g., Baye
and Morgan 2001). Recent literature asserts that an additional online channel in-
creases market coverage and thereby the firm’s profit (e.g., Friedman and Furey
2003, Bakos et al. 2005). Other studies highlight the demand-expanding capacity
of the online channel (e.g., Berman and Thelen 2004, Geyskens et al. 2002). Posi-
tive effects are also attributed to the presumption that the online channel strength-
ens relationships to existing consumers, and the firm receives a loyalty payoff
from maintaining its online channel. Evidence from the travel industry and even
from the outdoor industry show the profitableness of using the online medium to
reinforce loyalty (e.g., Shankar et al. 2003, Wallace et al. 2004).
Consumers may also obtain additional services by the online channel. Thereby
they may be more satisfied which in turn leads to increased loyalty. With the
use of an adapted time allocation model it is possible to display that multichan-
nel retailers could indeed serve consumers’ needs better and thus reduce harmful
switching loss (e.g., Reardon and McCorkle 2002). Another study shows that loy-
alty could be leveraged if the firm is capable to put more weight on non-digital
attributes of a product, which turn out to be highly relevant for the subsequent
purchase decision (e.g., Lal and Sarvary 1999). Evidence for loyal consumers be-
ing less price sensitive was found to be also prevalent in the coffee market (e.g.,
Krishnamurthi and Raj 1991).
Additionally there exist considerations that a firm may extract synergies from an
additional online sales channel (e.g., Berman and Thelen 2004, Adelaar et al.
2004, Steinfield et al. 2002). Since each channel provides different advantages,
consumers tend to choose the optimal channel for their purchase. An additional
channel therefore increases consumer fit and for this reason a firm’s profit (e.g.,
Fox et al. 2004, Wikstro¨m 2005, Schoenbachler and Gordon 2002). A spatial
model shows that an information provider is able to increase profits by supple-
menting the direct channel by an alternative indirect channel (e.g., Dewan et al.
2000). Thus, consumer value could be enhanced by serving their needs better
(e.g., Berman and Thelen 2004, Adelaar et al. 2004, Sullivan and Thomas 2004).
From the marketing perspective, an online channel provides closer customer con-
tact, which could be used for precise consumer profiling (e.g., Tsay and Agrawal
2004, Lee and Gosain 2002).
3The Internet is often described as a “friction free” market (e.g., Bakos 2001).
Increased competition should result in lower prices and less price dispersion. Fur-
thermore, the distinctive features of the Internet, most notably reduced search
costs, should increase price sensitivity. All together the friction free market should
increase efficiency such that total welfare rises (e.g., Bakos 2001, Alba et al. 1997,
Bakos et al. 2005).
But despite these advantages many practitioners believe in a threat from the fric-
tion free market. Indeed, reduced search costs encourage price competition, which
firms try to prevent by introducing barriers (e.g., Alba et al. 1997, Odlyzko 1996,
Bakos 1997, Salop 1979).
Thus, the fear of cannibalization seems to be well grounded. Cannibalization
determines sales shifts from an entrenched channel to a new established online
channel, which may not increase profits, but rather decrease them (e.g., Alba et al.
1997, Blattberg and Wisniewski 1989, Meredith and Maki 2001, Srinivasan et al.
2005, Steinfield et al. 2002, Hansen and Madlberger 2006). Further, cannibal-
ization will be more likely, the higher the perceived similarity between products
(e.g., Harvey and Kerin 1979). Especially the Internet sales channel offering dig-
ital information goods is exposed to cannibalization. Some authors state that is-
sues like cannibalization, channel coordination and channel conflicts may be more
pronounced due to the nature of the Internet (e.g., Balasubramanian 1998). Even
worse, the online channel may not necessarily enhance consumer spending, partly
due to a lack of cross-selling potential (e.g., Sullivan and Thomas 2004).
The newspaper and the music CDs industry both indicate signs of cannibalization,
and it was confined that cannibalization may increase as the Internet becomes
more mature (e.g., Deleersnyder et al. 2002, Biyalogorsky and Naik 2003). Addi-
tional studies reveal figures of cannibalization and decreasing returns on consumer
durable and apparel products (e.g., Ansari et al. 2005). Especially homogeneous
goods, in particular digital information goods, force firms to compete fiercely on
prices because they contain no other differentiation feature. The unique features
of digital information goods make particularly these firms very exposed to canni-
balization (e.g., Bailey 1998, Shapiro and Varian 1999).
However, the online sales channel is not only a threat, it may also be a chance.
Some studies even argue that there exists no cannibalization effect since online
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search generates offline sales (e.g., Ward 2001). But if the online sales channel
becomes attractive, pricing strategies for this channel should also become relevant.
Therefore, a proper pricing strategy is vital for firms doing business through dif-
ferent sales channels with homogeneous goods, since the price is closely related to
the profit of a firm. A wrong pricing policy could harm a firm’s profit or even drive
it to bankruptcy. Wrong pricing causes deadweight loss. Deadweight loss denom-
inates loss which could have been avoided by a proper allocation of resources, i.e.
in this case an optimal pricing in both sales channels. First, deadweight loss oc-
curs because too high a price lets some consumers forgo a purchase which would
otherwise have taken place and thus lowers a firm’s profit. Second, a price too
low would bring many consumers, but ceteris paribus due to low prices the profit
would not be adequate. Therefore, optimal pricing strategies are the passport to
maximizing profit in industries which sell homogeneous products on the Inter-
net as well as through traditional channels (e.g., Varian 1995, Shapiro and Varian
1999, Liebowitz 2002, Skiera 2000). In general the price is always an important
competitive issue in satisfying consumers (e.g., Wallace et al. 2004).
This work wants to support firms which operate an online and an offline sales
channel with normative guidance for their pricing decisions. Since price is just
one aspect of the whole marketing mix (e.g., Kotler 2006) the other issues will
also be covered.
The price a firm should charge in each channel denotes the main question of the
current thesis. From differences in reservation prices of each channel different
pricing strategies may emerge. Further, the product category may influence the
reservation prices for each channel. Therefore, a second question asks what dif-
ferences arise on the sale of various product categories. Does the product category
influence prevalent pricing strategies? One could imagine that, e.g. purchasing
shampoo will be different from purchasing digital cameras. But what is the influ-
ence of the differences on pricing.
Since pricing could be seen as the most important tool for marketers, these might
be the most important questions for firms doing business online and through tra-
ditional stores. A firm aware of the impacts its marketing mix exerts on its con-
sumers will be able to utilize this knowledge. Through a clever pricing policy
accompanied by supportive investments in promotion and distribution the firm
5may attain competitive advantages, which should result in higher sales and profit
for a firm.
But consumers will also profit from a firm knowing their needs. Consumers will
feel safer, and more comfortable doing business with such a firm. Negative expe-
riences will be reduced and finally consumers may be more satisfied overall.
The proposed model will cover reservation prices and switching probabilities from
one channel to another, and how firms are able to influence migration. It is a the-
oretical model but has foundations in an empirical survey. The model should end
in a simulation tool for multichannel retailers to obtain computer-assisted optimal
pricing strategies, which maximize profits. According to the pricing strategies the
management should also receive suggestions for optimally allocating pecuniary
resources on determinants of distribution and promotion. Starting with a simple
market model, suggestions for the management should be deduced. Stochastic
simulations will be used to search for profit maximizing prices at different mar-
ket conditions. In a pari passu manner, decisive parameters will be changed to
cover some specific market conditions, derive an optimal pricing behavior and the
impact of deviating from profit maximizing pricing.
The rationale for such a model is that market studies have some limitations. In-
evitably they could harm a firm’s business. In reality it is dangerous to play around
with prices to measure different effects. Thus, we propose a model to quantify
cannibalization and to assist firms with pricing suggestions and associated sup-
portive distribution and promotion investments in a laboratory-like environment.
However, this work may be just a starting point because pricing is influenced
by many more parameters. Thus, pricing still remains an inexact science with
numerous random variables.
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Literature Review
In the early days pricing was composed solely of strict calculations. These cal-
culations were only based on information about costs. Nowadays things have
become different. Pricing has grown to be a crucial management decision which
involves more than just the cost structure of the assembly process and the raw
materials, so called cost-plus pricing (e.g., Diller 2003, p. 458).
But this does not mean that pricing was not important in the old days. The opposite
turns out to be true. Pricing is and was always an important issue (e.g., Udell
1964). The impact of pricing on a manager’s decision process is still enormous
(Simon 1992). Especially pricing in the Internet receives growing attention as
this market promises higher returns. Various pricing strategies and tools may also
facilitate benefits for both sellers and buyers (Simon 1992, Hanson and Hansson
1999, Brandtweiner 2001). It seems obvious that pricing may mark the focus
of most marketing strategies. Finally, the price determines crucially whether a
product will be bought, or if it will be bought the remaining question is where to
buy, which is also determined by the price.
Numerous authors are concerned about required price changes for doing business
on the Internet sales channel. Many studies investigate the price level, the price
elasticity and price dispersion. These factors define a price structure in a market
as a whole. By knowing these factors firms were thought to be able to offer more
appropriate prices and enhance profits. Unfortunately the findings on price levels,
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variances and elasticities are ambiguous. The remaining solid statement is that
pricing in the Internet should be done very similarly to pricing in traditional stores.
Further, the Internet allows firms to implement new pricing strategies. The poten-
tial pricing strategies range from traditional posted prices to highly sophisticated
yield management. Firms may implement different strategies to avoid the bitter
competition. Therefore, dynamic strategies are useful to cover prices and make
the market more opaque. Interactivity allows applying pricing strategies with user
interaction like auctions. Finally, negligible price tagging costs allow firms to
calculate each price for a consumer individually almost like with yield manage-
ment. All these strategies are used to minimize competition and differentiate from
competitors.
Costs, especially search costs and transaction costs, determine additional differ-
ences to traditional markets (e.g., Geyskens et al. 2002, Reynolds 2002). Costs
still are an important ingredient for pricing. These costs directly influence con-
sumers’ reservation prices and their willingness to pay. Especially in the Internet,
where the competitor is just one click away, search costs play a tremendous role.
Price
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Figure 2.1: Influences on the Basic Model
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Figure 2.1 depicts the most relevant influences on the basic model. Each specific
topic will be covered in detail in the following sections.
2.1 Price Levels
Increased price competition should, by standard economic argument, drive prices
down (e.g., Brynjolfsson and Kahin 2000). Since the Internet is assumed to en-
courage competition this reasoning seems plausible (e.g., Alba et al. 1997). For
example, price comparison sites quote consumers a detailed overview on offer-
ings. Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000) also states that due to lower supply costs,
higher price competition and therefore the removal of physical monopolies, prices
should decrease online. Numerous studies show that prices are distinctively lower
in the online channel than in the offline channel. Especially digital information
goods are found to have lower prices in the online channels, since they contain no
additional differentiation feature and thus price competition may be enforced (Pan
et al. 2002a, Lee and Gosain 2002, Ancarani and Shankar 2004). Even in the car
retailing industry the Internet is capable to lower prices for new cars (Zettelmeyer
et al. 2006). This is not surprising. The Internet offers full information and there-
fore allows consumers to come up with the most economic decision. Even more,
software robots and price comparison sites provide convenient ways to find the
minimal price quickly. Thus, the price is indeed the dominant attribute to attract
consumers to an online shop (e.g., Reibstein 2002). Therefore, the well informed
consumer is able to pick the lowest price at minimal effort or costs. The result
is that higher competition combined with better informed consumers may be the
foundation of declining prices in the online environment.
Interestingly, findings of higher prices in the Internet are also prevalent. Against
intuition prices in the online channel may be higher due to differentiation, which
increases equilibrium prices (Kuksov 2004). In eBay auctions, trusted sellers
could obtain a premium compared to sellers with many negative ratings (Ba and
Pavlou 2002). It is important to note that lower prices do not coincide with
higher price sensitivity. Alba et al. (1997) argue in the opposite direction. On-
line consumers show higher loyalty, which decreases price sensitivity, and there-
fore higher online prices are obtainable. In a similar vein, Lynch and Ariely
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(2000) state that non-price attributes may be valued by consumers. Especially
convenience is worth some additional markup. For some products, where quality
attributes become more stringent, price also plays a lesser role in the purchase
decision and higher prices may be viable. Above all there exists also empiri-
cal evidence of higher prices for certain products in the online channel, indicating
consumers’ willingness to pay a premium for convenience (Bailey 1998, Ho-Guen
1998). An alternative interpretation may be given concerning the maturity of the
Internet. If the reach of the Internet is small, we will observe high prices, but as
soon as the Internet becomes more and more mature online prices will fall. How-
ever, there will be no discount to offline prices in a world with a mature Internet
(Zettelmeyer 2000). In the same direction goes the argument that well adopted
products have lower prices online, but not well adopted products display higher
prices in the online channel (Balasubramanian 1998).
Ambiguous results on the price level in the online channel may indicate that price
levels are determined by the maturity of the Internet, the adoption of a certain
product for selling through the Internet, the information strategy of the firms and
the competitiveness of the market. This ambiguity does not help firms to develop
secure strategies for multichannel retailing. The proposed model should give some
hints for pricing under different circumstances.
2.2 Price Elasticity
Price elasticity describes consumers’ reactions on marginal price changes.
Against common knowledge, online consumers seem to be less price sensitive
than offline consumers (Degeratu et al. 2000). A number of studies found that
improvements in quality and service will lower online consumers’ price sensi-
tivity even below offline consumers’ price sensitivity (Alba et al. 1997, Shankar
et al. 1999). Lynch and Ariely (2000) found also less price sensitivity online if
competing shops offer a non-overlapping assortment. They even argue that in-
creased transparency, i.e. easier price comparison, fast and appropriate informa-
tion, will not increases price sensitivity. Well established brands can also help to
lower price sensitivity. Danaher et al. (2003) state that online shoppers may prefer
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known brand to avoid risks. Therefore, higher brand loyalty was observed, which
reduced price sensitivity.
In contrast, transparency in the online sales channel would cause consumers to be
more price sensitive in the online channel than in the offline channel. This may
usually happen if the assortment of the shops is very similar and therefore con-
sumers tend to choose the cheaper shop (e.g., Lynch and Ariely 2000). Theoretical
studies as well as empirical studies on tax rates and groceries all claim increased
price sensitivity of online consumers (Goolsbee 2000, Burke et al. 1992).
It seems that price elasticity is strongly determined by the product class. Homo-
geneous products will show higher price elasticity compared to products which
can be differentiated by their features. This asymmetry may also be the outcome
of different search frictions. A second impact may stem from overlapping assort-
ments. The higher the overlap the higher consumers’ price elasticity may be.
2.3 Price Dispersion
Price dispersion is an indicator of the competitiveness of a market. Higher price
dispersion in the online channel than in the offline channel indicates that firms
could avoid price competition by differentiating themselves with quality or ser-
vice. Existing literature gives evidence for substantial price dispersion in the on-
line channel for traveling agents, retailers in the books and CDs market and other
products (Bailey 1998, Brynjolfsson and Smith 2000). Online traveling agencies
have to differentiate themselves from each other by specializing and offering in-
dividual prices to its customers. Those strategies bring a wide range of prices and
therefore high price dispersion. Clearly, the agencies try to avoid comparison and
competition (e.g., Clemons et al. 2002). Ancarani and Shankar (2004) investi-
gated books and CDs and found also higher price dispersion online than offline.
For pure online retailers they show a 4 % wider price range than with traditional
stores. Comparable results were also found by other authors (e.g., Iyer and Pazgal
2003, Baye and Morgan 2001).
On the opposite end are findings of lower price dispersion online, which imply
higher price competition in this sales channel (e.g., Wernerfelt 1994, Morton et al.
2001). Less price dispersion in the online channel than in the offline channel was
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found by studies on the car retail industry, CDs, DVDs, hardware, software and
consumer electronics (e.g., Fang-Fang and Xing 2001, Pan et al. 2002b). Morton
et al. (2001) for example found online consumers to be more informed about the
current price structure and therefore online prices have to be less dispersed. Price
comparison sites foster such a development. Even life insurance displays less
price dispersion due to online price comparison sites (e.g., Brown and Goolsbee
2002).
Overall there seems to be no clear assertion concerning price dispersion. Some
authors argue that price dispersion depends on the number of firms filling a certain
market (e.g., Baye et al. 2004).
It might be that price dispersion is a function of the product class, the number of
firms in that market and the competitiveness of that market, as well as the brand
strength of the incumbent firms.
2.4 Search Costs
Search costs became an economic topic since the seminal work of Stigler (1961).
For the Internet it emerges also as an important topic because search costs are
assumed to decrease with the adoption of the Internet. The Internet encourages
consumers to undertake unimpeded search across stores (Alba et al. 1997). Re-
duced search costs may result in increased competition and thereby in reduced
prices (Bakos 2001, 1997). Further, increased competition makes it harder for
firms to generate profits (Liebowitz 2002). Because of this, firms use brands to
increase search costs and prevent price competition (Bergen et al. 1996).
However, lower search costs also allow firms to better monitor their competi-
tors. This may foster collusion which increases firms’ revenues (Campbell et al.
2005). Further, firms may provide better consumer fit, since lower search costs
may help firms to identify qualified consumers. The Internet enables even pro-
filing and monitoring back such strategies for evaluation (Bakos 2001, Lee and
Gosain 2002).
Nevertheless online search costs may be not trivial (Lynch and Ariely 2000). Even
if prices could easily be found, perceived search costs may be significant. Search
costs of zero would imply unreasonable consideration sets for consumers, i.e. con-
2.5. TRANSACTIONS COSTS 13
sumers’ consideration sets may be overestimated frequently (Mehta et al. 2003).
Further, there may exist an asymmetric search behavior. If search costs are lowest,
consumers tend to search too little and vice versa (Zwick et al. 2003). Thus, con-
sumers indeed do not always search for the lowest price (Smith and Brynjolfsson
2001). Empirical evidence highlights this phenomenon. Results show households
visiting on average 1.2 book sites and 1.3 CD sites prior to their purchase decision
(Johnson et al. 2004). Such behavior explains excess prices and profits of firms,
if search costs become relevant, especially for low price products like books and
CDs (Lal and Sarvary 1999). Further, consumers also have to evaluate a trade-off
between benefits of higher accuracy and costs of more time spent on searching and
expended cognitive effort. This trade-off may also lead to non-optimal decisions,
i.e. consumers may not pick the store offering the lowest price. Search effort is
not without costs (e.g., Morwitz et al. 1998, Verhoef et al. 2007).
2.5 Transactions Costs
Information technology, especially the emergence of the Internet, has increased in
efficiency, which in turn reduces transaction costs (e.g., Bakos 1997, Alba et al.
1997, Bakos 1998, Litan and Rivlin 2001). Foremost, coordination between buy-
ers and sellers as well as coordination within the firm are affected in a positive
way by increased efficiency (Williamson 1981, Benjamin and Wigand 1995).
Transaction costs may be a competitive ability to firms, since consumers decide
purchases upon transaction costs (e.g., Benjamin and Wigand 1995, Baye and
Morgan 2001).
But firms should keep in mind that transactions costs may not only be perceived as
costs by consumers. Chircu and Mahajan (2006) mention that traditional search
and evaluation costs may create shopping entertainment. A firm reducing such
costs may not benefit from this action.
Transaction costs may be related to the product class. Some products may display
prohibitive transaction costs (e.g., cement), other services may need personal con-
tact, which makes them not suitable for selling through the online channel (e.g.,
medical certificates). On the other hand digital information goods may be per-
fectly suited for the online channel, because they allow a direct delivery through
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the Internet. This delivery may be conducted instantaneously and at almost zero
costs (e.g., Bakos 1998). Consumers tend to minimize transaction costs. Es-
pecially high frequency buyers could be expected to optimize their transactions.
Firms guiding and supporting their consumers’ demand may profit by differenti-
ating from competitors and fostering loyalty (e.g., Kumar and Venkatesan 2005).
Firms also may tend to minimize their transaction costs. As a natural fact, firms
may choose that channel for a certain transaction, which may reduce the costs
(Benjamin and Wigand 1995).
2.6 Pricing Strategies
The Internet allows firms to reach individual consumers and to customize pricing
by direct marketing (Chen and Iyer 2002). By this means firms are able to realize
complex pricing strategies. These strategies can even be modified at will in a
short time. Moreover, digital information goods could be varied in manifold ways
which promotes price differentiation. Interactivity in the end allows for auctions
to be realized in the Internet.
Thus, the range of possible pricing strategies reaches from well known posted
prices to sophisticated yield management. Each pricing strategy has its own ad-
vantages or disadvantages and there is no clear recommendation which strategy to
use in conjunction with a certain product or a certain market environment.
Posted prices represent the widespread form to price products in the developed
countries. Since there is no haggling about the price the transaction turns out to
be cheap, clear and fast. All three factors are relevant in our developed world.
Thus, posted prices show to be extremely efficient and functional (e.g., Liebowitz
2002). The most often used computation to calculate this kind of price is cost-plus
computation. Therefore, the final price of a product results from unit costs plus
a certain markup. Cost-plus pricing is by far the most common pricing strategy
because of its simple calculation and its foundations on the costs. Applying such
a strategy, managers stay in the safe haven, especially with regard to accounting
departments (e.g., Noble and Gruca 1999, Simon 1992). Although this pricing
strategy is pretty simple there are some drawbacks to it. The exclusive circum-
stances where this kind of pricing operates profit maximizing are described by
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average costs remaining fairly stable through time and at any point in the demand
curve (e.g., Nagle and Holden 1995, Lilien and Kotler 1983, p.405-407). Unfortu-
nately these conditions rarely happen. Cost-plus pricing also ignores information
about consumer behavior and the competitive environment, which turns out to be
another weakness.
However, there are also some advantages with cost-plus pricing. Since managers
usually obtain relatively little information on the demand function, it is more likely
that they tend to use cost-plus pricing (e.g., Wilkes and Harrison 1975). Another
organizational factor that supports cost-plus pricing is risk aversion. Managers
have to fulfill certain internal margin requirements. It turns out to be more secure
to price adding a predefined markup. It is also important to note that managers
usually have to decide about numerous prices simultaneously. To capture that
complexity the most secure way of pricing will be cost-plus (Noble and Gruca
1999).
Regarding the maturity of the product one can differentiate posted prices in other
different categories (e.g., Noble and Gruca 1999). The most important pricing
strategies for this work are competitive pricing strategies where the product is al-
ready established in a market. In this area one can distinguish three strategies.
First, leader pricing may be an option for firms. This strategy may prove success-
ful for the market leader. This firm initiates price changes and expects others to
follow. Since this firm obtains most of the market it also tends to display higher
prices than its competitors which use the leader’s prices to set their own prices
(Noble and Gruca 1999). As already mentioned, it is common that the leader ob-
tains the highest market share as well (Kotler 2006). The preconditions for such a
market environment are easy detectable price changes (Nagle and Holden 1995),
inelastic total demand (Guiltinan 1987), low costs (Nagle and Holden 1995), and
high factor capacity utilization (Noble and Gruca 1999).
Second, a firm could conduct parity pricing. This means that a firm just copies the
prevailing price or maintains a constant price level between its competitors. This
strategy demonstrates weakness because the firm does not act on its unique power
but rather reacts on the market’s will (e.g., Noble and Gruca 1999). If a firm sells
a superior product it should command price premiums. Usually consumers accept
the markup due to superior features of the product and the firm should earn the
16 CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
rent for its better product. If the firm operates with cost advantages compared
to its competitors, it should become a low-price supplier. The firm should hand
over the cost savings to its consumers and therefore extend pressure on its com-
petitors. Finally, the firm could afford that discount. Thus, the unique reason for
firms to conduct parity pricing arises if the firm has to cope with high costs in a
mature market (Guiltinan 1987). To sum up, the market conditions to command
such a pricing strategy are composed of easily detectable price changes (Nagle
and Holden 1995), inelastic total demand (Guiltinan 1987), high factor capacity
utilization (Noble and Gruca 1999), low market share (Nagle and Holden 1995,
Kotler 2006, p. 471-500), and low product differentiation (e.g., Noble and Gruca
1999).
The third pricing strategy is to become a low-price supplier. If the firm obtains
some cost advantages they should be exploited and handed over to consumers
(Nagle and Holden 1995). Consumers may regard these discounts and flock to
the firm. A threat that could arise with that strategy is that if the firm exploits the
lack of price knowledge in the market and undercuts its competitors, a damaging
price war might result (Noble and Gruca 1999). All firms start to cut back prices
and in the end the firm initializing that price war may be worse off than before
because profits certainly drop since the price-cost spread scales down. This might
be even worse, if a competitor obtains higher cost advantages and thus attracts
additional consumers. The firm’s market environment to perform that kind of
pricing is composed of a low market share, high brand elasticity, and low product
differentiation (e.g., Noble and Gruca 1999). Thus, an aggressive price policy
should be commanded in such a dynamic environment.
For new products three alternative pricing options are available to firms. First,
the firm can conduct a skimming strategy. This strategy commands an initial high
price to target consumers who are insensitive to this high price because of special
needs (Guiltinan 1987). The firm could take profit of its temporary monopoly
position until competitors catch up. This strategy can usually be observed with
new, highly technical gadgets, where innovators, i.e. those consumers who pur-
chase that product first, are willing to pay a markup. Conditions which foster
such a pricing strategy turn out to be high product differentiation, consumers with
special needs and price insensitivity, major product enhancements, high factor ca-
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pacity utilization, and a lack of cost advantages due to scale or learning (Guiltinan
1987, Noble and Gruca 1999).
Second, the opposite strategy, namely penetration pricing. With that strategy the
firm initially executes low prices to speed up adoption or establish a de facto
standard. This strategy proves to be successful at firms which experience cost
advantages due to scale (Tellis 1986). A prominent example of successful pene-
tration pricing is Apple’s iPod. The major source of income stems not from sales
of iPods but from sales of music titles. A more recent example is Sony’s PS3
where estimates claim that Sony loses almost $ 250 per console (Goldstein 2008).
The supporting conditions to perform penetration pricing consist of low product
differentiation, minor product revisions, elastic demand, and low factor capacity
utilization (Guiltinan 1987, Noble and Gruca 1999).
Third, the firm could command experience or learning curve pricing, which is
very similar to penetration pricing. Again, the firm initially sets low prices. Later
on, the firm takes advantage of the scale. Unit costs start to decrease as volume
increases due to familiarity (Kotler 2006, p. 471-500). Thus, the goal is to build
up a critical mass quickly and thereby drive down unit costs. The success of
such a strategy is still ambiguous, since the effect of scale and learning could
hardly be estimated a priori. However, the prevailing conditions are the same as
for penetration pricing, except that the factor capacity utilization should be low
(Noble and Gruca 1999).
Since the current work does not deal with dynamic pricing strategies, although
they should certainly be named, a short overview of these strategies is given in
the following. Price bundling may be useful for cross-selling purposes. The firm
offers products in a bundle without integration. Consumer value pricing is given
where firms like Wal-Mart and IKEA offer fairly low prices for products which
nevertheless serve good quality. The current list is not meant to be exhaustive. For
a complete review refer to relevant literature (e.g., Noble and Gruca 1999, Thaler
1985, Guiltinan 1987, Tellis 1986, Nagle and Holden 1995, Skiera 2000, Kotler
2006, p. 471-500). The most dynamic strategies are auction-type pricing. These
strategies have become more and more important partly due to the spreading of the
Internet. The power of these strategies foremost resides in pricing each individ-
ual consumer different and therefore make comparison impossible. Basic auction
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sites like eBay utilize for example English auctions to sell products to prospective
consumers. Firms in some industries (e.g. airline industry) pursue yield man-
agement, i.e. they frequently change prices to match demand (Boyd and Bilegan
2003, Biyalogorsky et al. 1999). Due to lower menu costs, frequent price adjust-
ments are also used to explore consumers’ demand function (e.g., Baye and Mor-
gan 2001, Wertenbroch and Skiera 2002). Evidence for frequent price changes
is also found for computer components (Ball and Romer 1991). Further, frequent
price changes make it difficult for consumers to estimate the true value of products
(Oh and Lucas Jr. 2006). This strategy helps firms to avoid strong competition and
maintain higher profits (Bakos 1997).
There are thousands of pricing strategies out there and finding the optimal one to
apply may be difficult. In the current thesis we restrict the pricing strategies on
posted prices and try to find optimal strategies within that restriction.
2.7 Task Definitions
Task definitions are referred to as situational conditions and their generated shop-
ping strategies. Task definitions specify goals a consumer forms to resolve needs
emerging from a specific situation (e.g., Marshall 1993). Another definition comes
from Foxall (1994). He described task definitions as “... orientation, intent, role or
frame of a person through which certain aspects of the environment may become
relevant”.
In an earlier study Belk (1975) used a revised stimulus-organism-response model
and suggested five groups of situational characteristics which are responsible for
triggering distinctive behaviors depending on a person (see Figure 2.2). These
characteristics will be discussed in the remainder of this section. The impact of
environmental situations on consumption habits is also explored in more recent
studies (e.g., Kroeber-Riel and Weinberg 1999, Xie and Shugan 2001, Balasubra-
manian et al. 2005).
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Figure 2.3: Parameters of Task Definitions
Figure 2.3 shows all parameters influencing a certain task definition for shopping.
Each individual parameter will be described in the following sections.
2.7.1 Physical Surroundings
First, physical surroundings like geographical locations, the shopping environ-
ment with its lights, scents and sounds and even the weather, play a role (Belk
1975). The offline environment is especially feasible for exciting all five senses
and inspires thoughts and feelings of human beings. This influence may change
consumption patterns (e.g., Bitner 1992, Raghunathan and Irwin 2001). Impulse
20 CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
buying, for example, more often happens in traditional stores since multisensory
attributes are harder to resist (Shiv, Baba and Fedorikhin, Alexander 1999).
The online channel on the other hand is bound to specific restrictions concerning
atmospheric experiences. These differences may help to differentiate the online
channel from the offline channel (e.g., Alba et al. 1997, Eroglu et al. 2001, Menon
and Kahn 2002).
Besides that, the Optimum Stimulation Theory may explain different needs of
arousal. The optimum stimulation level (OLS) is a unique attribute for each in-
dividual consumer, which describes his response to any environmental stimulus
(Raju 1980). When consumers are understimulated, or they generally demand in-
creased stimulation, they tend to seek higher stimulation and vice versa (Menon
and Kahn 2002). Thus, web site design must provide enough challenges to arouse
consumers. But arousal should neither be too much nor too little, or consumers
become frustrated and forego purchasing online (Novak et al. 2000).
2.7.2 Social Surroundings
Second, social surroundings determine also situational characteristics. The pres-
ence of friends or sales personnel may alter the purchase outcome (e.g., Bell 1967,
Albaum 1967). In an early study on ethnicity, Stayman and Deshpande (1989)
found different food consumption patterns depending an different social surround-
ings.
The store clientele, the social class appeal and the self-image congruency may
impact channel choice (Lim and Dubinsky 2004). Raghunathan and Corfman
(2006) put this statement in other words and assert that other persons shopping
during a shopping trip may influence perceived utility. This utility might be higher
the more similar the behavior of other consumers is perceived.
The quest for socialization seems to exert also tremendous effects on the purchase
behavior. Consumers’ desire to be part of social milieus or of stimulating envi-
ronments may influence channel choice (Balasubramanian et al. 2005).
On the other hand the Internet allows for more anonymity. This feature is es-
pecially relevant when purchasing for example erotic articles. Avoiding embar-
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rassment may also appear to be decisive in buying health-related products or for
investors preferring online brokers (Konana and Balasubramanian 2005).
2.7.3 Temporal Aspects
Third, temporal aspects influence shopping behavior. On a broad view, time of
day or season of the year may play a role. But also more specific parameters
like time to payday or a simple time constraint influence shopping behavior (e.g.,
Mattson 1982). This aspect is closely related to time saving. Information search
costs are assumed to be lowest in the online environment (e.g., Bakos 1997, Lynch
and Ariely 2000). Thus, the Internet seems to provide advantages in time-pressure
situations. But this advantage may be no longer relevant if for example consumers
like shopping. In this case consumers calculate low opportunity costs for search-
ing the offers (Marmorstein, Howard et al. 1992). Time pressure could change
online versus offline shopping habits (van Kenhove et al. 1999).
It seems obvious that consumers are confronted with a trade-off between different
purchase alternatives. On the one hand a consumer could buy the product online
and wait for the delivery to save a certain amount of money. On the other hand
the consumer could trade off this money for an instant purchase in the nearest
traditional store (e.g., Keeney 1999, Chircu and Mahajan 2006). Hitt and Frei
(2002) explained differences in online banking behavior with the opportunity cost
of time. To highlight the complexity of this trade-off, Read and Loewenstein
(1995) coined the word ”Positive Time Discounting”, which expresses consumers
preference for immediate consumption.
In a different environment the temporal aspect may also be a crucial issue. Bala-
subramanian et al. (2005) suggested the economic goal for the channel choice to
be strongly influenced by the consumers’ availability of time.
But the online channel may also run into problems different from delivery. Web
waiting times, poor navigation or loading times for example negatively affect con-
sumers’ evaluation of a web site, which may alter purchasing behavior in favor of
traditional stores (Novak et al. 2000).
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2.7.4 Task Definitions
Fourth, the task definition itself may change shopping behavior. The description
of the shopping task may alter the purchasing behavior (Belk 1975). If a con-
sumer intends to buy a gift for a friend or his children he would find himself in a
different situation than purchasing an appliance for personal use. Thus, shopping
for a present or shopping for oneself causes big differences regarding shopping
habits (e.g., Gehrt et al. 1991, Mattson 1982, Hansen and Deutscher 1977). Matt-
son (1982) empirically analyzed shopping behavior on the task of gift buying. He
found that consumers visit different stores for different tasks. A crucial shop char-
acteristic for gift shopping is return policies. Since specialty stores usually have
more stringent policies, consumers prefer department stores for gift shopping.
In a study on purchasing habits regarding do-it-yourself products van Kenhove
et al. (1999) revealed that certain stores were visited more frequently than others
for specific task definitions since each type of store carries its unique advantages.
For urgent purchases, consumers value proximity, quick service and availability.
Price, service, assortment and even quality turn out to be of minor interest. On the
other hand, the store choice for regular purchases is determined by proximity, low
prices and sufficient stock.
In the case of gift shopping Gehrt and Yan (2004) also found a significant relation-
ship with traditional stores and not towards online shops. Further, they observed
consumers’ preference for traditional stores when purchasing experience goods to
minimize risk.
A more comprehensive study by Balasubramanian et al. (2005) points out that
symbolic meanings in gift giving drive consumers to spend more time at the pur-
chasing process. This time spent increases consumers’ utility and may increase a
gift’s meaning and value. Since traditional stores call for higher personal involve-
ment consumers may prefer them over online stores for the task of gift shopping.
2.7.5 Antecedent States
Fifth, antecedent states may also alter current shopping behavior. Emotions seem
to be central to consumers’ actions. Current moods (e.g., anxiety, pleasantness)
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and conditions (e.g., cash, illness) may change the importance of a specific pur-
chase (Belk 1975).
A conceptual model by Gardner (1985) highlights the mediating role of mood
states. Mood states exhibit some influence on consumer behavior. Consumers in
a bad mood may go out shopping to cheer themselves up, whereas consumers in
a good mood may undertake only those shopping activities which support their
positive mood, i.e. activities with some positive outcome.
Donovan et al. (1994) found that shoppers’ emotional states may serve as good
predictors for actual purchase behavior. Pleasure could project the extra time a
consumer will spend in a store and also the extra money he will, although un-
intended, spend. Another important predictor was found to be arousal. Arousal
could serve as a sound proxy for spending less in unpleasant environments.
Sweeney and Wyber (2002) show that music in a women’s cloth store could im-
pact purchasing behavior. Music and its characteristics both influence emotions.
Highest levels of pleasure could be obtained by playing slow pop or fast classical
music.
A discussion on the emotional power and its partitions can be found at Yani-de-
Soriano and Foxall (2006). They argue that pleasure, arousal and dominance are
all important determinants describing consumers’ consumption habits.
Recently Fiore and Kim (2007) tried to form a conceptual model to explain con-
sumers’ shopping experience. Their model also includes these antecedent states.
Furthermore, it is an enhancement of Belk’s (1975) S-O-R model (see Section
2.7).
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Chapter 3
Reservation Prices
The reference price or reservation price determines a price against which a pur-
chase price is judged (Monroe 1973). Normative reference prices denote con-
sumers’ evaluation of fairness (Bolton and Lemon 1999, Campbell 1999, Kahne-
man et al. 1986). Fairness is an elusory concept. What consumers perceive as
fair strongly depends on price knowledge from prior purchases and competitors’
prices but also on consumers’ assessment of firms’ costs and profits (Bolton et al.
2003, Thaler 1985).
Thus, the reference price may be the “cornerstone of marketing strategies” (Jedidi
and Zhang 2002). The knowledge of reservation prices could guide firms in imple-
menting pricing strategies such as penetration pricing, skimming or other pricing
strategies. In his seminal article, Simon (1955) already emphasized the impact of
reservation prices. Further, various effects such as framing and different biases
towards gains or losses were revealed (Kahneman and Tversky 1979).
Reservation prices seem to be a complex artifact. From the reservation price lit-
erature different frameworks on the formation of reservation prices exist. The
memory-based approach argues that last paid prices influence the current reser-
vation price (Kalyanaram and Little 1994). Consumers keep a history of past
prices in mind to compute their current reservation price. This model lays strong
cognitive requirements on consumers because they have to remember a history of
prices. For each brand a separate price history might be necessary (Briesch et al.
1997).
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The second framework relies only on current prices of alternative brands. This
model puts less weight on the cognitive abilities of the consumers. Consumers
just compare current prices of alternatives and form their individual reservation
price out of that values (Hardie et al. 1993, Rajendran and Tellis 1994).
Others argue that reservation prices are also dependent on contextual factors. How
often a brand is on sale, store characteristics and price trends may alter reserva-
tion price formation (e.g., Winer 1986). Reservation prices cause various effects.
Reservation prices affect consumers’ brand choice decision. Winer (1986) found
a “sticker shock” effect which explains differences in reservation prices and pur-
chase prices. He argues that a positive price difference increases consumers’ util-
ity. On the other hand the prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) states
an asymmetric reference price effect, i.e. if the observed price is higher than the
reference price consumers perceive this negative price difference as loss. The loss
is perceived higher than a comparable gain due to asymmetric perception.
Krishnamurthi et al. (1992) found significant relations between purchase quanti-
ties and consumers’ reservation price. The effect is mediated by loyalty. Loyal
consumers tend to be more sensitive to gains than to losses when shopping for
their favorite brand. The time of a certain purchase has also been found to be
affected by reference prices. On every purchase, consumers undertake some
discounting to evaluate the attractiveness of an immediate purchase versus a
postponed purchase (Bell and Bucklin 1999). Mazumdar et al. (2005) give an
overview on effects exerted on brand choice, quantity and timing decisions caused
by reservation prices.
Finally, Greenleaf (1995) shows that reference price effects could indeed increase
profits. Thus, firms may be better off knowing the reference prices of their con-
sumers.
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Chapter 4
Research Scope
The e-commerce business model by Hansen (1998) and its extensions (Hansen
et al. 2004) should serve to integrate the current research into a firm’s decision
scope.
Conditions of the E-Commerce Business Model
IT/TC
Infrastructure Industry
Products and
Services Enterprise
Vision (Business Idea), Goals and Principles
Market Definition, Legal Form, Alliances and Partnerships
Product Management and its IT Support
Pricing and its IT Support
Communication and its IT Support
Distribution and its IT Support
Resources and Budget (Turnover, Costs, Earnings) S
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Figure 4.1: Elements of the E-Commerce Business Model (Hansen 1998)
Figure 4.1 displays the e-commerce business model. As one can see, this model
distinguishes strategic decisions, which could be influenced by the firm itself, and
conditions to reduce complexity. Conditions remain fixed and can not be altered
in the medium term.
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The first condition is related to the consumer-centric infrastructure of information
and telecommunication technology. This condition refers, among other parame-
ters, to the penetration of Internet access points, the access fees and Internet usage
behavior. In short, this condition determines which prospective consumers could
be addressed by an online shop. The industry condition describes the competi-
tive environment as well as consumer behavior. One might see this condition as
the market environment. On the one hand it refers to competitors, market devel-
opment and legal issues, and on the other hand to consumers’ buying patterns,
their socio-demographic attributes and psychographic attitudes. The third condi-
tion is related to the nature of the product, i.e. physical attributes of the product.
But this condition is also related to consumers’ acceptance of buying such prod-
ucts online, e.g. consumers’ willingness to order CDs (i.e. a standardized prod-
uct) online is much higher than their willingness to purchase vegetables online,
where sensory attributes dominate the purchase decision. The last condition is
the firm itself. This condition is a result of financial power, market share, current
IT-infrastructure, managerial skills etc.
Strategic decisions pertain managerial decisions which could be altered in the
short term. The also contain the marketing-relevant decisions of pricing, product,
promotion and distribution (Kotler 2006).
4.1 Discussion of Conditions
The current work addresses the problem of setting prices in a multichannel en-
vironment. A firm which operates a traditional store as well as an online shop
should carefully manage both channels. A problem arises of consumers switching
from one distribution channel to another. Thus, the first condition copes not only
with consumers in online channels but also with consumers of the same products
via the traditional channel. The typical firm this work examines maintains both
distribution channels and is exposed to both kinds of consumers. Therefore, a
reasonable strategy to manage both channels is inevitable for the firm.
The industry related condition is the most relevant part for the current work. As
already noted in earlier articles, socio-demographic factors are an important deter-
minant of consumers’ buying behaviors (e.g., Yang et al. 2005, Madlberger 2006,
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Sheth 1977, Fox et al. 2004, Keaveney and Parthasarathy 2001, Li et al. 2007).
Chapter 2.7 discusses those issues in broad. On the other hand relying on socio-
demographic data alone often results in ambiguous outcomes (e.g., Hitt and Frei
2002). In the current work consumers are aggregated by distributions of reser-
vation prices and switching probabilities. The reservation prices are depicted by
two probability functions, one for each channel. Depending on the price in an
individual channel, a certain fraction of consumers may undertake a purchase in
that channel. The switching probabilities are also defined by probability func-
tions which determine at which price differences a consumer may migrate to any
cheaper alternative channel. So these probabilities describe the whole consumer
market. Prices and price differences will alter the outcomes.
The nature of the products sold will differ. From the results of the survey, differ-
ent behavioral patterns of consumers regarding specific products were extracted.
Thus, this condition is closely related to the industry-related condition. Books,
clothes and digital cameras were taken as exemplary products for doing business
in the Internet. As we will see, the nature of products changes the way they are
bought. Additionally, different pecuniary advantages are taken into account to lay
weight on one of both channels. Therefore, consumers will flock to the channel
which looks advantageous to them for purchasing a certain product. An example
may serve to make things clear. Assume a firm offers equal prices in both chan-
nels. Though, from the nature of the product the online channel appears, because
of its features like convenience or home delivery, cheaper. Thus, although both
prices are equal the online channel attracts consumers from the offline channel
because of the “cheaper feeling”. This pecuniary advantage could also be capital-
ized on in another way. Since the online channel contains a pecuniary advantage
of a certain amount, a firm could mark up that amount at the online price and only
at this price consumers become indifferent between both channels. So, consumers
become indifferent between both sales channels although prices are different.
Characteristics of the firm itself are not of particular interest for this work. It is as-
sumed that the firm is equipped with the necessary infrastructure to maintain both
sales channels. These factors will be kept constant throughout the simulations.
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4.2 Discussion of Strategic Decisions
In this dimension we foremost consider the pricing policy of a firm. But within
a given budget constraint, specific other marketing policies, in particular actions
out of promotion and distribution policy, which are under a retailer’s control, are
considered for any given product category. The product dimension is given exoge-
nously. Thus, in the strategic dimension the firm of interest holds the chances to
alter prices in both channels, and to spend a certain amount of money on the pro-
motion and distribution dimension of each channel to foster sales. One note here
should soften the mid term steadiness of the conditions. The firm could influence
the shape of the switching probabilities at a certain amount through its market-
ing activities. Thus, if a firm conducts perfect marketing activities it could draw
advantages from such behavior by generating higher profits. Thus, conditions of
the industry are not that fixed. All other probabilities (e.g. reservation prices), pe-
cuniary advantages of a certain channel and weights of marketing actions remain
stable.
This work is affected by the following conditions:
Infrastructure of information and telecommunication technology In the sim-
ulation the number of online consumers relative to the number of offline
consumers will be changed frequently, thus that condition impacts this
work.
Industry This condition is the most important one. On the one hand the compet-
itive landscape is changing through the work, i.e. the performance of the
competitor will be modified. And on the other hand consumers’ purchase
behavior is also changed by the influence of firm’s marketing actions. In this
work this condition is much related to the initial state or the given market
environment.
Nature of products and services Natures of products remain stable within a cer-
tain product. Since three products will be analyzed cross comparison could
give deeper insights in the effects caused by different product classes.
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Enterprise The internal firm structure also remains stable. This work does not
touch the financial strength or a firm’s IT infrastructure.
4.3 Market Model
The whole model looks like Figure 4.2. The firm sets prices for a certain product.
Firm Consumers
Pricing Purchase
Decisions
Reservation
Prices
Other
Marketing
Channel
Decisions
Switching
Probabilities
Purchase
Figure 4.2: Market Model
In addition it performs a certain marketing program restricted by a given budget
constraint. The marketing program could be in the field of promotion policy and
distribution policy. Each policy affects consumers’ purchase decisions in a differ-
ent manner. This impact of a firm is highlighted by the dashed arrows in Figure
4.2. Note that the price determines the purchase of a certain product. The chan-
nel decision afterwards is influenced by the marketing activities. Consumers are
described by their reservation prices and switching intentions. The reservation
price is given and could not be influenced by the firm. The switching proba-
bility on the contrary could be affected by appropriate marketing actions. From
the concurrence of a firm’s pricing and consumers’ reservation prices individual
purchasing decisions emerge. A consumer having a reservation price above the
current price will undertake the purchase, but those consumers exposing reser-
vation prices below the current price will forgo the purchase. Since two sales
channels are assumed in this work each consumer obtains two independent reser-
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vation prices, one for each channel. The price set by the firm determines if the
consumers is actually interested in purchasing the product. The only issue which
is not yet answered concerns the choice of an appropriate sales channel. If the
consumer intends to undertake the purchase firms could influence the channel de-
cision through their marketing activities. Finally, the purchase decisions is made
and the consumer buy in the cheapest channel.
The scope of actions for firms is therefore limited to commanding prices and main-
tain marketing programs. The pricing itself only affects the reservation prices and
ascertains the number of interested consumers. By commanding different prices
in each channel consumers may migrate from on channel to the other. This mi-
gration could be hampered or fostered by appropriate marketing activities.
The final outcome, say profit, could then be evaluated and if necessary the firm
may alter its pricing and marketing strategies. The new setting applies for the next
cohort of consumers which start the purchasing process anew.
This process of finding appropriate prices is long and could be painful if false
decisions occur. Therefore, the model should quicken the process of finding suit-
able prices by a simulation. The simulation should give the firm insights into its
pricing decisions in an artificial environment. Thus, different marketing strategies
could be applied without affecting real time business.
This market model should help marketers to test pricing strategies in a virtual en-
vironment without harming their market. Marketers should be able to alter prices
and marketing strategies and receive some information on their impact on the
market. The accuracy of the predictions is closely dependent on a reliable ini-
tialization of all relevant parameters. An exemplary initialization will be given in
Chapter 8 and for each individual product.
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Chapter 5
Conceptual Consumer Model
The distribution of reservation prices may ask for more profound grounding.
Therefore, we suggest a conceptual model to describe the consumer market. This
model is an assembly of various results from the current literature. It should high-
light how different articles may fit together to draw one big picture. The model
(see Figure 5.1) consists of six parts, namely demographics, product, shopping
goal, latent demand, reservation prices and of course the firm itself. All parts will
be explained in the following paragraphs. The basic idea is that demographics and
the nature of the product determine a certain shopping goal associated with that
purchase process. The shopping goal originates latent demands at the consumers.
These demands include for example security, assessment and immediate usage.
From this demand the reservation price of a consumer should be developed. Note
Demographics Product
Shopping Goal
Latent Demand Firm
Reservation Price
Figure 5.1: Conceptual Consumer Model
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that the firm could influence the latent demand since it could invest for example
in extending online security or faster delivery. Thus, the dashed arrows should in-
dicate options of influence of a firm. A firm could alter the product but this option
is beyond the scope of the current work.
This conceptual model (see Figure 5.1) is related to the stimulus-organism-
response paradigm (S-O-R) (Hull 1951). Belk (1975) uses a modified S-O-R
model (see Figure 2.2) to emphasize the impact of situational surroundings on
behavior. The concept of the S-O-R paradigm applied to the proposed conceptual
model could be regarded as an enhancement of the former.
In the remainder of this chapter we will give a detailed overview of relevant liter-
ature concerning each node of the conceptual model.
5.1 Demographics
It is a long known issue that demographics influence consumer behavior (e.g.,
Yang and Lester 2005, Li et al. 2007). A set of studies reveal different effects
of demographic characteristics on the purchasing attitude. By the use of a con-
ceptual model, Schoenbachler and Gordon (2002) single out demographic differ-
ences as a source for channel choice. They also note that lifestyle factors, the
need for convenience or entertainment conjoined with demographic measures like
age, gender, income, occupation, household size and education should be predic-
tors of online shopping. A demographic difference was also found by Keaveney
and Parthasarathy (2001) concerning online service switching. They argued that
higher income and higher education is related to a consumer’s propensity to con-
tinue a service. Analyzing shopping patterns across retail format, Fox et al. (2004)
found that for example family size and working women in a household alter pur-
chasing behavior. In an explicit survey Yang and Lester (2005) found clear differ-
ences in the online behavior of men and women. Women seem to be influenced
by their attitude towards money and their computer anxiety. An amplifier for on-
line purchases for both sexes was found to be hours spent online. Madlberger
(2006) highlights an interesting spending difference between males and females
regarding online shopping. Female consumers would spend more online the more
favorable their attitude towards the online shop would be.
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Gupta et al. (2004) reveal in their study on books, airline tickets, wine and stereo
systems that consumers differ in their channel preferences. Burke et al. (1992)
and Liang and Huang (1998) also describe different behavior of offline and online
consumers. These findings are confirmed by other studies (e.g., Degeratu et al.
2000, Danaher et al. 2003). Others state that in the light of those results, the
online channel helps to target different consumers with different services and thus
exploit systematic differences to offline consumers (e.g., Steinfield et al. 2002,
Shankar et al. 2003). Some firms even create a new brand for their online channel
(e.g., Specht 2001), e.g. “Cre´ateur de Beaute´” as online brand of L’ Ore´al (see
Hansen and Neumann 2005, p. 662). Different brands pay if the firm targets
different consumers (e.g., Randall et al. 1998, Raju et al. 1995). Connolly (2004)
even mentioned that each sales channel needs its specific brand.
From the literature one should conclude that demographics will tell something
about purchase behavior. It might be the primary source of differences between
online and offline consumers.
5.2 Product
Without question the product is a major determinant of the reservation prices. A
refrigerator will, e.g. typically originate higher reservation prices than a CD. To
master as many products as possible it is necessary to classify them. A well known
differentiation comes from Kotler (2006, p. 410-412), who categorizes products
in classes like convenience goods, which are bought frequently, immediately and
with a minimum of effort, shopping goods, where consumers compare products
on the basis of price, quality, style and utility, specialty goods, which are unique
brands, and unsought goods which consumers are not aware of buying and do not
know exactly.
But it is easy to guess that consumers’ inherent classes may differ from these sug-
gestions, especially when the shopping process comes into play. When talking
about consumers’ purchasing behavior, researchers developed an alternative dis-
tinction to take care of differences of diverse sales channels. For example, one
can not push high prices if consumers do not care about brands and undertake
price comparisons before purchasing the product, especially if they buy online.
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Thus, marketers long for a classification which may help them to incorporate such
differences when deciding about prices.
In his ground-breaking paper Stigler (1961) was the first who mentioned that
search may decrease costs and Nelson (1970) utilized that result and categorized
products into experience and search goods. This basic distinction highlights di-
verse consumer behavior when purchasing products through different sales chan-
nels. The online channel seems perfectly practical for searching. Thus, mar-
keters have to be more sensitive to how consumers class products regarding their
purchase behavior. Therefore, products have been categorized into commod-
ity, “quasi”-commodity and look and feel products (e.g., de Figueiredo 2000).
Empirical studies take other discrimination parameters like search, experience-
1, experience-2 and credence (e.g., Girard et al. 2003), or complex, intelligent,
simple and light (e.g., Choi et al. 2006).
All these classifications show the influence of the product category on consumers’
purchasing process. Search goods are assumed to be described to all extent by
technical notes and measures. Such an exhaustive textual description makes these
items easy to compare and also easy to sell through the Internet, since consumers
do not need to touch, feel or smell the product to become fully informed about the
product attributes. This is the advantage of digital characteristics. The opposite
would be experience goods, which could hardly be described by textual notes
alone. Consumers sense risks if they were not allowed to feel, touch or smell such
products. Thus, usually this kind of product turn out to be not very suitable for
online selling since consumers tend to purchase through the offline channel for
security reasons.
Chun and Kim (2005) give a good summary of these issues. They argue that some
products exhibiting high consumer costs, e.g. perfumes and clothes, tend to dis-
play higher prices in the offline store because consumers are able to assess the
quality a priori offline. Thus, consumers feel exposed to uncertainty from tangi-
bility, smelling and seeing when purchasing online and want to be compensated
for risk taking in pecuniary terms. For the same reason products with lower con-
sumer costs tend to display higher prices in the online channel. These products do
not need to be examined with the same effort as clothes and perfumes.
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Therefore, product characteristics are indeed an important source of differences
in the distribution of the reservation prices. But product characteristics show also
to exhibit relevant impact on pricing strategies of different sales channels.
5.3 Shopping Goal
Mentioning shopping goals long ago entered marketing science. Although not
referred to directly, shopping goals are very similar to task definitions which have
been long known. Some early work on situational factors influencing consumer
choice has been done by Ward and Robertson (1973) and Engel et al. (1969).
In a comparison of department stores and grocery stores Hansen and Deutscher
(1977) noted differences regarding shopping preferences. If consumers enjoy
shopping they may value high value for money, courteous sales personnel and
advertising. On the opposite, if consumers dislike shopping they appreciate a fast
check out, proximity and after-sales service. These differences may explain store
choice.
A similar study by Mattson (1982) analyzed store choice on various occasions.
His results show department stores to be more likely to be visited in gift shopping
situations. Immediate sales personnel attention and a broad product selection de-
termine the store choice at time-pressure situations.
Van Kenhove et al. (1999) undertook a similar study and revealed varieties of the
store choice on do-it-yourself products depending on the surrounding situation.
A first work including the online channel into the store choice was Gehrt and
Yan (2004). They reviewed situational factors influencing the choice of the retail
format. A significant relation between gift shopping and purchasing experience
goods at traditional stores was revealed.
Different tasks or shopping goals emerge in varied shopping behavior. Consumers
form their task definitions or shopping goals to resolve the shopping process in a
specific situation (e.g., Balasubramanian et al. 2005, Gehrt and Yan 2004, van
Kenhove et al. 1999, Marshall 1993).
As Balasubramanian et al. (2005) point out, shopping goals have a tremendous
effect on the channel choice. They suggest five distinctive factors which influence
consumers’ channel choices. These factors are economic goal, quest for self-
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affirmation, quest for symbolic meaning, quest for social interaction and reliance
on schemas. In the remainder of this section we will discuss these five factors or
goals.
First is the economic shopping goal. Consumers of this kind seek to minimize
costs. This consumer aspires to maximize net utility, i.e. utility derived from the
product less total cost of obtaining it. The first stage of the shopping process,
information retrieval, is typically done online since search costs are cheapest on-
line. The channel choice for the purchase itself afterwards depends on the product
category. This first goal follows a stream of arguments dealing with minimiz-
ing transaction costs (e.g., Balasubramanian 1998, Bakos 1997, Liang and Huang
1998). Interestingly, Chircu and Mahajan (2006) noted that important factors in-
fluencing transaction costs are channel characteristics, consumer characteristics,
product characteristics and shopping occasion.
Second, consumers strive for self-affirmation as the most important shopping goal
(e.g., Steele 1988, Steele et al. 1993). Consumers, like every person, strive for pos-
itive self-regard which can be achieved by drawing on successful actions (Correll
1992). Thus, consumers like to prove their special knowledge on various product
attributes. They want to feel, touch and see the products the buy. These consumers
may behave ambiguously. For example, for clothes and groceries they tend to use
offline stores to affirm their sensory knowledge, but for technical items like digi-
tal cameras or mp3 players the online shop may also be an acceptable alternative
since all necessary information should be provided online.
Third, consumers express symbolic meanings with the purchase. This is mostly
the case when buying presents or toys for children. Consumers purchasing such
product categories for this specific shopping goal are typically very involved in
the purchasing process, because the effort of the process itself also adds some
symbolic meaning. For a present for their children such consumers spend time
wandering across different stores and glancing at thousands of items to find the
best gift for their children. Since the time spent for shopping is an important
determinant expressing shopping effort, these consumers may prefer traditional
stores.
Fourth, consumers have a need for experience and social influence. After a hard
day working, these consumers like to reward themselves. They relax during the
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shopping trip and enjoy the experience. This kind of consumer obviously takes
the offline store. They long for this experience, and not to forget, the reward has
to be immediate. Another thing also important for this group is to chat with the
sales personal. This behavior is reflected in the need for socialization. Since the
online channel cannot provide this experience, these consumers also prefer the
traditional sales channel.
Fifth, consumers which do not think about their shopping behavior. On their shop-
ping trip they follow long acquired schemas or scripts. For their shopping trip they
use the least possible cognitive effort. They behave as they have always behaved.
These consumers change their behavior very reluctantly. Such a behavior may
express some kind of security seeking.
Shopping goals are determined by the product and by the consumer himself. The
variety of shopping goals seems to be a large source of the variance in the choice
of the sales channel. Without knowing consumers’ goals for different purchasing
occasions, managers may find little potential to influence buyers’ choice.
5.4 Latent Demand
This part deals with consumers balancing different “soft” aspects of the sales
channels against each other. This includes issues like security, usability, deliv-
ery time, need for personal interaction and need to feel, touch and smell. The
impact of these parameters is well documented (e.g., Li et al. 2007, Flavia´n et al.
2006a, Lim and Dubinsky 2004, Park and Kim 2006, Rotem-Mindali and Sa-
lomon 2007, Verhoef et al. 2007). Lim and Dubinsky (2004) explored relevant
attributes for physical retail stores and online stores. They found the attitude to-
ward online shopping positively related to a web site’s merchandise variety and
product information, as well as trust-building functionalities. An eye should be
kept on delivery time since consumers’ preference for immediate consumption is
well known by the negative time discount utility. This form of utility addresses
the trade-off consumers are confronted with on deciding about an immediate con-
sumption or the chance of a lower price (Keeney 1999, Read and Loewenstein
1995). Hitt and Frei (2002) observed differences in the behavior of online and
offline banking consumers and attributed these differences to opportunity costs
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of time and trust. Others noted that time pressure may alter shopping behavior,
i.e. under conditions of time shortage consumers tend to rely on traditional stores
rather than online shops (e.g., Gehrt and Yan 2004, van Kenhove et al. 1999).
Interactivity seems to be not of primary interest to online consumers (e.g., Lim and
Dubinsky 2004). On the other hand interactivity could potentially enhance satis-
faction, which in turn causes a positive influence on purchase behavior (e.g., Wang
and Head 2007). Novak et al. (2000) noted that flow, which denotes the cognitive
state sensed during online navigation, may be improved by enriched interactiv-
ity. Improved control increases convenience and results in higher satisfaction. A
related term, namely enjoyment during shopping, turns out to be capable of low-
ering the subjective value of price-comparison shopping (e.g., van Birgelen et al.
2006, Marmorstein, Howard et al. 1992). Usability also appears to be a big issue,
especially in online retailing (e.g., Flavia´n et al. 2006a, Clemons et al. 2002). Web
waiting times, for example, affect shopping behavior negatively (e.g., Novak et al.
2000). On the other hand usability, as usually described for online purchases, does
not play a role for purchases in traditional stores. However, Lumpkin et al. (1985)
mentioned the weight of the ease of finding items in traditional stores, which may
be treated as comparable parameters to online stores’ usability.
Another important factor may be trust (e.g., Wang and Head 2007). Flavia´n et al.
(2006b) showed the importance of trust for decisions in risky situations. Trust
could also be used to command price premiums (e.g., Ba and Pavlou 2002). Sur-
prisingly Mitchell and Harris (2005) show that trust is also an important aspect
determining purchasing behavior in traditional stores.
Information displayed may also influence purchase decisions. The more infor-
mation is displayed, the more beneficial it will be for firms because consumers’
purchase decisions will be altered positively (e.g., Shankar et al. 2003, Park and
Kim 2006). For traditional stores this item may be also related to service qual-
ity, especially pre-purchase service from sales personnel. The positive impact of
these pre-purchase activities is well known (e.g., van Kenhove et al. 1999, Lump-
kin et al. 1985).
The Internet is supposed to exhibit advantages in being more convenient than tra-
ditional stores (e.g., Litan and Rivlin 2001). Although holding different character-
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istics, convenience plays an important role in traditional stores as well as online
stores (e.g., Lim and Dubinsky 2004, Lumpkin et al. 1985).
The breadth of product offerings is also known for being beneficial (e.g., Chen
and Hitt 2002). Hansen and Deutscher (1977) on groceries, and van Kenhove
et al. (1999) on do-it-yourself products mentioned different preferences in offline
shopping depending on the shopping task. For getting ideas or doing difficult jobs
a huge assortment is crucial, for urgent purchases just availability is relevant.
Nonetheless some consumers prefer traditional stores to see, feel and touch the
products (e.g., Pan et al. 2002b, Alba et al. 1997). Consumers who strongly rely
on such impressions will value them more and also demand them. If these effects
are not apparent, they are likely to expect pecuniary compensations.
Security is a crucial parameter in purchasing online (e.g., Wang and Head 2007,
Lim and Dubinsky 2004). But Park and Kim (2006) noted that security perception
may be less important than other attributes, foremost information about quality.
In traditional stores security may be of less relevance. By providing security en-
hancements a firms might draw consumers from insecure web appearances.
These items may be demanded with different strengths for each individual pur-
chase occasion and for each separate sales channel. The shopping goal determines
these attributes but a firm could influence these attributes by investing for example
in security, education of its sales personnel or usability.
5.5 Formation of Reservation Prices
The reference price is a subjective value against which the purchase price will be
judged (e.g., Simon 1955, Monroe 1973). It is a well known part of the marketing
literature which influences consumers’ choice and has its origins in different fields
of psychology. One rationale for reference prices is found in Helson’s Adaption-
Level Theory (e.g., Helson 1964, 1973). This theory assumes that each stimulus is
evaluated depending on specific internal rules. These rules represent joint effects
of current and past stimulations. Thus, each consumer’s valuation is based relative
to his individual, inherent adaption level.
Another rationale for the concept of reservation prices stems from the
Assimilation-Contrast Theory (Sherif et al. 1958). These authors presume a psy-
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chological price range which each individual consumer obtains. A price within
that range will be perceived as acceptable. If the price lies outside the range it just
will be noticed.
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) utilize these models in their Prospect Theory.
Their theory suggests, based on a certain reservation price belonging to a spe-
cific consumer, different value functions for gains and losses. The shape of the
value functions is assumed to be concave for gains and convex for losses. This
asymmetry determines a typical behavior. Consumers regard losses more than
gains. Putler (1992) found that consumers respond to a price increase above their
reference price 2.5 times more strongly than to a corresponding price decrease.
Further empirical evidence for reservation prices and their effect on consumer
choice comes from Kalyanaram, Gurumurthy and Winer (1995). They revealed
the fact that permanent price promotions reduce reference prices. Two problems
arise. First, subsequent promotions will no longer be regarded as such a bargain
as earlier ones, and secondly, a price rise to “normal” prices will be accounted as
a price increase. For a more complete overview on reference price research refer
to the current literature (e.g., Mazumdar et al. 2005).
Also managers consider the lore of reservation prices as an inevitable ingredient in
pricing (Anderson et al. 1993). Jedidi and Zhang (2002) discussed the importance
of reference prices for deciding about different pricing strategies. The value-added
by knowing about consumers’ reservation prices may be undoubtedly enormous.
The last part of the conceptual model could be seen as the integrative part of the
whole model. Here all issues come together and result in an appropriate reference
price unique for each individual. The shopping goal determines the latent demand
for each channel. Thereafter, the latent demand defines markups or discounts
depending on how a firm fits a consumer’s latent demand. This finally adds to the
basic reservation price and results in an individual reservation price for each sales
channel.
5.6 The Product-Shopping Goal Link
Form the literature about task definitions we know that situations influence pur-
chase decisions. In an early study the impact of other persons shopping in the
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store and interpersonal interactions with sales personnel during the shopping trip
may alter shopping behaviors (e.g., Bell 1967, Albaum 1967). Belk (1975) iden-
tified five different situational characteristics which trigger distinctive shopping
behaviors. Investigations on task definitions, i.e. present purchases, emergency
purchases, and similar situations revealed different shopping habits (e.g., van Ken-
hove et al. 1999, Gehrt et al. 1991, Mattson 1982, Hansen and Deutscher 1977).
Even Internet usage plays a role for generating task definitions (Gehrt and Yan
2004). Online shoppers are assumed to be more adventurous, willing to try a
retailer with an unfamiliar face and less sensitive to retailer atmosphere. Balasub-
ramanian et al. (2005) argued that goals and relevance of specific channel char-
acteristics may differ according to product or service category and consumers’
experience, knowledge and preferences of information presentation. The causal
link seems to be clear. Depending on the situational surrounding shopping habits
of consumers change.
The question arises if some products are most of the time bought under the same
situational surrounding, or to frame it in better words, if the product class defines
the purchase behavior for the majority of purchase decisions. Take for example
the purchase of a book. Consumers usually buy books in a certain manner. This
purchase behavior may be stable, irrespective of the surrounding environment. On
the other hand if someone is ill and needs some medicaments urgently, this situ-
ation is clearly an emergency case. Time is a crucial factor in such a situation.
This poor human will not even think of purchasing the necessary medicine online.
Compare that with the purchase of a book. If a consumer always facilitates the In-
ternet to purchase books, there may be very rare occasions when a book is needed
that urgently as to make him run to the next traditional book store. We assume
that consumers tend to rely on known habits for purchasing different products,
and changes may happen rather seldom.
In the current work the typical purchase of a product is given by a reservation price
for each sales channel. This reservation price should therefore include the pecu-
niary advantage of a sales channel and further all shopping influences of a typical
purchase. Thus, we are confident that the reservation prices are good enough to
describe the shopping behavior of consumers. From the monetary difference be-
tween the channels switching probabilities could be estimated. Together with the
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reservation prices we assume to describe the whole consumer market satisfacto-
rily.
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Chapter 6
Basic Model
In this chapter the basic model will be derived. Step by step all components of
the theoretical model will be explained and assembled. From the basic model first
results will be deduced. Calculations regarding cannibalization effects, expected
values and price elasticities will be presented to give an impression of the working
of the model. This model will serve as the foundation for the simulations.
This model is an extension of a simulation model in a monopolistic environment
(Gruber 2006). It provides the basis for the current model. The basic model con-
sists of a monopolist undertaking business in a multichannel environment. The
monopolist maintains two sales channels, an offline and an online channel. Con-
sumers are described by a reservation price for each channel and allowed to mi-
grate from the offline channel towards the online channel. The switching probabil-
ity and the number of consumers available in each channel is given exogenously.
The model identified optimal pricing strategies given certain exogenous param-
eters. The extensions of the current model are manifold. Consumers should be
allowed to switch from the online channel of a firm to the offline channel of the
same firm and vice versa. Further, consumers should be able to switch from one
firm to the other one. Another extension should be the firms’ option to spend
money on marketing activities. These investments may alter consumers’ attitude
towards a firm. Thus, firms could obtain competitive advantages by conducting
appropriate marketing activities.
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We will focus on a duopolistic market environment, i.e. two vertically integrated
firms with a direct distribution channel as well as a traditional store each. The
firms distribute their product through both channels. Both firms offer the same
product, thus product differences are not relevant for the channel choice of con-
sumers.
For each firm we assume two different autonomous sales channels with a fixed
independent maximum number of reachable consumers in each channel for both
firms.
The rationale for such a distinction stems from the literature. Findings confirm
that consumers behavior differs whether they purchase offline or online. Thus,
consumers could be separated by their channel preferences (Burke et al. 1992,
Liang and Huang 1998, Degeratu et al. 2000, Danaher et al. 2003). Further, ex-
istent literature argues that different consumers could be attracted by the online
channel. These consumers demand diverse services and therefore firms could ex-
ploit these systematic differences versus offline consumers (e.g., Steinfield et al.
2002, Shankar et al. 2003). Another argument for describing the sales channels
independently is because the prices in each channel could be set arbitrarily, espe-
cially if firms create new brands for their online appearance (e.g., Specht 2001,
Connolly 2004), e.g. Cre´ateur de Beaute´ as online brand of L’ Ore´al (see Hansen
and Neumann 2005, p. 662). Hence a firm could set its prices in each sales chan-
nel independently.
To make the problem statistically comprehensible we limit the number of reach-
able consumers in each channel. Further, with a price of zero the firm will not at-
tract all outstanding demand of the whole economy (e.g., Brynjolfsson and Smith
2000, Bakos 2001, Smith and Brynjolfsson 2001), i.e. some consumers stick to
their channel choice even if the price for the same product in the other channel
is zero. As reality suggests, we reject the assumption of fully rational consumers
(e.g., Kahneman and Tversky 1979, Simon 1955). Indeed consumers exhibit some
kind of inertia or state dependence, which makes them stick to their current choice
(e.g., Seetharaman et al. 1999, Guadagni and Little 1983, Klemperer 1995). Fi-
nally we assume that every individual consumer just purchases one unit of the
product.
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Each firm quotes prices for the product in its sales channels. Let pB and pO be the
price in the offline channel and the online channel, respectively. Assume that all
prices in the whole economy are normalized and in between zero and one, where
one is the highest price for the product across both sales channels and zero is a
price of zero, that is to say pB, pO ∈ {0,1}. Since the model describes a duopoly,
two firms act in the market. Thus, we denote the prices of firm 1 by pB1 and pO1 ,
and the prices quoted by firm 2 by pB2 and pO2 .
6.1 Reservation Prices
Assume that each consumer holds his own reservation price, which determines
whether he buys or not. If the current price quoted in a specific sales channel is
below or at least as high as the consumer’s reservation price, the consumer will
undertake the purchase. Otherwise, if the quoted price in that channel is above the
consumer’s reservation price, he will forgo the purchase. Assume that consumers
in each channel are autonomous and therefore hold an independent reservation
price. Thus, each firm has to deal with two different distributions of reservation
prices. One distribution represents the behavior of potential offline consumers,
the other one describes potential online consumers. Having these distributions
one could observe the potential of a certain market related to various prices. If a
firm is aware of its consumers’ reservation prices it could utilize this information
by setting prices optimal to maximize profits or sales. Since the model depicts a
duopoly, both reservation prices affect both firms since each firm acts on the same
consumer base. The market of offline and online consumers is shared among each
firm’s offline and online sales channel, respectively.
The probability of a consumer to have a reservation price above a quoted price
p.1, i.e. the probability of a consumer to undertake a purchase through a certain
1The dot in e.g. p. is a placeholder for either B to determine the price as offline price, or O
which assigns the price as online price. This naming convention is valid from now on if every
variable in the formula has the same subscript.
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sales channel at a particular price p., letting f. denote the according probability
density function, is
1−
p.∫
0
f.(x)dx (6.1)
In Equation 6.1 f. represents the probability density function of consumers’ reser-
vations price for a particular sales channel.
The shape of the distribution should describe consumers. For example one could
expect the density function of the reservation prices to be more skewed to the left,
i.e. to lower prices, in the online channel, since consumers expect lower prices in
that specific channel (e.g., Ansari et al. 2005, Lee and Gosain 2002).
Let the number of maximum available consumers obtainable through the offline
channel be b̂B and those obtainable via the online channel be b̂O. Hence the num-
ber b. of offline or online consumers who definitely intend to buy at a certain price
p. through a particular channel should be defined by
b. = b̂.
1− p.∫
0
f.(x)dx
 (6.2)
As already mentioned, f. in Equation 6.2 represents the probability density func-
tion of consumers’ reservation prices for any particular sales channel. To make
further equations more readable we will utilize the corresponding cumulative
probability function R(p.) from now on, i.e. Equation 6.3 becomes the follow-
ing
b. = b̂. (1−R.(p.)) (6.3)
From Equation 6.3 we infer that bB could be interpreted as the basic demand
function for the offline channel, and bO as the demand function for the online
channel. In the remainder of the work we will use the basic demand function
synonymously with distribution of the reservation prices. Above all, it seems
natural that for any firm there arises an incentive to open up a new online channel
to cover additional consumers, which may increase the firm’s total profit.
Since there are two firms competing in the market environment the basic demand
function should be different if the prices of both firms differ. If, say, firm 1 offers a
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price higher than firm 2 in the offline channel the basic demand function for each
firm becomes the following
bB1 =
b̂B (1−RB(pB1))
2
(6.4)
bB2 =
b̂B (1−RB(pB1))
2
+
+
(
b̂B (1−RB(pB2))− b̂B (1−RB(pB1))
)
(6.5)
Equation 6.4 gives the number of consumers with a reservation price above
firm 1’s price pB1 . Those consumers are shared between both firms equally, i.e.
each firm reaches half of those consumers exhibiting a reservation price above
pB1 . Firm 2, the one with the lower price pB2 obtains also the same number of con-
sumers as firm 1 determined by the price pB1 (the number of shared consumers).
Additionally firm 2 earns extra consumers by its lower price (see Equation 6.5).
This extra rent is composed of consumers having reservation prices below pB1 in-
deed, but above pB2 , i.e. these consumers reject firm 1’s price since it appears too
high, but firm 2’s price is lower than their reservation price and therefore accept-
able.
From Figure 6.1 one could see that firm 1, which quotes the higher price, could
obtain only consumers holding reservation prices above pB1 . The number of con-
sumers is represented by the shaded area indicated by bBSHARED . The problem
is that firm 2 which quotes a lower price pB2 also attracts consumers from this
area. That is the reason for naming that area bBSHARED , because this number of
consumers is shared between both firms equally.
Firm 2 could earn some extra consumers due to its lower price. The additional
consumer base which is not shared with the competitor is labeled by bBSINGLE . This
area specifies all consumers attracted only by firm 2’s price, i.e. those consumers
exhibiting lower reservation prices than pB1 but higher reservation prices than pB2 .
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Figure 6.1: Probability Density Function of Offline Reservation Prices
Thus, the basic consumer base for a certain firm, denoting the competitor’s price
by pBC and pOC , respectively, will be
bB =

b̂B (1−RB(pB)) ∀pB > pBC
b̂B (1−RB(pBC))+
+
[
b̂B (1−RB(pB))− b̂B (1−RB(pBC))
]
∀pB < pBC
(6.6)
The basic consumer base resulting for the online channel is given by a similar
equation. Note the different probability function for the distribution of the online
reservation prices RO.
bO =

b̂O (1−RO(pO)) ∀pO > pOC
b̂O (1−RO(pOC))+
+
[
b̂O (1−RO(pO))− b̂O (1−RO(pOC))
]
∀pO < pOC
(6.7)
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Equations 6.6 and 6.7 both form the basic or initial consumer base for each sales
channel. On these bases intra- and inter-firm switching occurs, i.e. consumers
start to migrate towards alternative channels.
6.2 Intra-Firm Switching
If the online channel is available, consumers from the traditional entrenched chan-
nel may migrate to the online channel of the same firm and vice versa under the
premises of this model. We assume that only those offline consumers switch chan-
nel which hold a reservation price above the current offline price and thus are in
principle willing to buy offline. This assumption claims that the purchase inten-
tion happens first and afterwards the channel choice (van Baal and Hudetz 1999,
p. 73). The switching affinity is determined by the price difference between both
sales channels of one firm and the shape of the switching probability pertaining to
each channel.
The switching probability is given by a stochastic measure. At low price differ-
ences few consumers switch to the lower price channel. With increasing differ-
ences more and more consumers may be likely to migrate to the lower priced
channel. Thus, this probability should be more accurately referred to as not-
accepted price difference, because the probability measure gives the likelihood
of not accepting the current price difference and therefore switching the channel
(see Figure 6.2). The probability of a consumer staying in the current channel
and therefore accepting the price difference is given by the corresponding counter
probability.
We use a stochastic switching probability because it seems plausible that this pa-
rameter is not measurable easily. Further, we endogenize the switching proba-
bility. The switching probability is assumed to be different for each firm. Thus,
each individual firm has to manage two different intra-firm switching probabili-
ties, namely the switching probability from the offline channel to the online chan-
nel of the firm itself SIBO, and the switching probability from the online channel to
the offline channel SIOB. Here again SIBO and SIBO denote cumulative probability
functions.
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An example may clarify the situation. If we assume high search costs one could
expect offline reservation prices to show a positive kurtosis, i.e. being flatter and
the online reservation prices to be “relatively” more skewed to the left, i.e. con-
centrated around lower prices compared to the offline reservation prices. High
search costs prohibit searching for the lowest price. Hence consumers may tend
to purchase where they are. In the offline sales channel the probability function of
the reservation prices may converge towards an uniform distribution, or be exactly
uniform if a consumer has to take the first offer, or leave it (Stigler 1961). In such
a situation consumers could not learn from additional price quotes in the offline
channel since search costs prohibit searching. Since, by definition, obtaining in-
formation is cheaper in the online channel, it seems to be evident that the density
function of the reservation prices of online consumers should be more skewed to
the left compared to the density function of offline consumers (Bakos 1997, Lal
and Sarvary 1999). But the flat shape of that density functions implies low switch-
ing probabilities, which we would expect in case of high search costs. From that
it appears that any combination of the distribution of reservation prices in both
channels would implicitly result in the corresponding switching probability for a
given product in the current market.
As revealed in Figure 6.2 we assume that the amount of switching is determined
by the difference between the online and the offline price. The STAYER-denoted
fraction of consumers accepts the prevailing price difference and stays in the cur-
rent sales channel. The other consumers denoted by SWITCHER do not accept
that price difference and migrate from the online channel towards the firm’s of-
fline channel. Thus, this distribution represents markups consumers accept before
switching to the alternative channel. If pB ≥ pO, then there occurs no migration
from the online channel towards the offline channel. The probability function is
assumed to result in SIOB = 0 ∀pO − pB ≤ 0, i.e. if the online channel offers
a price lower than the offline channel no consumer should hold an intention to
migrate towards the offline channel. Otherwise, if the difference is one, all online
consumers switch to the offline channel.
As already mentioned, each firm distinguishes two different not-accepted price
difference probabilities. One cumulative probability measure describes the con-
sumers who are not satisfied with the current offline price and thus migrate to the
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Figure 6.2: Probability Density Function of the Switching Probability from the Online
Channel to the Offline Channel
online channel SIBO, and the other one depicts online consumers switching from
the online channel to the offline channel due to pricing reasons SIOB. Since every
firm manages its individual intra-firm switching probabilities, each has the cor-
responding firm specific subscript 1 or 2 attached. Thus, we get the fraction of
consumers not migrating from the offline channel to the online channel, i.e. those
who stay in the offline channel, for a certain firm by
b′B = bB (1−SIBO(pB− pO)) (6.8)
Sometimes a certain channel holds some inherent price advantage, i.e. although
both prices are equal, consumers switch to this specific channel. Consumers per-
ceive some advantages from that channel and therefore demand pecuniary com-
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pensation in the alternative channel. Thus, an offset parameter OFIBO ∈ [0,1] is
introduced to take account of that option. Equation 6.8 therefore becomes
b′B = bB (1−SIBO(pB− pO +OFIBO)) (6.9)
The offset OFIBO in Equation 6.9 assigns more power to the online channel. The
higher this offset becomes the higher the price advantage of the online channel.
If both channels display the same prices but the parameter OFIBO is positive, then
some consumers switch to the online channel nevertheless. Thus, this parameter
is used to relay some competitive advantage on a certain channel. The numbers
of consumers in the offline and in the online channel for a certain firm therefore
become
b′B = bB (1−SIBO(pB− pO +OFIBO))+
+ bO (SIOB(pO− pB +OFIOB)) (6.10)
b′O = bO (1−SIOB(pO− pB +OFIOB))+
+ bB (SIBO(pB− pO +OFIBO)) (6.11)
Equation 6.10 is composed of two parts. The first part represents the number of
consumers in the offline channel who are not switching to the online channel. The
second part shows the number of consumers of the online channel migrating to the
offline channel. Equation 6.11 depicts the same facts for the online channel. The
first line represents online consumers not moving away from the online channel
and the second line in the equation gives those consumers which drift towards the
online channel from the offline channel.
6.3 Inter-Firm Switching
The model also allows consumers to switch from a certain channel of firm 1 to
any channel of firm 2, e.g. a consumer is able to switch from the online channel
of firm 1 to the offline channel of firm 2 at a predefined probability. Thus, each
individual firm has to manage four additional switching issues.
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SFBB Switching probability from the offline channel of one firm to the offline
channel of the competitor. The offset determining the price advantage of
the competitor’s offline channel versus the current firm’s offline channel is
denoted by OFFBB.
SFBO Switching probability from the offline channel to the online channel of
the alternative firm. The channel advantage of the alternative firm’s online
channel is denoted by OFFBO
SFOO Switching probability from the online channel of the current firm to the
online channel of the alternative firm. The corresponding channel offset is
determined by OFFOO
SFOB Switching probability from the online channel to the competitor’s offline
channel. The appropriate offset for the competitor’s price advantage in the
offline channel is represented by OFFOB
The basic equation turns out to be similar to Equation 6.9. Thus, we get for
example the fraction of firm 1’s offline consumers not switching from the offline
channel of firm 1 to the online channel of firm 1, or to the offline channel of firm 2,
or to the online channel of firm 2, i.e. those consumers who finally stay in firm 1’s
offline channel, by
b′B1 = bB (1−SIBO(pB1 − pO1 +OFIBO))
· (1−SFBB(pB1 − pB2 +OFFBB))
· (1−SFBO(pB1 − pO2 +OFFBO)) (6.12)
Equation 6.12 gives, as mentioned, all consumers which are initially in the offline
channel of firm 1 due to price reasons, and do not migrate to any alternative chan-
nel. Thus, the stringent condition b′B1 ≤ bB is fulfilled because each probability
measure falls between zero and one. If no consumer changes to an alternative
channel, all probability measures become 1, thus b′B1 = bB.
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6.4 Assembling the Model
A picture says more than a thousand words. Therefore, Figure 6.3 gives an
overview of all applicable switching probabilities. To keep it simple only the
migration structure of the offline channel of firm 1 is shown. Figure 6.3 should
Firm 1
Offline Channel
pB1
SIBO1 SFBB1
SFBO1
SIOB1
pB1
Online Channel
Firm 2
Offline Channel
pB2
SFBB2
SFOB2
pO2
Online Channel
Figure 6.3: Switching Probabilities of the Online Channel Consumer Base of Firm 1
be read as follows. From the initial offline consumer base (see Equation 6.6) of
firm 1, which is given by the offline price pB1 , a fraction of SIBO1 consumers
change to the online channel of firm 1. Contrariwise SIOB1 percentages of the
initial online consumer base of firm 1 migrate towards its offline channel. The ex-
change of consumers between the offline channel of firm 1 and the offline channel
of firm 2 works in a similar way. A fractional number of SFBB1 consumers switch
from the offline channel of firm 1 to the alternative offline channel of firm 2. On
the other hand, a percentage of SFBB2 of firm 2’s basic offline consumers swap
back to firm 1’s offline channel and add to its consumer base. Finally, the drift
of consumers from the offline channel of firm 1 to the online channel of firm 2
and vice versa follows a related procedure. SFBO1 percentage of the basic offline
consumer base switch to the online channel of firm 2, whereas SFOB2 consumers
migrate from firm 2’s online channel to firm 1’s offline channel.
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To finish the complete equation for the final consumer base in each channel, the
not-switching probabilities will be defined for readability reasons. Since the mar-
ket environment is a duopoly, all equations are symmetric, i.e. an equation for
firm 1 is also valid for firm 2 except for exchanged subscripts. Therefore, only
equations for firm 1 are given because the corresponding equations for firm 2
could be easily deduced. The not-switching probabilities for firm 1 are
siof f→on1 = 1−SIBO1(pB1 − pO1 +OFIBO1) (6.13)
sion→of f1 = 1−SIOB1(pO1 − pB1 +OFIBO1) (6.14)
sfof f→of f1 = 1−SFBB1(pB1 − pB2 +OFFBB1) (6.15)
sfof f→on1 = 1−SFBO1(pB1 − pO2 +OFFBO1) (6.16)
sfon→on1 = 1−SFOO1(pO1 − pO2 +OFFOO1) (6.17)
sfon→of f1 = 1−SFOB1(pO1 − pB2 +OFFOB1) (6.18)
Now we start to calculate the consumers for each channel. First, we calculate
the initial consumer base for each channel corresponding to firm 1. For the initial
consumer base it must be distinguished between consumers stemming from a price
equal to the competitor’s price or flocking to the firm due to a lower price than the
competitor offers. Therefore, two distinct initial consumer bases are calculated
bAB1 =
b̂B
(1−RB(pB1))
2 ∀pB1 > pB2
b̂B
(1−RB(pB2))
2 ∀pB1 < pB2
(6.19)
bBB1 =
[
b̂B (1−RB(pB1))− b̂B (1−RB(pB2))
]
(6.20)
bBB1 = 0 ∀pB1 > pB2
bAO1 =
b̂O
(1−RO(pO1))
2 ∀pO1 > pO2
b̂O
(1−RO(pO2))
2 ∀pO1 < pO2
(6.21)
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bBO1 =
[
b̂O (1−RO(pO1))− b̂O (1−RO(pO2))
]
(6.22)
bBO1 = 0 ∀pO1 > pO2
Equations 6.19 to 6.22 display the composition of the basic consumer bases for
each channel. Parts bAB1 and b
A
O1 represent consumers which are shared with the
competitor. If firm 1 prices its opponent price it will receive the shared part only.
Otherwise firm 1 could get off with extra consumers due to its lower pricing.
The basic consumer base part of Equation 6.20 and 6.22 representing optional
extra consumers will become zero if firm 1 commands prices above its opponents’
prices. bBB1 and b
B
O1 display the extra consumers obtained by firm 1 setting prices
lower than firm 2. These consumer bases will not be shared with the opponent
since it prices higher. The final consumer base of the offline channel of firm 1 is
composed out of six parts.
bB1 = b
A
B1 siof f→on1 sfof f→of f1 sfof f→on1 +
+bBB1 siof f→on1 +
+bAO1
(
1− sion→of f1
)
sfon→on1 sfon→of f1 +
+bBO1
(
1− sion→of f1
)
+
+bAB2 siof f→on2
(
1− sfof f→of f2
)
sfof f→on2 +
+bAO2 sion→of f2 sfon→on2
(
1− sfon→of f2
) (6.23)
The six parts, each line representing one single part, of Equation 6.32 could be
described as follows
• All initial consumers of the offline channel of firm 1 who are not switching
to the online channel of firm 1, who are not migrating to the offline channel
of firm 2 and who are also not migrating to the online channel of firm 2.
• All initial extra consumer of the offline channel of firm 1 (those who are
obtained due to lower prices) who are not changing to the online channel of
firm 1.
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• All initial consumers of the online channel of firm 1 who are neither switch-
ing to the online nor to the offline channel of firm 2, but are indeed migrating
to the offline channel of firm 1.
• All initial extra consumers of the online channel of firm 1 who are drifting
to the offline channel of the same firm.
• All initial consumers of the offline channel of firm 2 who are neither switch-
ing to its own online channel nor switching to online channel of firm 1, but
indeed drifting to the offline channel of firm 1.
• All initial consumers of the online channel of firm 2 who are neither migrat-
ing to its own offline channel nor migrating to the online channel of firm 1,
but indeed switching to the offline channel of firm 1
The final consumer base of the online channel of firm 1 is composed in a very
similar way and becomes
bO1 = b
A
O1 sion→of f1 sfon→on1 sfon→of f1 +
+bBO1 sion→of f1 +
+bAB1
(
1− siof f→on1
)
sfof f→of f1 sfof f→on1 +
+bBB1
(
1− siof f→on1
)
+
+bAO2 sion→of f2 (1− sfon→on2) sfon→of f2 +
+bAB2 siof f→on2 sfof f→of f2
(
1− sfof f→on2
) (6.24)
Equations 6.32 and 6.24 finally give the number of consumers in each sales chan-
nel attracted by the pricing. Thus, sales υ and profit pi using costs c of firm 1
could be derived easily by
υ1 = bB1 pB1 +bO1 pO1 (6.25)
pi1 = bB1 (pB1 − cB1)+bO1 (pO1 − cO1) (6.26)
Equation 6.25 represents the total sales of firm 1 and Equation 6.26 the corre-
sponding profit. Without loss of generality, fixed costs are assumed to be zero.
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Only variable costs c lower the profit of the firm. Since variable costs may be dif-
ferent in each channel, each firm has to be aware of that issue (see Equation 6.26).
The firms’ objectives are pretty clear. Each firm wants to maximize its profit.
The scope of options is limited to conduct pricing strategies in the online and in
the offline channel since variable costs are given exogenously. The optimization
problem for the firm 1 therefore becomes
max
pB1 ,pO1
pi(pB1, pO1) (6.27)
s.t.
pB1, pO1 ≥ 0 (6.28)
pB1, pO1 ≤ 1 (6.29)
Equation 6.27 states the mathematical optimization problem with conditions lim-
iting the price levels. Thus, the firm maximizes its profit by setting prices between
zero and one.
From this view, each firm has to manage three different effects. At first, it has to
handle the consumer switching effect. This effect describes the switching from,
say, firm 2 to firm 1 due to price cuts. Firms have to consider how much to charge
for a certain product to draw consumers away from its competitor. The second
impact factor relates to the market expansion effect. Depending on consumers’
willingness to pay, firms should evaluate their pricing. The quest is to find a
price to attract the maximum of consumers at a price which is profit maximizing.
The main focus of this effect lies on acquiring consumers. The third important
factor is the cannibalization effect. Since each firm offers its product in both
sales channels, different prices may occur and consumers may migrate from the
one channel to the alternative channel within the same firm. Thus, firms have to
carefully consider in which channel to offer a product and how to price it. The
model also allows to quantify the cannibalization effect. On the one hand a firm
may suffer a loss from consumers switching from the entrenched offline channel to
the new online channel. On the other hand this loss may be outweighed by the gain
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from acquiring new consumers through the online channel. The cannibalization
loss for firm 1 CanL1 therefore becomes
CanL1 = (pB1 − pO1)
(
bAB1
(
1− siof f→on1
)
sfof f→of f1 sfof f→on1 +
+bBB1
(
1− siof f→on1
)) (6.30)
Equation 6.30 displays consumers switching from the offline channel to the online
channel of firm 1 and therefore receiving a different potentially lower price.
Since prices may be different in both channels, the loss could even become pos-
itive, i.e. a profit, if the price in the online is located above the offline price
pB1 < pO1 . The opposite, the cannibalization gain of firm 1 CanP1 becomes
CanP1 = pO1
(
bAO1 sion→of f1 sfon→on1 sfon→of f1 +
+bBO1 sion→of f1 +
+bAO2 sion→of f2 (1− sfon→on2) sfon→of f2 +
+bAB2 siof f→on2 sfof f→of f2
(
1− sfof f→on2
))
+
+ pB1
(
bAO1
(
1− sion→of f1
)
sfon→on1 sfon→of f1 +
+bBO1
(
1− sion→of f1
)) (6.31)
Equation 6.31 shows the total profit by introducing the online channel. The first
part (multiplied by pO1) gives the consumers attracted by the new channel. This
part is composed of online consumers attracted plus consumers migrating from
firm 2 towards firm 1’s online channel. The second part displays the number of
consumers switching from the online channel to the offline channel and therefore
purchasing at pO1 . The online channel enables these consumers for the offline
channel. The total cannibalization effect of firm 1 Can1 results in
Can1 = CanP1 −CanL1 (6.32)
The “pure” cannibalization, i.e. the inter-firm cannibalization is composed of the
following. The cannibalization loss is equal to Equation 6.30 since only con-
sumers switching from the offline channel to the online channel are taken into
account. The pure cannibalization profit CanO1 of the online channel is made up
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of those consumers migrating from the online channel to the offline channel of the
same firm.
CanO1 = (pO1 − pB1)
(
bAO1
(
1− sion→of f1
)
sfon→on1 sfon→of f1 +
+bBO1
(
1− sion→of f1
)) (6.33)
6.5 Expected Value
Since the whole economy is described by various distributions one could calculate
the expected value, i.e. the expected profit of a certain firm. First, define the
expected consumer bases for each firm on the basis of its prices, i.e. the expected
consumers which show a reservation price higher than the price offered by the
firm. We have to distinguish between two situations. The first is represented
by firm 1’s prices below firm 2’s prices. Thus, firm 1 could earn some extra
consumers. The opposite situation emerges if firm 1 offers prices above firm 2.
The resulting consumers will be shared equally between firm 1 and firm 2 (see
Equations 6.19, 6.20, 6.21 and 6.22). The expected basic consumer bases for
firm 1 become
E[bAB1] =

1−E[RB|pB1 ]
2 ∀pB1 > pB2
1−E[RB|pB2 ]
2 ∀pB1 ≤ pB2
E[bBB1] =
(1−E[RB|pB1])− (1−E[RB|pB2]) ∀pB1 < pB20 ∀pB1 ≥ pB2
E[bAO1] =

1−E[RO|pO1 ]
2 ∀pO1 > pO2
1−E[RO|pO2 ]
2 ∀pO1 ≤ pO2
E[bBO1] =
(1−E[RO|pO1])− (1−E[RO|pO2]) ∀pO1 < pO20 ∀pO1 ≥ pO2
(6.34)
6.5. EXPECTED VALUE 63
For better readability let each expected value E[S.] be conditioned on its sub-
scripts, i.e. E[SIBO1] ≡ E[SIBO1|pB1 − pO1] or E[SFBB2] ≡ E[SFBB2|pB2 − pB1].
Therefore, the expected consumer base for the offline channel of firm 1 becomes
E[bB1] = E[b
A
B1]
(
(1−E[SIBO1]) (1−E[SFBB1]) (1−E[SFBO1])
)
+
+E[bBB1] (1−E[SIBO1])+
+E[bAO1]
(
E[SIOB1] (1−E[SFOO1]) (1−E[SFOB1])
)
+
+E[bBO1]E[SIOB1]+
+E[bAB2]
(
(1−E[SIBO2]) E[SFBB2] (1−E[SFBO2 ])
)
+
+E[bAO2]
(
(1−E[SIOB2]) (1−E[SFOO2]) E[SFOB2 ]
) (6.35)
The corresponding expected consumer base for the online channel looks like
E[bO1] = E[b
A
O1]
(
(1−E[SIOB1]) (1−E[SFOO1 ]) (1−E[SFOB1 ])
)
+
+E[bBO1] (1−E[SIOB1])+
+E[bAB1]
(
E[SIBO1] (1−E[SFBB1]) (1−E[SFBO1])
)
+
+E[bBB1]E[SIBO1]+
+E[bAO2]
(
(1−E[SIOB2]) E[SFOO2] (1−E[SFOB2])
)
+
+E[bAB2]
(
(1−E[SIBO2]) (1−E[SFBB2]) E[SFBO2]
) (6.36)
Equations 6.35 and 6.36 resulting in the expected profit of firm 1 could be written
as
E[pi] = E[bB1] (pB1 − cB1)+E[bO1] (pO1 − cO1) (6.37)
We are also able to quantify the expected cannibalization loss of firm 1 E[CanL1]
by
E[CanL1] = (pB1 − pO1) ·
·
(
E[bAB]E[SIBO1] (1−E[SFBB1]) (1−E[SFBO1])+
+E[bBB1]E[SIBO1]
) (6.38)
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But this forms only one side of the coin. The loss of consumers switching from
the offline channel to the online channel may be outweighed by the profit from
introducing the alternative online channel. The expected cannibalization profit of
firm 1 E[CanP1] therefore becomes
E[CanP1] = pO1
(
E[bAO1] (1−E[SIOB1]) (1−E[SFOO1]) (1−E[SFOB1])+
+E[bBO1] (1−E[SIOB1])+
+E[bAO2] (1−E[SIOB2]) E[SFOO2 ] (1−E[SFOB2])+
+E[bAB2] (1−E[SIBO2]) (1−E[SFBB2]) E[SFBO2]
)
+
+ pB1
(
E[bAO1]E[SIOB1] (1−E[SFOO1]) (1−E[SFOB1])+
+E[bBO1]E[SIOB1]
) (6.39)
An obvious result emerges immediately from Equations 6.38 and 6.39. If the
firm could command equal prices in both channels, the online channel exhibits a
positive return. The cannibalization effect will also result in a positive value since
E[CanL1] = 0 and E[CanP1] > 0. Thus, introducing the additional online channel
will be profitable for a firm.
The above-mentioned equations (Equations 6.34–6.39) allow us to conduct the-
oretical considerations for certain pricing conditions. The considerations are all
based on firm 1’s view.
Lowest Price Offline
The first environment to analyze is one with a pricing structure where firm 1’s
offline price is lowest and all other prices are equal, i.e. pB1 < pO1 = pB2 = pO2 .
Firm 1 offers a competitive price in the offline channel, i.e. a certain number of
consumers should migrate from firm 2’s sales channels as well as from firm 1’s
online channel towards firm 1’s offline channel. Further, due to the lower price in
the offline channel, firm 1 generates extra consumers holding reservation prices
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between firm 1’s offline price and all other prices. These consumers are denoted
by E[bBB1] and not shared with the competitor.
E[bB1] = E[b
A
B1]+E[b
B
B1]+E[b
A
O1]E[SIOB1]+
+E[bAB2]E[SFBB2]+E[b
A
O2]E[SFOB2]
E[bO1] = E[b
A
O1] (1−E[SIOB1])
E[CanL1] = 0
E[CanP1] = pO1 E[b
A
O1] (1−E[SIOB1])+ pB1 E[b
A
O1]E[SIOB1]
Equations 6.40 show the expected values for online and offline consumers and
cannibalization figures of firm 1. First to note is that due the given pricing
structure E[bAB1] = E[b
A
B2] and E[b
A
O1] = E[b
A
O2]. Next, a few words on the op-
timal profit. If pB1 = pO1 = pX all switching erodes and the profit results in
E[pi] = pX E[bABX ] + pX E[b
A
OX ]. Note that pX is a proxy for any price since all
prices are assumed to be equal in the first step. Further, note that E[bABX ] is equal
for all firms too. Also note that costs are neglected for better readability. If the
offline price of firm 1 is decreased, the following profit function (again neglecting
costs) is valid
E[pi] = pB1 E[b
A
BX ]+
+ pB1
(
E[bBB1]+E[b
A
OX ] (E[SIOB1]+E[SFOB2])+
+E[bABX ]E[SFBB2]
)
+
+ pX E[bAOX ] (1−E[SIOB1]) (6.40)
From Equation 6.40 we could deduce the following relations pB1 E[bABX ] <
pX E[bABX ] and E[b
A
OX ] (1−E[SIOB1]) < pX E[b
A
OX ], therefore the optimizing pro-
cess should rely on the remaining parts of the profit equation. The strategy to
maximize profits is one between setting the offline price equal to all other prices
and offering an offline price near to zero. If we let pB1 run to zero the number of
consumers are maximized but profits will also run towards zero. The profit max-
imizing offline price is determined by the internal switching probability and the
probability of consumers of firm 2 migrating to firm 1’s offline channel. The can-
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nibalization profit is also bound between both extreme values. At equal prices the
cannibalization profit amounts to pX E[bAOX ]. With an offline price of zero the can-
nibalization profit also erodes and approaches zero. Here the maximum is much
easier to detect because it depends on the intra-firm switching probability, i.e. the
probability of firm 1’s online consumers migrating towards its offline channel sub-
ject to the offline price. The cannibalization loss should certainly be zero, since
the online price is higher than the offline price and therefore no switching from
the offline channel towards the online channel occurs.
Highest Price Offline
The opposite scenario emerges when firm 1 commands the highest price in the
offline channel, i.e. pB1 > pO1 = pB2 = pO2 . All extra rents of consumers due to
lower prices nullify, i.e. E[bBB1] = E[b
B
O1] = 0. For the other consumers which may
purchase at firm 1 all switching probabilities kick in and further drive consumers
away from firm 1.
E[bB1] = E[b
A
B1]
(
(1−E[SIBO1]) (1−E[SFBB1]) (1−E[SFBO1])
)
E[bO1] = E[b
A
O1]+E[b
A
B1]
(
E[SIBO1] (1−E[SFBB1]) (1−E[SFBO1 ])
)
E[CanL1] = (pB1 − pO1) ·
·
(
E[bAB]E[SIBO1] (1−E[SFBB1]) (1−E[SFBO1])
)
E[CanP1] = pO1 E[b
A
O1] (6.41)
Equations 6.41 depict expected consumers for each channel and expected canni-
balization losses and gains. For some deeper analysis it may also be interesting
to start with an extreme case. Let pB1 = pO1 = pX and therefore the resulting
profit becomes E[pi] = pX E[bABX ]+ pX E[b
A
OX ]. Two things are clear. First, offline
consumers are lower if the offline price is higher, i.e. E[bABX ] > E[bB1]. Second,
online consumers increase by the number of consumers switching from the offline
channel to the online channel, i.e. E[bAOX ] < E[bO1]. The overall effect is not clear.
Depending on the switching structure and the offline price, profits may be higher
compared to an environment where all prices are equal. Regarding cannibaliza-
tion a loss is observed. This is very natural since consumers capitalize on the
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price advantage of the online channel and migrate from firm 1’s offline channel
towards its online channel. The cannibalization loss could be minimized if the
offline prices converge to the online price. If both prices are equal, the cannibal-
ization loss is nullified. Indeed, one could observe that with both prices equal, the
cannibalization effect, i.e. the sum of profit and loss, could be maximized. For
each pB1 > pO1 the cannibalization loss is larger than zero and lowers the positive
cannibalization effect.
Lowest Prices Firm 1
This pricing should be the most competitive one. Firm 1 in both channel prices
below its competitor, i.e. pB1 = pO1 < pB2 = pO2 . Both channels capture extra
consumers by undercutting firm 2’s prices. In this scenario consumers migrate
from firm 2 to firm 1 but not vice versa. Additionally no intra-firm switching
should occur since both prices of firm 1 are equal.
E[bB1] = E[b
A
B1]+E[b
B
B1]+
+E[bAB2]E[SFBB2] (1−E[SFBO2])+
+E[bAO2] (1−E[SFOO2 ]) E[SFOB2]
E[bO1] = E[b
A
O1]+E[b
B
O1]+
+E[bAO2]E[SFOO2 ] (1−E[SFOB2])+
+E[bAB2] (1−E[SFBB2]) E[SFBO2]
E[CanL1] = 0
E[CanP1] = pO1
(
E[bAO1]+E[b
B
O1]+
+E[bAO2]E[SFOO2 ] (1−E[SFOB2])+
+E[bAB2] (1−E[SFBB2]) E[SFBO2]
) (6.42)
Equations 6.43 again express expected values of interest. Regarding the profit it
is obvious that compared to equal prices (pB1 = pO1 = pX ) the profit reached by
the current strategy is larger. The profit surplus is composed of extra consumers
in both channels as well as switching consumers. The nullification of the canni-
balization loss is also no surprise. Both channels of firm 1 offer the same prices,
therefore intra-firm switching will not occur. Therefore, the cannibalization profit
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is composed of the profit made by the online channel. So it is enough to maximize
the cannibalization profit since the total profit should be maximal too.
Highest Prices Firm 1
The last scenario is the most unfortunate for firm 1. Here firm 2 prices both
channels below firm 1, i.e. pB1 = pO1 > pB2 = pO2 . So firm 1 is not capable to
attract any extra consumers, even worse, from the existing consumers a certain
fraction migrates to firm 2. That strategy should be neither competitive nor profit
maximizing.
E[bB1] = E[b
A
B1] (1−E[SFBB1]) (1−E[SFBO1])
E[bO1] = E[b
A
O1] (1−E[SFOO1 ]) (1−E[SFOB1])
E[CanL1] = 0
E[CanP1] = pO1
(
E[bAO1] (1−E[SFOO1]) (1−E[SFOB1])
)
(6.43)
Equations 6.43 give an overview of some interesting expected values. If we again
start by assuming pB1 = pO1 = pX , therefore letting the resulting profit become
E[pi] = pX E[bABX ]+ pX E[b
A
OX ], we could immediately find the loss firm 1 suffers
by the current strategy. Each value of E[bABX ] and E[b
A
OX ] is reduced by consumers
migrating to firm 2. Therefore, this strategy is the least profitable one. Since both
prices of firm 1 are again equal it suffers no cannibalization loss. The cannibaliza-
tion profit is composed of the profit earned from the online channel. All earnings
from the online channel are additional profits by the introduction of the online
channel and therefore regarded as cannibalization profit.
In that basic model certain things appear to be noteworthy. First of all, if a firm
could command equal prices in its sales channels it should do so. By this strategy
the cannibalization loss is minimized and the firm finds itself on the safe side by
earning profits from the development of the online channel. Second, although it is
clear for a strategy of overpricing which is the least profitable way of doing busi-
ness, all other strategies do not give such a clear picture. The profit-maximizing
strategy relies heavily on the switching probabilities and certainly the reservation
prices itself. So no recommendation could be deduced at this time. Which strat-
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egy to implement may be a matter of the product, which defines its own market
structure including all reservation prices and switching probabilities.
6.6 Price Elasticity
To give a complete overview of the model, the price elasticities subject to the
offline price of firm 1 are calculated. The price elasticity gives the percentage
consumer change on a one percent price change. This measure could give some
insight into the market behavior and consumers’ sensitivity towards prices.
Since the online channel could be regarded as the opposite of the offline channel,
calculations are restricted to the offline channel only. The complete derivative is
also very elusory, therefore certain situations are analyzed. Note that this elas-
ticity is calculated from the first derivative of the corresponding demand function
subject to the offline price.
Lowest Price Offline
The first interesting question may be a situation when firm 1’s offline price is
lowest, i.e. pB1 < pO1 = pB2 = pO2 . Therefore, all other prices except firm 1’s
offline price are denoted by pX .
bB1 =
1
2
(1−RB(pX))+
+(1−RB(pB))− (1−RB(pX)) (1−SIBO1(pB− pX))+
+
1
2
(1−RO(pX)) (1− (1−SIOB1(pX − pB)))+
+
1
2
(1−RB(pX)) (1− (1−SFBB2(pX − pB)))+
+
1
2
(1−RO(pX)) (1− (1−SFOB2(pX − pB))) (6.44)
Equation 6.44 gives the demand function for the current situation, i.e. the number
of consumers which could be obtained in the offline channel. The corresponding
elasticity subject to the offline price is given by the first derivative of this function
with respect to firm 1’s offline price. Some interesting features of that function
should be mentioned. First, since the offline price is lowest, no consumer has
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an intention to migrate from firm 1’s offline channel to any alternative channel.
That is to say that the switching probabilities SIBO1(pB − pX), SFBB1(pB − pX)
and SFBO1(pB− pX) all become zero. Second, due to the low offline price firm 1
earns some extra consumers in the offline channel. This issue is calculated in the
second row of Equation 6.44. Third, we see consumers migrating from all other
channels towards firm 1’s offline channel due to its lower price. Equation 6.44
shows that fact in the third to fifth rows.
∂bB1
∂ pB
= −
(∂RB(pB)
∂ pB
)
+
+
1
2
(
(1−RO(pX))
(∂SIOB1(pX − pB)
∂ pB
))
+
+
1
2
(
(1−RO(pX))
(∂SFOB2(pX − pB)
∂ pB
))
+
+
1
2
(
(1−RB(pX))
(∂SFBB2(pX − pB)
∂ pB
))
(6.45)
Equation 6.45 displays the price elasticity for a situation where firm 1 prices low-
est in its offline channel. Note that the derivative of a cumulative probability func-
tion results in the corresponding density function. Since price elasticities are al-
ways less than zero, i.e. an increases in prices leads to a decrease in sales, the only
negative part of the elasticity is the one which corresponds to extra consumers.
This outcome should not be surprising because for these consumers firm 1’s of-
fline price is relevant, all other consumers come from the pricing in alternative
channels. Therefore, the elasticity of switching consumers decreases price elas-
ticity in the offline channel. Naturally, the number of switching consumers is
influenced by the level of the offline price relative to alternative prices. Interest-
ingly, that issue seems not to intensify the price elasticity in the offline channel.
Thus, price elasticity in such a situation should be relatively low compared to the
next situation.
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Highest Price Offline
In that situation firm 1 prices its offline channel above all alternative channels, i.e.
pB1 > pO1 = pB2 = pO2 . Again, all other prices are denoted by pX for the sake of
simplicity.
bB1 =
1
2
(1−RB(pB)) (1−SIBO1(pB− pX)) (1−SFBB1(pB− pX)) ·
· (1−SFBO1(pB− pX)) (6.46)
Equation 6.46 displays the corresponding demand function. Consider the huge
differences compared to the previous situation. First, firm 1 shows no ability
to attract extra consumers to its offline channel. The extra consumers are now
at firm 2’s offline channel since the price is lower there. Second, all switching
probabilities from firm 1’s offline channel towards any other channel are larger
than zero and therefore remain in the equation. Third, since the offline price is
highest in the environment, all switching probabilities towards the offline channel
become zero, i.e. SIOB(pX − pB) = SFBB(pX − pB) = SFOB(pX − pB) = 0. No
consumer still intends to migrate from any other channel towards firm 1’s offline
channel. Fourth, the basic consumer base 1−RB(pB2 is now determined by firm 1’s
offline price. The largest price in a certain channel decides about the basic number
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of consumers for that channel, which in addition are equally shared between both
firms (see Equations 6.19 and 6.20).
∂bB1
∂ pB
= −
1
2
((∂RB(pB)
∂ pB
)
(1−SIBO1(pB− pX)) (1−SFBB1(pB− pX)) ·
· (1−SFBO1(pB− pX))
)
−
−
1
2
(
(1−RB(pB))
(∂SIBO1(pB− pX)
∂ pB
)
(1−SFBB1(pB− pX)) ·
· (1−SFBO1(pB− pX))
)
−
−
1
2
(
(1−RB(pB)) (1−SIBO1(pB− pX))
(∂SFBB1(pB− pX)
∂ pB
)
·
· (1−SFBO1(pB− pX))
)
−
−
1
2
(
(1−RB(pB)) (1−SIBO1(pB− pX)) (1−SFBB1(pB− pX)) ·
·
(∂SFBO1(pB− pX)
∂ pB
))
(6.47)
Equation 6.47 gives the price elasticity for the current situation where firm 1 prices
highest in its offline channel. This time the negative elasticity is evident. Note
the important difference of the partial derivative of the offline reservation price
distribution. The elasticity is composed of offline reservation prices and switching
probabilities from the offline channel to any alternative channel. The sum of all
these influences should further result in a much higher elasticity than in the prior
situation.
Overall the results on the elasticity imply different elasticities regarding the cur-
rent price level. We note that the price elasticity is a function of all prices in the
market. For a certain channel the price in that channel is a determining factor,
but the influence of the alternative prices changes with the relative price level of
that channel. If a firm prices a channel below all other channels, it could expect
minimal price elasticity, because migrating consumers still add to the consumers
in the specific channel. Pricing above all alternative channels definitely increases
the elasticity since consumers migrate towards cheaper alternatives.
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Chapter 7
Basic Model - Refined
One additional refinement needs to be applied to the basic model discussed in
Chapter 6. As noted earlier, certain parameters of the market environment, with
exception of the reservation prices, could be influenced by firms by performing
different marketing programs, e.g. enhancing web site usability may increase sat-
isfaction and thereby raise sales, training sales personnel may result in satisfaction
due to advanced counseling. Such marketing activities may alter the shape of the
switching distributions in favor of a firm.
Therefore, the influence of marketing activities on the theoretical model will be
derived. Afterwards all available marketing actions will be discussed in detail to
emphasize the impact of each individual action.
7.1 Influence of Marketing
Numerous marketing activities could be set by a firm to attract consumers. Each
separate action is proposed to cause different effects on consumers’ perception of
a certain channel. Thus, each firm j = {1,2} has to manage a vector M j = {mi},
where m.i determines expenses in a certain marketing activity i, for example
widening the product portfolio in the offline channel, enhancing security in the on-
line channel, etc. Each channel reacts differently to such investments. A widening
of the product range in the online channel, for example, would keep consumers
74 CHAPTER 7. BASIC MODEL - REFINED
bound to that channel because alternative channels lack assortment (e.g., Li et al.
2007, Shankar et al. 2003).
The problem is that different product categories may put diverse weights on sepa-
rate marketing activities. Therefore, a probability measure is defined to represent
the likelihood of picking the, from the consumers’ perspective, most desired mar-
keting action. Assume all marketing options, i.e. those for the online channel and
that for the offline channel, are ordered according to their value to the consumers,
i.e. the most demanded activity first. The firm is not aware of that ranking and
assigns to each activity a certain amount of money so that the total expenses per
channel do not exceed one, i.e. ∑ni=1 mi = 1. Now the pecuniary effort is multi-
plied with the effect of each activity to the consumers. A Geometric distribution
G is taken to assign to each marketing option the corresponding impact on con-
sumers’ behavior. The parameter p of this distribution gives the decay ratio of the
marketing effort to influence consumers. A p value of one will assign the whole
possible impact to the top-ranked desired marketing activity. Therefore, only fi-
nancial spending in this activity will influence consumers in a favorable direction.
The Geometric distribution could also be interpreted as the probability of a firm
to meet consumers’ demanded marketing activities in the correct order.
For the most desired action the probability measure would be P[X = i] =
p (1− p)i−1, where i indicates the ordered number of a certain marketing activ-
ity. So we define the impact probability of the ranked marketing activities of the
offline channel by IB =
{
P[X = i] = p (1− p)i−1
}n
i=1
. The impact probability is
the same for all firms but different for each channel. Further, the impact prob-
ability for each channel is only influenced by those actions which indeed affect
this particular channel. The definition of the impact limits results in one. Thus,
overspending is possible but does not affect consumers.
Therefore, we end up with one vector M j for the offline and the online channel of
each firm denoting the financial spending into a certain marketing activity, and an
impact probability different for each channel IB and IO.
Before we proceed with the evaluation of the impact on consumers, we truncate
every over-investment, i.e. we redefine M j to be
ξM j = min
(
M j, IB, IO
)
∀ j = {1,2} (7.1)
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Equation 7.1 discards any investments which exceed the optimal investments
given by IB and IO. Thus, each element mi of M j could at most be as large as
the corresponding optimal value from IB or IO. The final effect on the offline
switching probabilities therefore becomes
ξB j = 1IB • IB IB •M j ∀ j = {1,2} (7.2)
The result ξB j of Equation 7.2 alters all corresponding switching probabilities in
a favorable direction, i.e. in this case all switching probabilities leading away
from the offline channel will become lessened. Therefore, only those marketing
investments M j are taken into account which indeed affect the offline channel.
Note, although the sum of total spending is one in any case, the investment effi-
ciency of a certain channel may exceed one. A firm may in an extreme case direct
all its spending to just one particular channel and forgo the alternative channel.
Thus, the marketing activities in that particular channel may be too much. Over-
investment will not be honored. The maximum obtainable marketing efficiency
will be limited to one for each channel. ξB j gives the positive impact of the market-
ing strategies, i.e. the switching probability should become less. For example, for
the offline channel of firm 1, the following variations occur if the marketing activi-
ties prove to be accurate above 50%. The switching probabilities SIBO1,SFBB1 and
SFBO1 should all become more skewed to the right, i.e. the skewness of each dis-
tribution should become negative. That is to say, consumers in the offline channel
show less affinity to migrate from the offline channel to any alternative channel.
The final effect on the online switching probabilities becomes in a similar way
ξO j = 1IO • IO IO •M j ∀ j = {1,2} (7.3)
In Equation 7.3 also only these marketing expenditures kick in which influence
the online channel.
Lohse and Spiller (1998) give a good overview of the impact of different mar-
keting actions like promotion, navigation and information on consumers channel
choice. The impact of well done marketing is not as strong as for prices but still
present (Png 2004, Simon 1992, p. 139).
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Figure 7.1: Additional Dimensions of the Refined Model (Hansen 2005)
Figure 7.1 displays a classification of alternative marketing efforts available in
this study. Each individual marketing action of this dimension will be discussed
in detail in the following section. The various marketing activities available are
taken from current literature (Newman and Patel 2004, Holloway and Beatty 2008,
Baker et al. 2002, Trocchia and Janda 2003, Janda et al. 2002).
7.1.1 Strategic Scope
The strategic scope describes fundamental decisions like the legal form of a com-
pany, location and target customers.
Convenience
Consumers’ quest for convenience influences motivation to buy from a particular
channel (e.g., Schoenbachler and Gordon 2002). Convenience in the offline chan-
nel relates to a parking lot near the store or the reachability of a traditional store.
Lim and Dubinsky (2004) state that location, parking lots, the costs to move to
the store, the location of items, and the acceptance of credit cards are important
parameters describing convenience for offline stores.
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In the online context convenience is regarded as shopping from home (e.g., Lim
and Dubinsky 2004). Convenience seems to be more attributed to the online chan-
nel. Indeed, convenience was identified as the major benefit of the Internet (Litan
and Rivlin 2001, Lim and Dubinsky 2004, Lohse and Spiller 1998). In the same
vein, Keeney (1999) argued that a fundamental objective of online consumers is
to maximize convenience. This is not surprising since consumers appear to find it
more convenient and less costly to shop online (e.g., Reibstein 2002, Torkzadeh
and Dhillon 2002). Further, inconvenience is often regarded as one of the major
causes of service switching in the online context (e.g., Keaveney and Parthasarathy
2001).
Another convenience feature of the Internet becomes browsing through the as-
sortment. Search behavior and online shopping are closely related in a positive
manner, i.e. browsers often turn to buyers (e.g., Kim and Park 2005). Thus, on-
line shopping is considered convenient for information searching, but sometimes
regarded as too risky for purchasing (e.g., Alba et al. 1997, Verhoef et al. 2007).
Bridges and Florsheim (2008) revealed that online consumers are more likely to
purchase if their online experience is convenient. Finally, the ease of ordering
from home is a major determinant of online shopping (e.g., Gehrt and Yan 2004).
Also Donthu and Garcia (1999) found that internet shoppers are seeking more
convenience. They emphasize the importance of convenience for the choice of
the online channel.
Clientele
The clientele holds ambiguous meanings for each channel. In the physical retail
store the social status of other consumers shopping in the same store is relevant.
For some consumers this may be an important factor for deciding which store to
shop at. In the context of the online shop the meaning becomes a little different.
Since consumers could no longer really observe who is purchasing at a particular
online shop they just could infer from hearsay or word-of-mouth social groups of
the online store.
In case of physical retail stores, Balasubramanian et al. (2005) mentioned the
quest for socialization when purchasing certain products. The presence of con-
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sumers which share similar opinions and attitudes may increase utility and thus
enhance satisfaction. A similar result is reported from Belk (1975), who men-
tioned social surroundings like other persons present influence shopping behavior.
On the other hand personal hassle with sales personnel or other customers may
become an obstacle to visiting the offline store (Chircu and Mahajan 2006).
7.1.2 Product Policy
This dimension represents decisions on the type of products offered, services like
counseling, search agents, certificates, interactive help and guarantees, and assort-
ment.
Counseling
Availability of proper counseling may be a decisive factor in preferring a particular
sales channel. Balasubramanian et al. (2005) and Belk (1975) mentioned the quest
for socialization when purchasing a certain product. Sales personnel are available
for gossiping and some consumers may perceive an increased utility with such an
option. Sales personnel attributes like friendliness, information services, advice
and services are crucial factors for traditional stores (e.g., Verhoef et al. 2007,
Lim and Dubinsky 2004). Hansen and Deutscher (1977) found that among the
top ten attributes for department stores and grocery stores helpful personnel is
demanded. They also found that an adequate number of personnel is necessary
for grocery stores. The personality of the retailer, which is partly transported by
its sales personnel, may therefore by an important factor for store choice (e.g.,
Gehrt and Yan 2004). Highly interpersonal channels could even reduce risk, i.e.
a lot of communication might help to convince consumers and reduce their risk
perception (e.g., Kumar and Venkatesan 2005)
On the contrary, personal hassle with sales personnel could be a limitation to
offline shopping (e.g., Bakos 1997); even worse, if consumers dislike shopping in
the offline environment and interacting with the sales personnel (e.g., Chircu and
Mahajan 2006).
Ba¨ckstro¨m and Johansson (2006) summarized store personnel impacts in a clear
way. First of all, they distinguish between subtle and apparent aspects. Subtle as-
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pects of personal behavior such as smiles, good wishes, etc. contribute to positive
feelings in one way. If sales personnel make extra effort and stretch beyond the
necessary service level, positive in-store feelings may be generated in a second
way.
Assortment
Assortment describes the breadth of the product alternatives offered by a firm.
Each sales channel could offer its individual product portfolio. Thus, assortment
impacts each sales channel. Li et al. (2007) found switchers to be more aware
of alternatives. Therefore, it may hamper switching if a firm expands its product
portfolio. A similar result was also revealed by Chen and Hitt (2002) in the online
brokerage industry. They found switching to be negatively correlated to product
range. It was also found that increased product alternatives increase overall sat-
isfaction, which in turn boosts loyalty (e.g. Shankar et al. 2003). Verhoef et al.
(2007) mentioned that an assortment including items like popular brands, newest
types, etc. prove to be a relevant factor for store choice. Especially assortment is
identified to be a strong factor for choosing the online channel. Litan and Rivlin
(2001) found that wider product choice and customization is a major benefit of the
Internet, which enhances consumer satisfaction. A main objective of consumers
is to make better purchase choices (e.g., Keeney 1999). A wide assortment could
help to fulfill that goal. Some differences between online and offline shoppers
may arise at this point. Donthu and Garcia (1999) found that Internet shoppers
tend to be more innovative and variety seekers. On the other hand Degeratu et al.
(2000) mentioned that brands yield a higher impact online. Schoenbachler and
Gordon (2002) finally noted that product availability influences the motivation to
buy from a certain channel. If a product is not available online the competitor is
just one click away. In the offline channel the issue may appear likewise. If the
desired product is not available, consumers may migrate to the online channel.
Service
Service describes easy return policies or delivery on demand in case of the offline
store. Return policies seem to be a major obstacle for both online and offline
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stores. Hansen and Deutscher (1977) noted that ease of return is among the top
ten relevant factors for physical retail stores. This result is similar to Lim and
Dubinsky (2004) and Mattson (1982) who argued that on certain occasions, e.g.
gift shopping, consumers are likely to purchase at department stores due to less
stringent return policies than specialty stores.
In the online environment Schoenbachler and Gordon (2002) point out the fact
that service is related to perceived risk. Better service will lower perceived risk,
which in turn will decrease switching probabilities. A similar result comes from
Anderson et al. (1993) who found that service quality influences switching inten-
tions. Reibstein (2002) noted in that way that consumer service is important to
make people stick to a certain web site. Consumers’ return behavior is strongly
influenced by the service at a particular site (Schoenbachler and Gordon 2002).
Assessment
An assessment prior to the purchase may be important for some product cate-
gories. Consumers may perceive too much risk in buying those products online
because there is no opportunity to feel, touch and smell the merchandise (Alba
et al. 1997).
Keeney (1999) found that consumers are concerned about quality issues when
purchasing online. It is, for example, not possible to test-drive a car or to feel
the structure of clothes online. Such products provoke high consumer costs if
purchasing online and therefore prices have to be lower online (Chun and Kim
2005).
Other consumers feel some need for sensory evaluation. They want to self-affirm
their expertise, which gives them also confidence in their choice. This type of
consumer wants to squeeze an orange to assess its maturity or test-drive a car to
check its handling. Thus, for some consumers the only option to purchase certain
products remains the offline channel (Balasubramanian et al. 2005, Correll 1992,
Brucks 1985).
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Quality
Quality should evaluate the impact of product quality on store choice. It may turn
out that for certain products consumers trust only one specific supplier. Alba et al.
(1997) noted already that price may play a minor role when quality attributes
become important. It seems to be a crucial attribute for offline shoppers. High
quality is demanded by these consumers at department as well as grocery stores
(e.g., Hansen and Deutscher 1977, Lim and Dubinsky 2004).
For gift-shopping or if consumers want to judge the quality by themselves, quality
plays a bigger role. Under such circumstances consumers also tend to utilize
the offline channel for their purchase (e.g., Balasubramanian et al. 2005, Mattson
1982). Thus, the task of buying a certain product may be influenced by the quality
a particular store offers (e.g., van Kenhove et al. 1999).
Online consumers are exposed to purchase risk because it is difficult to judge the
quality prior to the purchase. Therefore, good quality may be mandatory for online
retailers (e.g., Verhoef et al. 2007). For this reason some authors argue for higher
prices in the online channel (e.g., Chun and Kim 2005). However, by activities
which provide arousal and pleasure the influence of quality could be reduced (e.g.,
Donovan et al. 1994).
Since quality attributes are hard to observe in the online channel, Internet shop-
pers tend to be more brand conscious than traditional shoppers (e.g., Donthu and
Garcia 1999). This argument is supported by Schoenbachler and Gordon (2002)
who found that higher familiarity with a certain brand could lower perceived risk.
Keeney (1999) found that one fundamental goal of shopping is to maximize prod-
uct quality. In that vein Li et al. (2007) and Park and Kim (2006) found that the
awareness of alternatives and the quality of alternatives are major indicators of
switching behavior. Thus, the quality of alternatives may be utilized to predict
switching (e.g., Chen and Hitt 2002).
An interdependency between the online and the offline shop of the same retailer
was also reported. Kim and Park (2005) point out that quality perceptions towards
the offline store are transferred to the online store of the same retailer. Thus,
trust might be transferred between shops of the same retailer (e.g., Balabanis and
Reynolds 2001, Steinfield et al. 2002).
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Security/Safety
Security of payments may be relevant for choosing the offline channel instead of
the online channel. Thus, payment issues may turn out to be a major obstacle for
online businesses. Consumers appear to be concerned about online payment se-
curity. Thus, a firm should assure a reliable and secure system for payment issues,
which minimizes misuse of, e.g. credit card information (e.g., Keeney 1999).
They further found safety to be one of the fundamental objectives consumers pur-
sue when shopping online. Such a secure system should be communicated to
consumers, because a positive relationship between information and security per-
ception was found by Park and Kim (2006). Therefore, security may prove a
competitive advantage for physical retail stores since shopping risk is lowest in
the offline channel (e.g., Gehrt and Yan 2004).
Consumers in the online environment tend to seek secure environments. Thus, a
key success factor for online businesses may be to enhance security on a web site.
A more secure purchase process would lower perceived risk (e.g., Schoenbachler
and Gordon 2002). Consumers’ attitude towards perceived risk and the observed
benefits from purchasing online determine their shopping behavior (e.g., Soopra-
manien and Robertson 2007).
Thus, security may be also an indicator to distinguish between Internet shoppers
and shoppers in traditional stores. Donthu and Garcia (1999) found the former to
be less risk averse than the latter.
Bakos (1998) finally noted that new types of intermediaries may emerge to fulfill
payment issues.
Availability
Availability, i.e. the product can immediately be taken home, is an important
factor of traditional retail stores (e.g., Lim and Dubinsky 2004).
Consumers strive for maximal product availability. Thus, their purchase decision
appears to be strongly influenced by availability (e.g., Keeney 1999). Schoen-
bachler and Gordon (2002) also found that product availability influences the mo-
tivation to buy from a certain channel. Therefore, a firm holds the option to create
positive in-store experiences for consumers by increasing availability of products
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offered. Positive experiences afterwards result in, e.g. more money spent (e.g.,
Ba¨ckstro¨m and Johansson 2006). If a desired product is not available, consumers
become dissatisfied and may immediately switch to an alternative channel or firm
(e.g., Wang and Head 2007).
For certain shopping occasions availability becomes most crucial. Gift shoppers
rate availability highest priority (e.g., Gehrt and Yan 2004). Thus, immediate
availability turns out to be indeed a decisive parameter in consumer’s choice of
the sale channel (e.g., Gehrt and Yan 2004, van Kenhove et al. 1999).
For certain product categories delivery is also important for consumers. If it is
hard for consumers to carry products home (e.g. furniture, fridges, etc.), delivery
becomes relevant like in the online channel (e.g., Chircu and Mahajan 2006, Lim
and Dubinsky 2004).
Privacy
Privacy may be a distinctive factor. The offline channel may give consumers a
sense of privacy regarding the protection of their financial information (Flavia´n
et al. 2006a). On the other hand if anonymity is of concern, the online channel
may be first choice. In any case, privacy is a major factor influencing online
purchasing behavior (Lim and Dubinsky 2004, Zhang and Li 2006, Verhoef et al.
2007).
Keeney (1999) found privacy to be a fundamental goal for consumers undertaking
online transactions. Thus, firms should take efforts to maximize privacy.
Consumers still are concerned about privacy issues in the online world. Strategies
to resolve those doubts may turn out to be beneficial to a firm (Park and Kim
2006).
7.1.3 Communication Policy
Communication policy deals with information, advertisements and entertainment.
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Information
The corresponding online counterpart to counseling might be information provid-
ing. The Internet allows consumers to gather information in a convenient and
efficient way. Thus, current information is vital for online shops (Bakos 1997).
Shankar et al. (2003) noted the positive effect of information satisfaction on loy-
alty. Thus, they suggest making information retrieval as easy as possible. A cur-
rent web site should also provide appropriate information. Further, they men-
tioned that additional information like local weather, maps, etc. could advance a
web site and thus increase loyalty.
A similar result stems from Park and Kim (2006), who also revealed the positive
effect of information quality on shopping behavior. They even found that infor-
mation satisfaction could increase security perceptions.
Bridges and Florsheim (2008) finally mentioned that every online text should offer
value by including the maximum possible information.
For some occasions or product categories, representation proved to be the most
important factor influencing buying decisions, rather than on-time delivery or
price (Reibstein 2002). They argued further that more information and higher
information quality may lead to better purchasing decisions, which in turn raise
consumers’ satisfaction.
Atmosphere in the Store
The atmosphere in a store typically influences the purchase behavior of con-
sumers. Balasubramanian et al. (2005) point out the quest for experimental im-
pact. Donovan et al. (1994) found that the emotional state of an individual shopper
within a store predicts actual shopping behavior very well. Firms should increase
pleasure induced by the store environment to keep consumers in the store and fur-
thermore persuade them to spend more money than initially intended. They even
argue that pleasure and arousal contribute to time and money which is spent extra
and unplanned, independent of other store attributes like perceived quality, variety
and value for money. In their case study, Ba¨ckstro¨m and Johansson (2006) re-
vealed aspects more important for younger consumers. Their results indicate that
products which are targeted at younger individuals should be offered in trendy
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and hip store environments. A store layout which allows consumers to easily find
their desired products will also result in positive consumer experiences and pos-
itive experiences may increase loyalty. If the store appears illogically ordered to
consumers, negative feelings may be provoked (e.g., Ba¨ckstro¨m and Johansson
2006). Thus, store atmosphere like certain lights, scents and colors could result
in positive or negative experience. If all ingredients compose a coherent picture,
positive feelings may arise (e.g., Ba¨ckstro¨m and Johansson 2006). Therefore,
store atmosphere may turn out to be a competitive advantage for a firm, which
could be used to differentiate besides the price. Gehrt and Yan (2004) found that
online shoppers may be less sensitive to atmospheric influences than offline shop-
pers. This outcome seems natural since online shops could hardly touch sensory
attributes like scents and lights.
Brand of Physical Retail Store or Onlineshop
The familiarity with a certain retailer could lower perceived risk and therefore
alter purchasing behavior (Schoenbachler and Gordon 2002).
On the one hand it was argued that Internet shoppers are more brand conscious
since they feel a distance (Donthu and Garcia 1999). On the other hand Gehrt
and Yan (2004) found that online shoppers tend to be more adventurous and even
willing to try shops with an unfamiliar face.
This difference may be due to the product category. Digital information goods
or those products which hold similar properties may be less critical to order from
unfamiliar shops. In contrast, credence products consumers may demand a trust-
worthy environment. In such cases familiar shops might be the only purchasing
option.
Interactivity/Selection Support
Childers et al. (2001) already stressed the importance of enjoyment and enter-
tainment on revisiting intentions. Web sites should provide such tools to attract
consumers. The higher the perceived interaction of a consumer, the higher will
be his satisfaction. Higher interactivity should also lead to higher perceived con-
trol, which in turn enhances shopping experience and therefore raises satisfaction
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(Marmorstein, Howard et al. 1992, Alba et al. 1997). Wang and Head (2007)
mentioned also the interrelation of perceived interaction and satisfaction.
Another quest remaining is that consumers should solve their problems utilizing
aids from the web site. Such solution aids may increase consumer’s loyalty and
furthermore consumers tend to exhibit positive word-of-mouth (Kumar and Ruan
2006). Therefore, they argue that consumers should be given the option of man-
ifold contact chances. A higher frequency of web-based contacts may return in
a higher likelihood of multichannel shopping and even serve as a good indicator
for loyalty (Kumar and Ruan 2006). The arguments of Ha¨ubl and Trifts, Valerie
(2000) run in a similar direction. They found that decision aids may result in
better purchase decisions which also increase satisfaction.
Usability
Usability may serve as the corresponding online counterpart to in-store atmo-
sphere. There exists a positive effect of ease of use on loyalty (e.g., Shankar et al.
2003, Chen and Hitt 2002). Usability could increase trust in a web site and ad-
ditionally increase satisfaction (e.g., Flavia´n et al. 2006a). Park and Kim (2006)
found a positive relation between satisfaction and user interface quality. Lohse
and Spiller (1998) mentioned that usability still is an obstacle to online shopping.
Some consumers noted difficulties in finding things. In the same vein Shankar
et al. (2003) argued that firms should offer access to information as easily as pos-
sible by providing intelligent search and appropriate information. They revealed
a positive relationship of ease of use of obtaining information and loyalty. With
those information tools the online medium could be utilized to reinforce loyalty
(e.g., Shankar et al. 2003).
If a web site is used very often and consumers become familiar with the site,
the switching propensity declines accordingly. There seems to be a reverse ef-
fect of usability on switching (e.g., Chen and Hitt 2002). Chen and Hitt (2002)
also demonstrated the negative effect of minimized usability on the likelihood of
switching.
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Another interesting effect with highly usable web sites is that consumers could
run into “flow”, i.e. they lose track of time and become exceptionally involved.
This may result in higher sales (e.g., Novak et al. 2000).
Thus, firms should develop web sites according to requirements like high speed
performance, offer easy ways to locate relevant information, reduce the number
of navigation levels, etc. to enhance usability (e.g., Bridges and Florsheim 2008).
Childers et al. (2001) also mentioned flexible navigation and convenient informa-
tion search as important factors for online shoppers. Affinity towards comput-
ers amplified by knowledge of Internet usage influences the propensity of online
shopping. Non-shoppers typically regard the process of online shopping as too
complicated (e.g., Soopramanien and Robertson 2007).
But not only performance and navigation are important parts of usability. Web site
characteristics like eye appeal, ease of the purchase process and product layout
might also affect the purchase behavior in the online channel (e.g., Schoenbachler
and Gordon 2002).
7.1.4 Distribution Policy
Distribution policy is a major determinant of online shops. It deals with sales
channels, ordering, logistics, transport and delivery.
Delivery Time
Delivery time in the online channel has its counterpart in availability in the phys-
ical retail stores. Fulfillment of delivery, i.e. the physical delivery of real world
orders from the virtual world is still a problem to online retailers (e.g., Chun and
Kim 2005). The unsolved problem gives rise to new types of intermediaries for
delivery (e.g., Bakos 1998). Digital information goods are the big exception. This
product category holds the advantage of instant delivery like in physical stores
(e.g., Chun and Kim 2005).
Timely delivery is still a crucial factor for online retailers. Online shoppers seek
on-time delivery (e.g., Schoenbachler and Gordon 2002, Lim and Dubinsky 2004,
Gehrt and Yan 2004). Reibstein (2002) further noted that timely delivery is rele-
vant for repeat purchase. Once consumers become discontent, it will be hard to
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attract them back. Even more, most of the consumers tend to sort their online
search by price in the first row, but delivery time in the second row. Thus, delivery
time may increase sales without participating in damaging price wars.
Soopramanien and Robertson (2007) concluded that browsers, i.e. consumers who
scan the Internet for bargains but undertake their purchase in traditional stores, are
most of the time dissatisfied about delivery times. Thus, on-time delivery repre-
sents a large area of enhancements for firms, but also of discontent to consumers
(e.g., Reibstein 2002). It seems clear that firms are well advised to take care on
reliable delivery (e.g., Keeney 1999, Chircu and Mahajan 2006). All in all con-
sumers regard delivery time as an integral part of the overall transaction costs
(Liang and Huang 1998). Thus, discounts may attract consumers from the offline
channel to the online channel despite the delivery time.
Delivery Options
This attribute should evaluate the impact of additional delivery options, like insur-
ance and additional delivery points, on the channel choice. The point of delivery
may be important. Most humans work throughout the day and thus delivery to
their workplace might increase convenience since they do no longer have to pick
up their delivery at the nearest post office.
Further, it is assumed that for certain products (e.g. jewelry) insurance may be an
important factor for purchasing online.
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Chapter 8
Simulation Model
Unfortunately the formulas of the model are no longer analytically tractable,
hence we performed simulations in the remaining sections. From the simula-
tion results we draw conclusions for managerial guidance. Simulations have been
proven successfully in marketing science (e.g., Stremersch and Tellis 2002, p. 17).
The simulation model consists of a Genetic Algorithm to evaluate a firm’s opti-
mal pricing behavior and the corresponding marketing activities, given a certain
market environment represented by the second firm. In this work an Evolution-
ary Strategy (Ba¨ck et al. 1992) is used to perform the optimization tasks. This
approach is taken because the Evolutionary Strategy holds the power to elicit ra-
tional behavior when continuous values represent different strategies (Takadama
et al. 2003). The parameter setting for the evolutionary strategy is the following
• parent population µ = 1000
• mating pool for new generation λ = 3000
• mutation rate 40%
• mutation range 0.5, i.e. to/from a value which is appointed to mutate half
the standard deviation of all corresponding generation values will either be
added or subtracted.
• crossover rate 15%
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The algorithm is programmed in R (R Development Core Team 2008). The com-
plete source code can be found in Chapter C in the appendix.
To fill in the theoretical model we utilize the survey results. The survey can also
be found (in German) in the appendix in Chapter B. From the different price data,
reservation prices and switching probabilities in terms of accepted price differ-
ences will be estimated. From the ranking of the different marketing activities the
impact and the relevance of each marketing strategy can also be observed.
8.1 The Firm Side
A firm j = {1,2} is described by a tuple Fj = {pB j , pO j ,M j} which could be
altered by the firm instantly. The relevant marketing actions for this model are
described in detail in Chapter 7.
Since marketing activities are valued in the survey, the available offline activities
of M j consist of a set of the following 12 attributes: availability, brand of store,
counseling by sales personnel, breadth of assortment, convenience (e.g., parking
lots), service, clientele, quality of the products sold, security, privacy, and assess-
ment. These attributes define the 12 sub-activities only relevant for the offline
channel.
In contrast, the sub-activities of M j only affecting the online channel consist of:
delivery time, convenience, usability, delivery options, information, security, pri-
vacy, brand of web site, interactivity, return policy, breadth of assortment, and
clientele. Thus, 13 attributes are available for each firm to enhance its online
appearance.
One firm is modeled by genetic algorithms. A firm described with evolutionary
strategies consists of µ (parent population) tuples of different pricing and market-
ing strategies. A specific tuple Fk (see Equation 8.1) consists of a certain online
price pO, an offline price pB and expenditures for marketing in the online channel
and in the offline channel.
Fk = {pB j , pO j ,M j} ∀ j = 1,2 (8.1)
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Such a tuple represents one specific occurrence of a firm in the genetic algorithm.
Note that for each firm j different tuples exist.
The prices are normalized between zero and one, i.e. we assume all available
prices in the market are within p∗ ∈ [0,1] and therefore pO, pB ∈ {p∗}. A further
restriction applies to the marketing expenses. These marketing parameters are
bounded by some budget constraint. The sum of all expenses must not exceed one
(see Equation 8.2). Let the financial effort for one particular marketing activity i
be m and j denote the firm.
M j = {mi} ∀ j = 1,2 (8.2)
25
∑
i=1
mi = 1 ≤ 1 (8.3)
These values could be interpreted as percentage investments in each distinctive
field of marketing given a certain budget. As already mentioned, these values
could alter the competitive landscape between firms and sales channels by modi-
fying consumers’ switching probabilities. The goal of the firm is to maximize its
profit (see Equation 6.26).
8.2 The Consumer Side
Consumers are determined by the whole structure of reservation prices and differ-
ent switching probabilities, i.e. a single consumer is described by the tuple
Ci = {RB,RO,SIBO1,SIOB1,SFBB1,SFBO1 ,
SFOO1,SFOB1,SIBO2,SIOB2,SFBB2,SFBO2,
SFOO2,SFOB2} (8.4)
Equation 8.4 displays the whole structure of distributions which describe the con-
sumer market. Note that SFOO1 and SFBB1 have not been observed and were set
equal to one for the simulation, i.e. no switching from an offline channel towards
the alternative offline channel, and from an online channel towards the competi-
tor’s online channel occurs. This is one weakness and will be discussed in the
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limitations (see Chapter 14). The different probabilities prescribe the consumers
and could be influenced by a firm’s marketing activities M j. More accurately, the
reservation prices RB and RO remain fixed and resistant to marketing. All other
probabilities could be altered by the firm. Thus, consumers’ attitude towards a
certain firm or sales channel might be modified by influencing a certain probabil-
ity.
An apparent result says that if all probabilities are symmetric, no competitive
advantage is in the market, and the online and offline prices of both firms are
equal, the market will be shared equally between both firms. This result is stable
as long as both firms keep their marketing activities the same.
Since the model should utilize real data, from the survey distributions for not-
accepted price differences as well as the reservation prices are obtained. The
distribution of the reservation prices could be estimated from the confessed pur-
chasing prices, i.e. the purchasing prices serve as proxy for the reservation price
of an individual consumer. With the use of maximum likelihood the parameters
of the probability functions could be estimated.
8.3 Scenarios
To gain some insight into the competitive environment of each product, simula-
tions with the following situations are performed. The scenarios present extreme
cases of certain market situations, thus firm 1’s reactions and pricing strategies
may also become somehow extreme. Firm 2 is the scenario lead, i.e. firm 2 sets
up certain marketing and pricing strategies and firm 1 should deal with them. An
optimal counter strategy for firm 2’s behavior should be found.
pB2 pO2 ξB2 ξO2
Scenario 1 0.10001 ˜pO2 1 0
Scenario 2 ˜pB2 0.10001 1 0
Scenario 3 0.10001 ˜pO2 0 1
Scenario 4 ˜pB2 0.10001 0 1
Table 8.1: Simulation Scenarios
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Table 8.1 gives an overview of all applied scenarios. The column pB2 gives the
applied offline price of firm 2. A price of = 0.10001 indicates that firm 2 operates
almost at its unit costs, which are held constant at 0.1 throughout all simulations.
Therefore, in such scenarios firm 2 prices highly competitively in that particular
channel. The pO2 column represents the same for the online channel of firm 2. The
tilde-prices are calculated by firm 2 optimizing just on the corresponding demand
shape.
˜pB2 = arg maxpB2∈0,1
b̂B (1−RB(pB2))(pB2 − cB2) (8.5)
˜pO2 = arg maxpO2∈0,1
b̂O (1−RO(pO2))(pO2 − cO2) (8.6)
Equations 8.5 and 8.6 show the evaluation of the tilde-prices. These prices should
also prove competitive since monopolistic prices usually are located just above
the optimal price for a duopoly.
ξB2 gives the marketing efficiency of firm 2 for the offline channel. A value of
one shows maximally efficient marketing investments, i.e. the firm’s investments
into the marketing activities equal consumers demand. Zero indicates no market-
ing investments in that channel at all. The parameter ξO2 represents the same as
ξB2 , just for the online channel. All these four scenarios run through the genetic
algorithm to find the optimal pricing policy of firm 1.
Note that these scenarios are very extreme presentations of market situations.
These extreme forms should underline special outcome and point at important
issues more obviously.
8.4 The Beta Distribution
For each individual probability a standard Beta distribution is assumed. We chose
the standard Beta distribution because it is a very flexibly one. With only two
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parameters a broad range of density shapes could be reproduced. Further the
standard Beta distribution is defined only between zero and one.
B(α,β ) =
∫ 1
0
tα−1 (1− t)β−1 dt (8.7)
f (x) = x
p−1 (1− x)q−1
B(p,q)
0 ≤ x ≤ 1; p,q > 0 (8.8)
Equation 8.7 shows the Beta function itself, and Equation 8.8 gives the density
function of the standard Beta distribution. p and q represent the parameters of the
Beta distributions. The Beta distribution further has the following properties
E[X ] =
p
p+q
(8.9)
var(X) =
pq
(p+q+1) (p+q)2
(8.10)
8.5 Estimating Beta Distributions with Maximum
Likelihood
From the price data of the survey, the corresponding reservation prices and switch-
ing probabilities with respect to pricing will be estimated. To achieve that, the
Maximum-Likelihood method for univariate distributions was conducted.
Since the Beta distribution provides no closed form, maximization of the log-
likelihood function is done by an numerical optimization algorithm. The Nelder-
Mead (Nelder and Mead 1965) algorithm is utilized. This algorithm refers only to
function values, is robust but turns out to be relatively slow. The advantage of this
algorithm is suitability for non-differentable functions like the Beta distribution.
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Since in this case the Beta distribution was restricted to be within zero and one, a
set of parameters is already defined. Therefore, the method of moments estimates
for the parameters p and q is
p = x¯
(
x¯ (1− x¯)
σ2
−1
)
(8.11)
p = (1− x¯)
(
x¯ (1− x¯)
σ2
−1
)
(8.12)
Equation 8.11 and 8.12 serve as initial values, or posterior parameters, for the
optimization process of the likelihood functions. In both equations x¯ represents
the sample mean and σ2 is the corresponding variance.
The maximum likelihood functions for the Beta distribution are
ψ(pˆ)−ψ(pˆ+ qˆ) = 1
n
n
∑
i=1
log(Yi) (8.13)
ψ(qˆ)−ψ(pˆ+ qˆ) = 1
n
n
∑
i=1
log(1−Yi) (8.14)
where ψ represents the digamma function
ψ(x) = Γ
′(x)
Γ(x)
(8.15)
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Chapter 9
Methodology
To give answers to the questions of what price to charge in each individual chan-
nel, what the influence of a certain product category is and how to optimally set
additional marketing activities, a survey was conducted. A survey seems to be
appropriate to get information on reservation prices (Vo¨lckner 2006). From the
survey, distributions for the theoretical model were deduced. This model will
be exposed to certain market situations to capture the optimal behavior of a firm
doing business in such an environment. Since the distributions are expected to
be different from unimodal, a genetic algorithm will be applied to calculate the
optimal strategy of a firm.
9.1 Survey
In the survey respondents were asked to give answers regarding books, digital
cameras and clothes. Books, clothes and digital cameras represent “centers” of
three distinctive clusters. Books could be attributed to commodity-like goods,
clothes to look-and-feel goods and digital cameras to quasi-commodity goods (Gi-
rard et al. 2003, Choi et al. 2006, de Figueiredo 2000). Thus, marketing actions
desired for each product should show maximal differences. Participants were fur-
ther requested to give information on the price they actually paid, the maximum
price they would pay in the alternative channel and to rank different marketing
strategies according to their demands. That is to say, first consumers were asked
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to name the price the usually pay for the products and give their favorite shop-
ping channel, e.g. the online channel. Afterwards participants were requested to
give the maximum price they would be willing to pay in the alternative channel,
e.g. the offline channel. In the end consumers were demanded to rank marketing
strategies they regard for each channel independently.
From that information, reservation prices and switching probabilities could be
estimated utilizing maximum likelihood. Thus, all price statements of a typical
purchase in one channel where taken to estimate the distribution of reservation
prices in that channel. The switching probabilities were calculated by taking the
price differences from the preferred channel towards the alternative channel. If
the participant denoted the online channel as his favorite channel for purchasing
digital cameras he may demand a discount for purchasing in the offline chan-
nel. This discount forms the basis for the switching probabilities from the online
channel towards the offline channel for each firm. The same procedure applies in
the reverse direction, i.e. switching from offline to online. As mentioned before,
switching within the same channel, i.e. from offline to offline or from online to
online was not recorded. This may be an extension for further research. Finally
the competitive advantage of a channel was calculated by the proportion of online
to offline consumers. If for example three consumers preferred the online channel
for purchasing digital cameras and only one favored the offline channel, the re-
sulting pecuniary advantage of the online channel will be 13 . This is to say that the
online channel could be ceteris paribus one third more expensive than the offline
channel to make the online consumers indifferent between both channels. In other
words, if both channels are priced equally the online channel appears one third
cheaper than the offline channel to online consumers.
9.2 Sample Constitution
The sample has the following structure. In total 1068 participants took part in
the survey. For books 307 rankings, for clothes 438 and for digital cameras 435
rankings were observed.
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Figure 9.1: Age Structure
The age structure (see Figure 9.1) consists of 4.80 % 15-19, 22.02 % 20-24,
24.52 % 25-29, 26.64 % 30-39, 14.39 % 40-49, 4.62 % 50-59, 1.78 % 60-69
and 0.53 % 70-79 year old consumers. Gender figures show 27.05 % females and
72.95 % males. Education figures (see Figure 9.2) display 3.37 % who finished
compulsory school, 15.28 % who are in apprenticeship, 11.01 % who passed a
professional school, 43.87 % with a graduation diploma and 26.47 % who ob-
tained a university diploma.
Detailed results for each individual product can be found in Chapters 10, 11 and
12. In those chapters the optimal marketing strategies for each product will be
presented. From these results, as well as from the price statements of the survey
participants, the corresponding probability shapes of the model will be estimated.
Basic simulations cover price elasticities and consumer drift dynamics given cer-
tain prices of firm 1. Finally, the optimal pricing strategy for firm 1 given special
market environments will be calculated.
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Figure 9.2: Educational Structure
101
Chapter 10
Results Books
Books are usually thought to be nearly digital information goods. With the knowl-
edge of the ISBN number a consumer knows what he gets, irrespective of the store.
Further, the attributes of a certain book are easy to capture. There are no such sub-
tle technical differences as with digital cameras and it may not be necessary for
consumers to feel or touch a book to evaluate the quality. The description of a
book is textual and therefore digitizable. All relevant information for a purchase
can be found online. Even more, since a book is identified by its ISBN number,
price comparison could easily take place. Competition may be reduced to pric-
ing in such a setting since product features do not contain competitively valuable
differences.
For books we received 304 pairs of prices at which consumers actually bought,
combined with the corresponding reference price for purchasing in the alternative
channel. The number of consumers who prefer the offline channel amounts to
162, whereas the number of consumers in favor of the online channel is 142. The
difference between both different consumer cohorts seems to be negligible, i.e.
a large number of consumers still use traditional stores to purchase books. This
finding is quite interesting given the nature of the product.
The price information is utilized to estimate different Beta distributed densities,
which afterwards will be included in the theoretical model.
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Figure 10.1: Frequency of Relative Price Statements
Figure 10.1 displays the frequency of price statements relative to the overall maxi-
mum of 200 paid at a usual purchasing occasion (Figure Reservation Price Offline
and Reservation Price Online). The other two graphs show the markup consumers
require for shopping in the alternative channel. These markups are also normal-
ized between zero and one relative to 200. Therefore, the whole price range of
purchased books and the equivalent markups are between zero and one. The red
lines in each figure depict the density function of the corresponding estimated
Beta distribution for these prices. One can see that the highest price purchase was
conducted through the offline channel. Another important issue is that offline con-
sumers seem to have lower reservation prices, i.e. at a price of 0.5 the firm may
capture already 14.9 % of the total available offline consumers but only 10.5 % of
the total online consumer base. The interesting thing, though, is that both switch-
ing probabilities are almost similar, i.e. consumers preferring the offline channel
demand similar pecuniary compensation for switching to the online channel as
consumers favoring the online channel and considering the offline channel. Fur-
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ther different price elasticities can be observed. In the lowest price segment, i.e.
books from 7− 10 C, a consumer surplus of roughly 40 % could be achieved in
the offline channel versus the online channel. In a price range from 10− 50 C
the picture is almost reverted. Around 25 % consumer surplus could be reached
through the online channel. For books and price above 50 C, the offline channel is
again the favorable channel for firms, since 43.3 % of offline consumers could be
achieved while in the online channel a mere of 27.3 % consumers are attainable.
Thus, the offline channel seems to be the more important sales channel for books
because consumers show higher reservation prices in this channel and therefore
consumer rents could be improved. Pricing is indeed an important issue for books.
This can be seen with the switching probabilities in Figure 10.1. One outcome is
that offline consumers seem to be more state-dependent, i.e. their propensity to
switch is lower than for online consumers.
The parameter values for each Beta distribution are given in Table 10.1. Note that
Shape Parameter Distribution
p q at the Model
Offline Reservation Price 0.88671820 2.53622180 RB
Online Reservation Price 2.35212100 9.79252900 RO
Offline → Online Switching 0.08644153 3.54315486 SIBO,SFBO
Online → Offline Switching 0.07490756 3.58202388 SIOB,SFOB
Table 10.1: Parameters for the Beta Distributions
due to shape parameters lower than one, the density function results in some kind
of U-shape (not unimodal), which makes it difficult for optimization algorithms
like Newton and Nelder-Mead to find the optimum. Therefore, genetic algorithms
seem again to be a good choice.
One problem remaining is switching within the same channel (SFOO and SFBB).
This switching behavior was not part of the survey, since it is definitly hard for
participants to give price markups for the alternative channel. It seems to be even
harder to judge price markups for alternative firms within the same channel. One
could hypothesize about different switching probabilities. The switching prob-
ability from one offline channel to the other should be very low compared to
the switching probability from one online channel to the other. This assump-
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tion seems to be natural, since in the virtual environment the competitor is just
one click away, whereas in the real world visiting an alternative firm is associated
with an increased effort in time for example. But this question is left for further
research.
10.1 Marketing Strategies
Participants were asked to rank their reasons for choosing a certain channel. From
these ratings the optimal marketing policy apart from pricing should be conducted.
For each attribute its rankings were summarized by each order. These rank sums
afterwards were multiplied with the “inverse” order number, i.e. the sum of all
first rankings of each product is multiplied with the number of attributes in that
sales channel, the second rank was multiplied with the number of attributes less
one, and so on and so forth. Let rac r ∈ [1,0] be the rank a consumer c assigns
to a certain attribute a for the offline channel.
The total rank now becomes
r¯a = ∑rai (10.1)
r∗a =
r¯a
∑ r¯a (10.2)
Equation 10.2 gives the optimal investments for each attribute. Index i denotes all
rankings given by the participants. Value r¯a denotes the sum of all weights a cer-
tain activity receives. Thus, r∗a represents the relative importance of the marketing
attribute a. The corresponding optimal efforts for each channel IB and IO could be
deduced by just taking relevant attributes for each channel into account.
Results show a clear difference regarding the online and the offline channel. In
a traditional store environment 153 consumers ranked availability and the option
to take the book home immediately as the number one argument for purchasing.
Interestingly, since books have some attributes like digital information goods, as-
sessment is second-most ranked on first place. For 79 consumers the most im-
portant factor for choosing the offline channel was the chance to assess the book.
In the online shop 163 consumers voted convenience to be the decisive factor for
picking that environment. This is not surprising since ordering from home and
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delivery is the unique selling proposition of online stores. Assortment and deliv-
ery time, with 48 and 40 votes respectively, were second most often number one
ranked. So it seems that assortment may be one cause for the success of Amazon,
since a traditional retail store could not usually afford to offer such a wide range
of products. Delivery time may be the counter attribute to immediate entrainment
in the offline channel. Fast delivery may be important to keep the uncertainty due
to mismatching of payment with physical delivery at low levels.
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Figure 10.2: Importance of Marketing Attributes Offline
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Figure 10.3: Importance of Marketing Attributes Online
Figure 10.2 and 10.3 depict the fractions of rankings for first place, i.e. most im-
portant attribute, up to fifth place. One can see that availability is indeed the most
important factor. Surprisingly, assessment is second most important. Another
interesting finding is that assortment as well as atmosphere are highly relevant
attributes for consumers purchasing in traditional stores. For the online environ-
ment, besides convenience, the factors assortment, information and delivery time
turn out to be highly important for consumers choosing the online channel.
Since assortment is ranked very highly in both sales channels, it may be an obsta-
cle for the traditional store and an enabler for online shops since the latter could
offer a deep range of products at low costs. Therefore, lack of assortment may
turn consumers into online shoppers.
Information may be another important feature of online shops. During shopping
consumers browse through offered books to search for something desirable. The
final order is just one click away. Thus, providing extensive information may
boost online sales (Wang and Head 2007, Park and Kim 2006).
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But it could also be the reverse. The online channel may serve as information
channel. Consumers inform themselves in the online environment and purchase
offline afterwards (e.g., Reardon and McCorkle 2002).
Offline Online
Availability 0.13180253 Delivery Time 0.05118746
Brand of Store 0.01779564 Convenience 0.12877565
Atmosphere 0.05476464 Usability 0.048997
Counseling 0.0347876 Delivery Options 0.03170394
Assortment 0.06165327 Information 0.0650219
Convenience 0.02181401 Security 0.01740835
Service 0.02858783 Privacy 0.01740835
Clientele 0.00516648 Brand of Shop 0.01590961
Quality 0.02893226 Interactivity 0.02190454
Security 0.02227325 Return Policy 0.02248098
Privacy 0.00493685 Quality 0.01394973
Assessment 0.08748565 Assortment 0.06386903
Clientele 0.00138344
Table 10.2: Optimal Marketing Investments
Table 10.2 gives the optimal spending efforts for each marketing attribute. The
investments are normalized so that they add up to one, which is the maximum
allowed marketing effort. If a firm behaves exactly like this, its marketing effi-
ciency will be maximal in each channel. Optimal marketing moves the shape of
the switching distributions in favor of the performing firm.
10.2 Elasticity
The demand function for books is given by a set of Beta distributions which all de-
pend on prices and price differences. The elasticity is given by the first derivative
of the demand function. To display an overview, we restrict our price elasticity
measures on the offline price of firm 1 and perform two situations exemplarily.
10.4.
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Figure 10.4: Price Elasticity versus the Offline Price of Firm 1
Figure 10.4 displays the dynamics of the price elasticity of firm 1’s offline con-
sumers with respect to firm 1’s offline price and a consumer base of 100 in each
channel without taking effects of marketing activities into account. The second
row represents the dynamics of firm 1’s overall profit. For detailed tables refer to
the appendix (see Table A.1).
One can easily detect the other prices since the negative spikes in the elasticity
curve of consumers indicate them. The first column of figures (Price Elasticity
(1) and Profit (1)) displays prices of the following: The first spike relates to the
fixed price in firm 1’s online channel of 0.5. An immediate increase in the num-
ber of online consumers as well as a drop of almost the same amount in offline
consumers emerge at that crossing point. The peak in elasticity stems from intro-
ducing the online channel as alternative channel since prices become equal. In-
terestingly, no additional profit could be made by setting online and offline prices
equal. This result is due to the fact that both prices are well above the optimal
prices. The second spike stems from firm 2’s online channel which prices at 0.6.
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Declining online consumers underline that issue. At the same price level a kink
in the profit curve could be observed, which is due to falling online consumers.
Since online and offline price of firm 1 and online price of firm 2 are at the same
level, switching between these channels occur and the available consumers are
somehow shared. The last peak relates to firm 2’s offline price of 0.7. After this
time the elasticity drops dramatically. If the offline price of firm 1 is increased
any further, the dramatically decreasing elasticity is not surprising. All alternative
channels become cheaper than the offline channel of firm 1. Therefore, consumers
will react and move to one of the alternatives. Another important observation may
be the increasing profit of firm 2 from the point where both offline channels offer
equal prices. At the intersection of both profit lines, each offline channel prices
equally. Further increasing firm 1’s offline price will harm firm 1’s profits.
Figures Price Elasticity (2) and Profit (2) of Figure 10.4 display a similar extract
of the whole dynamics. In this case firm 2’s online price is set to 0.2, which is
clearly pointed out by firm 2’s profit shape. Firm 1’s profit shape is lower than
in the former case. This is a clear sign of lower prices of firm 2. The first peak
at 0.2 is due to firm 1’s offline price exceeding firm 2’s online price. The second
harmful spike results from firm 1’s offline price exceeding firm 2’s offline price.
From this level on, both prices of firm 1 rest above firm 2’s prices. Interestingly,
firm 2 loses profit as the offline price of firm 1 runs above firm 1’s online price.
An important deduction may be that each crossing of prices in alternative chan-
nels decreases elasticity in the current channel. These results seem to be obvious.
As soon as the price level of a certain channel reaches the price level of an alter-
native channel, consumers become aware of that alternative. A further increase
of the price in the current channel will drive consumers more quickly towards
the now cheaper alternative. Thus, price increases may result in larger effects on
consumers in a certain channel.
10.3 Mean and Variance
The price structure of a certain market is not only determined by price levels and
price elasticities but also by price variance. A short overview of the structure of
the reservation prices may shed light on the book market. Table 10.3 displays
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Offline Online Both
Mean Reservation Prices 0.18861110 0.18968310 0.18911180
Variance of Reservation Prices 0.01754293 0.01506816 0.01633370
Mean Markup 0.02638889 0.02218310 0.02442434
Variance Markup 0.00181157 0.00225442 0.00201609
Table 10.3: Results Summary
variances of price statements of consumers. The variance in reservation prices
of the offline channel is larger than the reservation prices for the online channel.
However this finding is not statistically significant at a 5 % level. Similar results
are obtained by investigating the demanded markup. Reservation price levels also
give a similar picture. Both means are very similar and statistically indifferent at
a 5 % level 1. One interesting observation remains: means and variances could be
misleading. If we compare the current results with those from Figure 10.1, large
differences become evident. This may indicate that individual reservation prices
are vital for applying optimal pricing strategies.
10.4 Consumer Drift Dynamics
Consumers drift from one channel to the other, apart from different prices, also
due to different marketing and most important due to individual preferences. To
incorporate those preferences various offsets are calculated. The basic competitive
advantage of a channel emerges from the survey. Different numbers of consumers
preferring a certain channel form the foundations of the offsets. Let the number of
participants of the survey which favor traditional store environments be denoted
by bSB and the number of those who prefer the Internet by bSO. The pecuniary offset
for each channel is calculated by
OF.BO = 1−
(
1−
1
max
(
bSB,bSO
)) bSB (10.3)
1Insignificant test results for Ansari-Bradley test for similar variance and Mann-Whitney test
for similar means.
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OF.OB = 1−
(
1−
1
max
(
bSB,bSO
)) bSO (10.4)
Equation 10.3 gives the pecuniary offset of the offline channel. Values below zero
indicate competitive advantages for the offline channel, i.e. for a value of −0.1
the online channel has to offer prices 0.1 below the prices in the offline channel
to avoid switching. At such a price consumers become indifferent between both
channels and therefore switching falls. For values of OF.BO above zero, the com-
petitive advantages fall to the online channel. In this case prices in the traditional
environment have to undercut online prices by the value of OF.BO to make con-
sumers indifferent between both channels. Equation 10.4 gives the competitive
offset for the online channel, which is also related to the number of consumers
preferring a certain channel above the other.
For books there emerges a small competitive advantage for the offline channel, i.e.
a slightly larger fraction of consumers still prefer the offline channel. The pecu-
niary advantage amounts to 0.1234568. Therefore, the online channel should offer
a price 0.1234568 below the offline price to prevent consumers from switching to
the offline channel.
OFIBO 0
OFIOB 0.1234568
OFFBO 0
OFFBB -
OFFOB 0.1234568
OFFOO -
Table 10.4: Initial Offset Values
Table 10.4 gives all initial offset values for the book environment. All offsets
corresponding to consumers drifting from the online to the offline store exhibit
positive numbers, indicating competitive advantages for the related offline chan-
nels.
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Figure 10.5: Elasticity
Figure 10.5 displays the composition of consumers at both channels of firm 1.
Again, two scenarios (see Paragraph 10.2) were utilized and detailed tables can
be found in the appendix A.1. The figures in the first column, denoted by the
suffix (1), result from firm 1’s online price of 0.5, firm 2’s offline price of 0.7
and its online price of 0.6. The offline price of firm 1 varies. The first figure
shows an overview of the total consumers for each firm. As we might expect, the
total consumers of the offline channel bB1 drop as soon as the price of the online
channel is reached. But as the offline consumers decline, the number of total
online consumers bO1 increases by the same amount. The number of extra offline
consumers attracted due to lower prices reaches zero as soon as firm 2’s offline
price is met. A drop in the total online consumers bO1 is also visible as the offline
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price tops firm 2’s online price. This occurs since firm 1’s offline consumers do
not switch only to its online channel but also to firm 2’s online channel.
The second figure Consumer Drift Offline (1), which breaks the total offline con-
sumers down to the basic parts and the last figure in the column (Consumer Drift
Online (1)), which shows the same for online consumers, should be considered
together. A loss in the offline channel should result in a gain in the online channel
as long as both prices are below the competitor’s prices. Again, the total consumer
base bB1 of firm 1 drops as the offline price reaches its online price. This drop is
related to an increase of almost the same amount in total online consumers bO1 .
So, consumers migrate from the offline channel to the online channel of firm 1.
The non-switching extra consumers of the offline channel show a similar behav-
ior. Again, growing extra offline consumers migrating from the offline channel
towards the online channel can be observed in the last figure.
Naturally reversed appears the development of the non-switching extra consumers
of online consumers. As soon as the offline price meets the online price, no on-
line consumer migrates from the online channel of firm 1 away to any alternative
channel. The online channel of firm 1 starts to be the cheapest one from this point
on. Extra consumers of the offline channel decrease gradually till the offline price
of firm 1 meets the corresponding price of firm 2. Conversely, extra online con-
sumers of firm 1 do not decrease and remain stable. That outcome is obvious since
firm 1’s online price remains lower than firm 2’s online price and therefore firm 1
could earn some extra consumers in the online channel.
In the price range where firm 1’s offline price lies between 0.5 and 0.6, consumers
switching from both competitor’s channels towards the offline channel of firm 1
are negligible since even firm 1’s prices are relatively high and therefore even
fewer consumers are attracted by firm 2’s pricing. Consumers migrating from
firm 1’s offline channel towards firm 1’s online channel can be observed in the last
figure. The basic offline consumers and the extra consumers offline start to mi-
grate as the offline price hits the online price. The increasing offline price has the
effect that extra consumers decline further and retain switching towards firm 1’s
online channel till the benefit of lower prices offline is lost because firm 1’s offline
price meets that of firm 2.
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The basic offline consumers switching to the online channel increase a little once
both prices of firm 1 are equal. But as soon as firm 2’s online price is reached,
consumers divide between those channels and therefore the deep decline could be
explained. Another interesting observation may be the contribution of the differ-
ent sources of consumers to the total number of consumers in each channel. For
the offline channel one can see that the major part of the total consumers bB1 is
made up of non switching consumers. At a price of 0.1 we observe 2.8 % of-
fline consumers from the shared base which are not migrating, 95.7 % consumers
from the extra base which are not switching and 1.3 % consumers migrating from
firm 1’s extra online consumers. As the offline price approaches the online price,
the total offline consumers decline. Also the contribution of the different sources
changes. At an offline price of 0.5, the contribution of the not switching shared
consumers amounts to 15.3 % and is further rising till the online price of firm 2 is
met. The ratio of not switching extra consumers drops to a mere 10.9 %, which
is natural since the differences between both offline prices diminishes. After ex-
ceeding firm 1’s online price the ratio declines to 2.3 % and decreases further. The
fraction of extra consumers which do not migrate to an alternative channel also
falls to 84.1 % and falls even further since the price advantage versus firm 2’s of-
fline price goes down. As the offline price of firm 2 is surpassed, this source of
consumers drains and therefore their number becomes zero. It is also noteworthy
that the contribution of firm 2’s online consumers migrating towards firm 1’s of-
fline channel increases from 2.4 % at an offline price of 0.51 to 9.5 % at a price of
0.59 %. After exceeding firm 2’s online price this source of consumers also runs
dry. After even surpassing firm 2’s offline price at 0.7, the remaining contributing
source of consumers stems from not switching consumers of the offline channel.
Certainly, this fraction is quite low at such price levels.
The contribution figures to the total online consumers bO1 are quite different. Till
firm 1’s online price is met, the major contributors are non switching extra con-
sumers from the online channel and offline consumers of firm 2 migrating towards
firm 1’s online channel. After exceeding that point, the main players appear to be
consumers migrating from firm 1’s offline channel towards its online channel. An
additional source is also extra consumers captured due to lower online pricing
than firm 2, which make up around 10 % between both online prices. Within that
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price range, firm 1 could also attract most consumers towards its online channel.
Once firm 1’s offline price exceeds firm 2’s online price, the major contributors to
the total online consumers still remain consumers switching from firm 1’s offline
channel, but the impact of extra online consumers not migrating is increasing.
This is an effect of declining total online consumers due to fewer switching of-
fline consumers. Therefore, the number of “fixed” extra consumers of the online
channel becomes more and more important.
After it exceeds even firm 2’ offline price the online price consists of almost en-
tirely extra consumers of the online channel and not switching consumers from
the online channel which are shared between both firms. Firm 1 could also attract
consumers from both offline channels at a certain rate due to lower prices. Af-
ter surpassing firm 2’s offline price, both offline channels contribute around 10 %
each to the total online consumer base of firm 1, but these levels are decreasing to
less than 1 % in the end.
The figures in the second column, denoted by suffix (2), result from firm 1’s on-
line price of 0.4, firm 2’ offline price of 0.2 and its online price of 0.3. Again, the
offline price of firm 1 varies. In the first figure an overview of each firm’s con-
sumers is presented. The difference to the former situation is evident. As firm 1’s
offline price reaches that of firm 2, the total offline consumer base bB1 starts to
decrease, the really harmful event happens when firm 2’s online price is also sur-
passed. Firm 1’s achievable consumers fall dramatically. Extra consumers offline
also vanish as firm 2’s offline price is touched.
The two remaining figures (Consumer Drift Offline (2) and Consumer Drift Online
(2)) depict the situation in more detail. The basic offline consumers decline with
the rise in the offline price. But one has to keep in mind that switching consumers
have to be subtracted from these values. The number of consumers not switching
from firm 1’s offline channel drops at first at the crossing point with firm 2’s
offline price, secondly with firm 2’s online price and finally with firm 1’s online
price. That issue is also visible in the decomposition of the online price. One
can observe the spike in the number of consumers switching from firm 1’s offline
channel towards its online channel.
The contribution values for this scenario are quite different. The total offline con-
sumers of firm 1 almost entirely depend on the non switching shared or basic con-
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sumers. As the offline price is below firm 2’s offline price, the non migrating extra
consumers of the offline channel also add to the total offline consumers, but after
surpassing firm 2’s offline price more than 90 % of the total consumers stem from
the basic offline consumers. Till the level of the online prices consumers could be
persuaded to migrate to firm 1’s offline channel but after even exceeding those lev-
els, the non switching basic consumers alone make up the total consumers in the
offline channel of firm 1. The total online consumers of firm 1 start to consist of
basic online consumers not switching away till the offline price exceeds the online
price at 0.4. Afterwards, the online channel attracts 88.9 % of its consumers from
firm 1’s offline channel. The number of basic online consumers not switching
away drop to 11.1 % a share of total online consumers. Since the number of of-
fline consumers declines with rising offline prices, the impact of those consumers
decreases to 0.03 % in the end. In contrast, the fraction of basic online consumers
being responsible for the total online consumers increases to 99.7 % in the same
way. Note, since firm 1’s online price is higher than any price of firm 2 no other
source of consumers could be tapped.
The figures give a very raw overview of the interrelation. For a more detailed view
refer to the corresponding Tables A.3 and A.4 in the appendix. However, the main
picture is the following. There seems to be a kind of equal weight between both
channels. The channel offering a lower price is able to attract consumers from
other channels. If a channel obtains an advantage this value should be very low,
which is confirmed by Table 10.4.
10.5 Pricing
The first important result is that firm 1 should keep a successful pricing strategy
through the linear evolvement of consumers, i.e. the successful pricing strategy
for an offline and online consumer base of one also proves successful if both
consumer bases become 20, 40, 60, 80 and 100. Note that both consumer bases
have to increase by the same amount in a linear fashion. Thus, if firm 1 exercises
already a perfect pricing strategy at an offline and online consumer base of the
same amount, and the number of available consumers is expected to double in
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each channel, firm 1 should simply do nothing. The current pricing policy will
prove close to optimum.
Market Environment
Profit Max. 6.55904 pB2 = ˜pB2 , pO2 = 0.10001, ξB2 = 1
Min. 0.06099 pO2 = ˜pO2 , pB2 = 0.10001, ξB2 = 1
Offline Max. 26.06772 pB2 = ˜pB2 , pO2 = 0.10001, ξO2 = 1
Consumer Min. 0.15190 pO2 = ˜pO2 , pB2 = 0.10001, ξO2 = 1
Online Max. 29.81364 pO2 = ˜pO2 , pB2 = 0.10001, ξB2 = 1
Consumer Min. 0.11902 pO2 = ˜pO2 , pB2 = 0.10001, ξB2 = 1
Offline Prices Max. 0.40205 pB2 = ˜pB2 , pO2 = 0.10001, ξB2 = 1
Min. 0.25037 pO2 = ˜pO2 , pB2 = 0.10001, ξO2 = 1
Online Prices Max. 0.28848 pO2 = ˜pO2 , pB2 = 0.10001, ξO2 = 1
Min. 0.18145 pO2 = ˜pO2 , pB2 = 0.10001, ξB2 = 1
Table 10.5: Results Summary
Table 10.5 presents an overview of the most interesting results. A more detailed
overview of the results can be found in the appendix A.1.
The first result is that irrespective of firm 2’s pricing and marketing activities (sce-
narios) the overall maximum profit for firm 1 could be reached in an environment
where firm 2 offers online prices almost at its costs, offline prices like a monopolist
and further conducts maximal effective offline marketing, neglecting any market-
ing efforts in the online channel. That offline price seems to be too high for that
market situation and therefore the offline market is left to firm 1. Firm 1 prices at
on average 0.28459 (Median 0.27039, Std.Dev. 0.037318), whereas firm 2 prices
at 0.34649 in the offline channel. The offline market, where consumers exhibit
higher reservation prices, is almost run by firm 1. Although the number of offline
consumers which are captured in that market situation (25.97320) is close to the
maximum, it already indicates the importance of the offline channel. Consumer
drift pictures stress that issue very strongly. Total offline consumers consist of
57.7 % of not switching offline consumers and 39.5 % of not switching extra of-
fline consumers. Together offline consumers make up 97.2 % of the total offline
consumers. The influence of online consumers is negligible, which is natural since
firm 2’s online price is highly competitive.
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The minimum profit firm 1 is able to make is in an environment in which firm 2
prices most aggressively in the offline channel, i.e. at its costs, conducts mo-
nopolistic pricing in the online channel and performs top marketing in the offline
channel. This result could also be expected. The offline market is slightly more
important for books, and just in that channel firm 2 prices at marginal costs. Thus,
firm 1 is able to attack firm 2 by no means whatsoever as long as the number of
online consumers remains low. Firm 1 conducts an average pricing of 0.33496
(Median 0.33814, Std.Dev. 0.00768), which is far above firm 2’s offline price of
0.10001. The market left to firm 1 remains the online market. This part how-
ever could only become profitable if a certain number of consumers are available
through this channel. If both consumer bases are 100 as in the maximum profit
environment, the profit in the current scenario is not that far below the overall
maximum, just the sources are different. In the current scenario with the maxi-
mal consumer bases firm 1 could earn a profit of 6.09880. The important issue
is that this profit depends largely on online consumers which are not switching
away from that channel. Although firm 2 prices a monopolistic price (0.21877)
firm 1 could attack firm 2 in the online market. Firm 1 manages to receive the
largest share possible in that sub market by pricing an average price of 0.19245
(Median 0.18372, Std.Dev. 0.02435) below its competitor’s price and captures a
large number of available online consumers which make up almost the amount of
the overall maximum consumers ever acquired in the online channel (28.92044
versus 29.81364). But if the online market is negligible, firm 1 runs into trouble
especially if the offline market turns out to be also very narrow.
The maximum offline consumers could interestingly be captured in an environ-
ment where firm 2 prices at its cost online, supported by an excellent marketing
and prices monopolistically offline only. This outcome could be expected since
the offline channel is again left to firm 1. Even more, since firm 1 always per-
forms optimal marketing it could draw additional consumers to its offline channel
because firm 2’s marketing in the offline channel is zero. Although the offline
price of firm 1 is higher than any online price, only a small fraction of offline con-
sumers migrate to both online channels. The important thing is that firm 1 could
manage to keep a large amount of its offline consumers. The number of offline
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consumers is almost entirely composed of not switching offline and extra offline
consumers.
From that, it might be less surprising that the maximum number of online con-
sumers could be generated in an environment where firm 2 prices at its costs of-
fline and monopolistically online. Firm 2’s perfect marketing is performed in the
online channel. In such a situation firm 1 could draw a lot of consumers towards
its online channel. The total number of online consumers is composed of 97.5 %
of not switching online consumers.
Books seem to offer a well-balanced consumer structure in each channel. This
feature allows firm 1 to attack firm 2 on the alternative channel. So if firm 2 starts
to become price leader in one channel, firm 1 holds the option to become price
leader in the alternative channel and will still be well off. Since no channel holds
a large competitive advantage, switching will become small if prices are similar.
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Chapter 11
Results Clothes
Clothes may be the other kind of products (Keeney 1999). Consumers may per-
ceive huge differences purchasing apparel in the Internet. These products tradi-
tionally exhibit a necessity for sensory examination. For example, tactile offline
experiences could not be replicated online. Consumers may not trust images in the
online environment since colors may be distorted. Another issue refers to mea-
sures. It is hard to judge whether a purchased dress fits without trying it. Textual
descriptions of sensory attributes do not satisfy consumers. It seems evident that
the online channel has to overcome some obstacles when selling products such
as clothes. (Chircu and Mahajan 2006). Further, return policies may also repre-
sent a hurdle (de Koster et al. 2002). Thus, consumers tend to utilize the offline
channel for purchases where sensory attributes become important (Konana and
Balasubramanian 2005, Gehrt and Yan 2004).
Results from the survey tend to support these issues. Most of the respondents un-
dertake their typical apparel purchase through traditional stores. 254 consumers
prefer the offline channel, whereas only 43 consumers utilize the online chan-
nel for purchasing clothes. This large difference seems to support the mentioned
difficulties and risks when purchasing online. Traditional stores may hold some
competitive advantage against online stores.
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Figure 11.1: Frequency of Relative Price Statements
The estimates for the different Beta distributions are conducted by maximum like-
lihood and depicted in Figure 11.1. All prices are again normalized relative to the
overall maximum of 1000. Those prices are typically paid by offline consumers at
a usual purchasing occasion. The red lines again indicate the corresponding Beta
density functions. Although the offline channel holds a competitive advantage
over the online channel, a certain price range seems to be interesting for firms do-
ing such business in the Internet. At a price range of 5−150 C the online channel
could capture 86.9 % of its consumer base, whereas the offline channel is able to
acquire 54.2 % of its initial consumer base. But due to the fact that the online con-
sumer base adds up to a mere 16.9 % of the offline consumer base, absolute figures
look very different. If we divide the price range into smaller pieces things may
become clearer. At a price range of 5− 50 C the offline channel retains 25.9 %
and the online channel 13.6 % of each total available consumer base. Thus, in
the low price segment the offline channel seems to exhibit advantages over the
online channel. The findings further suggest that in an intermediate price range
11.1. MARKETING STRATEGIES 123
the online channel may be able to strike back and capture most of its available
consumer base. The high price segment is definitely held by traditional stores.
Those are able to acquire 33.4 % of their total consumer base within a price range
of 150− 500 C, whereas in the online channel only 13.1 % of the available con-
sumer base are conducting their purchase through this channel. Keeping these
figures in mind, the offline market turn out to be the most important market for
firms doing business in that industry. Thus, pricing may be strongly determined
by the offline environment.
A typical observation regards switching probabilities. The data seem to indicate a
lower propensity to switch for offline consumers. Therefore, firms performing an
online business in that industry may not only be confronted with price sensitive
consumers running away to the offline channel, but also with a very low consumer
base compared to the offline environment. Individualization may be a way to
overcome some obstacles of selling such sensory-intensive products.
Shape Parameter
p q
Offline Reservation Price 0.6453024 3.6127472
Online Reservation Price 4.0247430 37.1375760
Offline → Online Switching 0.11659230 6.29874870
Online → Offline Switching 0.09456613 6.40430122
Table 11.1: Parameter for the Beta Distribution
Table 11.1 gives the final parameters for each Beta distribution. Again, since intra-
channel switching (SFOO and SFBB) was not part of the survey, these switching
probabilities were eliminated from the model.
11.1 Marketing Strategies
The overall ranking of all available marketing strategies again is calculated in the
same way as with books (see Equation 10.2).
On an individual basis, 225 participants voted assessment first place. This is not
surprising since for this kind of products consumers regard sensory attributes per-
suasive for evaluating its utility. A fraction of 123 consumers ranked availability to
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be most important for purchasing clothes in traditional stores. Availability may be
a natural outcome, since without the item being available in the store, consumers
could not judge its sensory attributes, which in the end makes no difference of
purchasing in the Internet. Assortment with 23 votes for number one, counseling
capturing 22 votes and quality retrieving 20 votes for first place follow on place.
Assortment seems to be important. Since consumer tastes are individually differ-
ent, assortment may prove important to satisfy each individual taste. Counseling
may serve as a decisive selling proposition to attract consumers. Friendly sales
personnel might be a good investment in industries where subjective tastes decide
upon purchasing or not-purchasing (Hansen and Deutscher 1977, Ba¨ckstro¨m and
Johansson 2006). Finally, quality appears in the list of numerous number one
votes. Subjective tastes may be evaluated by individual quality perceptions. Con-
sumers affirm their expertise by touching the material and trying on the clothes
(Balasubramanian et al. 2005, Verhoef et al. 2007). Quality therefore could only
be judged by directly accessing the item. The online channel prevents consumers
from evaluating the quality prior to the purchase.
In the online channel again convenience is rated to be most important. For 194
consumers convenience is the number one attribute regarding decisions to buy
in the Internet. Almost at the same levels follow assortment, delivery time and
return policy. Assortment is voted on first place by 45 participants. This result
is very similar to offline consumers’ demand for variety. As already mentioned
tastes differ, the higher the available variety, the higher the probability that a con-
sumer finds what he desires (Verhoef et al. 2007). A fraction of 42 consumers
voted delivery time as number one. This behavior reflects consumers’ preference
for immediate consumption (Read and Loewenstein 1995). Thus, short and reli-
able delivery time may be an important marketing attribute to attract consumers
to the online channel (Bakos 1997, Keeney 1999). Finally, 40 participants ranked
return policy as number one. This outcome could be expected, because of subjec-
tive evaluations of product attributes. Consumers are able to judge the purchased
product not until the item arrives at their home. Thus, high rates of uncertainty
about sensory attributes unsettle consumers. Therefore, its is obvious that easy
return policies may help to lower that uncertainty (Hansen and Deutscher 1977,
Lim and Dubinsky 2004, Gehrt and Yan 2004).
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Figures 11.2 and 11.3 depict the rankings for first place, i.e. most important at-
tribute, up to fifth place. The tremendous importance of assessment in the offline
channel is evident at first glance. This is already a huge difference to books. Ob-
viously purchasing clothes is strongly linked to assessment. This should not be
surprising. Clothes are products which consumers usually want to try on, touch,
feel and see the fabric (Keeney 1999, Verhoef et al. 2007). The demand for these
experiences may be a large obstacle to selling clothes online. That five times as
many consumers preferring the online channel still choose the offline channel for
purchasing clothes stresses that issue. The second most important feature, avail-
ability, is natural. If the desired product is not in stock an alternative shop will be
visited.
For consumers buying online, again convenience, followed by assortment are the
decisive factors. These factors should be optimally served by the Internet. An im-
portant factor, which may be caused by high uncertainty about experience factors
(touching, feeling, seeing), is return policies for clothes.
Offline Online
Availability 0.11283186 Delivery Time 0.03848647
Brand of Store 0.01999052 Convenience 0.10808621
Atmosphere 0.02963021 Usability 0.04521147
Counseling 0.03847977 Delivery Options 0.02900664
Assortment 0.05657396 Information 0.05274672
Convenience 0.02220291 Security 0.02690002
Service 0.02662769 Privacy 0.02009399
Clientele 0.00331858 Brand of Shop 0.02690002
Quality 0.05246523 Interactivity 0.01126236
Security 0.01359039 Return Policy 0.04456328
Privacy 0.00434576 Quality 0.03459731
Assessment 0.11994311 Assortment 0.05914763
Clientele 0.00299789
Table 11.2: Optimal Marketing Spending
Table 11.2 represents the total ranking (see Equation 10.2) of all available mar-
keting attributes. Firms behaving accordingly will cause the maximum impact on
consumers.
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The figures in detail reveal nothing really new compared to the number one view.
One interesting outcome is that counseling is no longer present above a 5 % level
in the offline channel, whereas all others, notably assessment and quality, are still
major factors for the offline environment.
In the online environment, information appears with a percentage of 5.2 % in the
class of more important marketing attributes, while delivery time as well as return
policy are no longer present above a 5% level. This is an interesting result but
deeper insight might be gained be cross-comparing all three products.
11.2 Elasticity
As clothes seem to be more bound to the offline channel, the impact of offline
pricing to consumers in that channel should be high.
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Figure 11.4: Price Elasticity versus the Offline Price of Firm 1
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Figure 11.4 shows the elasticities of offline prices, offline and online consumers
of firm 1 as well as profit shapes of both firms. The Figures Price Elasticity (1)
and Profit (1) depict the dynamics related to an increasing offline price of firm 1
subject to firm 1’s online price of 0.4 and firm 2’s offline and online prices of 0.7
and 0.6 respectively. As firm 1’s offline price exceeds its online price, a notable
change in the number of consumers can be observed. The interesting part comes
into view as firm 1’s offline price also exceeds firm 2’s online price. A small kink
in the profit shape and almost no influence on the current number of consumers
materializes. Things become very different as firm 1’s offline price reaches and
exceeds firm 2’s offline price. Firm 1’s profits falls apart, whereas firm 2’s profits
soar. The importance of the offline channel is more pronounced in the figures
Price Elasticity (2) and Profit (2) of Figure 11.4. The relatively low online price
of firm 2 seems to have almost no impact on firm 1’s offline consumers or its
profits. The dramatic impact stems from firm 1’s offline price exceeding firm 2’s
offline price. The resulting drop in offline consumers and the decline in profits are
apparent.
11.3 Mean and Variance
The picture of a clothes environment should be different to books, since most
consumers prefer purchasing clothes through traditional stores.
Offline Online Both
Mean Reservation Prices 0.09232283 0.09779070 0.09311448
Variance of Reservation Prices 0.00853055 0.00212655 0.00759677
Mean Markup 0.01921260 0.01548837 0.01867340
Variance Markup 0.00083912 0.00047764 0.00078672
Table 11.3: Results Summary
Table 11.3 displays different values from the survey. The Mann-Whitney test on
offline prices being lower than online prices turns out to be highly significant
below a 5 % confident interval (p-value=0.006181). From this result, one could
deduce that offline reservation prices are lower than online reservation prices on
average. For the level of desired markups no significance was found.
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The variance in reservation prices also seems to be congruent. Interestingly,
the Ansari-Bradley test reveals online markups to be less disparsed than offline
markups (p-value 0.01029), i.e. online consumers seem to hold more clear ideas
of their desired markup if they were forced to purchase in the offline channel.
The lower variance may also be explained by the comparably low number of con-
sumers purchasing in the online shop.
11.4 Consumer Drift Dynamics
For clothes a huge competitive advantage for the offline channel comes into light.
This fact is already stressed by Figure 11.1. Utilizing Equations 10.3 and 10.4 we
get the competitive advantage of the offline channel at zero and the competitive
disadvantage of the online channel at 0.8307087. Remember that positive num-
bers indicate discounts which are required in that channel to make consumers at
least indifferent between both channels.
OFIBO 0
OFIOB 0.8307087
OFFBO 0
OFFBB -
OFFOB 0.8307087
OFFOO -
Table 11.4: Initial Offset Values
Table 11.4 depicts the large disadvantages of the online channels. Firms which
like to implement a well-balanced pricing strategy in each channel to minimize
switching have to grant a deep discount of about 0.8307087 in the online channel.
Otherwise consumers tend to move to traditional stores.
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Figure 11.5: Elasticity
Figure 11.5 presents the composition of consumers in each channel for firm 1. For
clothes again the same scenarios as for books are applied. Column one displays
consumers’ behavior at firm 1’s online price of 0.5 and firm 2’s offline and on-
line price of 0.7 and 0.6, respectively. Again, total consumers of firm 1’s offline
channel bB1 decrease as the corresponding price increases. At the level of firm 1’s
online price a radical drop in that number of consumers could be observed. Note
that consumers migrate to firm 1’s online channel bO1 at that point. The figure
Consumer Drift Offline (1) underlines that argument. The number of extra offline
consumers not migrating to the online channel drops as the online price of firm 1
is met. Note that still a number of extra consumers are generated through lower
pricing in firm 1’s offline channel compared to firm 2’s offline channel. But as the
figures point out, those are switching towards the online channel. Further, note
the slight difference between the not switching extra consumers or the extra con-
sumers in general and the total consumers in the offline channel bB1 . This means
that above firm 2’s offline price of 0.7 almost no consumers are available. Thus,
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firm 1’s offline base is almost overall composed of extra consumers due to lower
pricing. The share of total online consumers bO1 is almost insignificant. This
may again indicate the importance of the offline channel for purchasing clothes.
The figures also show that the increase in online consumers is driven by migrating
consumers, not by consumers obtained from the channel itself. Thus, the online
channel could hardly obtain consumers due to its pricing. The argument of the
importance of the offline channel becomes even more weighty if the composition
of total offline consumers bB1 within both online prices is observed in detail. One
could observe that offline consumers are almost entirely built of consumers not
switching away from that channel. The fraction of consumers migrating from
firm 2’s online channel towards firm 1’s offline channel due to lower pricing is
negligible.
The figure Consumer Drift Online (1) displays the previously mentioned drift be-
havior again. Total consumers online rise as the offline price meets the online
price. The effect is mainly driven by extra offline consumers migrating to the
cheaper online channel of firm 1. Additionally, a small fraction of consumers of
firm 1’s basic offline consumers also start switching towards its online channel.
This share of consumers drops as firm 2’s online price is met. Also note the small
decrease in total online consumers bO1 as the online price of firm 1 is surpassed.
This might also indicate the almost negligible power of the online consumers.
The contribution figures of this scenario are different than with books. First, con-
sider the ridiculously small amount of basic consumers in the offline as well as in
the online channel. That indicates that firm 2’s offline and online price both are far
too high for the current market (see Table 11.3). Remember that basic or shared
offline consumers are determined by the highest offline price in the economy. For
the basic online price the calculation is adequate. Therefore, it is not surprising
to see extra offline consumers to be the major source of consumers for firm 1’s
offline channel in the beginning and keep on being dominante until firm 2’s of-
fline price is surpassed. Interestingly, the offline channel of firm 1 is able to attract
consumers from each online channel of the environment due to its low price. Just
before the offline price hits firm 1’s online price, the main contributors to the to-
tal offline consumers are non switching extra offline consumers (92.8 %) and non
switching basic offline consumers (7.2 %) of firm 1.
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Online consumers also migrate to the offline channel but their magnitude is too
small to become relevant. Thus, the offline channel appears strong to attract con-
sumers, which again underlines the importance of the offline channel for such
products. After exceeding firm 1’s online price, the major source of offline con-
sumers stems from firm 1’s extra offline consumers, which amounts between 80 %
and 94 % till firm 2’s offline price is met. Afterwards this source of consumers
dries up naturally. The remaining source of consumers becomes not switching
basic consumers from the offline channel.
In the beginning total online consumers are entirely based on offline consumers of
firm 2 migrating to firm 1’s online channel due to distinctive lower pricing. Until
firm 1’s online price is met by its offline price, the single source of online con-
sumers remains switching consumers of firm 2’s offline channel (almost 100 %).
It is interesting to note that the online channel itself is not able to attract con-
sumers. Throughout the variations of firm 1’s offline price the contribution of the
non switching online consumers and the non switching extra online consumers
remains insignificant. When firm 1’s online price is met by its offline price, con-
sumers start to migrate to its online channel due to its lower price. Therefore, the
main parts of total online consumers are switching offline consumers and switch-
ing extra offline consumers of firm 1. But if firm 2’s offline price is surpassed
the source of extra consumers is ebbing. From that point on the components of
the total online consumers are switching offline consumers of both firms. At the
crossing point, i.e. each offline channel prices equally, each offline channel do-
nates exactly 50 % of the total online consumers. Since firm 1’s offline price is
still rising, the contribution of that channel declines, whereas firm 2’s contribution
increases. However, the total amount of online consumers drops further after the
crossing point.
The second column gives the results for firm 1’s online price of 0.4 and firm 2’s
prices of 0.2 in the offline and 0.3 in the online channel. A similar picture as with
books emerges. Total offline consumers drop dramatically after exceeding firm 2’s
online and offline prices. At the level of 0.2, firm 1 loses all its extra consumers
due to lower pricing. The second figure shows that issue in more detail. The
number of not switching offline consumers almost vanishes as the offline price of
firm 1 exceeds its online price. Not switching extra offline consumers disappear
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as the offline price exceeds firm 2’s offline price. More interesting may be the
last figure concerning the online channel of firm 1. Since both prices of firm 2
are below firm 1’s online price, firm 1 is not able to capture any extra consumers.
Even worse, the basic consumers remain at low levels. Consumers migrating from
firm 1’s offline channel show a spike after the offline channel price surpasses the
online channel price. This spike results in an increase in total online consumers
bO1 of almost the same amount. The price in the online channel of firm 1 al-
ready seems too high to capture a significant fraction of consumers. Contribution
figures for this scenario again show very extreme values. Until firm 2’s offline
price is met, the total offline consumers of firm 1 consist of non switching offline
consumers and non switching extra offline consumers. Both sources add up to
approximately 99 % of the total offline consumers. After that point the unique
source of offline consumers remains non switching offline consumers. Sure there
are some consumers migrating from both online channels towards the offline chan-
nel of firm 1, but the number of consumers in both channel stays too low to make
significant contributions.
As mentioned previously, clothes seem to have low mean reservation prices (see
Table 11.3). The total online consumers of firm 1 on the other hand start to rely
on non switching online consumers. But after firm 1’s offline price surpasses
its online price this channel is able to attract some consumers from the offline
channel. Thus, right after the crossing point the total online consumers of firm 1
are almost entirely composed of firm 1’s offline consumers migrating to its online
channel (99.9 %). Since the offline price is still rising, the magnitude of these
migrating consumers’ influence declines. In the end the major contributors to
firm 1’s total online consumers are made up of 2.5 % migrating offline consumers
of firm 1 and 97.5 % not switching online consumers.
The weakness of the online channel is evident. At certain points the online channel
is not able to prevent consumers from switching away. On the other hand, the
offline channel shows sticky consumers. It holds power to capture consumers
from the offline as well as from the online channel. Although online consumers
are quite low due to too high pricing a large fraction is migrating towards the
offline channel. So firms should keep in mind the strong effect of the offline
channel for such products.
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11.5 Pricing
The strategy, like with books, of keeping a successful pricing strategy on linear
changes of consumers bases of both channels no longer exists. For clothes things
appear different. The reliable pricing strategy of books works just in certain sit-
uations. Firm 1 could stick to its prices in environments where firm 2 prices at
its cost in the offline channel and therefore monopolistically in the online envi-
ronment. In such situations firm 1 could keep its well-working pricing strategy as
long as both consumer bases change by the same amount. If the market situation
is different, that strategy would fail to return maximal profits.
Market Environment
Profit Max. 7.09419 pO2 = ˜pO2 , pB2 = 0.10001, ξO2 = 1
Min. 0.02023 pB2 = ˜pB2 , pO2 = 0.10001, ξB2 = 1
Offline Max. 20.79750 pO2 = ˜pO2 , pB2 = 0.10001, ξO2 = 1
Consumer Min. 0.08345 pO2 = ˜pO2 , pB2 = 0.10001, ξB2 = 1
Online Max. 18.40330 pO2 = ˜pO2 , pB2 = 0.10001, ξO2 = 1
Consumer Min. 0.00001 pO2 = ˜pO2 , pB2 = 0.10001, ξB2 = 1
Offline Prices Max. 0.65763 pO2 = ˜pO2 , pB2 = 0.10001, ξO2 = 1
Min. 0.21202 pB2 = ˜pB2 , pO2 = 0.10001, ξO2 = 1
Online Prices Max. 0.69821 pO2 = ˜pO2 , pB2 = 0.10001, ξB2 = 1
Min. 0.10001 pO2 = ˜pO2 , pB2 = 0.10001, ξB2 = 1
Table 11.5: Results Summary
Table 11.5 gives an overview of the most interesting results. A detailed overview
of the results can be found in the appendix A.2.
The overall maximum profit can be achieved in an environment where firm 2
prices at its costs in the offline channel, commanding monopolistic pricing in the
online channel and exercising perfect marketing in the online channel. A profit
of 7.09419 could be reached by firm 1. Firm 1 follows a clear rip-off strategy in
such a situation. Although the offline market is the more interesting one, firm 1
prices extraordinarily high in that channel, on average about 0.49345 (Median
0.55142, Std.Dev. 0.12798). But one has to note here that at times when the on-
line consumer base is extremely small compared to the offline base, i.e. at every
circumstance when the online consumer base is one, firm 1 reverses its strategy.
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In such situations firm 1 prices both channels almost equally to minimize can-
nibalization. This strategy is obvious. As long as the online consumer base is
not profitable, firm 1 has to face the strong pricing of firm 2 and tries to offer
competitive prices. If there is no price range left for offering its own competitive
pricing, firm 1 chooses to minimize cannibalization. As soon as the online market
becomes profitable, firm 1 strikes back and offers highly competitive prices in the
online environment and just exploits the offline channel with high prices. Usu-
ally, online prices turn out to be on average 0.11480 (Median 0.10024, Std.Dev.
0.04893). So, firm 1 undercuts firm 2’s online price, which is at 0.13882. One can
see that firm 1 as well as firm 2 both act with highly aggressive pricing policies in
that market environment.
The smallest profit firm 1 is able to generate stems from an environment in which
firm 2 prices monopolistically with an excellent marketing in the online channel
and, further, commands prices at cost level in the online channel. As the monop-
olistic price firm 2 announces 0.27423 in the offline channel. Although firm 1 at
times undercuts this price and sometimes even tries to compete in the online chan-
nel with similar prices as firm 2, profits stay small. It seems that such situations
allow almost no competitive action for firm 1. Firm 1 again tries to implement
a similar rip-off strategy as in the scenario where it achieves maximum profits.
So it commands relatively high offline and extremely low online prices. Since
firm 2’s online prices are also quite low, almost no extra consumers could be at-
tracted. Although firm 1 undercuts firm 2’s offline price, the discount seems to
satisfy consumers less. These results appear also in similar situations, i.e. each
time firm 2 prices monopolistically offline and at its cost level online irrespective
of the marketing investments. This situation forms a perfectly undesirable market
environment for firm 1, since even the monopolistic pricing in the offline channel
turns out to have competitive strength.
Regarding the maximum consumers, firm 1 is able to attract most offline con-
sumers in a market situation where it also generates its highest profits. Interest-
ingly, though, firm 1 offers extremely low prices in the online channel. The result
is that firm 1 generates a large number of extra consumers in the online chan-
nel. But due to the channel advantage of the offline channel, they tend to migrate
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towards the offline channel. Almost 90 % of the offline consumers stem from
switching online consumers.
Another interesting thing is that the maximum attainable online consumers oc-
cur in scenarios which display five times as many online consumers as offline
consumers. These consumers are attracted from not switching extra online con-
sumers alone. Profits turn out to be less, since to capture all online consumers
firm 1 prices extremely low in the online channel and prohibitively high in the
offline channel, so that migration is minimized.
To summarize the findings: if firm 2 is strong price leader in the offline chan-
nel. Since the offline channel is the more important one for products like clothes,
firm 1 has to conduct an alternative strategy. Firm 1’s strategy is to draw online
consumers towards its offline channel. This strategy proves to be successful at
times when firm 2 prices monopolistically in the online channel. Firm 1 under-
cuts that price, attracts consumers and some of them tend to migrate to firm 1’s
offline channel due to the channel advantage. There is little place for firm 1 to
perform its own pricing strategies, it rather has to react to firm 2’s competitive
pricing in such environments.
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Results Digital Camera
Digital cameras are highly technical items. Descriptions of such devices encom-
pass technical attributes like focal length, insolation and resolution. It may be-
come difficult for consumers to evaluate all items and furthermore bring that in-
formation in line with their needs. On the one hand a comprehensive descrip-
tion of digital cameras would easily be achievable within the online environment.
Technical attributes entirely describe a camera and are usually given in real num-
bers. Comparison may no longer be as simple as with books, but with all relevant
information consumers should be able to come up with an optimal purchase deci-
sion. Unfortunately humans suffer some cognitive limitations, which do not allow
them to process such a big load of complex information. Therefore, suboptimal
decisions may arise due to information overloads (Malhotra 1982).
Although all relevant information could be presented in the online environment,
some consumers may long for counseling or testing the product. This behavior
may arise as a result of too much technical information. Technophile consumers
may show less fear of not getting what they want, other may secure themselves by
asking sales personnel or testing the camera themselves.
To estimate the shapes of the various distributions we received 302 price state-
ments from consumers favoring online shops and 127 consumers preferring to
purchase in the offline environment. The difference is surprising. Around twice
as many consumers of the offline channel utilize the alternative online channel for
performing their digital camera purchase.
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Figure 12.1: Frequency of Relative Price Price Statements
Figure 10.1 displays the frequency of all price statements relative to the overall
maximum of 3000 paid at a usual purchasing occasion. The Figures Reservation
Price Offline and Reservation Price Online show the prices at which the digital
camera was actually bought. The required markup for switching to the alternative
channel is depicted in the other figures. Again, the whole price range of digital
cameras is normalized at 3000 and therefore all prices are between zero and one.
The red lines again mark the estimated Beta density functions for the prices and
markups.
The overall highest price paid for digital cameras now stems from the online chan-
nel. Further, reservations prices online appear higher than in the offline channel.
This indicates the importance of the online channel relative to the traditional chan-
nel. Because of consumers’ inherent higher reservation prices in the online chan-
nel, consumer rents may be higher, which makes this channel more interesting for
firms. This fact is underlined by differences in obtainable consumers. At a price
of 0.5 the firm is able to achieve 11.3 % of the total online consumer base but at
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the same price almost no consumer from the offline base is willing to purchase
digital cameras.
Nevertheless, this is not the whole story. The offline channel holds its advantages
in the lower price segment. If we take the number of consumers which could be
reached by a price range from 100 C to 300 C, a firm could reach about 33.4 %
of the total consumer base in the offline environment and a mere 13.8 % in the
online environment. This may be due to an assortment offering lower prices in the
offline channel, so that digital cameras in the offline channel may even be bought
as the consumers pass by the store.
Higher priced digital cameras perform very differently. Within a price range of
500− 1000 C the online channel takes over. For such items a firm could attract
23 % of the online consumers but the number of interested offline consumers falls
to 17.9 %. In this case one may hypothesize about increased information demand.
The online channel could present an overwhelming amount of information. An-
other assertion may be that high priced items are bought by consumers who “know
what they do”, i.e. technically affine consumers who have some expertise with
digital cameras and are able to judge the quality of these items by just comparing
data sheets. If we take the increased information demand of 6.6 % (see Figure
12.3) for such items in the online channel into account, this statement might con-
tain some relevance.
Regarding the propensity to migrate towards an alterative sales channel, a sim-
ilar result as with books materializes. Offline consumers appear to exhibit less
propensity to switch than online consumers. Thus, the online channel may be the
more interesting channel but pricing should be done very carefully.
Shape Parameter Distribution
p q at the Model
Offline Reservation Price 2.5848580 20.4944280 RB
Online Reservation Price 0.6788757 2.46354660 RO
Offline → Online Switching 0.1388618 8.97627020 SIBO,SFBO
Online → Offline Switching 0.0983261 10.16078696 SIOB,SFOB
Table 12.1: Parameter for the Beta Distribution
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The shape parameters for the Beta distributions are given in Table 12.1. Again,
since intra-channel switching (SFOO and SFBB) was not part of the survey, these
switching probabilities were eliminated from the model.
12.1 Marketing Strategies
Concerning the most favorable marketing strategies total ranking is calculated as
with books (see Equation 10.2).
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Figure 12.2: Importance of Marketing Attributes Offline
For digital cameras 177 consumers in the offline channel demand availability as
the most important attribute and 90 participants regarded the opportunity of as-
sessment to be most important (see Figure 12.2). At last 66 consumers appreciated
counseling and voted it number one (e.g., Hansen and Deutscher 1977, Ba¨ckstro¨m
and Johansson 2006). The major influence of assessment and counseling may
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suggest that less technically affine consumers purchase through traditional store
environments since both activities could reduce consumers’ perceived risks.
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Figure 12.3: Importance of Marketing Attributes Online
In the online environment (see Figure 12.3) a share of 146 consumers regarded
convenience to be the most important attribute for online channels. This attribute
is typical for this environment since its description consists of 24/7 and home de-
livery. Thus, this attribute is some kind of “natural” online attribute (e.g., Donthu
and Garcia 1999). Information on the other hand, which was voted by 67 con-
sumers as number one, may also be provided in traditional stores. However, in the
online environment the evaluation of that information is bound to consumers. Data
sheets and technical descriptions provide guidance, but comparing and weighing
those parameters against each other is left to the consumer. Thus, one may ascer-
tain online consumers to be more technically informed and hold higher expertise
than an average offline consumer (e.g., Donthu and Garcia 1999). Another im-
portant attribute is delivery time. Delivery time may be perceived as additional
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costs (e.g., Bakos 1997, Liang and Huang 1998). Thus, immediate delivery may
improve perceived shopping experience and shed a positive light on the online
channel (Soopramanien and Robertson 2007).
Offline Online
Availability 0.113650895 Delivery Time 0.048052363
Brand of Store 0.025415601 Convenience 0.098180077
Atmosphere 0.020859974 Usability 0.034562580
Counseling 0.069693095 Delivery Options 0.032407407
Assortment 0.043158568 Information 0.066171775
Convenience 0.024056905 Security 0.030172414
Service 0.047714194 Privacy 0.011414432
Clientele 0.003196931 Brand of Shop 0.023148148
Quality 0.044037724 Interactivity 0.026021711
Security 0.026614450 Return Policy 0.033604725
Privacy 0.005115090 Quality 0.039431673
Assessment 0.076486573 Assortment 0.054916986
Clientele 0.001915709
Table 12.2: Optimal Marketing Spending
Table 12.2 shows in which marketing activities firms should invest. The values
represent the percentage values of optimal investments in different marketing op-
erations which maximize the effect on consumers. These values show the total
ranking (see Equation 10.2).
Note that taking a 5 % boundary for important activities, availability, assessment
and counseling appears to be most effective in the offline environment. In the
online channel, convenience, information and assortment turn out to be most im-
portant. Assortment seems to be supported by the price range. Higher priced
products, premium digital cameras may be hard to find in traditional stores. On-
line stores offer the necessary depth of assortment to serve “power-users” demand
(Lim and Dubinsky 2004, Verhoef et al. 2007).
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12.2 Elasticity
Digital cameras attract a large fraction of consumers to the online channel. De-
veloping a sophisticated online strategy may be important for successfully selling
digital cameras to maximize profits.
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Figure 12.4: Price Elasticity versus the Offline Price of Firm 1
Figure 12.4 represents the elasticities of offline prices, offline and online con-
sumers of firm 1, as well as profit shapes of both firms. The Figures Price Elas-
ticity (1) and Profit (1) depict the following: The first peak in the price elasticity
of offline consumers shows firm 1’s offline price exceeding its online price (0.5).
There is a decline in offline consumers corresponding to the increase in online
consumers. Consumers are shared among both channels of firm 1. The impact
emerges when firm 1’s offline price exceeds firm 2’s online price (0.6). The im-
portance of the online channel seems to be clear. Declining offline consumers as
well as a dramatic drop in profits occur. Online consumers of firm 1 are almost not
144 CHAPTER 12. RESULTS DIGITAL CAMERA
affected by that event. This should be normal, since firm 1’s online price under-
cuts firm 2’s online price. It is also interesting to note that the elasticity to prices
decreases as the offline price approaches firm 1’s online price, i.e. less reaction
of consumers to hikes in the offline price. The spike as the offline price equals
the online price of firm 1 may be explained by high sensitivity of consumers at
this point since switching is now an alternative. This is recognized by declining
offline consumers combined with expanding online consumers if the offline price
is increased further. Although the online channel is now available, elasticity of the
offline consumers bounces back to levels prior to equal offline and online prices.
Afterwards, if the offline price of firm 1 exceeds firm 2’s online price (0.6) the de-
cline in the elasticity is enormous. This may also emphasize the importance of the
online channel. The last spike when firm 1’s offline price finally tops firm 2’s of-
fline price (0.7) causes almost no effect on firm 1’s profits or consumers. Further,
decreasing elasticity appears normal since the offline price of firm 1 is highest in
such an environment. This issue is underlined by the importance of the online
channel which makes the offline channel almost negligible.
The Figures Price Elasticity (2) and Profit (2) of Figure 12.4 display a different
setting. The first small kink relates to firm 2’s online price of 0.2 being met by
firm 1’s offline price. Compared to previous descriptions the price elasticity of
offline consumers starts to decline immediately. The online price of firm 2 is
competitive right from the start. Elasticity levels rest clearly below the ones of
Figure Price Elasticity (1), i.e. consumers more easily leave firm 1’s offline chan-
nel on further price increases. This issue can be seen in the offline consumers’
curve. Another observation is also that firm 1’s profits decline as firm 2’s profits
soar. As the offline price of firm 1 meets the one of firm 2 at 0.3, things become
even worse. Firm 1’s offline consumers almost vanish, as do profits. One in-
teresting observation is that as firm 1’s offline price approaches its online price
consumers’ elasticity lessens. This may indicate lower intra-firm switching due to
negligible price differences between both channels of a firm. Thus, similar pric-
ing in both channels may be good advice for firms. As soon as firm 1’s offline
price exceeds its online price at 0.4, the price elasticity of its offline consumers
decreases dramatically since its offline price turns out to be the highest price in
the environment.
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12.3 Mean and Variance
Offline Online Both
Mean Reservation Prices 0.11093440 0.12856180 0.12334340
Variance of Reservation Prices 0.00563761 0.01401316 0.01157963
Mean Markup 0.0158163 0.00966115 0.01148339
Variance Markup 0.0005420 0.00068258 0.00064752
Table 12.3: Results Summary
Again, Table 12.3 presents various values from the survey. These values should
give a first sign on differences due to the product class. The first result is that
offline reservation prices are significantly lower than online reference prices. The
Mann-Whitney test yields a p-value of 0.03098. This result also emphasizes the
importance of the online channel for doing business in the digital camera market.
Online consumers seem to be willing to spend more than offline consumers.
12.4 Consumer Drift Dynamics
In contrast to clothes, a huge competitive advantage for the online channel ap-
pears with digital cameras. That issue was already prominent in Section 12.1.
Again, utilizing Equations 10.3 and 10.4, the competitive disadvantage of the of-
fline channel amounts to 0.5794702, whereas the online channel provides no dis-
advantage at all. Please note that a firm setting prices in the offline channel should
offer discounts at 0.5794702 to attract consumers indifferent between the online
and the offline sales channel.
OFIBO 0.5794702
OFIOB 0
OFFBO 0.5794702
OFFBB -
OFFOB 0
OFFOO -
Table 12.4: Initial Offset Values
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Table 12.4 shows the competitive weights in detail. All switching offsets from
an offline channel towards any online channel show positive numbers, which in-
dicates the pecuniary disadvantage of the offline channel. Therefore, consumers
rather tend to purchase in the online environment.
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Figure 12.5: Elasticity
Figure 12.5 again displays the composition of consumers in each channel for cer-
tain conditions. The eye-catching differences to books and clothes are apparent
and will be discussed in detail. The first column displays results for a scenario
consisting of firm 1’s online price of 0.5, firm 2’s offline price of 0.7 and its online
price of 0.6. The total consumers of firm 1’s offline channel bB1 start to decline
immensely at a price level of around 0.3 already. Afterwards the number of total
offline consumers does not drop further in such a dramatic fashion till firm 1’s
online price is met. A similar shape could be also observed with extra offline
consumers. They also decline very fast towards the level of firm 1’s online price.
The severe decrease in total online consumers may be a first sign of the power
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of the online channel. As the online price of firm 1 is surpassed, the total online
consumers bO1 go up and remain almost stable at a certain level. One can see that
as soon as the online price is met no consumers switch from the online channel
towards the offline channel. The online channel can keep its consumers and ad-
ditionally adds some migrating consumers from the offline channels. Almost the
whole share of online consumers at this point stems from online consumers due
to online pricing. Only a small fraction comes from migrating consumers. The
level of basic consumers of firm 2, which is the same for firm 1 since firm 1’s
online pricing is lower than firm 2’s, remain stable. The same is true for the extra
online consumers. But keep in mind that these values are reduced by switching
consumers. Note also that the number of total offline consumers bB1 finally falls,
as the level of firm 2’s online price is exceeded.
The magnitude of offline consumers is also driven by migrating online consumers.
As long as firm 1’s offline price is still lower than firm 2’s online price, consumers
switch from the online channel to the offline channel. Again, the offline chan-
nel itself could not attract a significant fraction of consumers. This matter also
emphasizes the importance of the online channel for selling digital cameras.
The Figure Consumer Drift Offline (1) shows the drifting situation for total offline
consumers bB1 in detail. One can see large contributions of both online channels to
the amount of offline consumers. The values of switching consumers from firm 1’s
online channel, firm 1’s extra consumers online and firm 2’s online consumers
make up almost the whole offline consumers above an offline price level of around
0.3. This threshold indicates low price consumers in the offline channel and again
the importance of the online channel.
The last figure in the first column (Consumer Drift Online (1)) represents the com-
position of total online consumers bO1 . Note the sharp increase in this amount at
the crossing point with firm 1’s online price. A slight increase follows till the
online price of firm 2. As one can see total consumers online consist primarily of
consumers of the online channel, since the major parts are consumers not switch-
ing from the online channel and extra consumers of the online channel also not
switching.
Contribution figures of this scenario are again different from books. Just before
the offline price hits firm 1’s online price, the main contributors to the total of-
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fline consumers are switching extra online consumers (42.2 %) and basic online
consumers (26.5 %) of firm 1 and migrating online consumers of firm 2 (31.3 %).
Note that the offline channel itself is not able to attract a significant fraction of of-
fline consumers. Certainly, extra offline consumers determine the number of total
offline consumers at very low offline prices. But as the offline price rises these
consumers vanish and consumers migrating from both online channels make up
the total offline consumers of firm 1. Migration occurs since the offline price is
lowest in the environment. The interesting composition of total offline consumers
may be a first hint regarding the importance of the online channel. After exceed-
ing firm 1’s online price, the major source of offline consumers is firm 2’s online
channel, which amounts to almost 100 %. The severe drop of total offline con-
sumers of firm 1 after exceeding that price level stresses that point. The numbers
of offline consumers and extra offline consumers do not play a significant role in
the composition of total consumers. When firm 1’s offline price finally exceeds
firm 2’s online price, the last source of consumers for its offline channel dries up.
Now the total offline consumers are composed of not switching extra and basic
offline consumers. The total number of offline consumers attracted at this price
level is almost negligible, nevertheless.
Total online consumers consist throughout the whole situation of around 38.5 %
not switching online consumers and 62.4 % not switching extra online consumers.
All other sources of consumers contribute just insignificant fractions of consumers
to be added to the number of total online consumers. This again shows the impor-
tance of the online channel, since before the offline and online prices of firm 1 are
equal, large fractions of online consumers migrate to the offline channel of firm 1.
After exceeding that level those consumers stick to the online channel.
The second column shows a different picture. Now firm 1’s online price is at 0.4,
but firm 2 prices 0.2 and 0.3 in the offline and in the online channel respectively.
The number of total offline consumers bB1 drops strongly at the level of firm 2’s
offline price. Nevertheless, the total offline consumers of firm 1 are composed
of consumers of the offline channel not switching away, since both online prices
are still higher. When the level of firm 2’s online price is met, a further slump
occurs. Now consumers migrating from firm 2’s online channel soar. Total con-
sumers offline are now composed of consumers still not switching away from that
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channel and approximately one third of consumers migrating from firm 1’s online
channel. While the number of consumers not switching from the offline channel
decreases as the level of firm 1’s online price approaches, the number of online
consumers switching towards that channel remains fairly stable. Thus, the num-
ber of total offline consumers becomes more and more dependent on migrating
online consumers. Finally, as the price level of firm 1’s online channel is reached,
this source of consumers also vanishes and the number of offline consumers be-
comes negligible. In contrast, the online channel captures those former migrating
consumers and further draws consumers from the offline channel. The number of
total online consumers bO1 is almost entirely composed of consumers not switch-
ing from the online channel.
The composition of the total offline consumers consists of 68 % not switching
offline consumers and 28.6 % not switching extra offline consumers right before
firm 2’s offline price is surpassed. The contribution of firm 1’s online channel is
less than one percent. This low fraction could be explained by the low number
of consumers attracted to the online channel because almost all online consumers
migrate to the offline channel. A price of 0.4 seems to be far too much to attract
consumers to the online channel in the current situation. As firm 2’s offline price
is surpassed, the number of extra consumers dries up. Therefore, the impact of
consumers switching from both online channels to firm 1’s offline channel starts to
become more important. Just before firm 2’s online price is met, the composition
of the total offline consumers of firm 1 consists of 76.5 % not switching offline
consumers, 19.1 % switching online consumers of firm 2 and 4.4 % consumers
migrating from firm 1’s online channel. Naturally the impact of firm 2’s online
consumers is higher. This is due to the lower online price of firm 2, which allows
firm 2 to attract extra online consumers compared to firm 1’s online channel. Thus,
the number of online consumers is larger for firm 2. Finally, as the online price
of firm 1 is met by firm 1’s offline price, the single source of offline consumers
remains not switching offline consumers. Note again the importance of the online
channel. Just before the offline and online prices of firm 1 are equal, the total
number of offline consumers is composed of 6 % not switching offline consumers
and 94 % online consumers of firm 1 migrating to its offline channel.
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Total online consumers almost entirely consist of not switching online consumers
of firm 1. Since the given online price is very high and until the offline price
exceeds its level of 0.4, which represents also the maximum price in the whole
environment, only a small number of consumers are attracted by this price. Note
that as the offline price exceeds the online price, a considerable hike in total online
consumers takes place. On the other hand the fraction of offline consumers now
migrating to firm 1’s online channel is not significantly contributing to the total
amount of online consumers. This may also indicate the importance of the online
channel for selling digital cameras.
All these figures depict the importance of the online channel. In the first column
the online channel takes command as soon as the offline price surpasses the online
price. Since the online price of firm 1 is the lowest in the economy, firm 1 could
make a good profit irrespectively of the offline pricing. The second column mir-
rors the economy. Firm 2 prices lowest in each channel. Obviously firm 1 could
no longer maintain the profit level from the previous scenario. However, as the
offline price rises, firm 1 is able to preserve some profit from the online channel.
12.5 Pricing
For digital cameras a similar pricing strategy like with books is applicable for
linear rises in both consumer bases of the same amount, i.e. both consumer bases
in each channel exhibit an amount of one, 20, 40, 60, 80 and 100 consumers
available. The close to optimal pricing strategy for an environment in which both
consumer bases offer one consumer each is also applicable for consumer bases
of 20 each and so on. Although almost the same optimal prices emerge for such
situations, slight differences remain.
Table 12.5 gives an overview of the most interesting results. A more detailed
overview of the results can be found in the appendix A.3.
Digital cameras seem to be the opposite of clothes. As noted earlier the more
interesting market with this product is the online market, since reservation prices
proved to be higher. Note that surprisingly the maximum profit for firm 1 could be
acquired in an environment where firm 2 commands cost-plus pricing in conjunc-
tion with an excellent marketing in the offline channel and pricing like a monop-
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Market Environment
Profit Max. 8.76540 pO2 = ˜pO2 , pB2 = 0.10001, ξB2 = 1
Min. 0.04192 pO2 = ˜pO2 , pB2 = 0.10001, ξO2 = 1
Offline Max. 27.52518 pB2 = ˜pB2 , pO2 = 0.10001, ξO2 = 1
Consumer Min. 0.00000 pB2 = ˜pB2 , pO2 = 0.10001, ξO2 = 1
Online Max. 47.85159 pO2 = ˜pO2 , pB2 = 0.10001, ξB2 = 1
Consumer Min. 0.16620 pB2 = ˜pB2 , pO2 = 0.10001, ξB2 = 1
Offline Prices Max. 0.71083 pB2 = ˜pB2 , pO2 = 0.10001, ξO2 = 1
Min. 0.10002 pB2 = ˜pB2 , pO2 = 0.10001, ξB2 = 1
Online Prices Max. 0.47742 pB2 = ˜pB2 , pO2 = 0.10001, ξO2 = 1
Min. 0.23462 pO2 = ˜pO2 , pB2 = 0.10001, ξB2 = 1
Table 12.5: Results Summary
olist in the online channel. Obviously firm 2’s strategy reveals two shortcomings.
First, firm 2 makes all its marketing effort in the offline channel, which is the less
profitable one. Second, the monopolistic price in the online channel seems to be
too high. Therefore, firm 1 could generate a profit of about 8.76540 with prices
of 0.10006 and 0.28317 in the offline and in the online channel respectively. Con-
sider the differences given firm 2’s pricing, which is 0.10001 and 0.336469. One
can see that firm 1 prices clearly below firm 2 in the online channel and addition-
ally fights in the offline channel. The effect is obvious. In the offline channel,
firm 1 captures as many switching-willing consumers as possible. The number
of total consumers offline of firm 1 is composed of 65.7 % not switching offline
consumers and 34.3 % online consumers migrating to its offline channel due to
that price advantage. In the online channel on the other hand, firm 1 manages
to attract as many consumers as possible due to the channel advantage of digital
cameras. The number of total online consumers therefore is composed of 26.6 %
not switching online consumers and 73.4 % consumers migrating from any chan-
nel of firm 2 towards firm 1’s online channel. It might be not surprising that the
overall maximum of online consumers occurs also in that scenario.
The least profitable environment for firm 1 turns out if firm 2 combines monopo-
listic online pricing with excellent online marketing and cost-plus offline pricing.
This situation is unfortunate for firm 1 again in two ways, and very similar to the
maximum profit environment, except for the marketing. First, firm 2 again fol-
152 CHAPTER 12. RESULTS DIGITAL CAMERA
lows a very strict low price policy in the offline channel and firm 1 again tries to
challenge it. The problem is that this time, although firm 2’s online price rests
again above firm 1’s online price (0.33647 versus 0.24474), firm 2 could counter
by utilizing its perfect marketing strategy in the online channel. With the help of
marketing the pecuniary advantage of firm 1 is lessened. Although again around
66.8 % of the offline consumers stem from migrating consumers of firm 2, the
picture in the online channel has changed. This time the total online consumers
of firm 1 consist of 72.0 % not switching online consumers and only 28.0 % con-
sumers migrating from firm 2. Here resides the big difference towards the envi-
ronment where firm 1 could get off with maximum profits.
The smallest number of offline consumers appears in an environment where firm 2
prices at its cost in the online channel, conducts perfect marketing in the online
channel and additionally prices monopolistically in the offline channel. Since
the monopolistic offline price of firm 2 is quite low (0.15908), firm 1 could not
even get a significant fraction of offline consumers as long as the available offline
consumer base remains small, i.e. one. Note that in such a situation firm 1 also
prices highest in the offline channel, just to exploit the few consumers which stay
in their offline channel. Surprisingly that environment also shows the highest
online price and the largest offline consumers. If the offline consumer base grows,
firm 1 starts to decrease its offline price to levels just above its costs. As the offline
consumers reach 100, firm 1 starts to exploit online consumers. This behavior is
natural since the market is captured by firm 2 with its cost-plus pricing. Thus,
firm 1 attracts a large number of offline consumers by its cost-plus price in the
offline channel. The total number of offline consumers consists of around 88.0 %
not switching offline consumers. So firm 1 could successfully grab the offline
market and get away with a profit too.
The digital camera market shows the importance of the online channel for do-
ing business. The power of the online channel is undoubted but there is an exit
route for the opposite firm if the alternative channel is left over. This firm could
successfully apply a profitable pricing strategy in the offline channel.
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Chapter 13
Cross-Comparison
In this section a comparison of all three products is presented. Differences should
help to draw conclusions for similar products. The first apparent differences stem
from the shapes of the reservation prices. Books take up a moderate position. The
extreme poles are clothes and digital cameras. Clothes show the offline channel
to be most important for doing business. Even more, the offline channel reveals a
tremendous competitive advantage of 0.8307087. So pricing in the offline chan-
nel should deeply impact a firm’s overall pricing strategy. On the opposite end,
digital cameras display the online channel to be most profitable. A competitive
advantage of the online channel of 0.5794702 could also be observed. Note that
these figures describe a general behavior. For both products it is important to note
that depending on the pricing range the alternative channel becomes more prof-
itable. Another interesting observation is that for all three products it turns out
that offline consumers tend to be more state-dependent than online consumers.
The most fundamental result may be that firms could run into the wrong pricing
if they do not regard the whole reservation price structure. If a firm bases its
pricing on average prices, this strategy could harm a firm’s profits. If a firm knows
the whole reservation price shape, more accurate pricing decisions help to avoid
losses.
Further, price elasticity seems to be strongly affected as soon as a firm prices
highest in a market, i.e. a further price hike would result in a higher loss of
consumers than it would be the case with the lowest price in the economy. At the
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beginning of the price hikes consumers’ price elasticity rests in a range conform
to existent literature (Bijmolt et al. 2005, Png 2004, Simon 1992). But as the price
reaches regions above competitive prices, the increase in price elasticity might be
harmful to a firm’s profits. Thus, firms should be aware of the price structure of
their opponents to set prices in an appropriate range.
Next, different products require different channels. For products which utilize
sensory attributes, the offline channel may be the more important sales channel. If
a firm intends doing business in the online channel, special quality measures may
be demanded by the consumers, e.g. return policies. The relevance of different
marketing activities also differs for each product.
The first impressive result is that for clothes assessment is the most important
attribute for purchasing offline. This is a clear difference to digital cameras
and books. The Mann-Whitney test reveals highly significant results regard-
ing a higher impact of assessment for clothes versus the other products (p-value
1.913e−7 and 4.664e−13 for books and digital cameras respectively). Thus, if
firms intend to sell clothes through the Internet consumers, may demand special
discounts for reducing their risk or simple return policies.
Second, consumers purchasing products like books and digital cameras demand
availability as most the important attribute. This is not surprising since the pref-
erence for immediate consumption has been long known (e.g., Read and Loewen-
stein 1995). Books show another interesting attribute significantly different from
both other products. Atmosphere in the traditional shop is regarded highly by of-
fline consumers. This may be the cause why books, although they inhere typical
features of digital information goods, are still bought through traditional stores.
The p-value for the Mann-Whitney test gives values of 3.974e−5 and 0.01795 for
clothes and digital cameras respectively.
A third interesting result comes from digital cameras. Consumers purchasing digi-
tal cameras offline demand significantly more counseling than for books or clothes
(p-value of 5.567e−5 and 2.2e−16 for books and clothes respectively). This result
may indicate a higher cognitive effort in purchasing digital cameras.
If we take a closer look at the relevant online attributes, some interesting results
also appear. As we might have guessed return policies are indeed a striking at-
tribute for selling clothes online. A firm doing business in the Internet with such
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a product should take care to have well established return policies. The Mann-
Whitney test emphasizes the difference to books and digital cameras since it re-
sults in a p-value of 8.56e−6 versus books and 0.0007002 versus digital cameras.
Digital cameras require a large amount of information to foster purchases. In the
offline channel therefore counseling is a demanded attribute. For the online chan-
nel the corresponding attribute might be information. Indeed, higher demand for
information was found with digital cameras (p-value of 0.002855 and 0.008525
for books and clothes respectively). This high demand for information might be
the cause why a larger fraction of survey participants prefer the online channel for
purchasing digital cameras. Firms should therefore emphasize information if they
sell technical items like digital cameras on the web. Consumers may regard that
with higher profits and loyalty (e.g., Flavia´n et al. 2006a, Shankar et al. 2003).
For books little differences regarding the most important attributes were found.
Delivery time turned out to be no more important for books than for all other
products. Nevertheless, assortment shows a difference versus digital cameras.
While assortment of books versus clothes turns out to be not significantly higher,
digital cameras require less assortment than books (p-value 0.02637). Thus, firms
doing online business in the clothing and books industries should emphasize a
large assortment. If we take a look at successful firms like Amazon or Otto, this
argument seem to be plausible and confirmed.
Comparing the consumer drift dynamics, books appear to be somewhere in a
“middle” position. The extreme positions are held by clothes on the one side
and digital cameras on the other side. While for clothes the offline channel con-
tributes most of the total consumers of the offline channel, the impact of these
consumers appears to be negligible for digital cameras. For digital cameras mi-
grating online consumers make up the major part of the total offline consumer
base. As these consumers erode, a significant slump in total offline consumers
could be observed. The opposite extreme, represented by clothes, shows the im-
portance of the offline channel. Almost the whole contribution towards the total
amount of offline consumers stems from not switching offline consumers. For the
number of total online consumers things are reversed. For clothes major parts mi-
grate from both offline channels, whereas for digital cameras the number of total
online consumers almost entirely consists of not switching online consumers.
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These findings are highlighted by the results in the situation where firm 1’s online
price is fixed at 0.4. Here the environment is more competitive since at a certain
point firm 2 prices both channels below firm 1. One can see the dependence on
migrating online consumers and the severe eroding of total offline consumers as
migration disappears for digital cameras. For clothes an immense reliance on
offline consumers could be observed. Here total online consumers depend on
migrating offline consumers.
These extreme poles emphasize the importance of knowing the market. A firm
should be well aware where its consumers come from. A proper pricing policy
should at first serve the preferred or performing sales channel. If that can not be
accomplished, the other channel could be utilized to draw consumers from the
performing channel as in the digital camera case.
Finally, a short comparison of different pricing strategies in a certain situations
should be made. The maximum profit for clothes and digital cameras could be
earned in an environment where firm 2 prices cost-plus in the offline channel, and
monopolistically in the online channel. This result might be puzzling. The dif-
ference is made by marketing. While for clothes, firm 2 leaves the offline market
to firm 1, the latter firm could maintain that market with an appropriate market-
ing strategy and therefore attract a maximum of offline consumers. In the digital
camera case firm 1 is able to maintain the online market with its marketing and
generate a maximum of online consumers.
This result gives rise to important notes. A firm should carefully analyse the reser-
vation price structure of its product. If we assume the same reservation price struc-
ture for both products we should expect the maximum profit in the clothes case
with firm 2 pricing monopolistically in the offline channel and at its costs in the
online channel, since the offline channel is the more important one for clothes. As
we could observe, the shape of the reservation prices alters these expectations in
a dramatic way. The remaining variations in marketing still pronounce the differ-
ence regarding channel profitability. For books, where the higher yielding market
is the offline channel, the expected outcome occurs. The profitable scenario is
the one in which firm 2 prices monopolistically in the offline channel and at its
costs in the online channel. What remains insightful is that firm 2 also performs
excellent marketing in the offline channel. Apparently the monopolistic price is
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too high, so firm 1 still has enough range to operate its pricing. The composition
of the total offline consumers stresses that argument.
For the number of consumers in each scenario, books are very similar to clothes.
This should not be surprising since both products show some advantage in the
offline channel. The single exception remains the situation where the maximum
offline consumers could be obtained. For both products this happens when firm 2
prices monopolistically in the offline channel and prices at its cost combined with
perfect marketing in the online channel. This should be expected, firm 2 prices
too high in the offline channel, leaving a competitive price to firm 1. For both
products the prices are able to attract almost all of their offline consumers from the
offline channel and persuade them not to migrate. The interesting question is why
for clothes this obvious argument is not true. Admittedly the offline consumer
base remains large in that scenario, but for a certain condition an even higher
number of offline consumers could be achieved for clothes. In a situation where
firm 2 prices monopolistically supported with an excellent marketing strategy in
the online channel, and at its cost in the offline channel, firm 1 has no chance
in the offline channel. But it could offer incredibly low online prices and due to
the pecuniary advantage of the offline channel a large fraction, especially from the
extra consumers of the online channel, start to migrate towards the offline channel.
That is exactly what happens with clothes.
From the different pricing strategies two results could be drawn very clearly. First,
firms should know their consumers’ reservation prices. Second, keep an eye on
excellent marketing. As it could be seen, firm 1 always manages to perform mar-
keting activities close to the optimum and in certain situations competitor’s price
advantages could be mediated.
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Chapter 14
Conclusion and Limitations
The research goal was to design a model which may help marketers in their pricing
decision. The problem of setting prices in parallel in two sales channels emerges
with the rise of the Internet. Most firms operate two sales channels nowadays.
Thus, the pricing problem becomes a relevant topic. Since most firms still use
cost-plus pricing, this model should show alternatives which may prove more
profitable (e.g., Noble and Gruca 1999, Simon 1992). Setting prices in the real
world without thinking about it may result in losses. This model should help mar-
keters to apply their pricing strategies in a virtual environment to test their ideas.
From different scenarios they could conclude the success or failure of different
pricing strategies. Further, the model should be applicable in a quick and easy
way. The demand of data to feed the current model is very low. Only reservation
prices are needed to set up the model. It represents a simple model but offers clear
lines how consumers may move through the environment. Because of its sim-
plicity it may suffer some drawbacks which will be discussed in the limitations
section.
14.1 Conclusion
The model applied proves to be very powerful in showing interesting results and
giving hints for marketers of different products. The most striking result may be
the important power of knowing the shape of reservation prices. By knowing that,
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a firm could already conduct very decisive pricing. Differences in optimal pricing
strategies for various products highlight that issue. If we remember the two poles
of products, digital cameras and clothes, the first important difference is the con-
sumers’ preferred channel. While for clothes the offline channel is the channel of
choice, for digital cameras the online channel turns out to be more relevant. This
difference is reflected in different pricing strategies. While the profit maximiz-
ing scenario of both products appears similar (except for marketing), pricing is as
different as it could be. For clothes the successful strategy is to transfer online
consumers towards the offline channel by undercutting the competitor’s online
price. Almost all the profit stems from the offline channel. For digital cameras
on the other hand it appears more important to draw consumers from the offline
channel towards the online channel, and finally the profit is composed almost en-
tirely of online consumers. These results are determined by different distributions
of reservation prices. The impact is overwhelming. So those examples illustrate
difficult differences in products and their accurate pricing. The model could help
to develop appropriate pricing strategies for each product. Firms should be aware
of using average prices for their pricing decisions. They may be completely wrong
and not even notice it.
A second result is that excellent marketing strategies may help to lower a price ad-
vantage of a competitor. The scenarios where the competitor performs incorrect
marketing actions give an opportunity for a firm to either attract additional con-
sumers, or to command higher prices without losing consumers. So wise market-
ing may serve as a differentiation attribute, which may result in increased profits.
Note that firm 1 always conducts excellent marketing. As there is enough money,
it should be spent accordingly. It makes no sense to invest in improper marketing
since it would not affect consumers. This could be an entry for further research
since marketing activities should be evaluated on their efficiency to optimize such
investments.
A third interesting result is that price elasticity depends crucially on the price
structure of the market. As long as a firm’s price is the lowest in the market, it
could increase the price and suffer the usual loss of consumers comparable with
existent literature (Tellis 1988). As soon as alternative price levels are reached
elasticity soars. Especially crossing points are marked by spikes in elasticity since
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consumers start to migrate at once. Note that with the highest price in the whole
economy, the highest elasticity of prices is associated. Thus, firms should be
aware of the surrounding price levels and try to price lowest.
There are also some remarkable differences regarding marketing activities. Books
show that the store atmosphere is an important distinctive asset. This might be the
cause why traditional bookshops still exist although online shops offer higher con-
venience. For clothes, assessment and return policies are demanded by consumers
more than for other products. This might be the reason why most consumers pre-
fer traditional stores to purchase clothes. Firms doing online business with clothes
should keep a sharp eye on return policies. By developing a sound return policy,
consumers’ fears of online shopping might be reduced. Conversely digital cam-
era consumers demand information and counseling. This complex product could
be described very well in the Internet. Thus, a firm should provide all relevant
information to satisfy consumers.
The different weights of marketing attributes magnify the differences in the pur-
chase behavior of various products. Firms should utilize these differences and
provide consumers with their desired marketing activities since accurate market-
ing positively influences profits.
14.2 Limitations
Although the model is very exhaustive there is still place for possible extensions.
First, one could also let extra consumers migrate to any channel. This is the most
important limitation in the current model. Extra consumers for a certain channel
are there due to the lower price in that channel. If they intend to migrate to an
alternative channel it is assumed that they stay within the same firm. The argu-
ment goes as follows. Consumers typically strive for the lowest price. When they
finally find the channel offering the lowest price, but they prefer the alternative
channel for undertaking the purchase, they stick to the selected firm. Johnson
et al. (2004) also found that consumers only visit 1.2 book sites for a typical pur-
chase. Second, the intra-channel switching probabilities SFOO1 and SFBB1 have
not been observed. Common sense would imply that switching within the online
market is much higher than switching within traditional stores because in the In-
162 CHAPTER 14. CONCLUSION AND LIMITATIONS
ternet the competitor is just one click away and price comparison sites foster such
behavior. The effort to visit numerous traditional stores is higher beyond com-
parison. Another interesting field of expansion could be to incorporate the impact
of marketing activities on reservation prices. Common sense would support that
view.
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Detailed Tables
A.1 Books
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Price Consumer Consumer Elasticity Profit Profit
Offline Offline Online F1 F2
0.1 70.84695 0.04800 -0.31893 0.01920 0.01025
0.12 66.38925 0.05473 -0.38678 1.34968 0.01166
0.14 62.16521 0.06184 -0.45736 2.51134 0.01313
0.16 58.15483 0.06930 -0.53100 3.51701 0.01464
0.18 54.34272 0.07709 -0.60803 4.37825 0.01618
0.2 50.71650 0.08517 -0.68880 5.10572 0.01775
0.22 47.26591 0.09353 -0.77368 5.70932 0.01932
0.24 43.98219 0.10214 -0.86309 6.19836 0.02088
0.26 40.85773 0.11102 -0.95749 6.58165 0.02241
0.28 37.88577 0.12017 -1.05739 6.86751 0.02392
0.3 35.06021 0.12963 -1.16340 7.06390 0.02537
0.32 32.37549 0.13947 -1.27621 7.17840 0.02677
0.34 29.82642 0.14981 -1.39664 7.21827 0.02810
0.36 27.40812 0.16083 -1.52570 7.19044 0.02936
0.38 25.11593 0.17282 -1.66465 7.10159 0.03054
0.4 22.94524 0.18623 -1.81518 6.95807 0.03164
0.42 20.89134 0.20187 -1.97972 6.76598 0.03267
0.44 18.94903 0.22120 -2.16253 6.53115 0.03361
0.46 17.11147 0.24745 -2.37375 6.25911 0.03449
0.48 15.36521 0.29063 -2.66590 5.95503 0.03532
0.5 12.93878 1.11884 -39.08513 5.62305 0.03612
0.52 2.13272 10.42826 -10.31370 5.06705 0.03693
0.54 1.40785 9.75481 -8.85212 4.52138 0.03781
0.56 0.99358 8.86574 -8.43351 4.00334 0.03889
0.58 0.71956 7.92766 -8.50396 3.51645 0.04055
0.6 0.46940 6.99721 -22.71431 3.03358 0.07126
0.62 0.23159 4.57761 -13.07310 1.95147 0.12235
0.64 0.14217 3.62422 -15.29811 1.52646 0.11755
0.66 0.07967 2.76376 -19.82566 1.15012 0.11240
0.68 0.03570 1.97924 -31.84796 0.81240 0.10760
0.7 0.00510 1.26553 -14.96648 0.50927 0.10328
0.72 0.00315 1.20207 -15.45569 0.48278 0.41610
0.74 0.00194 1.15221 -16.10656 0.46213 0.69661
0.76 0.00118 1.11267 -16.91847 0.44585 0.94591
0.78 0.00071 1.08117 -17.90518 0.43295 1.16521
0.8 0.00042 1.05608 -19.09375 0.42273 1.35585
0.82 0.00024 1.03620 -20.52747 0.41465 1.51921
0.84 0.00013 1.02057 -22.27295 0.40833 1.65680
0.86 0.00007 1.00847 -24.43434 0.40344 1.77022
0.88 0.00004 0.99929 -27.18116 0.39974 1.86115
0.9 0.00002 0.99254 -0.31893 0.39703 1.93143
Table A.1: Elasticity Scenario α (pO1 = 0.5, pB2 = 0.7, pO2 = 0.6)
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Price Consumer Consumer Elasticity Profit Profit
Offline Offline Online F1 F2
0.1 46.24483 0.00105 -0.49353 0.00032 3.82420
0.12 41.74753 0.00121 -0.61849 0.83531 3.82993
0.14 37.50371 0.00140 -0.75992 1.50057 3.83398
0.16 33.48582 0.00161 -0.92275 2.00963 3.83717
0.18 29.67221 0.00185 -1.11352 2.37433 3.84022
0.2 26.04624 0.00213 -0.67097 2.60526 3.84371
0.22 24.31978 0.00247 -0.75291 2.91911 4.02047
0.24 22.67464 0.00286 -0.84078 3.17531 4.19032
0.26 21.10341 0.00333 -0.93695 3.37754 4.35487
0.28 19.59750 0.00389 -1.04675 3.52872 4.51755
0.3 17.21402 0.00460 -23.03356 3.44418 5.04666
0.32 3.07782 0.00549 -5.82083 0.67877 7.73155
0.34 2.11733 0.00669 -4.95207 0.51017 7.78937
0.36 1.56143 0.00844 -4.70721 0.40850 7.77149
0.38 1.18542 0.01146 -4.72523 0.33536 7.72510
0.4 0.85620 0.07240 -32.03208 0.27858 7.85225
0.42 0.11917 0.60947 -10.76702 0.22098 6.16454
0.44 0.06780 0.50869 -9.77685 0.17566 6.14372
0.46 0.04146 0.41786 -9.58050 0.14028 6.16647
0.48 0.02612 0.34236 -9.67729 0.11263 6.20612
0.5 0.01668 0.28119 -9.93332 0.09103 6.25360
0.52 0.01072 0.23231 -10.29705 0.07420 6.30459
0.54 0.00689 0.19364 -10.74505 0.06112 6.35669
0.56 0.00442 0.16334 -11.26606 0.05103 6.40842
0.58 0.00281 0.13983 -11.85507 0.04330 6.45882
0.6 0.00178 0.12178 -12.51080 0.03742 6.50724
0.62 0.00111 0.10807 -13.23452 0.03300 6.55324
0.64 0.00068 0.09778 -14.02951 0.02970 6.59650
0.66 0.00042 0.09017 -14.90093 0.02728 6.63684
0.68 0.00025 0.08462 -15.85582 0.02553 6.67413
0.7 0.00014 0.08064 -16.90334 0.02428 6.70832
0.72 0.00008 0.07784 -18.05525 0.02340 6.73939
0.74 0.00005 0.07590 -19.32653 0.02280 6.76737
0.76 0.00003 0.07459 -20.73645 0.02239 6.79232
0.78 0.00001 0.07373 -22.31016 0.02213 6.81432
0.8 0.00001 0.07318 -24.08111 0.02196 6.83347
0.82 0.00000 0.07284 -26.09505 0.02185 6.84990
0.84 0.00000 0.07264 -28.41669 0.02179 6.86375
0.86 0.00000 0.07252 -31.14155 0.02176 6.87517
0.88 0.00000 0.07246 -34.41857 0.02174 6.88432
0.9 0.00000 0.07243 -0.49353 0.02173 6.89140
Table A.2: Elasticity Scenario β (pO1 = 0.4, pB2 = 0.2, pO2 = 0.3)
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Profit Price Cons. Cons. N-S N-S Ex. Off. F2 On. F2 On. F1 On. Ex. F1 N-S N-S Ex. On. F2 Off. F2 Off. F1 Off. Ex. F1
Offline Online Offline Offline Off. F1 Off. F1 Off. F1 Off. F1 Online Online On. F1 On. F1 On. F1 On. F1
0.019 0.10 70.846950 0.047997 1.984877 67.811060 0.003623 0.072520 0.072437 0.902434 0.000514 0.006398 0.000001 0.041085 0 0
1.35 0.12 66.389255 0.054726 1.984877 63.354720 0.003421 0.072478 0.072354 0.901405 0.000596 0.007426 0.000001 0.046703 0 0
2.511 0.14 62.165212 0.061837 1.984877 59.132204 0.003211 0.072429 0.072260 0.900231 0.000690 0.008600 0.000001 0.052545 0 0
3.517 0.16 58.154834 0.069301 1.984877 55.123545 0.002994 0.072374 0.072152 0.898891 0.000798 0.009940 0.000001 0.058562 0 0
4.378 0.18 54.342721 0.077087 1.984877 51.313369 0.002774 0.072311 0.072029 0.897361 0.000921 0.011470 0.000001 0.064695 0 0
5.106 0.20 50.716502 0.085170 1.984877 47.689335 0.002551 0.072239 0.071889 0.895612 0.001061 0.013220 0.000001 0.070888 0 0
5.709 0.22 47.265909 0.093527 1.984877 44.241210 0.002328 0.072157 0.071728 0.893609 0.001222 0.015223 0.000002 0.077081 0 0
6.198 0.24 43.982191 0.102144 1.984877 40.960291 0.002107 0.072063 0.071544 0.891310 0.001406 0.017522 0.000002 0.083214 0 0
6.582 0.26 40.857731 0.111021 1.984877 37.839015 0.001891 0.071955 0.071331 0.888662 0.001619 0.020169 0.000002 0.089230 0 0
6.868 0.28 37.885769 0.120171 1.984877 34.870693 0.001681 0.071833 0.071085 0.885601 0.001865 0.023231 0.000003 0.095073 0 0
7.064 0.30 35.060213 0.129632 1.984877 32.049323 0.001478 0.071693 0.070800 0.882042 0.002150 0.026789 0.000003 0.100690 0 0
7.178 0.32 32.375487 0.139475 1.984877 29.369448 0.001286 0.071532 0.070465 0.877878 0.002485 0.030954 0.000003 0.106033 0 0
7.218 0.34 29.826415 0.149814 1.984877 26.826053 0.001105 0.071348 0.070071 0.872960 0.002879 0.035871 0.000004 0.111060 0 0
7.19 0.36 27.408122 0.160832 1.984877 24.414485 0.000937 0.071136 0.069599 0.867087 0.003351 0.041744 0.000004 0.115733 0 0
7.102 0.38 25.115930 0.172817 1.984877 22.130387 0.000783 0.070891 0.069028 0.859964 0.003922 0.048867 0.000005 0.120022 0 0
6.958 0.40 22.945240 0.186233 1.984877 19.969653 0.000643 0.070607 0.068319 0.851142 0.004631 0.057690 0.000006 0.123907 0 0
6.766 0.42 20.891344 0.201869 1.984877 17.928384 0.000518 0.070273 0.067415 0.839876 0.005535 0.068956 0.000007 0.127372 0 0
6.531 0.44 18.949030 0.221195 1.984877 16.002859 0.000409 0.069880 0.066205 0.824801 0.006745 0.084031 0.000008 0.130412 0 0
6.259 0.46 17.111469 0.247453 1.984877 14.189501 0.000315 0.069409 0.064449 0.802918 0.008501 0.105913 0.000009 0.133029 0 0
5.955 0.48 15.365207 0.290635 1.984877 12.484863 0.000235 0.068839 0.061404 0.764988 0.011546 0.143843 0.000011 0.135235 0 0
5.623 0.50 12.938781 1.118842 1.984877 10.885601 0.000170 0.068133 0 0 0.072950 0.908831 0.000013 0.137048 0 0
5.067 0.52 2.132720 10.42826 0.360449 1.704922 0.000118 0.067231 0 0 0.072950 0.908831 0.000015 0.138497 1.624428 7.683538
4.521 0.54 1.407847 9.754807 0.266984 1.074761 0.000078 0.066024 0 0 0.072950 0.908831 0.000018 0.139614 1.717893 6.915500
4.003 0.56 0.993585 8.865739 0.212674 0.716589 0.000048 0.064273 0 0 0.072950 0.908831 0.000023 0.140438 1.772203 5.971293
3.516 0.58 0.719560 7.927664 0.175079 0.483217 0.000027 0.061237 0 0 0.072950 0.908831 0.000031 0.141015 1.809798 4.995039
3.034 0.60 0.469401 6.997209 0.146877 0.322510 0.000014 0 0 0 0.072950 0.908831 0.000199 0.141389 1.838000 4.035840
1.951 0.62 0.231591 4.577614 0.022649 0.208936 0.000006 0 0 0 0.072950 0.908831 0.000199 0.141609 0.337800 3.116225
1.526 0.64 0.142171 3.624221 0.014363 0.127806 0.000002 0 0 0 0.072950 0.908831 0.000199 0.141720 0.252621 2.247900
1.15 0.66 0.079666 2.763763 0.009852 0.069814 0 0 0 0 0.072950 0.908831 0.000199 0.141764 0.202822 1.437196
0.812 0.68 0.035697 1.979239 0.007013 0.028684 0 0 0 0 0.072950 0.908831 0.000199 0.141775 0.168066 0.687418
0.509 0.70 0.005102 1.265532 0.005102 0 0 0 0 0 0.072950 0.908831 0.000199 0.141776 0.141776 0
0.483 0.72 0.003153 1.202070 0.003153 0 0 0 0 0 0.072950 0.908831 0.000199 0.118765 0.101324 0
0.462 0.74 0.001941 1.152214 0.001941 0 0 0 0 0 0.072950 0.908831 0.000199 0.098212 0.072022 0
0.446 0.76 0.001185 1.112669 0.001185 0 0 0 0 0 0.072950 0.908831 0.000199 0.080005 0.050684 0
0.433 0.78 0.000713 1.081169 0.000713 0 0 0 0 0 0.072950 0.908831 0.000199 0.064034 0.035154 0
0.423 0.80 0.000421 1.056084 0.000421 0 0 0 0 0 0.072950 0.908831 0.000199 0.050186 0.023917 0
0.415 0.82 0.000242 1.036195 0.000242 0 0 0 0 0 0.072950 0.908831 0.000199 0.038345 0.015870 0
0.408 0.84 0.000135 1.020569 0.000135 0 0 0 0 0 0.072950 0.908831 0.000199 0.028389 0.010199 0
0.403 0.86 0.000072 1.008465 0.000072 0 0 0 0 0 0.072950 0.908831 0.000199 0.020196 0.006288 0
0.4 0.88 0.000036 0.999288 0.000036 0 0 0 0 0 0.072950 0.908831 0.000199 0.013636 0.003671 0
0.397 0.90 0.000017 0.992542 0.000017 0 0 0 0 0 0.072950 0.908831 0.000199 0.008572 0.001990 0
Table A.3: Consumer Decomposition Scenario α (pO1 = 0.5, pB2 = 0.7, pO2 = 0.6)
A
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Profit Price Cons. Cons. N-S N-S Ex. Off. F2 On. F2 On. F1 On. Ex. F1 N-S N-S Ex. On. F2 Off. F2 Off. F1 Off. Ex. F1
Offline Online Offline Offline Off. F1 Off. F1 Off. F1 Off. F1 Online Online On. F1 On. F1 On. F1 On. F1
3E-04 0.10 46.244825 0.001053 25.82954 20.1217251 0.070463 0.151741 0.071352 0 0.0010532 0 0 0 0 0
0.835 0.12 41.747529 0.001213 25.82954 15.6653854 0.030383 0.151025 0.071192 0 0.0012128 0 0 0 0 0
1.501 0.14 37.503713 0.001396 25.82954 11.4428693 0.010112 0.150179 0.071009 0 0.0013959 0 0 0 0 0
2.01 0.16 33.485821 0.001607 25.82954 7.43421047 0.002099 0.149169 0.070798 0 0.0016068 0 0 0 0 0
2.374 0.18 29.672214 0.001851 25.82954 3.62403446 0.000138 0.147943 0.070554 0 0.0018507 0 0 0 0 0
2.605 0.20 26.04624 0.002134 25.82954 0 0 0.146425 0.070271 0 0.0021342 0 0 0 0 0
2.919 0.22 24.319779 0.002466 24.10535 0 0 0.144487 0.069939 0 0.002466 0 0 0 0 0
3.175 0.24 22.674637 0.002858 22.4632 0 0 0.141894 0.069547 0 0.0028578 0 0 0 0 0
3.378 0.26 21.103409 0.003326 20.8962 0 0 0.138129 0.069079 0 0.0033257 0 0 0 0 0
3.529 0.28 19.597495 0.003893 19.39738 0 0 0.131604 0.068512 0 0.0038931 0 0 0 0 0
3.444 0.30 17.214017 0.004596 17.14621 0 0 0 0.067809 0 0.004596 0 0 0 0 0
0.679 0.32 3.0778177 0.005494 3.010906 0 0 0 0.066911 0 0.0054935 0 0 0 0 0
0.51 0.34 2.1173258 0.006695 2.051616 0 0 0 0.06571 0 0.0066946 0 0 0 0 0
0.409 0.36 1.5614257 0.008438 1.497459 0 0 0 0.063967 0 0.0084379 0 0 0 0 0
0.335 0.38 1.1854231 0.01146 1.124478 0 0 0 0.060945 0 0.0114597 0 0 0 0 0
0.279 0.40 0.8562022 0.072405 0.856202 0 0 0 0 0 0.0724048 0 0 0 0 0
0.221 0.42 0.119172 0.609475 0.119172 0 0 0 0 0 0.0724048 0 0 0 0.53707 0
0.176 0.44 0.0678044 0.508689 0.067804 0 0 0 0 0 0.0724048 0 0 0 0.436284 0
0.14 0.46 0.0414561 0.417855 0.041456 0 0 0 0 0 0.0724048 0 0 0 0.345451 0
0.113 0.48 0.0261153 0.342359 0.026115 0 0 0 0 0 0.0724048 0 0 0 0.269955 0
0.091 0.50 0.0166846 0.281193 0.016685 0 0 0 0 0 0.0724048 0 0 0 0.208788 0
0.074 0.52 0.0107212 0.232308 0.010721 0 0 0 0 0 0.0724048 0 0 0 0.159904 0
0.061 0.54 0.0068929 0.19364 0.006893 0 0 0 0 0 0.0724048 0 0 0 0.121235 0
0.051 0.56 0.0044174 0.163342 0.004417 0 0 0 0 0 0.0724048 0 0 0 0.090937 0
0.043 0.58 0.0028135 0.139832 0.002814 0 0 0 0 0 0.0724048 0 0 0 0.067427 0
0.037 0.60 0.0017766 0.121777 0.001777 0 0 0 0 0 0.0724048 0 0 0 0.049372 0
0.033 0.62 0.0011096 0.108066 0.00111 0 0 0 0 0 0.0724048 0 0 0 0.035661 0
0.03 0.64 0.000684 0.097781 0.000684 0 0 0 0 0 0.0724048 0 0 0 0.025376 0
0.027 0.66 0.0004153 0.09017 0.000415 0 0 0 0 0 0.0724048 0 0 0 0.017765 0
0.026 0.68 0.0002478 0.084621 0.000248 0 0 0 0 0 0.0724048 0 0 0 0.012216 0
0.024 0.70 0.0001449 0.08064 0.000145 0 0 0 0 0 0.0724048 0 0 0 0.008235 0
0.023 0.72 8.29E-05 0.077836 8.29E-05 0 0 0 0 0 0.0724048 0 0 0 0.005431 0
0.023 0.74 4.62E-05 0.0759 4.62E-05 0 0 0 0 0 0.0724048 0 0 0 0.003495 0
0.022 0.76 2.50E-05 0.074593 2.50E-05 0 0 0 0 0 0.0724048 0 0 0 0.002188 0
0.022 0.78 1.31E-05 0.073733 1.31E-05 0 0 0 0 0 0.0724048 0 0 0 0.001328 0
0.022 0.80 6.62E-06 0.073182 6.62E-06 0 0 0 0 0 0.0724048 0 0 0 0.000777 0
0.022 0.82 3.20E-06 0.072841 3.20E-06 0 0 0 0 0 0.0724048 0 0 0 0.000437 0
0.022 0.84 1.46E-06 0.072638 1.46E-06 0 0 0 0 0 0.0724048 0 0 0 0.000233 0
0.022 0.86 6.30E-07 0.072522 6.30E-07 0 0 0 0 0 0.0724048 0 0 0 0.000118 0
0.022 0.88 2.51E-07 0.07246 2.51E-07 0 0 0 0 0 0.0724048 0 0 0 5.50E-05 0
0.022 0.90 9.04E-08 0.072428 9.04E-08 0 0 0 0 0 0.0724048 0 0 0 2.34E-05 0
Table A.4: Consumer Decomposition Scenario β (pO1 = 0.4, pB2 = 0.2, pO2 = 0.3)
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Cons. Cons. Price Price Price Price Cons. Cons. Cons. Cons. Eff. Eff. Eff. Eff. Profit Profit
Off. On. Off. F1 On. F1 Off. F2 On. F2 Off. F1 On. F1 Off. F2 On. F2 Off. F1 On. F1 Off. F2 On. F2 F1 F2
1 1 0.33926 0.18413 0.10001 0.21877 0.15314 0.28996 0.57359 0.17202 0.99980 0.99981 1 0 0.06099 0.02044
1 20 0.32175 0.18145 0.10001 0.21877 0.16553 5.96562 0.75092 3.43008 0.99988 0.99985 1 0 0.52244 0.40738
1 40 0.32249 0.18218 0.10001 0.21877 0.16601 11.82507 0.95019 6.85989 0.99981 0.99984 1 0 1.00822 0.81473
1 60 0.32212 0.18176 0.10001 0.21877 0.16730 17.82855 1.15045 10.28853 0.99970 0.99959 1 0 1.49380 1.22194
1 80 0.31762 0.18278 0.10001 0.21877 0.17125 23.47420 1.33607 13.71920 0.99976 0.99980 1 0 1.97981 1.62939
1 100 0.33928 0.18260 0.10001 0.21877 0.15797 29.40982 1.60162 17.14714 0.99964 0.99949 1 0 2.46551 2.03651
20 1 0.33895 0.19822 0.10001 0.21877 3.07369 0.25855 11.27271 0.18203 0.99982 0.99978 1 0 0.75945 0.02173
20 20 0.33814 0.18479 0.10001 0.21877 3.07774 5.75112 11.45701 3.44011 0.99985 0.99982 1 0 1.21965 0.40868
20 40 0.32587 0.18283 0.10001 0.21877 3.23868 11.75160 11.49721 6.86671 0.99990 0.99985 1 0 1.70430 0.81565
20 60 0.33234 0.18372 0.10001 0.21877 3.15448 17.42690 11.78691 10.29813 0.99986 0.99985 1 0 2.19092 1.22318
20 80 0.32666 0.18247 0.10001 0.21877 3.23159 23.58778 11.90913 13.72598 0.99961 0.99965 1 0 2.67442 1.63030
20 100 0.32766 0.18345 0.10001 0.21877 3.21845 29.12362 12.12223 17.15646 0.99985 0.99983 1 0 3.16158 2.03772
40 1 0.34296 0.23816 0.10001 0.21877 6.07265 0.15902 22.63480 0.22057 0.99940 0.99947 1 0 1.49601 0.02642
40 20 0.34293 0.18370 0.10001 0.21877 6.02848 5.86221 22.83161 3.45325 0.99992 0.99988 1 0 1.95454 0.41036
40 40 0.33814 0.18479 0.10001 0.21877 6.15548 11.50225 22.91402 6.88022 0.99985 0.99982 1 0 2.43930 0.81736
40 60 0.32821 0.18318 0.10001 0.21877 6.41450 17.56478 22.85694 10.30492 0.99988 0.99989 1 0 2.92346 1.22410
40 80 0.32587 0.18283 0.10001 0.21877 6.47736 23.50320 22.99441 13.73342 0.99990 0.99985 1 0 3.40861 1.63129
40 100 0.32941 0.18192 0.10001 0.21877 6.38352 29.70388 23.29467 17.16477 0.99982 0.99981 1 0 3.89496 2.03882
60 1 0.34756 0.26311 0.10001 0.21877 8.95404 0.11902 34.11649 0.26766 0.99964 0.99977 1 0 2.23489 0.03213
60 20 0.33607 0.18315 0.10001 0.21877 9.30791 5.92170 33.88506 3.45892 0.99987 0.99983 1 0 2.68843 0.41114
60 40 0.33451 0.18376 0.10001 0.21877 9.37171 11.67313 34.02779 6.88772 0.99974 0.99985 1 0 3.17280 0.81837
60 60 0.33916 0.18504 0.10001 0.21877 9.19318 17.19856 34.41076 10.32135 0.99987 0.99988 1 0 3.65975 1.22617
60 80 0.33262 0.18398 0.10001 0.21877 9.44828 23.20271 34.35964 13.74553 0.99984 0.99983 1 0 4.14427 1.63284
60 100 0.34195 0.18378 0.10001 0.21877 9.08706 29.07181 34.93323 17.18291 0.99978 0.99972 1 0 4.62930 2.04109
80 1 0.34428 0.26232 0.10001 0.21877 12.09458 0.12962 45.32503 0.27283 0.99916 0.99913 1 0 2.97288 0.03286
80 20 0.34370 0.18614 0.10001 0.21877 12.02318 5.74272 45.49243 3.47771 0.99987 0.99987 1 0 3.42333 0.41349
80 40 0.34293 0.18370 0.10001 0.21877 12.05697 11.72442 45.66322 6.90650 0.99992 0.99988 1 0 3.90909 0.82071
80 60 0.33345 0.18335 0.10001 0.21877 12.55080 17.58262 45.38411 10.32552 0.99984 0.99982 1 0 4.39261 1.22677
80 80 0.33814 0.18479 0.10001 0.21877 12.31095 23.00449 45.82803 13.76044 0.99985 0.99982 1 0 4.87860 1.63473
80 100 0.33209 0.18277 0.10001 0.21877 12.62264 29.44844 45.71962 17.18384 0.99982 0.99985 1 0 5.36276 2.04131
100 1 0.34575 0.26821 0.10001 0.21877 15.03469 0.12033 56.74205 0.29503 0.99928 0.99912 1 0 3.71145 0.03561
100 20 0.33956 0.18515 0.10001 0.21877 15.29240 5.83551 56.55619 3.48351 0.99977 0.99982 1 0 4.15746 0.41429
100 40 0.33835 0.18391 0.10001 0.21877 15.36931 11.71181 56.68454 6.91180 0.99970 0.99980 1 0 4.64193 0.82145
100 60 0.33530 0.18348 0.10001 0.21877 15.56603 17.58408 56.69762 10.33684 0.99988 0.99985 1 0 5.12828 1.22823
100 80 0.33837 0.18425 0.10001 0.21877 15.37036 23.18839 57.09703 13.77086 0.99984 0.99978 1 0 5.61371 1.63608
100 100 0.34254 0.18436 0.10001 0.21877 15.10257 28.92044 57.56954 17.20718 0.99979 0.99982 1 0 6.09880 2.04420
Table A.5: Scenario 1 (pB2 = 0.10001, pO2 = ˜pO2 ,ξB2 = 1,ξO2 = 0)
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Cons. Cons. Price Price Price Price Cons. Cons. Cons. Cons. Eff. Eff. Eff. Eff. Profit Profit
Off. On. Off. F1 On. F1 Off. F2 On. F2 Off. F1 On. F1 Off. F2 On. F2 Off. F1 On. F1 Off. F2 On. F2 F1 F2
1 1 0.26886 0.21226 0.34649 0.10001 0.26186 0.19059 0.14346 0.60848 0.99991 0.99990 1 0 0.06559 0.03537
1 20 0.38915 0.21161 0.34649 0.10001 0.25580 3.81991 0.22137 11.98871 0.99979 0.99982 1 0 0.50004 0.05468
1 40 0.38819 0.20978 0.34649 0.10001 0.39334 7.75147 0.27836 23.84471 0.99994 0.99992 1 0 0.96421 0.06885
1 60 0.36301 0.21300 0.34649 0.10001 0.54454 11.32262 0.26635 36.05786 0.99990 0.99988 1 0 1.42228 0.06601
1 80 0.27965 0.21307 0.34649 0.10001 0.80155 15.08321 0.19523 48.07443 0.99992 0.99989 1 0 1.84907 0.04860
1 100 0.40205 0.21237 0.34649 0.10001 0.75470 18.96903 0.49276 59.99156 0.99992 0.99988 1 0 2.35911 0.12206
20 1 0.26882 0.21140 0.34649 0.10001 5.10261 0.20860 2.85817 0.77688 0.99980 0.99985 1 0 0.88427 0.70451
20 20 0.27039 0.21485 0.34649 0.10001 5.18896 3.73047 2.86887 12.25107 0.99987 0.99985 1 0 1.31182 0.70726
20 40 0.27251 0.21251 0.34649 0.10001 5.27040 7.59234 2.88187 24.17895 0.99989 0.99988 1 0 1.76253 0.71059
20 60 0.27495 0.21301 0.34649 0.10001 5.33829 11.33443 2.89472 36.22580 0.99985 0.99985 1 0 2.21339 0.71388
20 80 0.28375 0.21338 0.34649 0.10001 5.21883 15.06417 2.91257 48.29315 0.99987 0.99988 1 0 2.66528 0.71840
20 100 0.28307 0.21339 0.34649 0.10001 5.37924 18.82173 2.92568 60.32174 0.99985 0.99985 1 0 3.11716 0.72175
40 1 0.26982 0.21121 0.34649 0.10001 10.13924 0.22586 5.71575 0.95724 0.99979 0.99983 1 0 1.74619 1.40887
40 20 0.26820 0.21194 0.34649 0.10001 10.37149 3.83866 5.72695 12.33729 0.99989 0.99988 1 0 2.17329 1.41175
40 40 0.27039 0.21485 0.34649 0.10001 10.37792 7.46095 5.73775 24.50213 0.99987 0.99985 1 0 2.62364 1.41453
40 60 0.27010 0.21285 0.34649 0.10001 10.54090 11.36520 5.75024 36.38578 0.99986 0.99987 1 0 3.07384 1.41773
40 80 0.27251 0.21251 0.34649 0.10001 10.54079 15.18469 5.76374 48.35791 0.99989 0.99988 1 0 3.52507 1.42117
40 100 0.27478 0.21374 0.34649 0.10001 10.54174 18.78233 5.77593 60.55028 0.99981 0.99983 1 0 3.97603 1.42430
60 1 0.26969 0.21110 0.34649 0.10001 15.21607 0.24458 8.57288 1.13671 0.99967 0.99978 1 0 2.60797 2.11312
60 20 0.27084 0.21348 0.34649 0.10001 15.24804 3.80682 8.58467 12.56895 0.99988 0.99986 1 0 3.03536 2.11614
60 40 0.26939 0.21249 0.34649 0.10001 15.52158 7.62603 8.59626 24.53338 0.99988 0.99988 1 0 3.48538 2.11912
60 60 0.26928 0.21352 0.34649 0.10001 15.66981 11.31693 8.60717 36.62656 0.99990 0.99987 1 0 3.93531 2.12193
60 80 0.27289 0.21222 0.34649 0.10001 15.49307 15.24013 8.62186 48.50266 0.99986 0.99988 1 0 4.38676 2.12567
60 100 0.27246 0.21346 0.34649 0.10001 15.66933 18.83971 8.63239 60.68582 0.99989 0.99983 1 0 4.83688 2.12838
80 1 0.27077 0.21049 0.34649 0.10001 20.15721 0.26475 11.42989 1.31951 0.99960 0.99982 1 0 3.46979 2.81734
80 20 0.26887 0.21148 0.34649 0.10001 20.51972 3.88802 11.44251 12.68111 0.99989 0.99988 1 0 3.89728 2.82056
80 40 0.26820 0.21194 0.34649 0.10001 20.74297 7.67731 11.45390 24.67459 0.99989 0.99988 1 0 4.34657 2.82349
80 60 0.27029 0.21267 0.34649 0.10001 20.63461 11.41369 11.46588 36.73044 0.99989 0.99987 1 0 4.79769 2.82657
80 80 0.27039 0.21485 0.34649 0.10001 20.75584 14.92190 11.47549 49.00426 0.99987 0.99985 1 0 5.24727 2.82906
80 100 0.27165 0.21274 0.34649 0.10001 20.75718 18.97049 11.49026 60.75156 0.99988 0.99986 1 0 5.69803 2.83282
100 1 0.27027 0.21054 0.34649 0.10001 25.27000 0.28020 14.28876 1.49694 0.99984 0.99986 1 0 4.33191 3.52202
100 20 0.26812 0.21335 0.34649 0.10001 25.72394 3.84134 14.29953 12.91552 0.99987 0.99988 1 0 4.75877 3.52479
100 40 0.26781 0.21255 0.34649 0.10001 25.91399 7.65372 14.31134 24.88946 0.99992 0.99990 1 0 5.20844 3.52782
100 60 0.27007 0.21341 0.34649 0.10001 25.71793 11.35898 14.32273 36.97885 0.99986 0.99987 1 0 5.65903 3.53074
100 80 0.26958 0.21394 0.34649 0.10001 25.93051 15.05123 14.33338 49.06908 0.99985 0.99986 1 0 6.10883 3.53349
100 100 0.27028 0.21276 0.34649 0.10001 25.97320 18.98229 14.34686 60.93062 0.99988 0.99984 1 0 6.55904 3.53693
Table A.6: Scenario 2 (pB2 = ˜pB2 , pO2 = 0.10001,ξB2 = 1,ξO2 = 0)
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Cons. Cons. Price Price Price Price Cons. Cons. Cons. Cons. Eff. Eff. Eff. Eff. Profit Profit
Off. On. Off. F1 On. F1 Off. F2 On. F2 Off. F1 On. F1 Off. F2 On. F2 Off. F1 On. F1 Off. F2 On. F2 F1 F2
1 1 0.33043 0.18494 0.10001 0.21877 0.15846 0.29814 0.57101 0.17170 0.99989 0.99985 0 1 0.06181 0.02040
1 20 0.33146 0.18322 0.10001 0.21877 0.15778 5.93973 0.82017 3.42971 0.99967 0.99961 0 1 0.53049 0.40734
1 40 0.34055 0.18356 0.10001 0.21877 0.15190 11.82480 1.08889 6.85876 0.99945 0.99941 0 1 1.02363 0.81460
1 60 0.25037 0.18372 0.10001 0.21877 0.24639 17.69371 1.29151 10.28516 0.99879 0.99847 0 1 1.51565 1.22154
1 80 0.30841 0.18324 0.10001 0.21877 0.18337 23.73130 1.60179 13.70514 0.99887 0.99732 0 1 2.00976 1.62772
1 100 0.28799 0.18441 0.10001 0.21877 0.22025 29.24701 1.85638 17.13196 0.99645 0.99672 0 1 2.50298 2.03471
20 1 0.33348 0.27127 0.10001 0.21877 3.15122 0.22875 11.21600 0.24895 0.99978 0.99972 0 1 0.77470 0.02968
20 20 0.33043 0.18494 0.10001 0.21877 3.16926 5.96273 11.42025 3.43394 0.99989 0.99985 0 1 1.23627 0.40795
20 40 0.32782 0.18445 0.10001 0.21877 3.20401 11.84257 11.64996 6.86395 0.99995 0.99989 0 1 1.72959 0.81532
20 60 0.32904 0.18566 0.10001 0.21877 3.18815 17.43433 11.93515 10.29387 0.99996 0.99992 0 1 2.22301 1.22268
20 80 0.32829 0.18403 0.10001 0.21877 3.19749 23.65165 12.18026 13.72357 0.99994 0.99989 0 1 2.71662 1.63001
20 100 0.32819 0.18393 0.10001 0.21877 3.19871 29.56176 12.44103 17.15350 0.99994 0.99991 0 1 3.21012 2.03737
40 1 0.33382 0.27333 0.10001 0.21877 6.29390 0.34220 22.41931 0.26403 0.99986 0.99978 0 1 1.53066 0.03158
40 20 0.33183 0.18511 0.10001 0.21877 6.30095 6.10171 22.61204 3.43794 0.99992 0.99988 0 1 1.97948 0.40854
40 40 0.33043 0.18494 0.10001 0.21877 6.33851 11.92546 22.84049 6.86788 0.99989 0.99985 0 1 2.47255 0.81590
40 60 0.32904 0.18512 0.10001 0.21877 6.37593 17.69797 23.07070 10.29788 0.99992 0.99986 0 1 2.96595 1.22327
40 80 0.32782 0.18445 0.10001 0.21877 6.40802 23.68513 23.29992 13.72789 0.99995 0.99989 0 1 3.45919 1.63064
40 100 0.32849 0.18501 0.10001 0.21877 6.39055 29.33581 23.58517 17.15758 0.99991 0.99986 0 1 3.95280 2.03797
60 1 0.33705 0.28359 0.10001 0.21877 9.31897 0.43082 33.73873 0.28992 0.99980 0.99980 0 1 2.28679 0.03477
60 20 0.32978 0.19201 0.10001 0.21877 9.54496 5.76331 33.71986 3.44373 0.99994 0.99991 0 1 2.72293 0.40933
60 40 0.32961 0.18640 0.10001 0.21877 9.54263 11.86935 33.97073 6.87254 0.99992 0.99989 0 1 3.21566 0.81656
60 60 0.33043 0.18494 0.10001 0.21877 9.50777 17.88819 34.26074 10.30182 0.99989 0.99985 0 1 3.70882 1.22385
60 80 0.32957 0.18438 0.10001 0.21877 9.54100 23.85697 34.48935 13.73166 0.99994 0.99986 0 1 4.20194 1.63120
60 100 0.32810 0.18536 0.10001 0.21877 9.60193 29.36345 34.70453 17.16240 0.99994 0.99992 0 1 4.69534 2.03865
80 1 0.33390 0.28848 0.10001 0.21877 12.58598 0.52877 44.82181 0.31454 0.99991 0.99986 0 1 3.04303 0.03780
80 20 0.33105 0.19025 0.10001 0.21877 12.65420 6.03743 44.92952 3.44742 0.99985 0.99980 0 1 3.46653 0.40989
80 40 0.33183 0.18511 0.10001 0.21877 12.60190 12.20342 45.22409 6.87589 0.99992 0.99988 0 1 3.95895 0.81707
80 60 0.33090 0.18398 0.10001 0.21877 12.64883 18.24354 45.43627 10.30579 0.99993 0.99990 0 1 4.45156 1.22443
80 80 0.33043 0.18494 0.10001 0.21877 12.67702 23.85091 45.68098 13.73576 0.99989 0.99985 0 1 4.94509 1.63180
80 100 0.32873 0.18513 0.10001 0.21877 12.76817 29.59405 45.86128 17.16641 0.99994 0.99991 0 1 5.43804 2.03924
100 1 0.33861 0.28384 0.10001 0.21877 15.43133 0.64769 56.31418 0.31578 0.99979 0.99978 0 1 3.79914 0.03807
100 20 0.33101 0.19350 0.10001 0.21877 15.82889 5.95507 56.09652 3.45291 0.99988 0.99983 0 1 4.21078 0.41065
100 40 0.33357 0.18782 0.10001 0.21877 15.64305 11.97066 56.51748 6.88008 0.99989 0.99986 0 1 4.70247 0.81768
100 60 0.33094 0.18770 0.10001 0.21877 15.81948 17.60447 56.61920 10.31071 0.99989 0.99984 0 1 5.19529 1.22513
100 80 0.33325 0.18603 0.10001 0.21877 15.65938 23.69511 57.02352 13.73946 0.99991 0.99990 0 1 5.68870 1.63235
100 100 0.33043 0.18494 0.10001 0.21877 15.84628 29.81364 57.10123 17.16970 0.99989 0.99985 0 1 6.18136 2.03975
Table A.7: Scenario 3 (pB2 = 0.10001, pO2 = ˜pO2 ,ξB2 = 0,ξO2 = 1)
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Cons. Cons. Price Price Price Price Cons. Cons. Cons. Cons. Eff. Eff. Eff. Eff. Profit Profit
Off. On. Off. F1 On. F1 Off. F2 On. F2 Off. F1 On. F1 Off. F2 On. F2 Off. F1 On. F1 Off. F2 On. F2 F1 F2
1 1 0.26883 0.22108 0.34649 0.10001 0.25307 0.17634 0.14231 0.62079 0.99987 0.99984 0 1 0.06404 0.03508
1 20 0.27347 0.21833 0.34649 0.10001 0.24762 3.60864 0.14225 12.18515 0.99967 0.99969 0 1 0.46956 0.03518
1 40 0.27585 0.21884 0.34649 0.10001 0.24502 7.18652 0.14227 24.39378 0.99988 0.99984 0 1 0.89659 0.03531
1 60 0.26738 0.21958 0.34649 0.10001 0.26446 10.70842 0.14227 36.65349 0.99958 0.99943 0 1 1.32324 0.03543
1 80 0.27299 0.21879 0.34649 0.10001 0.25389 14.37800 0.14225 48.77309 0.99965 0.99974 0 1 1.75039 0.03555
1 100 0.27716 0.21898 0.34649 0.10001 0.24914 17.94494 0.14225 60.99242 0.99947 0.99935 0 1 2.17711 0.03567
20 1 0.26618 0.20666 0.34649 0.10001 5.13976 0.20080 2.84036 0.74405 0.99990 0.99987 0 1 0.87531 0.70012
20 20 0.26843 0.22263 0.34649 0.10001 5.07387 3.48002 2.84679 12.46261 0.99991 0.99989 0 1 1.28081 0.70182
20 40 0.27093 0.21963 0.34649 0.10001 4.99890 7.14060 2.84571 24.58755 0.99989 0.99983 0 1 1.70736 0.70168
20 60 0.27017 0.21976 0.34649 0.10001 5.02396 10.69756 2.84575 36.81624 0.99989 0.99984 0 1 2.13440 0.70181
20 80 0.27135 0.22049 0.34649 0.10001 4.99015 14.17354 2.84600 49.12612 0.99986 0.99983 0 1 2.56116 0.70199
20 100 0.26968 0.22023 0.34649 0.10001 5.04372 17.75492 2.84580 61.32999 0.99980 0.99985 0 1 2.98857 0.70207
40 1 0.26719 0.20960 0.34649 0.10001 10.21798 0.19822 5.68264 0.90310 0.99975 0.99974 0 1 1.72917 1.40071
40 20 0.26684 0.22169 0.34649 0.10001 10.24325 3.51021 5.69285 12.58988 0.99990 0.99981 0 1 2.13489 1.40334
40 40 0.26843 0.22263 0.34649 0.10001 10.14774 6.96004 5.69358 24.92521 0.99991 0.99989 0 1 2.56162 1.40365
40 60 0.26942 0.22074 0.34649 0.10001 10.08915 10.61105 5.69216 37.05945 0.99989 0.99984 0 1 2.98777 1.40342
40 80 0.27093 0.21963 0.34649 0.10001 9.99781 14.28119 5.69142 49.17509 0.99989 0.99983 0 1 3.41472 1.40336
40 100 0.26659 0.22220 0.34649 0.10001 10.26915 17.45806 5.69326 61.78247 0.99989 0.99985 0 1 3.84212 1.40394
60 1 0.26450 0.23439 0.34649 0.10001 15.57491 0.16666 8.53535 1.11505 0.99845 0.99834 0 1 2.58123 2.10387
60 20 0.26839 0.22248 0.34649 0.10001 15.22075 3.48820 8.53989 12.76935 0.99986 0.99982 0 1 2.98870 2.10510
60 40 0.26658 0.22283 0.34649 0.10001 15.39082 6.94920 8.54041 25.09399 0.99987 0.99983 0 1 3.41510 2.10536
60 60 0.26821 0.21859 0.34649 0.10001 15.23979 10.80810 8.53588 37.01911 0.99989 0.99984 0 1 3.84254 2.10436
60 80 0.26825 0.22203 0.34649 0.10001 15.24087 13.99236 8.53961 49.62075 0.99989 0.99984 0 1 4.26855 2.10540
60 100 0.27157 0.21947 0.34649 0.10001 14.93527 17.87411 8.53711 61.52459 0.99992 0.99988 0 1 4.69605 2.10491
80 1 0.26694 0.19813 0.34649 0.10001 20.45984 0.22949 11.33368 1.18571 0.99904 0.99782 0 1 3.43404 2.79362
80 20 0.26607 0.21113 0.34649 0.10001 20.57463 3.83859 11.36932 12.57164 0.99988 0.99987 0 1 3.84237 2.80252
80 40 0.26684 0.22169 0.34649 0.10001 20.48651 7.02041 11.38571 25.17975 0.99990 0.99981 0 1 4.26978 2.80669
80 60 0.26879 0.21733 0.34649 0.10001 20.24641 10.92560 11.37934 37.05787 0.99989 0.99983 0 1 4.69588 2.80524
80 80 0.26843 0.22263 0.34649 0.10001 20.29549 13.92009 11.38715 49.85042 0.99991 0.99989 0 1 5.12324 2.80729
80 100 0.26767 0.22006 0.34649 0.10001 20.39274 17.78724 11.38324 61.76824 0.99985 0.99978 0 1 5.54882 2.80645
100 1 0.26377 0.20663 0.34649 0.10001 26.06772 0.21297 14.19087 1.36147 0.99937 0.99906 0 1 4.28876 3.49789
100 20 0.26691 0.20957 0.34649 0.10001 25.58905 3.89007 14.20849 12.67495 0.99989 0.99987 0 1 4.69585 3.50234
100 40 0.26818 0.22192 0.34649 0.10001 25.40112 7.00798 14.23230 25.34936 0.99988 0.99987 0 1 5.12368 3.50834
100 60 0.27042 0.22256 0.34649 0.10001 25.05925 10.44967 14.23384 37.69209 0.99991 0.99987 0 1 5.54970 3.50884
100 80 0.26776 0.21945 0.34649 0.10001 25.46820 14.30889 14.22782 49.61813 0.99987 0.99984 0 1 5.97714 3.50748
100 100 0.26825 0.21967 0.34649 0.10001 25.39534 17.84665 14.22848 61.86575 0.99987 0.99984 0 1 6.40461 3.50776
Table A.8: Scenario 4 (pB2 = ˜pB2 , pO2 = 0.10001,ξB2 = 0,ξO2 = 1)
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Cons. Cons Cons. Cons. N-S N-S Ex. Off. F2 On. F2 On. F1 On. Ex. F1 N-S N-S Ex. On. F2 Off. F2 Off. F1 Off. Ex. F1
Off. On. Off. F1 On. F1 Offline Offline Off. F1 Off. F1 Off. F1 Off. F1 Online Online On. F1 On. F1 On. F1 On. F1
1 1 0.15311 0.28993 0.15306 0 0 0.00005 0.00000 0 0.17497 0.1135798 0 0 0.0013763 0
1 20 0.16551 5.96536 0.16455 0 0 0.00096 0.00000 0 3.50383 2.46052 0 0 0.00101 0
1 40 0.16599 11.82435 0.16407 0 0 0.00193 0.00000 0 7.00528 4.81806 0 0 0.00101 0
1 60 0.16719 17.82726 0.16430 0 0 0.00289 0.00000 0 10.50925 7.31700 0 0 0.00101 0
1 80 0.17122 23.47312 0.16737 0 0 0.00385 0.00000 0 14.00648 9.46575 0 0 0.00089 0
1 100 0.15780 29.40792 0.15299 0 0 0.00481 0.00000 0 17.50805 11.89844 0 0 0.00143 0
20 1 3.07348 0.25818 3.07343 0 0 0.00005 0.00000 0 0.17370 0.06535 0 0 0.01913 0
20 20 3.07715 5.75047 3.07619 0 0 0.00096 0.00000 0 3.49832 2.22567 0 0 0.02647 0
20 40 3.23838 11.75107 3.23646 0 0 0.00193 0.00000 0 7.00320 4.72647 0 0 0.02141 0
20 60 3.15416 17.42578 3.15128 0 0 0.00289 0.00000 0 10.50040 6.90128 0 0 0.02410 0
20 80 3.22955 23.58539 3.22570 0 0 0.00385 0.00000 0 14.00795 9.55538 0 0 0.02206 0
20 100 3.21783 29.12211 3.21302 0 0 0.00481 0.00000 0 17.50280 11.59739 0 0 0.02193 0
40 1 6.07389 0.15503 6.07385 0 0 0.00004 0.00000 0 0.14273 0.00000 0 0 0.01230 0
40 20 6.02822 5.86161 6.02725 0 0 0.00096 0.00000 0 3.50019 2.30172 0 0 0.05970 0
40 40 6.15430 11.50094 6.15238 0 0 0.00192 0.00000 0 6.99665 4.45135 0 0 0.05295 0
40 60 6.41400 17.56324 6.41111 0 0 0.00289 0.00000 0 10.50318 7.01537 0 0 0.04469 0
40 80 6.47676 23.50214 6.47291 0 0 0.00385 0.00000 0 14.00640 9.45293 0 0 0.04281 0
40 100 6.38252 29.70103 6.37770 0 0 0.00481 0.00000 0 17.51519 12.13844 0 0 0.04741 0
60 1 8.95298 0.11839 8.95294 0 0 0.00003 0.00000 0 0.11056 0.00000 0 0 0.00782 0
60 20 9.30716 5.92067 9.30620 0 0 0.00096 0.00000 0 3.50104 2.34041 0 0 0.07922 0
60 40 9.37045 11.67060 9.36852 0 0 0.00192 0.00000 0 7.00012 4.59477 0 0 0.07570 0
60 60 9.19221 17.19743 9.18933 0 0 0.00289 0.00000 0 10.49386 6.62299 0 0 0.08058 0
60 80 9.44730 23.20082 9.44345 0 0 0.00385 0.00000 0 13.99876 9.12980 0 0 0.07226 0
60 100 9.08357 29.06872 9.07876 0 0 0.00481 0.00000 0 17.49949 11.48142 0 0 0.08780 0
80 1 12.09792 0.12090 12.09788 0 0 0.00003 0.00001 0 0.11145 0.00000 0 0 0.00945 0
80 20 12.02241 5.74155 12.02145 0 0 0.00096 0.00000 0 3.49609 2.13092 0 0 0.11454 0
80 40 12.05643 11.72323 12.05451 0 0 0.00192 0.00000 0 7.00038 4.60345 0 0 0.11940 0
80 60 12.54865 17.58075 12.54577 0 0 0.00289 0.00000 0 10.50212 6.97902 0 0 0.09961 0
80 80 12.30861 23.00188 12.30476 0 0 0.00385 0.00000 0 13.99329 8.90270 0 0 0.10590 0
80 100 12.62101 29.44416 12.61620 0 0 0.00481 0.00000 0 17.50847 11.83743 0 0 0.09825 0
100 1 15.03522 0.11402 15.03518 0 0 0.00003 0.00001 0 0.10460 0.00000 0 0 0.00943 0
100 20 15.29070 5.83332 15.28974 0 0 0.00096 0.00000 0 3.49772 2.20040 0 0 0.13520 0
100 40 15.36615 11.70957 15.36422 0 0 0.00192 0.00000 0 6.99953 4.57400 0 0 0.13605 0
100 60 15.56503 17.58184 15.56214 0 0 0.00289 0.00000 0 10.50155 6.95141 0 0 0.12888 0
100 80 15.36790 23.18588 15.36405 0 0 0.00385 0.00000 0 13.99676 9.05438 0 0 0.13474 0
100 100 15.10011 28.91748 15.09530 0 0 0.00481 0.00000 0 17.49512 11.27630 0 0 0.14606 0
Table A.9: Consumer Drift Scenario 1 (pB2 = 0.10001, pO2 = ˜pO2 ,ξB2 = 1,ξO2 = 0)
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Cons. Cons Cons. Cons. N-S N-S Ex. Off. F2 On. F2 On. F1 On. Ex. F1 N-S N-S Ex. On. F2 Off. F2 Off. F1 Off. Ex. F1
Off. On. Off. F1 On. F1 Offline Offline Off. F1 Off. F1 Off. F1 Off. F1 Online Online On. F1 On. F1 On. F1 On. F1
1 1 0.26184 0.19058 0.14997 0.10474 0 0.00706 0.00007 0 0.18976 0 0 0.00077 0.00003 0.00002
1 20 0.25597 3.81937 0.12351 0.00000 0 0.13246 0.00000 0 3.81687 0 0 0.00066 0.00184 0.00000
1 40 0.39335 7.75115 0.12400 0.00000 0 0.26936 0.00000 0 7.74858 0 0 0.00070 0.00188 0.00000
1 60 0.54454 11.32163 0.13902 0.00000 0 0.40552 0.00000 0 11.31983 0 0 0.00071 0.00110 0.00000
1 80 0.80146 15.08225 0.14995 0.08889 0 0.55968 0.00294 0 15.08141 0 0 0.00076 0.00005 0.00003
1 100 0.75506 18.96824 0.11620 0.00000 0 0.63886 0.00000 0 18.96542 0 0 0.00061 0.00221 0.00000
20 1 5.10238 0.20795 2.99936 2.09585 0 0.00711 0.00007 0 0.19111 0 0 0.01586 0.00057 0.00040
20 20 5.18831 3.72970 2.99943 2.04932 0 0.13811 0.00146 0 3.71448 0 0 0.01438 0.00050 0.00034
20 40 5.26966 7.59161 2.99925 1.98661 0 0.28152 0.00227 0 7.57510 0 0 0.01538 0.00068 0.00045
20 60 5.33722 11.33283 2.99916 1.91469 0 0.42037 0.00300 0 11.31640 0 0 0.01516 0.00077 0.00049
20 80 5.21817 15.06130 2.99865 1.65948 0 0.55781 0.00223 0 15.04431 0 0 0.01501 0.00128 0.00071
20 100 5.37801 18.81930 2.99870 1.67912 0 0.69725 0.00294 0 18.80239 0 0 0.01499 0.00123 0.00069
40 1 10.13853 0.22540 5.99862 4.13273 0 0.00712 0.00006 0 0.19141 0 0 0.03189 0.00124 0.00086
40 20 10.37065 3.83798 5.99881 4.22889 0 0.14152 0.00143 0 3.80493 0 0 0.03125 0.00105 0.00074
40 40 10.37663 7.45941 5.99886 4.09863 0 0.27622 0.00291 0 7.42895 0 0 0.02877 0.00100 0.00069
40 60 10.53986 11.36289 5.99873 4.11582 0 0.42129 0.00402 0 11.33052 0 0 0.03046 0.00113 0.00078
40 80 10.53932 15.18321 5.99850 3.97322 0 0.56305 0.00455 0 15.15019 0 0 0.03076 0.00136 0.00090
40 100 10.53991 18.77907 5.99840 3.83981 0 0.69642 0.00527 0 18.74698 0 0 0.02969 0.00146 0.00093
60 1 15.21534 0.24270 8.99793 6.21023 0 0.00712 0.00006 0 0.19158 0 0 0.04797 0.00187 0.00129
60 20 15.24684 3.80491 8.99808 6.10776 0 0.13968 0.00132 0 3.75716 0 0 0.04488 0.00171 0.00116
60 40 15.52011 7.62489 8.99814 6.23751 0 0.28173 0.00274 0 7.57592 0 0 0.04616 0.00166 0.00115
60 60 15.66841 11.31441 8.99827 6.24678 0 0.41900 0.00436 0 11.26699 0 0 0.04483 0.00153 0.00106
60 80 15.49208 15.23643 8.99766 5.92571 0 0.56435 0.00437 0 15.18638 0 0 0.04651 0.00214 0.00141
60 100 15.66675 18.83727 8.99788 5.96455 0 0.69831 0.00601 0 18.78920 0 0 0.04489 0.00191 0.00127
80 1 20.15608 0.26229 11.99693 8.15194 0 0.00716 0.00006 0 0.19254 0 0 0.06506 0.00279 0.00190
80 20 20.51855 3.88690 11.99744 8.37771 0 0.14205 0.00134 0 3.81969 0 0 0.06333 0.00228 0.00159
80 40 20.74130 7.67596 11.99761 8.45777 0 0.28305 0.00286 0 7.60986 0 0 0.06250 0.00211 0.00149
80 60 20.63261 11.41229 11.99740 8.20937 0 0.42190 0.00394 0 11.34716 0 0 0.06123 0.00232 0.00159
80 80 20.75325 14.91881 11.99772 8.19727 0 0.55244 0.00583 0 14.85791 0 0 0.05753 0.00201 0.00137
80 100 20.75441 18.96686 11.99719 8.04857 0 0.70259 0.00607 0 18.90152 0 0 0.06111 0.00253 0.00170
100 1 25.26827 0.27933 14.99631 10.26474 0 0.00716 0.00006 0 0.19246 0 0 0.08124 0.00334 0.00229
100 20 25.72265 3.84022 14.99728 10.58393 0 0.13990 0.00154 0 3.76107 0 0 0.07509 0.00237 0.00168
100 40 25.91246 7.65254 14.99720 10.63059 0 0.28165 0.00302 0 7.57154 0 0 0.07680 0.00245 0.00174
100 60 25.71515 11.35691 14.99694 10.29474 0 0.41933 0.00414 0 11.27739 0 0 0.07494 0.00271 0.00186
100 80 25.92739 15.04908 14.99713 10.36770 0 0.55672 0.00583 0 14.97098 0 0 0.07383 0.00253 0.00175
100 100 25.96963 18.97935 14.99678 10.26360 0 0.70265 0.00660 0 18.89816 0 0 0.07634 0.00288 0.00197
Table A.10: Consumer Drift Scenario 2 (pB2 = ˜pB2 , pO2 = 0.10001,ξB2 = 1,ξO2 = 0)
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Cons. Cons Cons. Cons. N-S N-S Ex. Off. F2 On. F2 On. F1 On. Ex. F1 N-S N-S Ex. On. F2 Off. F2 Off. F1 Off. Ex. F1
Off. On. Off. F1 On. F1 Offline Offline Off. F1 Off. F1 Off. F1 Off. F1 Online Online On. F1 On. F1 On. F1 On. F1
1 1 0.15846 0.29811 0.15846 0 0 0.00000 0.00000 0 0.17981 0.11075 0 0.00643 0.00112 0
1 20 0.15771 5.93922 0.15771 0 0 0.00000 0.00000 0 3.59624 2.33538 0 0.00641 0.00120 0
1 40 0.15166 11.82342 0.15166 0 0 0.00000 0.00000 0 7.19248 4.62333 0 0.00618 0.00143 0
1 60 0.23345 17.69592 0.21638 0 0 0.01356 0.00214 0.00137 10.78659 6.90056 0 0.00870 0.00008 0
1 80 0.17383 23.73000 0.17349 0 0 0.00034 0.00000 0 14.38497 9.33734 0 0.00701 0.00069 0
1 100 0.19086 29.25032 0.18802 0 0 0.00275 0.00005 0.00003 17.98115 11.26122 0 0.00757 0.00038 0
20 1 3.15120 0.22887 3.15117 0 0 0.00000 0.00003 0 0.11103 0.00000 0 0.11701 0.00083 0
20 20 3.16910 5.96220 3.16910 0 0 0.00000 0.00000 0 3.59624 2.21502 0 0.12858 0.02235 0
20 40 3.20396 11.84184 3.20395 0 0 0.00001 0.00000 0 7.19248 4.49805 0 0.12994 0.02136 0
20 60 3.18811 17.43340 3.18810 0 0 0.00001 0.00000 0 10.78872 6.49415 0 0.12926 0.02127 0
20 80 3.19742 23.65031 3.19741 0 0 0.00001 0.00000 0 14.38497 9.11380 0 0.12972 0.02183 0
20 100 3.19867 29.56008 3.19865 0 0 0.00001 0.00000 0 17.98121 11.42726 0 0.12977 0.02184 0
40 1 6.29377 0.34269 6.29374 0 0 0.00000 0.00003 0 0.10877 0.00000 0 0.23245 0.00147 0
40 20 6.30081 6.10105 6.30081 0 0 0.00000 0.00000 0 3.59624 2.20322 0 0.25572 0.04587 0
40 40 6.33821 11.92439 6.33820 0 0 0.00000 0.00000 0 7.19248 4.43004 0 0.25716 0.04470 0
40 60 6.37569 17.69691 6.37568 0 0 0.00001 0.00000 0 10.78872 6.60648 0 0.25856 0.04314 0
40 80 6.40792 23.68367 6.40790 0 0 0.00001 0.00000 0 14.38497 8.99610 0 0.25988 0.04272 0
40 100 6.39030 29.33431 6.39029 0 0 0.00001 0.00000 0 17.98121 11.05121 0 0.25913 0.04276 0
60 1 9.31762 0.43108 9.31757 0 0 0.00000 0.00004 0 0.09801 0.00000 0 0.33173 0.00134 0
60 20 9.54483 5.76253 9.54483 0 0 0.00000 0.00000 0 3.59624 1.72585 0 0.38571 0.05474 0
60 40 9.54254 11.86779 9.54254 0 0 0.00000 0.00000 0 7.19248 4.22514 0 0.38679 0.06339 0
60 60 9.50731 17.88659 9.50730 0 0 0.00000 0.00000 0 10.78872 6.64507 0 0.38575 0.06705 0
60 80 9.54075 23.85483 9.54074 0 0 0.00001 0.00000 0 14.38497 9.01600 0 0.38713 0.06674 0
60 100 9.60180 29.36143 9.60179 0 0 0.00001 0.00000 0 17.98121 10.92797 0 0.38925 0.06300 0
80 1 12.58545 0.52955 12.58538 0 0 0.00000 0.00006 0 0.09313 0.00000 0 0.43548 0.00094 0
80 20 12.65450 6.03340 12.65450 0 0 0.00000 0.00000 0 3.59624 1.84625 0 0.51204 0.07887 0
80 40 12.60162 12.20209 12.60161 0 0 0.00000 0.00000 0 7.19248 4.40644 0 0.51144 0.09173 0
80 60 12.64858 18.24211 12.64858 0 0 0.00000 0.00000 0 10.78872 6.84729 0 0.51353 0.09256 0
80 80 12.67641 23.84879 12.67641 0 0 0.00001 0.00000 0 14.38497 8.86009 0 0.51433 0.08940 0
80 100 12.76804 29.59104 12.76803 0 0 0.00001 0.00000 0 17.98121 11.00640 0 0.51776 0.08568 0
100 1 15.42943 0.64895 15.42939 0 0 0.00000 0.00004 0 0.09776 0.00000 0 0.54875 0.00244 0
100 20 15.82907 5.95023 15.82907 0 0 0.00000 0.00000 0 3.59624 1.62448 0 0.63932 0.09019 0
100 40 15.64301 11.96648 15.64301 0 0 0.00000 0.00000 0 7.19248 4.02865 0 0.63424 0.11110 0
100 60 15.81886 17.60218 15.81885 0 0 0.00000 0.00000 0 10.78872 6.06732 0 0.64096 0.10518 0
100 80 15.65912 23.69165 15.65912 0 0 0.00000 0.00000 0 14.38497 8.55570 0 0.63547 0.11552 0
100 100 15.84551 29.81098 15.84551 0 0 0.00001 0.00000 0 17.98121 11.07511 0 0.64291 0.11175 0
Table A.11: Consumer Drift Scenario 3 (pB2 = 0.10001, pO2 = ˜pO2 ,ξB2 = 0,ξO2 = 1)
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Cons. Cons Cons. Cons. N-S N-S Ex. Off. F2 On. F2 On. F1 On. Ex. F1 N-S N-S Ex. On. F2 Off. F2 Off. F1 Off. Ex. F1
Off. On. Off. F1 On. F1 Offline Offline Off. F1 Off. F1 Off. F1 Off. F1 Online Online On. F1 On. F1 On. F1 On. F1
1 1 0.25305 0.17630 0.14815 0.10479 0 0 0.00011 0 0.17623 0 0 0.00005 0.00001 0.00001
1 20 0.24732 3.60818 0.14795 0.09792 0 0 0.00145 0 3.60810 0 0 0.00005 0.00002 0.00002
1 40 0.24487 7.18532 0.14784 0.09444 0 0 0.00259 0 7.18523 0 0 0.00005 0.00003 0.00002
1 60 0.26161 10.70851 0.14820 0.10695 0 0 0.00645 0 10.70844 0 0 0.00005 0.00001 0.00001
1 80 0.25269 14.37574 0.14797 0.09863 0 0 0.00609 0 14.37566 0 0 0.00005 0.00002 0.00002
1 100 0.24635 17.94356 0.14777 0.09251 0 0 0.00606 0 17.94346 0 0 0.00005 0.00003 0.00002
20 1 5.13961 0.20068 2.96478 2.17476 0 0 0.00006 0 0.19863 0 0 0.00091 0.00065 0.00048
20 20 5.07351 3.47951 2.96345 2.10776 0 0 0.00230 0 3.47821 0 0 0.00091 0.00023 0.00016
20 40 4.99840 7.13850 2.96129 2.03356 0 0 0.00355 0 7.13698 0 0 0.00091 0.00036 0.00025
20 60 5.02347 10.69427 2.96193 2.05596 0 0 0.00558 0 10.69279 0 0 0.00091 0.00034 0.00023
20 80 4.98938 14.17090 2.96094 2.02122 0 0 0.00722 0 14.16940 0 0 0.00091 0.00035 0.00024
20 100 5.04255 17.75265 2.96231 2.07051 0 0 0.00974 0 17.75121 0 0 0.00091 0.00031 0.00022
40 1 10.21744 0.19774 5.92803 4.28934 0 0 0.00007 0 0.19394 0 0 0.00183 0.00115 0.00083
40 20 10.24266 3.50862 5.92942 4.31084 0 0 0.00240 0 3.50604 0 0 0.00183 0.00043 0.00032
40 40 10.14703 6.95903 5.92690 4.21552 0 0 0.00461 0 6.95641 0 0 0.00183 0.00046 0.00033
40 60 10.08805 10.60666 5.92518 4.15680 0 0 0.00607 0 10.60384 0 0 0.00183 0.00059 0.00041
40 80 9.99680 14.27700 5.92258 4.06712 0 0 0.00710 0 14.27396 0 0 0.00183 0.00072 0.00050
40 100 10.26761 17.45649 5.92982 4.32539 0 0 0.01241 0 17.45396 0 0 0.00183 0.00041 0.00030
60 1 15.57559 0.15987 8.89812 6.67725 0 0 0.00022 0 0.15690 0 0 0.00274 0.00013 0.00010
60 20 15.21988 3.48657 8.89037 6.32721 0 0 0.00230 0 3.48263 0 0 0.00274 0.00070 0.00050
60 40 15.38916 6.94735 8.89477 6.48929 0 0 0.00510 0 6.94362 0 0 0.00274 0.00057 0.00042
60 60 15.23907 10.80280 8.89058 6.34261 0 0 0.00588 0 10.79843 0 0 0.00274 0.00095 0.00068
60 80 15.23945 13.98746 8.89073 6.33964 0 0 0.00908 0 13.98349 0 0 0.00274 0.00071 0.00051
60 100 14.93453 17.87146 8.88224 6.04378 0 0 0.00850 0 17.86678 0 0 0.00274 0.00115 0.00078
80 1 20.45999 0.22420 11.85325 8.60671 0 0 0.00004 0 0.21260 0 0 0.00366 0.00460 0.00334
80 20 20.57416 3.83720 11.86013 8.71248 0 0 0.00155 0 3.83024 0 0 0.00366 0.00190 0.00139
80 40 20.48532 7.01724 11.85884 8.62167 0 0 0.00481 0 7.01208 0 0 0.00366 0.00087 0.00063
80 60 20.24496 10.92041 11.85206 8.38751 0 0 0.00538 0 10.91426 0 0 0.00366 0.00146 0.00103
80 80 20.29405 13.91805 11.85380 8.43104 0 0 0.00922 0 13.91282 0 0 0.00366 0.00092 0.00065
80 100 20.38911 17.78105 11.85596 8.52240 0 0 0.01076 0 17.77555 0 0 0.00366 0.00107 0.00077
100 1 26.06893 0.20812 14.83236 11.23650 0 0 0.00007 0 0.19866 0 0 0.00457 0.00278 0.00211
100 20 25.58814 3.88902 14.82153 10.76524 0 0 0.00137 0 3.87960 0 0 0.00457 0.00281 0.00204
100 40 25.39968 7.00502 14.81815 10.57700 0 0 0.00453 0 6.99840 0 0 0.00457 0.00120 0.00085
100 60 25.05832 10.44768 14.80901 10.24307 0 0 0.00623 0 10.44079 0 0 0.00457 0.00137 0.00095
100 80 25.46663 14.30124 14.81953 10.63876 0 0 0.00833 0 14.29423 0 0 0.00457 0.00142 0.00102
100 100 25.39345 17.84135 14.81758 10.56562 0 0 0.01025 0 17.83429 0 0 0.00457 0.00145 0.00104
Table A.12: Consumer Drift Scenario 4 (pB2 = ˜pB2 , pO2 = 0.10001,ξB2 = 0,ξO2 = 1)
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Offline Offline Online F1 F2
0.1 49.25957 0.00488 -0.53850 0.00195 0.00082
0.12 44.11296 0.00555 -0.63938 0.88448 0.00093
0.14 39.54314 0.00624 -0.74316 1.58422 0.00104
0.16 35.45615 0.00696 -0.85051 2.13015 0.00116
0.18 31.78280 0.00769 -0.96204 2.54570 0.00128
0.2 28.46980 0.00842 -1.07832 2.85035 0.00141
0.22 25.47468 0.00916 -1.19994 3.06063 0.00153
0.24 22.76268 0.00989 -1.32753 3.19073 0.00165
0.26 20.30474 0.01060 -1.46177 3.25300 0.00177
0.28 18.07611 0.01130 -1.60340 3.25822 0.00189
0.3 16.05541 0.01197 -1.75327 3.21587 0.00200
0.32 14.22392 0.01260 -1.91233 3.13430 0.00210
0.34 12.56512 0.01320 -2.08169 3.02091 0.00220
0.36 11.06426 0.01375 -2.26264 2.88221 0.00230
0.38 9.70807 0.01426 -2.45672 2.72397 0.00238
0.4 8.48457 0.01473 -2.66575 2.55126 0.00246
0.42 7.38283 0.01514 -2.89198 2.36856 0.00253
0.44 6.39288 0.01550 -3.13813 2.17978 0.00259
0.46 5.50556 0.01581 -3.40765 1.98832 0.00264
0.48 4.71240 0.01607 -3.70494 1.79714 0.00268
0.5 4.00559 0.01629 -38.79302 1.60875 0.00272
0.52 0.62349 2.77086 -13.42067 1.37021 0.00275
0.54 0.35334 2.48581 -12.08771 1.14979 0.00277
0.56 0.21488 2.13514 -11.87472 0.95290 0.00279
0.58 0.13382 1.78728 -12.10541 0.77915 0.00280
0.6 0.08376 1.46319 -20.86405 0.62716 0.00281
0.62 0.04104 0.92589 -15.81985 0.39170 0.00833
0.64 0.02240 0.64631 -18.21010 0.27062 0.00752
0.66 0.01106 0.40812 -22.96800 0.16944 0.00672
0.68 0.00425 0.20518 -36.06120 0.08454 0.00603
0.7 0.00030 0.03370 -20.88529 0.01366 0.00544
0.72 0.00015 0.02336 -21.69204 0.00944 0.07554
0.74 0.00007 0.01616 -22.68786 0.00651 0.13330
0.76 0.00003 0.01109 -23.87484 0.00446 0.18020
0.78 0.00002 0.00752 -25.27061 0.00302 0.21765
0.8 0.00001 0.00499 -26.90754 0.00200 0.24696
0.82 0.00000 0.00322 -28.83604 0.00129 0.26936
0.84 0.00000 0.00201 -31.13218 0.00080 0.28599
0.86 0.00000 0.00119 -33.91252 0.00048 0.29790
0.88 0.00000 0.00066 -37.36225 0.00026 0.30604
0.9 0.00000 0.00033 -0.53850 0.00013 0.31127
Table A.13: Elasticity Scenario α (pO1 = 0.5, pB2 = 0.7, pO2 = 0.6)
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Offline Offline Online F1 F2
0.1 35.22049 0.00000 -0.75679 0.00000 1.44138
0.12 30.05156 0.00000 -0.94125 0.60103 1.44361
0.14 25.47046 0.00000 -1.15533 1.01882 1.44474
0.16 21.37902 0.00000 -1.41113 1.28274 1.44518
0.18 17.70459 0.00000 -1.72709 1.41637 1.44529
0.2 14.39152 0.00000 -1.06658 1.43915 1.44530
0.22 12.89390 0.00000 -1.18579 1.54727 1.59506
0.24 11.53704 0.00000 -1.31205 1.61519 1.73075
0.26 10.30498 0.00000 -1.44731 1.64880 1.85396
0.28 9.18389 0.00000 -1.59355 1.65310 1.96607
0.3 8.02691 0.00000 -22.99687 1.60538 2.09526
0.32 1.33442 0.00000 -7.62202 0.29357 3.33737
0.34 0.79847 0.00000 -6.82279 0.19163 3.35731
0.36 0.51590 0.00000 -6.68115 0.13413 3.33362
0.38 0.34396 0.00000 -6.77837 0.09631 3.29439
0.4 0.23276 0.00000 -31.95469 0.06983 3.24931
0.42 0.02926 0.12928 -13.88098 0.04815 2.62948
0.44 0.01354 0.09459 -13.04538 0.03298 2.62534
0.46 0.00678 0.06681 -13.01546 0.02248 2.64155
0.48 0.00350 0.04634 -13.29247 0.01523 2.66428
0.5 0.00183 0.03168 -13.74113 0.01024 2.68887
0.52 0.00096 0.02138 -14.30912 0.00682 2.71325
0.54 0.00051 0.01423 -14.97277 0.00449 2.73641
0.56 0.00026 0.00934 -15.72094 0.00292 2.75782
0.58 0.00014 0.00603 -16.54899 0.00188 2.77725
0.6 0.00007 0.00383 -17.45617 0.00118 2.79463
0.62 0.00003 0.00239 -18.44446 0.00074 2.81000
0.64 0.00002 0.00146 -19.51801 0.00045 2.82342
0.66 0.00001 0.00088 -20.68297 0.00027 2.83503
0.68 0.00000 0.00051 -21.94755 0.00016 2.84495
0.7 0.00000 0.00029 -23.32227 0.00009 2.85334
0.72 0.00000 0.00016 -24.82043 0.00005 2.86036
0.74 0.00000 0.00009 -26.45880 0.00003 2.86614
0.76 0.00000 0.00005 -28.25873 0.00001 2.87083
0.78 0.00000 0.00002 -30.24774 0.00001 2.87458
0.8 0.00000 0.00001 -32.46205 0.00000 2.87751
0.82 0.00000 0.00001 -34.95055 0.00000 2.87975
0.84 0.00000 0.00000 -37.78136 0.00000 2.88142
0.86 0.00000 0.00000 -41.05330 0.00000 2.88261
0.88 0.00000 0.00000 -44.91682 0.00000 2.88342
0.9 0.00000 0.00000 -0.75679 0.00000 2.88394
Table A.14: Elasticity Scenario β (pO1 = 0.4, pB2 = 0.2, pO2 = 0.3)
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0.002 0.1 49.2596 0.0048828 0.31337672 48.94597 0.0002163 1.98E-10 1.98E-10 9.32E-07 2.73E-13 1.28E-09 1.98E-16 0.0048828 0 0
0.884 0.12 44.113 0.0055503 0.31337672 43.79938 0.0002043 1.98E-10 1.98E-10 9.32E-07 3.48E-13 1.64E-09 2.62E-16 0.0055503 0 0
1.584 0.14 39.5431 0.0062447 0.31337672 39.22957 0.0001917 1.98E-10 1.98E-10 9.32E-07 4.43E-13 2.08E-09 3.43E-16 0.0062447 0 0
2.13 0.16 35.4562 0.0069597 0.31337672 35.1426 0.0001788 1.98E-10 1.98E-10 9.31E-07 5.61E-13 2.64E-09 4.47E-16 0.0069597 0 0
2.546 0.18 31.7828 0.0076886 0.31337672 31.46926 0.0001656 1.98E-10 1.98E-10 9.30E-07 7.07E-13 3.32E-09 5.78E-16 0.0076886 0 0
2.85 0.2 28.4698 0.0084246 0.31337672 28.15627 0.0001523 1.98E-10 1.98E-10 9.30E-07 8.89E-13 4.18E-09 7.44E-16 0.0084246 0 0
3.061 0.22 25.4747 0.0091606 0.31337672 25.16116 0.000139 1.98E-10 1.98E-10 9.28E-07 1.11E-12 5.24E-09 9.50E-16 0.0091606 0 0
3.191 0.24 22.7627 0.0098895 0.31337672 22.44918 0.0001258 1.98E-10 1.97E-10 9.27E-07 1.39E-12 6.55E-09 1.21E-15 0.0098895 0 0
3.253 0.26 20.3047 0.0106045 0.31337672 19.99125 0.0001129 1.98E-10 1.97E-10 9.26E-07 1.74E-12 8.18E-09 1.53E-15 0.0106045 0 0
3.258 0.28 18.0761 0.0112989 0.31337672 17.76263 0.0001003 1.97E-10 1.97E-10 9.24E-07 2.17E-12 1.02E-08 1.93E-15 0.0112989 0 0
3.216 0.3 16.0554 0.0119665 0.31337672 15.74194 8.83E-05 1.97E-10 1.96E-10 9.21E-07 2.71E-12 1.27E-08 2.43E-15 0.0119665 0 0
3.134 0.32 14.2239 0.0126015 0.31337672 13.91047 7.68E-05 1.97E-10 1.95E-10 9.18E-07 3.38E-12 1.59E-08 3.04E-15 0.0126015 0 0
3.021 0.34 12.5651 0.0131988 0.31337672 12.25168 6.60E-05 1.97E-10 1.94E-10 9.14E-07 4.23E-12 1.99E-08 3.80E-15 0.0131988 0 0
2.882 0.36 11.0643 0.0137542 0.31337672 10.75082 5.60E-05 1.96E-10 1.93E-10 9.09E-07 5.32E-12 2.50E-08 4.75E-15 0.0137542 0 0
2.724 0.38 9.70807 0.014264 0.31337672 9.394645 4.67E-05 1.96E-10 1.92E-10 9.02E-07 6.71E-12 3.16E-08 5.92E-15 0.014264 0 0
2.551 0.4 8.48457 0.0147257 0.31337672 8.171151 3.84E-05 1.95E-10 1.90E-10 8.94E-07 8.56E-12 4.02E-08 7.39E-15 0.0147256 0 0
2.369 0.42 7.38283 0.0151375 0.31337672 7.069424 3.09E-05 1.95E-10 1.88E-10 8.82E-07 1.11E-11 5.19E-08 9.23E-15 0.0151374 0 0
2.18 0.44 6.39288 0.0154987 0.31337672 6.079482 2.44E-05 1.94E-10 1.84E-10 8.65E-07 1.46E-11 6.85E-08 1.15E-14 0.0154987 0 0
1.988 0.46 5.50556 0.0158098 0.31337672 5.19216 1.88E-05 1.93E-10 1.79E-10 8.40E-07 2.00E-11 9.40E-08 1.45E-14 0.0158097 0 0
1.797 0.48 4.7124 0.016072 0.31337672 4.399004 1.41E-05 1.91E-10 1.69E-10 7.93E-07 2.98E-11 1.40E-07 1.83E-14 0.0160719 0 0
1.609 0.5 4.00559 0.0162883 0.31337672 3.692202 1.02E-05 1.90E-10 0 0 1.99E-10 9.34E-07 2.33E-14 0.0162874 0 0
1.37 0.52 0.62349 2.770861 0.05784225 0.565638 7.05E-06 1.87E-10 0 0 1.99E-10 9.34E-07 3.01E-14 0.0164595 0.255534 2.498866
1.15 0.54 0.35334 2.4858131 0.03922923 0.314105 4.65E-06 1.84E-10 0 0 1.99E-10 9.34E-07 3.98E-14 0.0165923 0.274147 2.195072
0.953 0.56 0.21488 2.1351387 0.02885903 0.186018 2.87E-06 1.78E-10 0 0 1.99E-10 9.34E-07 5.45E-14 0.0166903 0.284518 1.83393
0.779 0.58 0.13382 1.7872843 0.02202111 0.111798 1.64E-06 1.68E-10 0 0 1.99E-10 9.34E-07 8.14E-14 0.0167588 0.291356 1.479169
0.627 0.6 0.08376 1.4631938 0.01715385 0.066605 8.31E-07 0 0 0 1.99E-10 9.34E-07 5.42E-13 0.0168033 0.296223 1.150167
0.392 0.62 0.04104 0.9258917 0.00249831 0.038538 3.58E-07 0 0 0 1.99E-10 9.34E-07 5.42E-13 0.0168294 0.055344 0.853717
0.271 0.64 0.0224 0.6463144 0.0013482 0.021055 1.19E-07 0 0 0 1.99E-10 9.34E-07 5.42E-13 0.0168426 0.037881 0.59159
0.169 0.66 0.01106 0.4081174 0.0007935 0.010269 2.48E-08 0 0 0 1.99E-10 9.34E-07 5.42E-13 0.0168479 0.028066 0.363203
0.085 0.68 0.00425 0.2051792 0.00048611 0.003765 1.63E-09 0 0 0 1.99E-10 9.34E-07 5.42E-13 0.0168491 0.021535 0.166794
0.014 0.7 0.0003 0.0336994 0.00030462 0 0 0 0 0 1.99E-10 9.34E-07 5.42E-13 0.0168492 0.016849 0
0.009 0.72 0.00015 0.0233587 0.00014972 0 0 0 0 0 1.99E-10 9.34E-07 5.42E-13 0.0130357 0.010322 0
0.007 0.74 7.28E-05 0.0161592 7.28E-05 0 0 0 0 0 1.99E-10 9.34E-07 5.42E-13 0.0099022 0.006256 0
0.004 0.76 3.48E-05 0.0110938 3.48E-05 0 0 0 0 0 1.99E-10 9.34E-07 5.42E-13 0.0073636 0.003729 0
0.003 0.78 1.63E-05 0.0075151 1.63E-05 0 0 0 0 0 1.99E-10 9.34E-07 5.42E-13 0.0053404 0.002174 0
0.002 0.8 7.38E-06 0.004991 7.38E-06 0 0 0 0 0 1.99E-10 9.34E-07 5.42E-13 0.0037592 0.001231 0
0.001 0.82 3.21E-06 0.003225 3.21E-06 0 0 0 0 0 1.99E-10 9.34E-07 5.42E-13 0.0025522 0.000672 0
8E-04 0.84 1.33E-06 0.0020079 1.33E-06 0 0 0 0 0 1.99E-10 9.34E-07 5.42E-13 0.0016569 0.00035 0
5E-04 0.86 5.18E-07 0.0011891 5.18E-07 0 0 0 0 0 1.99E-10 9.34E-07 5.42E-13 0.0010163 0.000172 0
3E-04 0.88 1.86E-07 0.0006576 1.86E-07 0 0 0 0 0 1.99E-10 9.34E-07 5.42E-13 0.0005787 7.80E-05 0
1E-04 0.9 5.95E-08 0.0003304 5.95E-08 0 0 0 0 0 1.99E-10 9.34E-07 5.42E-13 0.0002977 3.18E-05 0
Table A.15: Consumer Decomposition Scenario α (pO1 = 0.5, pB2 = 0.7, pO2 = 0.6)
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Offline Online Offline Offline Off. F1 Off. F1 Off. F1 Off. F1 Online Online On. F1 On. F1 On. F1 On. F1
6E-05 0.1 35.2205 0.000216 14.3915115 20.7897 0.03926 9.18E-06 2.92E-06 0 1.31E-08 0 0 0 0 0
0.601 0.12 30.0516 0.000216 14.3915115 15.64311 0.0169284 9.15E-06 2.92E-06 0 1.65E-08 0 0 0 0 0
1.019 0.14 25.4705 0.000216 14.3915115 11.0733 0.0056342 9.11E-06 2.92E-06 0 2.06E-08 0 0 0 0 0
1.283 0.16 21.379 0.000216 14.3915115 6.986329 0.0011698 9.06E-06 2.91E-06 0 2.57E-08 0 0 0 0 0
1.416 0.18 17.7046 0.000216 14.3915115 3.312992 7.68E-05 8.99E-06 2.90E-06 0 3.21E-08 0 0 0 0 0
1.439 0.2 14.3915 0.000216 14.3915115 0 0 8.90E-06 2.90E-06 0 4.00E-08 0 0 0 0 0
1.547 0.22 12.8939 0.000216 12.8938878 0 0 8.79E-06 2.89E-06 0 5.00E-08 0 0 0 0 0
1.615 0.24 11.537 0.000216 11.5370273 0 0 8.62E-06 2.87E-06 0 6.26E-08 0 0 0 0 0
1.649 0.26 10.305 0.000216 10.3049664 0 0 8.37E-06 2.86E-06 0 7.86E-08 0 0 0 0 0
1.653 0.28 9.18389 0.000216 9.18387805 0 0 7.91E-06 2.84E-06 0 9.92E-08 0 0 0 0 0
1.605 0.3 8.02691 0.000216 8.02690306 0 0 0 2.81E-06 0 1.26E-07 0 0 0 0 0
0.294 0.32 1.33442 0.000216 1.33441758 0 0 0 2.77E-06 0 1.63E-07 0 0 0 0 0
0.192 0.34 0.79847 0.000216 0.79847169 0 0 0 2.72E-06 0 2.16E-07 0 0 0 0 0
0.134 0.36 0.5159 0.000216 0.5158942 0 0 0 2.64E-06 0 2.96E-07 0 0 0 0 0
0.096 0.38 0.34396 0.000216 0.34396052 0 0 0 2.50E-06 0 4.41E-07 0 0 0 0 0
0.07 0.4 0.23276 0.000216 0.23276413 0 0 0 0 0 2.94E-06 0 0 0 0 0
0.009 0.42 0.02926 0.000216 0.0292625 0 0 0 0 0 2.94E-06 0 0 0 0.129275 0
0.005 0.44 0.01354 0.000216 0.01353564 0 0 0 0 0 2.94E-06 0 0 0 0.094592 0
0.003 0.46 0.00678 0.000216 0.00677651 0 0 0 0 0 2.94E-06 0 0 0 0.066809 0
0.001 0.48 0.0035 0.000216 0.00350197 0 0 0 0 0 2.94E-06 0 0 0 0.046334 0
8E-04 0.5 0.00183 0.000216 0.00183456 0 0 0 0 0 2.94E-06 0 0 0 0.03168 0
5E-04 0.52 0.00096 0.000216 0.00096486 0 0 0 0 0 2.94E-06 0 0 0 0.021374 0
3E-04 0.54 0.00051 0.000216 0.00050631 0 0 0 0 0 2.94E-06 0 0 0 0.014226 0
2E-04 0.56 0.00026 0.000216 0.00026389 0 0 0 0 0 2.94E-06 0 0 0 0.009333 0
1E-04 0.58 0.00014 0.000216 0.00013611 0 0 0 0 0 2.94E-06 0 0 0 0.00603 0
1E-04 0.6 6.93E-05 0.000216 6.93E-05 0 0 0 0 0 2.94E-06 0 0 0 0.003831 0
8E-05 0.62 3.47E-05 0.000216 3.47E-05 0 0 0 0 0 2.94E-06 0 0 0 0.00239 0
7E-05 0.64 1.70E-05 0.000216 1.70E-05 0 0 0 0 0 2.94E-06 0 0 0 0.001462 0
7E-05 0.66 8.17E-06 0.000216 8.17E-06 0 0 0 0 0 2.94E-06 0 0 0 0.000875 0
7E-05 0.68 3.83E-06 0.000216 3.83E-06 0 0 0 0 0 2.94E-06 0 0 0 0.000511 0
7E-05 0.7 1.74E-06 0.000216 1.74E-06 0 0 0 0 0 2.94E-06 0 0 0 0.000291 0
7E-05 0.72 7.68E-07 0.000216 7.68E-07 0 0 0 0 0 2.94E-06 0 0 0 0.000161 0
7E-05 0.74 3.27E-07 0.000216 3.27E-07 0 0 0 0 0 2.94E-06 0 0 0 8.59E-05 0
6E-05 0.76 1.33E-07 0.000216 1.33E-07 0 0 0 0 0 2.94E-06 0 0 0 4.42E-05 0
6E-05 0.78 5.20E-08 0.000216 5.20E-08 0 0 0 0 0 2.94E-06 0 0 0 2.18E-05 0
6E-05 0.8 1.92E-08 0.000216 1.92E-08 0 0 0 0 0 2.94E-06 0 0 0 1.03E-05 0
6E-05 0.82 6.67E-09 0.000216 6.67E-09 0 0 0 0 0 2.94E-06 0 0 0 4.57E-06 0
6E-05 0.84 2.15E-09 0.000216 2.15E-09 0 0 0 0 0 2.94E-06 0 0 0 1.90E-06 0
6E-05 0.86 6.36E-10 0.000216 6.36E-10 0 0 0 0 0 2.94E-06 0 0 0 7.27E-07 0
6E-05 0.88 1.68E-10 0.000216 1.68E-10 0 0 0 0 0 2.94E-06 0 0 0 2.52E-07 0
6E-05 0.9 3.88E-11 0.000216 3.88E-11 0 0 0 0 0 2.94E-06 0 0 0 7.64E-08 0
Table A.16: Consumer Decomposition Scenario β (pO1 = 0.4, pB2 = 0.2, pO2 = 0.3)
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Cons. Cons. Price Price Price Price Cons. Cons. Cons. Cons. Eff. Eff. Eff. Eff. Profit Profit
Off. On. Off. F1 On. F1 Off. F2 On. F2 Off. F1 On. F1 Off. F2 On. F2 Off. F1 On. F1 Off. F2 On. F2 F1 F2
1 1 0.61380 0.10002 0.10001 0.13882 0.08345 0.17192 0.53781 0.00396 1.00000 0.99999 1 0 0.04288 0.00016
1 20 0.59841 0.10002 0.10001 0.13882 1.83868 3.15117 1.41920 0.00474 0.99999 0.99999 1 0 0.91647 0.00020
1 40 0.60195 0.10003 0.10001 0.13882 3.58405 6.38395 2.38490 0.00475 0.99999 0.99999 1 0 1.79919 0.00021
1 60 0.58308 0.10002 0.10001 0.13882 6.10531 8.85008 3.07285 0.00567 1.00000 1.00000 1 0 2.94952 0.00025
1 80 0.60419 0.10002 0.10001 0.13882 7.05412 12.87996 4.32453 0.00497 0.99999 0.99999 1 0 3.55686 0.00024
1 100 0.57919 0.10002 0.10001 0.13882 10.42515 14.48928 4.70902 0.00611 1.00000 0.99999 1 0 4.99592 0.00028
20 1 0.26964 0.10016 0.10001 0.13882 2.09225 0.10754 7.96384 0.04072 0.99993 0.99990 1 0 0.35485 0.00166
20 20 0.61380 0.10002 0.10001 0.13882 1.66901 3.43842 10.75615 0.07919 1.00000 0.99999 1 0 0.85760 0.00318
20 40 0.58061 0.10002 0.10001 0.13882 4.18492 5.96599 11.39617 0.10759 0.99999 0.99999 1 0 2.01141 0.00429
20 60 0.62064 0.10002 0.10001 0.13882 4.69536 10.36625 12.86809 0.07405 1.00000 0.99999 1 0 2.44478 0.00300
20 80 0.61017 0.10001 0.10001 0.13882 6.78082 13.28224 13.69438 0.08263 0.99999 0.99999 1 0 3.45952 0.00334
20 100 0.59729 0.10001 0.10001 0.13882 9.29376 15.77232 14.36344 0.09356 0.99999 0.99999 1 0 4.62195 0.00378
40 1 0.26245 0.10061 0.10001 0.13882 4.12719 0.18395 15.76254 0.06948 0.99994 0.99992 1 0 0.67046 0.00286
40 20 0.62054 0.10002 0.10001 0.13882 1.60507 3.60762 20.56037 0.14743 0.99999 0.99999 1 0 0.83558 0.00593
40 40 0.61380 0.10002 0.10001 0.13882 3.33801 6.87684 21.51230 0.15838 1.00000 0.99999 1 0 1.71521 0.00636
40 60 0.60783 0.10002 0.10001 0.13882 5.21255 10.00524 22.41433 0.16832 0.99999 0.99999 1 0 2.64726 0.00676
40 80 0.58061 0.10002 0.10001 0.13882 8.36984 11.93198 22.79233 0.21518 0.99999 0.99999 1 0 4.02282 0.00858
40 100 0.61833 0.10002 0.10001 0.13882 7.97751 17.16617 24.64112 0.15160 0.99999 0.99999 1 0 4.13535 0.00613
60 1 0.27428 0.58341 0.10001 0.13882 5.70629 0.00022 24.21111 0.12619 0.99254 0.98569 1 0 0.99246 0.00514
60 20 0.61891 0.10006 0.10001 0.13882 1.64938 3.67935 30.30841 0.22497 1.00000 0.99999 1 0 0.85611 0.00904
60 40 0.60735 0.10002 0.10001 0.13882 3.53843 6.83313 31.17422 0.25330 0.99999 0.99999 1 0 1.79536 0.01015
60 60 0.61380 0.10002 0.10001 0.13882 5.00702 10.31526 32.26845 0.23757 1.00000 0.99999 1 0 2.57281 0.00955
60 80 0.60994 0.10002 0.10001 0.13882 6.84917 13.47362 33.18269 0.24717 1.00000 0.99999 1 0 3.49296 0.00993
60 100 0.56476 0.10002 0.10001 0.13882 11.57069 14.00203 32.87958 0.36429 0.99999 0.99999 1 0 5.37790 0.01447
80 1 0.27371 0.53392 0.10001 0.13882 7.63174 0.00203 32.19551 0.16704 0.98931 0.98412 1 0 1.32310 0.00681
80 20 0.31927 0.10006 0.10001 0.13882 9.78888 1.02666 33.89014 0.36193 0.99995 0.99993 1 0 2.14621 0.01439
80 40 0.62054 0.10002 0.10001 0.13882 3.21014 7.21524 41.12074 0.29486 0.99999 0.99999 1 0 1.67116 0.01186
80 60 0.60495 0.10001 0.10001 0.13882 5.39042 10.11892 41.84125 0.34577 1.00000 0.99999 1 0 2.72205 0.01384
80 80 0.61380 0.10002 0.10001 0.13882 6.67603 13.75368 43.02459 0.31676 1.00000 0.99999 1 0 3.43041 0.01273
80 100 0.60665 0.10001 0.10001 0.13882 8.78569 16.67691 43.81757 0.34040 0.99999 0.99999 1 0 4.45153 0.01365
100 1 0.27572 0.69821 0.10001 0.13882 9.43218 0.00000 40.31315 0.22001 0.99077 0.98700 1 0 1.65405 0.00894
100 20 0.30925 0.10008 0.10001 0.13882 11.63977 1.08308 41.88372 0.39827 0.99991 0.99986 1 0 2.43498 0.01588
100 40 0.57335 0.10002 0.10001 0.13882 4.61887 6.35515 50.02999 0.56873 0.99999 0.99999 1 0 2.18651 0.02258
100 60 0.61078 0.10002 0.10001 0.13882 5.18353 10.41624 51.70774 0.40795 1.00000 0.99999 1 0 2.64781 0.01635
100 80 0.59872 0.10002 0.10001 0.13882 7.51445 13.16984 52.37414 0.45859 0.99999 0.99999 1 0 3.74787 0.01833
100 100 0.61380 0.10002 0.10001 0.13882 8.34503 17.19210 53.78074 0.39595 1.00000 0.99999 1 0 4.28802 0.01591
Table A.17: Scenario 1 (pB2 = 0.10001, pO2 = ˜pO2 ,ξB2 = 1,ξO2 = 0)
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Cons. Cons. Price Price Price Price Cons. Cons. Cons. Cons. Eff. Eff. Eff. Eff. Profit Profit
Off. On. Off. F1 On. F1 Off. F2 On. F2 Off. F1 On. F1 Off. F2 On. F2 Off. F1 On. F1 Off. F2 On. F2 F1 F2
1 1 0.2158211 0.1002766 0.2742333 0.10001 0.17467 0.00761 0.09487 0.00675 0.99997 0.99996 1 0 0.02023 0.01653
1 20 0.3966579 0.1000259 0.2742333 0.10001 0.17106 0.04251 0.82821 0.04802 0.99977 0.99991 1 0 0.05074 0.14430
1 40 0.4296434 0.1000314 0.2742333 0.10001 0.28045 0.08947 1.99961 0.09588 0.99971 0.99979 1 0 0.09240 0.34840
1 60 0.4390163 0.1000191 0.2742333 0.10001 0.39825 0.13600 3.14432 0.14225 0.99991 0.99991 1 0 0.13501 0.54785
1 80 0.4467133 0.1000178 0.2742333 0.10001 0.51212 0.18677 4.39690 0.19294 0.99993 0.99993 1 0 0.17755 0.76609
1 100 0.4453211 0.1000226 0.2742333 0.10001 0.63769 0.22747 5.40315 0.23363 0.99990 0.99988 1 0 0.22019 0.94141
20 1 0.2158142 0.2022802 0.2742333 0.10001 3.37690 0.01867 2.13050 0.14895 0.99262 0.99180 1 0 0.39160 0.37121
20 20 0.2148697 0.1003385 0.2742333 0.10001 3.52196 0.15106 1.90610 0.13456 0.99995 0.99995 1 0 0.40453 0.33211
20 40 0.2216067 0.100099 0.2742333 0.10001 3.48471 0.16186 1.95714 0.14225 0.99998 0.99998 1 0 0.42376 0.34100
20 60 0.2238249 0.100111 0.2742333 0.10001 3.58309 0.16719 2.05228 0.14823 0.99991 0.99988 1 0 0.44336 0.35758
20 80 0.2267065 0.1000713 0.2742333 0.10001 3.66259 0.17383 2.12776 0.15397 0.99996 0.99995 1 0 0.46400 0.37073
20 100 0.2345663 0.1000742 0.2742333 0.10001 3.60285 0.18754 2.26831 0.16807 0.99993 0.99990 1 0 0.48454 0.39522
40 1 0.2152293 0.3140916 0.2742333 0.10001 6.79140 0.02029 3.95411 0.28008 0.99347 0.98734 1 0 0.78248 0.68894
40 20 0.2137046 0.1019509 0.2742333 0.10001 6.94893 0.28679 3.94847 0.27294 0.99990 0.99991 1 0 0.79044 0.68796
40 40 0.2148697 0.1003385 0.2742333 0.10001 7.04392 0.30211 3.81220 0.26913 0.99995 0.99995 1 0 0.80907 0.66421
40 60 0.2162246 0.1001548 0.2742333 0.10001 7.12671 0.30867 3.84112 0.27244 0.99995 0.99993 1 0 0.82814 0.66925
40 80 0.2216067 0.100099 0.2742333 0.10001 6.96943 0.32371 3.91427 0.28450 0.99998 0.99998 1 0 0.84752 0.68200
40 100 0.224209 0.1000971 0.2742333 0.10001 6.98048 0.33259 4.01018 0.29319 0.99996 0.99994 1 0 0.86688 0.69871
60 1 0.2159151 0.3414567 0.2742333 0.10001 10.12798 0.02296 5.74014 0.42967 0.98984 0.98268 1 0 1.17294 1.00013
60 20 0.2162005 0.1423313 0.2742333 0.10001 10.10443 0.15134 10.45047 0.59863 0.99977 0.99974 1 0 1.17958 1.82083
60 40 0.2161823 0.1007134 0.2742333 0.10001 10.28296 0.45102 5.72800 0.40712 0.99995 0.99992 1 0 1.19485 0.99801
60 60 0.2163655 0.1003208 0.2742333 0.10001 10.43053 0.45807 5.71507 0.40704 0.99997 0.99996 1 0 1.21381 0.99576
60 80 0.2146469 0.1000992 0.2742333 0.10001 10.75249 0.45729 5.67812 0.40150 0.99996 0.99995 1 0 1.23263 0.98932
60 100 0.2181679 0.1001904 0.2742333 0.10001 10.59530 0.47028 5.84196 0.41670 0.99995 0.99995 1 0 1.25188 1.01787
80 1 0.2164861 0.3096692 0.2742333 0.10001 13.43369 0.04218 7.52419 0.56867 0.99282 0.99225 1 0 1.56468 1.31097
80 20 0.2171587 0.1580288 0.2742333 0.10001 13.35597 0.13357 13.16431 0.77155 0.99802 0.99795 1 0 1.56941 2.29367
80 40 0.2137046 0.1019509 0.2742333 0.10001 13.89786 0.57359 7.89695 0.54588 0.99990 0.99991 1 0 1.58088 1.37592
80 60 0.2142031 0.1004559 0.2742333 0.10001 14.00565 0.59729 7.56665 0.53359 0.99997 0.99988 1 0 1.59955 1.31837
80 80 0.2148697 0.1003385 0.2742333 0.10001 14.08783 0.60422 7.62440 0.53825 0.99995 0.99995 1 0 1.61814 1.32843
80 100 0.2165123 0.1002655 0.2742333 0.10001 14.05251 0.61437 7.68693 0.54575 0.99997 0.99988 1 0 1.63720 1.33932
100 1 0.2165513 0.2537165 0.2742333 0.10001 16.77506 0.09910 9.30138 0.68309 0.99456 0.99150 1 0 1.95680 1.62062
100 20 0.2158787 0.1518243 0.2742333 0.10001 16.87413 0.19752 14.60997 0.88647 0.99834 0.99861 1 0 1.96208 2.54555
100 40 0.2141904 0.112616 0.2742333 0.10001 17.19149 0.56231 12.70464 0.79881 0.99983 0.99974 1 0 1.96835 2.21358
100 60 0.2152484 0.1006767 0.2742333 0.10001 17.22629 0.74683 9.46944 0.67182 0.99995 0.99995 1 0 1.98544 1.64990
100 80 0.2155271 0.1003627 0.2742333 0.10001 17.34976 0.75595 9.43837 0.67175 0.99992 0.99989 1 0 2.00393 1.64448
100 100 0.2152199 0.1002188 0.2742333 0.10001 17.55965 0.75924 9.43868 0.67053 0.99995 0.99995 1 0 2.02288 1.64454
Table A.18: Scenario 2 (pB2 = ˜pB2 , pO2 = 0.10001,ξB2 = 1,ξO2 = 0)
A
.2
.
CLO
TH
ES
201
Cons. Cons. Price Price Price Price Cons. Cons. Cons. Cons. Eff. Eff. Eff. Eff. Profit Profit
Off. On. Off. F1 On. F1 Off. F2 On. F2 Off. F1 On. F1 Off. F2 On. F2 Off. F1 On. F1 Off. F2 On. F2 F1 F2
1 1 0.4411114 0.1000427 0.10001 0.1388218 0.20798 0.07231 0.58356 0.00001 0.99995 0.99992 0 1 0.07094 0.00001
1 20 0.5514157 0.1000219 0.10001 0.1388218 2.52904 2.58910 3.67536 0.00025 0.99999 0.99998 0 1 1.14170 0.00005
1 40 0.5760641 0.1000172 0.10001 0.1388218 4.39445 5.82812 7.08843 0.00052 0.99999 0.99999 0 1 2.09214 0.00009
1 60 0.5769648 0.1000153 0.10001 0.1388218 6.55509 8.77705 10.40104 0.00078 0.99999 0.99999 0 1 3.12668 0.00013
1 80 0.6003274 0.1000191 0.10001 0.1388218 7.49569 12.92821 14.02068 0.00107 1.00000 0.99999 0 1 3.75054 0.00018
1 100 0.6160941 0.1000168 0.10001 0.1388218 8.34531 17.17337 17.60702 0.00136 1.00000 0.99999 0 1 4.30725 0.00023
20 1 0.2577803 0.1001519 0.10001 0.1388218 2.22333 0.10929 7.86897 0.00076 0.99997 0.99995 0 1 0.35078 0.00011
20 20 0.4411114 0.1000427 0.10001 0.1388218 4.15950 1.44616 11.67120 0.00019 0.99995 0.99992 0 1 1.41884 0.00012
20 40 0.6157652 0.1000161 0.10001 0.1388218 3.35600 6.89785 16.60181 0.00054 0.99999 0.99999 0 1 1.73102 0.00019
20 60 0.5489008 0.1000245 0.10001 0.1388218 7.72607 7.74115 19.16717 0.00074 0.99999 0.99999 0 1 3.46842 0.00022
20 80 0.5485382 0.1000195 0.10001 0.1388218 10.30750 10.27561 22.34041 0.00099 0.99999 0.99999 0 1 4.62350 0.00026
20 100 0.6354735 0.1000134 0.10001 0.1388218 7.13509 18.40330 27.08927 0.00138 1.00000 0.99999 0 1 3.82090 0.00032
40 1 0.2557276 0.1002897 0.10001 0.1388218 4.25527 0.20560 15.64539 0.00159 0.99995 0.99993 0 1 0.66262 0.00022
40 20 0.5586793 0.1000237 0.10001 0.1388218 2.50303 2.83738 22.52108 0.00025 1.00000 0.99999 0 1 1.14815 0.00024
40 40 0.4411114 0.1000427 0.10001 0.1388218 8.31900 2.89232 23.34240 0.00037 0.99995 0.99992 0 1 2.83768 0.00025
40 60 0.555441 0.1000161 0.10001 0.1388218 7.49899 8.07845 28.91756 0.00075 0.99999 0.99999 0 1 3.41547 0.00032
40 80 0.6157652 0.1000161 0.10001 0.1388218 6.71200 13.79571 33.20362 0.00109 0.99999 0.99999 0 1 3.46204 0.00037
40 100 0.5528864 0.1000198 0.10001 0.1388218 12.61985 13.18962 35.27083 0.00125 1.00000 0.99999 0 1 5.71562 0.00040
60 1 0.2622983 0.2734813 0.10001 0.1388218 6.00225 0.05218 23.80957 0.03832 0.99976 0.99968 0 1 0.98257 0.00173
60 20 0.5683031 0.1000163 0.10001 0.1388218 2.39021 3.01975 32.27436 0.00026 1.00000 0.99999 0 1 1.11939 0.00033
60 40 0.4203036 0.1000458 0.10001 0.1388218 9.31966 2.71286 31.91771 0.00036 0.99996 0.99992 0 1 2.98514 0.00033
60 60 0.4412161 0.1000456 0.10001 0.1388218 12.47308 4.34089 35.01761 0.00056 0.99995 0.99991 0 1 4.25595 0.00037
60 80 0.5619208 0.1000177 0.10001 0.1388218 9.64861 11.12444 41.93391 0.00102 0.99999 0.99998 0 1 4.45709 0.00046
60 100 0.5645288 0.1000251 0.10001 0.1388218 11.85215 14.01164 45.25210 0.00128 0.99999 0.99998 0 1 5.50600 0.00050
80 1 0.2598782 0.2656114 0.10001 0.1388218 8.12245 0.07223 31.57564 0.04737 0.99974 0.99961 0 1 1.31012 0.00215
80 20 0.3278154 0.1000406 0.10001 0.1388218 9.20961 1.12142 35.51615 0.00063 0.99998 0.99997 0 1 2.09808 0.00038
80 40 0.5586793 0.1000237 0.10001 0.1388218 5.00606 5.67475 45.04216 0.00051 1.00000 0.99999 0 1 2.29631 0.00047
80 60 0.6490493 0.1000247 0.10001 0.1388218 3.80319 11.59202 49.64515 0.00083 1.00000 0.99999 0 1 2.08843 0.00053
80 80 0.4411114 0.1000427 0.10001 0.1388218 16.63800 5.78464 46.68479 0.00075 0.99995 0.99992 0 1 5.67535 0.00050
80 100 0.4719375 0.1000503 0.10001 0.1388218 18.38213 8.59530 50.90340 0.00102 0.99984 0.99974 0 1 6.83469 0.00055
100 1 0.2625617 0.2775757 0.10001 0.1388218 9.98683 0.08567 39.58306 0.06730 0.99987 0.99985 0 1 1.63810 0.00301
100 20 0.2993148 0.1000554 0.10001 0.1388218 12.04678 1.03150 42.52277 0.00146 0.99997 0.99996 0 1 2.40107 0.00048
100 40 0.5141193 0.100022 0.10001 0.1388218 6.48051 4.80373 53.59898 0.00046 0.99999 0.99999 0 1 2.68381 0.00055
100 60 0.6576319 0.1000151 0.10001 0.1388218 3.50587 11.89687 59.52427 0.00084 1.00000 0.99999 0 1 1.95517 0.00063
100 80 0.6209624 0.1000297 0.10001 0.1388218 6.46708 14.14938 62.55531 0.00109 1.00000 0.99999 0 1 3.36952 0.00067
100 100 0.4411114 0.1000427 0.10001 0.1388218 20.79750 7.23080 58.35599 0.00093 0.99995 0.99992 0 1 7.09419 0.00062
Table A.19: Scenario 3 (pB2 = 0.10001, pO2 = ˜pO2 ,ξB2 = 0,ξO2 = 1)
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Cons. Cons. Price Price Price Price Cons. Cons. Cons. Cons. Eff. Eff. Eff. Eff. Profit Profit
Off. On. Off. F1 On. F1 Off. F2 On. F2 Off. F1 On. F1 Off. F2 On. F2 Off. F1 On. F1 Off. F2 On. F2 F1 F2
1 1 0.3723012 0.1000506 0.2742333 0.10001 0.14995 0.01781 0.35743 0.01211 0.99995 0.99995 0 1 0.04083 0.06228
1 20 0.4538226 0.1000531 0.2742333 0.10001 1.97460 0.37811 6.40712 0.13557 0.99993 0.99989 0 1 0.69863 1.11634
1 40 0.4563819 0.1000697 0.2742333 0.10001 3.90681 0.76272 12.75806 0.26433 0.99982 0.99982 0 1 1.39210 2.22288
1 60 0.4501086 0.1000732 0.2742333 0.10001 5.96094 1.08722 18.71236 0.38484 0.99978 0.99976 0 1 2.08622 3.26032
1 80 0.4523098 0.1000649 0.2742333 0.10001 7.89957 1.47291 25.07150 0.51412 0.99994 0.99992 0 1 2.78307 4.36829
1 100 0.4580874 0.1000383 0.2742333 0.10001 9.71202 1.92337 31.82688 0.65074 0.99996 0.99994 0 1 3.47774 5.54531
20 1 0.2120156 0.1007726 0.2742333 0.10001 3.55662 0.04202 1.78180 0.10272 0.99995 0.99987 0 1 0.39833 0.31045
20 20 0.3741966 0.1000499 0.2742333 0.10001 2.97747 0.35990 7.20119 0.24378 0.99992 0.99991 0 1 0.81633 1.25469
20 40 0.4178189 0.1000743 0.2742333 0.10001 4.66698 0.72146 13.93366 0.39021 0.99989 0.99987 0 1 1.48308 2.42771
20 60 0.4305183 0.1000395 0.2742333 0.10001 6.57468 1.08689 20.31894 0.52184 0.99996 0.99992 0 1 2.17305 3.54024
20 80 0.4344415 0.100047 0.2742333 0.10001 8.56615 1.43322 26.46110 0.64735 0.99995 0.99996 0 1 2.86486 4.61041
20 100 0.4323294 0.1000525 0.2742333 0.10001 10.69872 1.72433 32.13480 0.76188 0.99994 0.99991 0 1 3.55536 5.59896
40 1 0.2122156 0.1040987 0.2742333 0.10001 6.96828 0.07577 3.51000 0.20548 0.99983 0.99973 0 1 0.78178 0.61156
40 20 0.23891 0.1001554 0.2742333 0.10001 7.89027 0.16878 5.40209 0.24171 0.99989 0.99985 0 1 1.09516 0.94123
40 40 0.3741966 0.1000499 0.2742333 0.10001 5.95494 0.71980 14.40238 0.48756 0.99992 0.99991 0 1 1.63267 2.50938
40 60 0.4097329 0.1000467 0.2742333 0.10001 7.38607 1.11720 21.72145 0.65216 0.99994 0.99990 0 1 2.28756 3.78461
40 80 0.4178189 0.1000743 0.2742333 0.10001 9.33396 1.44293 27.86732 0.78042 0.99989 0.99987 0 1 2.96617 4.85542
40 100 0.4287333 0.1000455 0.2742333 0.10001 11.11885 1.84488 34.63128 0.92138 0.99996 0.99992 0 1 3.65511 6.03393
60 1 0.2139139 0.2280351 0.2742333 0.10001 10.23315 0.01606 5.66671 0.78583 0.99656 0.98822 0 1 1.16428 0.98734
60 20 0.2273105 0.1001241 0.2742333 0.10001 11.53148 0.19681 6.91350 0.33874 0.99993 0.99990 0 1 1.46735 1.20456
60 40 0.3266629 0.1000964 0.2742333 0.10001 8.17707 0.67666 13.88370 0.53454 0.99988 0.99981 0 1 1.85265 2.41901
60 60 0.3743636 0.1000504 0.2742333 0.10001 8.92672 1.08071 21.61767 0.73178 0.99992 0.99991 0 1 2.44893 3.76653
60 80 0.3922911 0.100091 0.2742333 0.10001 10.59582 1.40454 28.13346 0.87753 0.99983 0.99986 0 1 3.09590 4.90179
60 100 0.4096303 0.1000771 0.2742333 0.10001 12.17106 1.80084 35.27133 1.03276 0.99992 0.99983 0 1 3.76814 6.14545
80 1 0.2137616 0.3307666 0.2742333 0.10001 13.64898 0.01183 7.52406 2.56504 0.99533 0.98636 0 1 1.55108 1.31097
80 20 0.2250174 0.1001093 0.2742333 0.10001 14.76445 0.24380 8.57380 0.43853 0.99997 0.99993 0 1 1.84569 1.49385
80 40 0.23891 0.1001554 0.2742333 0.10001 15.78053 0.33756 10.80418 0.48341 0.99989 0.99985 0 1 2.19033 1.88245
80 60 0.3540606 0.1000533 0.2742333 0.10001 10.43964 1.12855 22.31102 0.82215 0.99997 0.99996 0 1 2.65231 3.88733
80 80 0.3741966 0.1000499 0.2742333 0.10001 11.90988 1.43959 28.80475 0.97513 0.99992 0.99991 0 1 3.26534 5.01876
80 100 0.3860815 0.1000862 0.2742333 0.10001 13.66489 1.73612 35.01729 1.11217 0.99981 0.99966 0 1 3.90660 6.10119
100 1 0.2143083 0.4335525 0.2742333 0.10001 16.97818 0.00179 9.37565 6.73771 0.99486 0.99121 0 1 1.93822 1.63362
100 20 0.2240403 0.1000867 0.2742333 0.10001 17.93930 0.29366 10.25311 0.53873 0.99998 0.99998 0 1 2.22514 1.78644
100 40 0.2297797 0.1001052 0.2742333 0.10001 19.73900 0.35143 12.20168 0.57811 0.99992 0.99990 0 1 2.56028 2.12594
100 60 0.2461594 0.1000632 0.2742333 0.10001 20.02897 0.48634 14.83418 0.62985 0.99997 0.99997 0 1 2.92736 2.58461
100 80 0.3647988 0.1000376 0.2742333 0.10001 13.05534 1.53996 30.23848 1.08970 0.99998 0.99998 0 1 3.45706 5.26856
100 100 0.3723012 0.1000506 0.2742333 0.10001 14.99518 1.78071 35.74285 1.21128 0.99995 0.99995 0 1 4.08310 6.22761
Table A.20: Scenario 4 (pB2 = ˜pB2 , pO2 = 0.10001,ξB2 = 0,ξO2 = 1)
A
.2
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Cons. Cons Cons. Cons. N-S N-S Ex. Off. F2 On. F2 On. F1 On. Ex. F1 N-S N-S Ex. On. F2 Off. F2 Off. F1 Off. Ex. F1
Off. On. Off. F1 On. F1 Offline Offline Off. F1 Off. F1 Off. F1 Off. F1 Online Online On. F1 On. F1 On. F1 On. F1
1 1 0.08345 0.17192 0.00135 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00002 0.08208 0.00004 0.16692 0.00000 0.00000 0.00495 0.00000
1 20 1.83868 3.15117 0.00185 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00049 1.83634 0.00084 3.14458 0.00000 0.00000 0.00576 0.00000
1 40 3.58405 6.38395 0.00172 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00096 3.58137 0.00171 6.37668 0.00000 0.00000 0.00557 0.00000
1 60 6.10531 8.85008 0.00249 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00163 6.10119 0.00236 8.84112 0.00000 0.00000 0.00660 0.00000
1 80 7.05412 12.87996 0.00164 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00189 7.05059 0.00344 12.87107 0.00000 0.00000 0.00545 0.00000
1 100 10.42515 14.48927 0.00268 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00279 10.41968 0.00387 14.47859 0.00000 0.00000 0.00681 0.00000
20 1 2.09205 0.10752 1.85310 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00006 0.23889 0.00000 0.00898 0.00000 0.00000 0.09853 0.00000
20 20 1.66901 3.43842 0.02693 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00044 1.64164 0.00089 3.33846 0.00000 0.00000 0.09906 0.00000
20 40 4.18492 5.96599 0.05215 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00110 4.13166 0.00156 5.82977 0.00000 0.00000 0.13466 0.00000
20 60 4.69536 10.36625 0.02326 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00125 4.67085 0.00275 10.27126 0.00000 0.00000 0.09225 0.00000
20 80 6.78081 13.28224 0.02905 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00181 6.74996 0.00352 13.17595 0.00000 0.00000 0.10277 0.00000
20 100 9.29376 15.77232 0.03777 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00247 9.25352 0.00419 15.65181 0.00000 0.00000 0.11633 0.00000
40 1 4.12701 0.18390 3.89070 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00006 0.23625 0.00000 0.00786 0.00000 0.00000 0.17604 0.00000
40 20 1.60507 3.60762 0.04663 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00042 1.55802 0.00092 3.42202 0.00000 0.00000 0.18469 0.00000
40 40 3.33801 6.87684 0.05385 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00088 3.28328 0.00179 6.67692 0.00000 0.00000 0.19813 0.00000
40 60 5.21255 10.00524 0.06100 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00138 5.15018 0.00262 9.79226 0.00000 0.00000 0.21036 0.00000
40 80 8.36983 11.93198 0.10429 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00221 8.26333 0.00312 11.65955 0.00000 0.00000 0.26931 0.00000
40 100 7.97750 17.16616 0.04890 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00212 7.92648 0.00454 16.97257 0.00000 0.00000 0.18905 0.00000
60 1 5.70150 0.00000 5.70150 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
60 20 1.64938 3.67935 0.07247 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00042 1.57649 0.00091 3.39662 0.00000 0.00000 0.28182 0.00000
60 40 3.53843 6.83313 0.09242 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00092 3.44509 0.00174 6.51434 0.00000 0.00000 0.31705 0.00000
60 60 5.00702 10.31526 0.08078 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00132 4.92493 0.00268 10.01539 0.00000 0.00000 0.29719 0.00000
60 80 6.84917 13.47362 0.08757 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00181 6.75979 0.00352 13.16110 0.00000 0.00000 0.30899 0.00000
60 100 11.57069 14.00203 0.20894 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00304 11.35871 0.00362 13.54097 0.00000 0.00000 0.45744 0.00000
80 1 7.62682 0.00000 7.62682 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
80 20 9.78846 1.02660 5.17261 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00123 4.61462 0.00010 0.35866 0.00000 0.00000 0.66785 0.00000
80 40 3.21013 7.21524 0.09325 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00083 3.11605 0.00183 6.84404 0.00000 0.00000 0.36937 0.00000
80 60 5.39041 10.11892 0.12943 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00141 5.25957 0.00259 9.68358 0.00000 0.00000 0.43275 0.00000
80 80 6.67603 13.75367 0.10770 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00176 6.56657 0.00357 13.35385 0.00000 0.00000 0.39626 0.00000
80 100 8.78568 16.67692 0.12499 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00232 8.65837 0.00434 16.24694 0.00000 0.00000 0.42563 0.00000
100 1 9.42381 0.00000 9.42381 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
100 20 11.63837 1.08294 6.98167 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00124 4.65545 0.00008 0.31508 0.00000 0.00000 0.76777 0.00000
100 40 4.61886 6.35514 0.29828 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00116 4.31943 0.00151 5.63969 0.00000 0.00000 0.71395 0.00000
100 60 5.18353 10.41624 0.14344 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00135 5.03874 0.00265 9.90287 0.00000 0.00000 0.51072 0.00000
100 80 7.51444 13.16984 0.18353 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00196 7.32895 0.00337 12.59251 0.00000 0.00000 0.57396 0.00000
100 100 8.34503 17.19209 0.13463 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00220 8.20821 0.00446 16.69231 0.00000 0.00000 0.49532 0.00000
Table A.21: Consumer Drift Scenario 1 (pB2 = 0.10001, pO2 = ˜pO2 ,ξB2 = 1,ξO2 = 0)
204
A
PPEN
D
IX
A
.
D
ETA
ILED
TA
BLES
Cons. Cons Cons. Cons. N-S N-S Ex. Off. F2 On. F2 On. F1 On. Ex. F1 N-S N-S Ex. On. F2 Off. F2 Off. F1 Off. Ex. F1
Off. On. Off. F1 On. F1 Offline Offline Off. F1 Off. F1 Off. F1 Off. F1 Online Online On. F1 On. F1 On. F1 On. F1
1 1 0.17465 0.00761 0.09377 0.07280 0.00000 0.00000 0.00808 0.00000 0.00012 0.00000 0.00000 0.00523 0.00128 0.00099
1 20 0.17011 0.04231 0.03265 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.13746 0.00000 0.02782 0.00000 0.00000 0.00248 0.01200 0.00000
1 40 0.27861 0.08885 0.02297 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.25563 0.00000 0.07454 0.00000 0.00000 0.00199 0.01232 0.00000
1 60 0.39558 0.13512 0.02063 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.37495 0.00000 0.12099 0.00000 0.00000 0.00187 0.01226 0.00000
1 80 0.50867 0.18554 0.01883 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.48984 0.00000 0.17161 0.00000 0.00000 0.00177 0.01216 0.00000
1 100 0.63346 0.22596 0.01915 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.61431 0.00000 0.21199 0.00000 0.00000 0.00178 0.01218 0.00000
20 1 3.37713 0.00407 1.90097 1.47610 0.00000 0.00000 0.00007 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00406 0.00001 0.00000
20 20 3.52154 0.15103 1.87624 1.48407 0.00000 0.00000 0.16124 0.00000 0.00232 0.00000 0.00000 0.10440 0.02474 0.01957
20 40 3.48399 0.16184 1.87042 1.28899 0.00000 0.00000 0.32458 0.00000 0.00535 0.00000 0.00000 0.10489 0.03055 0.02106
20 60 3.58066 0.16712 1.86840 1.22633 0.00000 0.00000 0.48593 0.00000 0.00834 0.00000 0.00000 0.10482 0.03258 0.02138
20 80 3.66018 0.17378 1.86561 1.14602 0.00000 0.00000 0.64855 0.00000 0.01175 0.00000 0.00000 0.10493 0.03537 0.02173
20 100 3.59875 0.18745 1.85728 0.93338 0.00000 0.00000 0.80809 0.00000 0.01688 0.00000 0.00000 0.10490 0.04370 0.02196
40 1 6.78823 0.00000 3.80195 2.98628 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
40 20 6.94806 0.28655 3.75663 3.03889 0.00000 0.00000 0.15255 0.00000 0.00208 0.00000 0.00000 0.20248 0.04532 0.03666
40 40 7.04308 0.30207 3.75247 2.96813 0.00000 0.00000 0.32248 0.00000 0.00465 0.00000 0.00000 0.20880 0.04948 0.03914
40 60 7.12496 0.30862 3.75005 2.88838 0.00000 0.00000 0.48653 0.00000 0.00722 0.00000 0.00000 0.20952 0.05190 0.03998
40 80 6.96798 0.32368 3.74084 2.57799 0.00000 0.00000 0.64915 0.00000 0.01069 0.00000 0.00000 0.20977 0.06111 0.04211
40 100 6.97779 0.33252 3.73607 2.43110 0.00000 0.00000 0.81062 0.00000 0.01402 0.00000 0.00000 0.20975 0.06588 0.04287
60 1 10.12243 0.00000 5.70293 4.41951 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
60 20 10.10269 0.14849 5.68823 4.38331 0.00000 0.00000 0.03115 0.00000 0.00019 0.00000 0.00000 0.12227 0.01470 0.01133
60 40 10.28202 0.45093 5.62652 4.33732 0.00000 0.00000 0.31818 0.00000 0.00467 0.00000 0.00000 0.31096 0.07641 0.05890
60 60 10.42956 0.45803 5.62515 4.32054 0.00000 0.00000 0.48388 0.00000 0.00718 0.00000 0.00000 0.31333 0.07778 0.05974
60 80 10.75046 0.45724 5.62868 4.47146 0.00000 0.00000 0.65033 0.00000 0.00938 0.00000 0.00000 0.31463 0.07425 0.05899
60 100 10.59296 0.47022 5.62039 4.16302 0.00000 0.00000 0.80954 0.00000 0.01247 0.00000 0.00000 0.31408 0.08253 0.06113
80 1 13.43028 0.00000 7.60390 5.82638 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
80 20 13.35243 0.11793 7.59538 5.74208 0.00000 0.00000 0.01496 0.00000 0.00006 0.00000 0.00000 0.10290 0.00852 0.00644
80 40 13.89613 0.57310 7.51325 6.07777 0.00000 0.00000 0.30510 0.00000 0.00417 0.00000 0.00000 0.40495 0.09065 0.07333
80 60 14.00428 0.59720 7.50742 6.01526 0.00000 0.00000 0.48160 0.00000 0.00683 0.00000 0.00000 0.41658 0.09649 0.07731
80 80 14.08617 0.60414 7.50494 5.93626 0.00000 0.00000 0.64496 0.00000 0.00930 0.00000 0.00000 0.41760 0.09896 0.07827
80 100 14.05042 0.61429 7.49959 5.74346 0.00000 0.00000 0.80737 0.00000 0.01202 0.00000 0.00000 0.41807 0.10431 0.07989
100 1 16.77841 0.00011 9.50488 7.27353 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00011 0.00000 0.00000
100 20 16.87041 0.18138 9.49039 7.35990 0.00000 0.00000 0.02012 0.00000 0.00010 0.00000 0.00000 0.15555 0.01449 0.01124
100 40 17.18592 0.55574 9.42476 7.55337 0.00000 0.00000 0.20779 0.00000 0.00231 0.00000 0.00000 0.40910 0.08012 0.06421
100 60 17.22481 0.74670 9.38102 7.36565 0.00000 0.00000 0.47814 0.00000 0.00690 0.00000 0.00000 0.51869 0.12386 0.09725
100 80 17.34648 0.75578 9.37870 7.32375 0.00000 0.00000 0.64403 0.00000 0.00939 0.00000 0.00000 0.52167 0.12618 0.09853
100 100 17.55720 0.75913 9.37934 7.36843 0.00000 0.00000 0.80944 0.00000 0.01178 0.00000 0.00000 0.52319 0.12554 0.09862
Table A.22: Consumer Drift Scenario 2 (pB2 = ˜pB2 , pO2 = 0.10001,ξB2 = 1,ξO2 = 0)
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Cons. Cons Cons. Cons. N-S N-S Ex. Off. F2 On. F2 On. F1 On. Ex. F1 N-S N-S Ex. On. F2 Off. F2 Off. F1 Off. Ex. F1
Off. On. Off. F1 On. F1 Offline Offline Off. F1 Off. F1 Off. F1 Off. F1 Online Online On. F1 On. F1 On. F1 On. F1
1 1 0.20797 0.07230 0.01486 0.00000 0.00000 0.00231 0.00371 0.18709 0.00122 0.06173 0.00000 0.00032 0.00903 0.00000
1 20 2.52904 2.58910 0.00215 0.00000 0.00000 0.03311 0.04850 2.44529 0.05027 2.53460 0.00000 0.00014 0.00409 0.00000
1 40 4.39445 5.82812 0.00125 0.00000 0.00000 0.05921 0.08429 4.24970 0.11328 5.71165 0.00000 0.00011 0.00308 0.00000
1 60 6.55509 8.77705 0.00123 0.00000 0.00000 0.08843 0.12574 6.33970 0.17063 8.60327 0.00000 0.00011 0.00305 0.00000
1 80 7.49568 12.92820 0.00070 0.00000 0.00000 0.10427 0.14374 7.24697 0.25139 12.67448 0.00000 0.00009 0.00224 0.00000
1 100 8.34531 17.17337 0.00047 0.00000 0.00000 0.11878 0.15998 8.06608 0.33395 16.83756 0.00000 0.00008 0.00179 0.00000
20 1 2.22328 0.10928 1.97529 0.00000 0.00000 0.00276 0.00478 0.24045 0.00015 0.00747 0.00000 0.02017 0.08149 0.00000
20 20 4.15950 1.44606 0.29725 0.00000 0.00000 0.04614 0.07421 3.74189 0.02448 1.23456 0.00000 0.00643 0.18058 0.00000
20 40 3.35600 6.89785 0.00955 0.00000 0.00000 0.04761 0.06415 3.23469 0.13342 6.72702 0.00000 0.00153 0.03589 0.00000
20 60 7.72607 7.74115 0.04523 0.00000 0.00000 0.10037 0.14744 7.43303 0.14887 7.50537 0.00000 0.00281 0.08409 0.00000
20 80 10.30750 10.27561 0.04557 0.00000 0.00000 0.13403 0.19696 9.93093 0.19814 9.99024 0.00000 0.00282 0.08441 0.00000
20 100 7.13509 18.40330 0.00564 0.00000 0.00000 0.10468 0.13661 6.88817 0.35734 18.01834 0.00000 0.00125 0.02636 0.00000
40 1 4.25511 0.20557 4.00796 0.00000 0.00000 0.00276 0.00478 0.23961 0.00014 0.00718 0.00000 0.04080 0.15744 0.00000
40 20 2.50303 2.83737 0.07355 0.00000 0.00000 0.03209 0.04663 2.35076 0.05215 2.62883 0.00000 0.00517 0.15122 0.00000
40 40 8.31900 2.89211 0.59451 0.00000 0.00000 0.09229 0.14842 7.48378 0.04897 2.46912 0.00000 0.01285 0.36117 0.00000
40 60 7.49899 8.07845 0.07882 0.00000 0.00000 0.09764 0.14240 7.18013 0.15395 7.76243 0.00000 0.00532 0.15675 0.00000
40 80 6.71200 13.79571 0.01910 0.00000 0.00000 0.09521 0.12831 6.46938 0.26683 13.45403 0.00000 0.00306 0.07178 0.00000
40 100 12.61985 13.18961 0.08320 0.00000 0.00000 0.16452 0.24062 12.13151 0.25328 12.76973 0.00000 0.00544 0.16117 0.00000
60 1 6.00104 0.05234 6.00101 0.00000 0.00000 0.00003 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.05234 0.00000 0.00000
60 20 2.39021 3.01975 0.08942 0.00000 0.00000 0.03072 0.04415 2.22592 0.05464 2.75489 0.00000 0.00713 0.20309 0.00000
60 40 9.31956 2.71276 1.19045 0.00000 0.00000 0.09591 0.15623 7.87697 0.04115 2.07490 0.00000 0.02226 0.57446 0.00000
60 60 12.47304 4.34057 0.89040 0.00000 0.00000 0.13840 0.22255 11.22169 0.07350 3.70625 0.00000 0.01927 0.54155 0.00000
60 80 9.64861 11.12444 0.10286 0.00000 0.00000 0.12652 0.18317 9.23606 0.21194 10.68627 0.00000 0.00754 0.21869 0.00000
60 100 11.85214 14.01164 0.09718 0.00000 0.00000 0.15630 0.22558 11.37308 0.26824 13.52378 0.00000 0.00737 0.21223 0.00000
80 1 8.12161 0.07243 8.12157 0.00000 0.00000 0.00004 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.07243 0.00000 0.00000
80 20 9.20951 1.12142 4.48768 0.00000 0.00000 0.05340 0.09082 4.57761 0.00792 0.39919 0.00000 0.05359 0.66072 0.00000
80 40 5.00606 5.67475 0.14710 0.00000 0.00000 0.06418 0.09326 4.70151 0.10429 5.25767 0.00000 0.01034 0.30245 0.00000
80 60 3.80319 11.59201 0.01536 0.00000 0.00000 0.05698 0.07257 3.65828 0.22376 11.28002 0.00000 0.00435 0.08388 0.00000
80 80 16.63799 5.78422 1.18901 0.00000 0.00000 0.18458 0.29684 14.96756 0.09794 4.93824 0.00000 0.02571 0.72234 0.00000
80 100 18.38290 8.59187 0.74316 0.00000 0.00000 0.21526 0.33842 17.08605 0.15430 7.78998 0.00000 0.02061 0.62699 0.00000
100 1 9.98569 0.08574 9.98566 0.00000 0.00000 0.00002 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.08574 0.00000 0.00000
100 20 12.04664 1.03149 7.20124 0.00000 0.00000 0.05433 0.09322 4.69784 0.00549 0.27652 0.00000 0.07937 0.67012 0.00000
100 40 6.48051 4.80373 0.44814 0.00000 0.00000 0.07618 0.11584 5.84035 0.08171 4.11939 0.00000 0.01868 0.58395 0.00000
100 60 3.50587 11.89687 0.01493 0.00000 0.00000 0.05337 0.06685 3.37072 0.22951 11.57231 0.00000 0.00496 0.09009 0.00000
100 80 6.46708 14.14938 0.04169 0.00000 0.00000 0.09217 0.12320 6.21002 0.27188 13.70437 0.00000 0.00727 0.16587 0.00000
100 100 20.79749 7.23028 1.48627 0.00000 0.00000 0.23072 0.37106 18.70945 0.12242 6.17280 0.00000 0.03214 0.90292 0.00000
Table A.23: Consumer Drift Scenario 3 (pB2 = 0.10001, pO2 = ˜pO2 ,ξB2 = 0,ξO2 = 1)
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Cons. Cons Cons. Cons. N-S N-S Ex. Off. F2 On. F2 On. F1 On. Ex. F1 N-S N-S Ex. On. F2 Off. F2 Off. F1 Off. Ex. F1
Off. On. Off. F1 On. F1 Offline Offline Off. F1 Off. F1 Off. F1 Off. F1 Online Online On. F1 On. F1 On. F1 On. F1
1 1 0.14993 0.01780 0.03253 0.00000 0.00000 0.05872 0.05869 0.00000 0.00894 0.00000 0.00000 0.00001 0.00885 0.00000
1 20 1.97440 0.37794 0.01056 0.00000 0.00000 0.98214 0.98170 0.00000 0.37057 0.00000 0.00000 0.00001 0.00736 0.00000
1 40 3.90658 0.76217 0.01013 0.00000 0.00000 1.94892 1.94753 0.00000 0.75491 0.00000 0.00000 0.00001 0.00726 0.00000
1 60 5.96136 1.08598 0.01119 0.00000 0.00000 2.97643 2.97373 0.00000 1.07847 0.00000 0.00000 0.00001 0.00750 0.00000
1 80 7.89877 1.47235 0.01082 0.00000 0.00000 3.94482 3.94312 0.00000 1.46493 0.00000 0.00000 0.00001 0.00742 0.00000
1 100 9.71080 1.92260 0.00987 0.00000 0.00000 4.85115 4.84979 0.00000 1.91540 0.00000 0.00000 0.00001 0.00719 0.00000
20 1 3.55642 0.04199 1.85613 1.56902 0.00000 0.06582 0.06544 0.00000 0.00088 0.00000 0.00000 0.00051 0.02200 0.01860
20 20 2.97694 0.35984 0.63601 0.00000 0.00000 1.17077 1.17016 0.00000 0.18231 0.00000 0.00000 0.00028 0.17725 0.00000
20 40 4.66626 0.72112 0.36173 0.00000 0.00000 2.15302 2.15150 0.00000 0.55119 0.00000 0.00000 0.00021 0.16972 0.00000
20 60 6.57379 1.08652 0.30159 0.00000 0.00000 3.13667 3.13554 0.00000 0.92320 0.00000 0.00000 0.00019 0.16313 0.00000
20 80 8.56512 1.43272 0.28462 0.00000 0.00000 4.14085 4.13966 0.00000 1.27177 0.00000 0.00000 0.00019 0.16076 0.00000
20 100 10.69737 1.72354 0.29365 0.00000 0.00000 5.20300 5.20073 0.00000 1.56131 0.00000 0.00000 0.00019 0.16205 0.00000
40 1 6.96754 0.07495 3.71618 3.12994 0.00000 0.06160 0.05983 0.00000 0.00076 0.00000 0.00000 0.00101 0.03972 0.03345
40 20 7.88828 0.16877 3.60916 1.63975 0.00000 1.32074 1.31863 0.00000 0.02970 0.00000 0.00000 0.00101 0.09493 0.04313
40 40 5.95389 0.71967 1.27202 0.00000 0.00000 2.34155 2.34032 0.00000 0.36462 0.00000 0.00000 0.00056 0.35450 0.00000
40 60 7.38498 1.11687 0.80892 0.00000 0.00000 3.28883 3.28722 0.00000 0.77036 0.00000 0.00000 0.00044 0.34607 0.00000
40 80 9.33252 1.44225 0.72347 0.00000 0.00000 4.30604 4.30301 0.00000 1.10238 0.00000 0.00000 0.00042 0.33945 0.00000
40 100 11.11726 1.84423 0.61914 0.00000 0.00000 5.25006 5.24806 0.00000 1.51553 0.00000 0.00000 0.00039 0.32831 0.00000
60 1 10.22371 0.00152 5.62665 4.59489 0.00000 0.00168 0.00049 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00152 0.00000 0.00000
60 20 11.52973 0.19676 5.48903 3.38814 0.00000 1.32708 1.32548 0.00000 0.02425 0.00000 0.00000 0.00152 0.10572 0.06526
60 40 8.17480 0.67672 3.19727 0.00000 0.00000 2.49027 2.48726 0.00000 0.21324 0.00000 0.00000 0.00112 0.46237 0.00000
60 60 8.92501 1.08050 1.90422 0.00000 0.00000 3.51134 3.50945 0.00000 0.54785 0.00000 0.00000 0.00083 0.53182 0.00000
60 80 10.59305 1.40402 1.52640 0.00000 0.00000 4.53533 4.53132 0.00000 0.87144 0.00000 0.00000 0.00074 0.53184 0.00000
60 100 12.16905 1.80017 1.21519 0.00000 0.00000 5.47930 5.47456 0.00000 1.28046 0.00000 0.00000 0.00066 0.51904 0.00000
80 1 13.64540 0.00200 7.50097 6.14441 0.00000 0.00002 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00200 0.00000 0.00000
80 20 14.76384 0.24378 7.33635 4.77185 0.00000 1.32845 1.32719 0.00000 0.02329 0.00000 0.00000 0.00203 0.13236 0.08609
80 40 15.77656 0.33754 7.21833 3.27949 0.00000 2.64148 2.63726 0.00000 0.05940 0.00000 0.00000 0.00203 0.18985 0.08626
80 60 10.43865 1.12843 3.20410 0.00000 0.00000 3.61798 3.61658 0.00000 0.44137 0.00000 0.00000 0.00126 0.68579 0.00000
80 80 11.90777 1.43935 2.54405 0.00000 0.00000 4.68309 4.68063 0.00000 0.72924 0.00000 0.00000 0.00111 0.70900 0.00000
80 100 13.65957 1.73553 2.20097 0.00000 0.00000 5.73369 5.72491 0.00000 1.02350 0.00000 0.00000 0.00103 0.71101 0.00000
100 1 16.97348 0.00232 9.37317 7.60031 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00232 0.00000 0.00000
100 20 17.93892 0.29365 9.17943 6.10140 0.00000 1.32945 1.32864 0.00000 0.02291 0.00000 0.00000 0.00254 0.16111 0.10709
100 40 19.73559 0.35133 9.12356 5.30895 0.00000 2.65291 2.65016 0.00000 0.05076 0.00000 0.00000 0.00254 0.18841 0.10963
100 60 20.02787 0.48631 8.93161 3.18287 0.00000 3.95763 3.95578 0.00000 0.10131 0.00000 0.00000 0.00254 0.28198 0.10049
100 80 13.05391 1.53973 3.54969 0.00000 0.00000 4.75265 4.75156 0.00000 0.66170 0.00000 0.00000 0.00147 0.87656 0.00000
100 100 14.99341 1.78045 3.25258 0.00000 0.00000 5.87152 5.86931 0.00000 0.89426 0.00000 0.00000 0.00140 0.88479 0.00000
Table A.24: Consumer Drift Scenario 4 (pB2 = ˜pB2 , pO2 = 0.10001,ξB2 = 0,ξO2 = 1)
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Offline Offline Online F1 F2
0.1 61.80870 0.00119 -1.00086 0.00048 0.00003
0.12 49.88136 0.00172 -1.26330 0.99832 0.00005
0.14 39.88767 0.00247 -1.48629 1.59650 0.00007
0.16 31.91029 0.00353 -1.64324 1.91603 0.00011
0.18 25.78793 0.00499 -1.71021 2.06503 0.00016
0.2 21.24358 0.00703 -1.67322 2.12717 0.00023
0.22 17.96821 0.00983 -1.53619 2.16012 0.00033
0.24 15.66926 0.01368 -1.32342 2.19917 0.00048
0.26 14.09435 0.01898 -1.07311 2.26269 0.00068
0.28 13.03896 0.02624 -0.82446 2.35751 0.00096
0.3 12.34503 0.03621 -0.60651 2.48349 0.00135
0.32 11.89482 0.04993 -0.43415 2.63683 0.00189
0.34 11.60316 0.06891 -0.31065 2.81232 0.00263
0.36 11.40965 0.09534 -0.23295 3.00464 0.00365
0.38 11.27152 0.13257 -0.19682 3.20905 0.00504
0.4 11.15741 0.18593 -0.20139 3.42159 0.00696
0.42 11.04143 0.26444 -0.25484 3.63903 0.00960
0.44 10.89585 0.38499 -0.38868 3.85858 0.01325
0.46 10.67632 0.58485 -0.71885 4.07742 0.01833
0.48 10.26376 0.97818 -2.01610 4.29150 0.02548
0.5 3.06578 8.15319 -0.25217 4.48759 0.03574
0.52 3.03352 8.15412 -0.35367 4.53573 0.05083
0.54 2.98704 8.15381 -0.59881 4.57582 0.07400
0.56 2.91016 8.15379 -1.16490 4.60019 0.11243
0.58 2.75892 8.15410 -3.39774 4.58592 0.18804
0.6 0.00000 8.16160 -28.70146 3.26464 1.56750
0.62 0.00000 8.16158 -30.51866 3.26463 1.56750
0.64 0.00000 8.16157 -32.86148 3.26463 1.56750
0.66 0.00000 8.16157 -36.57991 3.26463 1.56750
0.68 0.00000 8.16157 -46.88265 3.26463 1.56750
0.7 0.00000 8.16157 -43.47251 3.26463 1.56750
0.72 0.00000 8.16157 -45.97491 3.26463 1.56750
0.74 0.00000 8.16157 -48.74647 3.26463 1.56750
0.76 0.00000 8.16157 -51.79717 3.26463 1.56750
0.78 0.00000 8.16157 -55.14767 3.26463 1.56750
0.8 0.00000 8.16157 -58.80873 3.26463 1.56750
0.82 0.00000 8.16157 -62.76172 3.26463 1.56750
0.84 0.00000 8.16157 -66.58666 3.26463 1.56750
0.86 0.00000 8.16157 -86.00000 3.26463 1.56750
0.88 0.00000 8.16157 NA 3.26463 1.56750
0.9 0.00000 8.16157 -1.00086 3.26463 1.56750
Table A.25: Elasticity Scenario α (pO1 = 0.5, pB2 = 0.7, pO2 = 0.6)
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Price Consumer Consumer Elasticity Profit Profit
Offline Offline Online F1 F2
0.1 45.80439 0.00004 -1.35152 0.00001 1.51678
0.12 33.86952 0.00005 -1.86131 0.67741 1.51946
0.14 23.87221 0.00007 -2.48389 0.95491 1.52248
0.16 15.89370 0.00010 -3.29921 0.95365 1.52629
0.18 9.77153 0.00013 -4.51278 0.78176 1.53145
0.2 5.22790 0.00018 -3.40054 0.52284 1.53875
0.22 3.58961 0.00025 -3.84799 0.43083 1.71301
0.24 2.43884 0.00035 -4.26258 0.34154 1.84385
0.26 1.64856 0.00048 -4.62810 0.26391 1.94846
0.28 1.11395 0.00066 -5.04482 0.20071 2.05062
0.3 0.58208 0.00093 -22.50619 0.11669 2.92258
0.32 0.09880 0.00133 -7.77042 0.02213 3.00604
0.34 0.06084 0.00193 -4.83097 0.01518 3.01347
0.36 0.04655 0.00293 -3.06734 0.01298 3.03036
0.38 0.03940 0.00490 -3.25543 0.01250 3.07075
0.4 0.00136 0.04088 -33.77787 0.01267 3.87495
0.42 0.00010 0.04131 -21.70889 0.01242 3.87075
0.44 0.00002 0.04105 -21.86544 0.01232 3.87122
0.46 0.00001 0.04094 -22.69530 0.01229 3.87157
0.48 0.00000 0.04090 -23.81037 0.01227 3.87177
0.5 0.00000 0.04088 -25.10587 0.01227 3.87188
0.52 0.00000 0.04088 -26.54269 0.01226 3.87194
0.54 0.00000 0.04088 -28.10473 0.01226 3.87196
0.56 0.00000 0.04088 -29.78613 0.01226 3.87198
0.58 0.00000 0.04088 -31.58653 0.01226 3.87198
0.6 0.00000 0.04088 -33.50896 0.01226 3.87198
0.62 0.00000 0.04088 -35.55887 0.01226 3.87198
0.64 0.00000 0.04088 -37.74368 0.01226 3.87199
0.66 0.00000 0.04088 -40.07253 0.01226 3.87199
0.68 0.00000 0.04088 -42.55624 0.01226 3.87199
0.7 0.00000 0.04088 -45.20724 0.01226 3.87199
0.72 0.00000 0.04088 -48.03954 0.01226 3.87199
0.74 0.00000 0.04088 -51.06871 0.01226 3.87199
0.76 0.00000 0.04088 -54.31147 0.01226 3.87199
0.78 0.00000 0.04088 -57.78742 0.01226 3.87199
0.8 0.00000 0.04088 -61.50292 0.01226 3.87199
0.82 0.00000 0.04088 -65.43574 0.01226 3.87199
0.84 0.00000 0.04088 -69.22142 0.01226 3.87199
0.86 0.00000 0.04088 -86.00000 0.01226 3.87199
0.88 0.00000 0.04088 NA 0.01226 3.87199
0.9 0.00000 0.04088 -1.35152 0.01226 3.87199
Table A.26: Elasticity Scenario β (pO1 = 0.4, pB2 = 0.2, pO2 = 0.3)
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5E-04 0.1 61.8087 0.0011877 5.27E-08 50.52196 1.42E-11 3.13493372 3.143112 5.0086951 0.0004579 0.0007296 1.65E-07 6.13E-10 0 0
0.998 0.12 49.8814 0.0017219 5.27E-08 38.59518 1.34E-11 3.13490125 3.142906 5.0083669 0.0006638 0.0010578 2.54E-07 6.97E-10 0 0
1.596 0.14 39.8877 0.0024746 5.27E-08 28.60229 1.26E-11 3.13485332 3.1426158 5.0079044 0.000954 0.0015202 3.85E-07 7.84E-10 0 0
1.916 0.16 31.9103 0.0035282 5.27E-08 20.62604 1.18E-11 3.13478335 3.1422097 5.0072572 0.0013602 0.0021675 5.77E-07 8.74E-10 0 0
2.065 0.18 25.7879 0.0049946 5.27E-08 14.50525 1.09E-11 3.13468226 3.1416444 5.0063564 0.0019255 0.0030683 8.53E-07 9.65E-10 0 0
2.127 0.2 21.2436 0.0070257 5.27E-08 9.963072 1.00E-11 3.13453756 3.1408614 5.0051087 0.0027084 0.004316 1.25E-06 1.06E-09 0 0
2.16 0.22 17.9682 0.0098278 5.27E-08 6.690705 9.14E-12 3.13433217 3.1397812 5.0033873 0.0037886 0.0060374 1.81E-06 1.15E-09 0 0
2.199 0.24 15.6693 0.0136825 5.27E-08 4.395905 8.27E-12 3.13404278 3.1382952 5.0010194 0.0052746 0.0084053 2.60E-06 1.24E-09 0 0
2.263 0.26 14.0943 0.0189751 5.27E-08 2.826688 7.42E-12 3.13363772 3.136255 4.9977682 0.0073148 0.0116565 3.71E-06 1.33E-09 0 0
2.358 0.28 13.039 0.0262369 5.27E-08 1.779128 6.60E-12 3.13307397 3.1334556 4.9933072 0.0101142 0.0161175 5.25E-06 1.42E-09 0 0
2.483 0.3 12.345 0.0362079 5.27E-08 1.095946 5.81E-12 3.13229315 3.1296119 4.9871821 0.0139579 0.0222426 7.39E-06 1.50E-09 0 0
2.637 0.32 11.8948 0.0499316 5.27E-08 0.660532 5.05E-12 3.13121588 3.1243216 4.9787517 0.0192483 0.030673 1.03E-05 1.58E-09 0 0
2.812 0.34 11.6032 0.0689068 5.27E-08 0.389327 4.34E-12 3.12973398 3.1170068 4.9670953 0.026563 0.0423294 1.44E-05 1.66E-09 0 0
3.005 0.36 11.4096 0.0953371 5.27E-08 0.22427 3.68E-12 3.1276993 3.1068182 4.9508592 0.0367517 0.0585655 2.00E-05 1.73E-09 0 0
3.209 0.38 11.2715 0.1325707 5.27E-08 0.126157 3.07E-12 3.12490756 3.0924649 4.9279865 0.051105 0.0814382 2.76E-05 1.79E-09 0 0
3.422 0.4 11.1574 0.1859286 5.27E-08 0.069232 2.52E-12 3.12107435 3.0718956 4.8952085 0.0716742 0.1142162 3.81E-05 1.85E-09 0 0
3.639 0.42 11.0414 0.2644358 5.27E-08 0.037022 2.04E-12 3.11579842 3.0416309 4.8469803 0.1019389 0.1624444 5.25E-05 1.90E-09 0 0
3.859 0.44 10.8958 0.384988 5.27E-08 0.019266 1.61E-12 3.10850365 2.995157 4.772922 0.1484128 0.2365027 7.25E-05 1.95E-09 0 0
4.077 0.46 10.6763 0.584855 5.27E-08 0.009741 1.24E-12 3.09834276 2.9181045 4.6501353 0.2254653 0.3592894 0.0001 1.99E-09 0 0
4.292 0.48 10.2638 0.9781759 5.27E-08 0.004777 9.24E-13 3.08402862 2.7664659 4.4084921 0.3771039 0.6009326 0.000139 2.02E-09 0 0
4.488 0.5 3.06578 8.1531901 5.27E-08 0.002268 6.68E-13 3.06351547 0 0 3.1435698 5.0094247 0.000196 2.05E-09 0 0
4.536 0.52 3.03352 8.1541246 9.50E-09 0.000187 4.63E-13 3.03333337 0 0 3.1435698 5.0094247 0.000278 2.07E-09 4.3E-08 0.000852
4.576 0.54 2.98704 8.1538062 5.98E-09 5.21E-05 3.06E-13 2.98698625 0 0 3.1435698 5.0094247 0.000405 2.08E-09 4.7E-08 0.000407
4.6 0.56 2.91016 8.1537889 4.11E-09 1.52E-05 1.89E-13 2.91014396 0 0 3.1435698 5.0094247 0.000615 2.10E-09 4.9E-08 0.000179
4.586 0.58 2.75892 8.1540978 2.93E-09 4.39E-06 1.08E-13 2.75891901 0 0 3.1435698 5.0094247 0.001029 2.10E-09 5.0E-08 7.44E-05
3.265 0.6 1.24E-06 8.1615994 2.14E-09 1.23E-06 5.46E-14 0 0 0 3.1435698 5.0094247 0.008576 2.11E-09 5.1E-08 2.92E-05
3.265 0.62 3.32E-07 8.161581 2.84E-10 3.32E-07 2.36E-14 0 0 0 3.1435698 5.0094247 0.008576 2.11E-09 9.2E-09 1.08E-05
3.265 0.64 8.41E-08 8.1615739 1.33E-10 8.39E-08 7.84E-15 0 0 0 3.1435698 5.0094247 0.008576 2.11E-09 5.8E-09 3.68E-06
3.265 0.66 1.92E-08 8.1615713 6.84E-11 1.92E-08 1.63E-15 0 0 0 3.1435698 5.0094247 0.008576 2.12E-09 4.0E-09 1.13E-06
3.265 0.68 3.45E-09 8.1615705 3.66E-11 3.42E-09 1.07E-16 0 0 0 3.1435698 5.0094247 0.008576 2.12E-09 2.9E-09 2.70E-07
3.265 0.7 2.00E-11 8.1615702 2.00E-11 0 0 0 0 0 3.1435698 5.0094247 0.008576 2.12E-09 2.1E-09 0
3.265 0.72 2.81E-12 8.1615702 2.81E-12 0 0 0 0 0 3.1435698 5.0094247 0.008576 5.36E-10 4.0E-10 0
3.265 0.74 3.58E-13 8.1615702 3.58E-13 0 0 0 0 0 3.1435698 5.0094247 0.008576 1.22E-10 6.8E-11 0
3.265 0.76 4.03E-14 8.1615702 4.03E-14 0 0 0 0 0 3.1435698 5.0094247 0.008576 2.47E-11 1.0E-11 0
3.265 0.78 3.93E-15 8.1615702 3.93E-15 0 0 0 0 0 3.1435698 5.0094247 0.008576 4.31E-12 1.3E-12 0
3.265 0.8 3.21E-16 8.1615702 3.21E-16 0 0 0 0 0 3.1435698 5.0094247 0.008576 6.35E-13 1.5E-13 0
3.265 0.82 2.12E-17 8.1615702 2.12E-17 0 0 0 0 0 3.1435698 5.0094247 0.008576 7.61E-14 1.3E-14 0
3.265 0.84 1.09E-18 8.1615702 1.09E-18 0 0 0 0 0 3.1435698 5.0094247 0.008576 7.14E-15 9.3E-16 0
3.265 0.86 3.70E-20 8.1615702 3.70E-20 0 0 0 0 0 3.1435698 5.0094247 0.008576 4.46E-16 4.3E-17 0
3.265 0.88 0 8.1615702 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.1435698 5.0094247 0.008576 0 0 0
3.265 0.9 0 8.1615702 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.1435698 5.0094247 0.008576 0 0 0
Table A.27: Consumer Decomposition Scenario α (pO1 = 0.5, pB2 = 0.7, pO2 = 0.6)
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Offline Online Offline Offline Off. F1 Off. F1 Off. F1 Off. F1 Online Online On. F1 On. F1 On. F1 On. F1
1E-05 0.1 45.8044 3.52E-05 4.981536 40.55889 0.01359 0.209536 0.0408402 0 3.52E-05 0 0 0 0 0
0.677 0.12 33.8695 4.93E-05 4.981536 28.63211 0.00586 0.2091818 0.0408262 0 4.93E-05 0 0 0 0 0
0.955 0.14 23.8722 6.86E-05 4.981536 18.63922 0.00195 0.20869206 0.0408068 0 6.86E-05 0 0 0 0 0
0.954 0.16 15.8937 9.51E-05 4.981536 10.66297 0.000405 0.2080099 0.0407803 0 9.51E-05 0 0 0 0 0
0.782 0.18 9.77153 0.0001315 4.981536 4.54218 2.66E-05 0.20704891 0.0407439 0 0.0001315 0 0 0 0 0
0.523 0.2 5.2279 0.0001815 4.981536 0 0 0.20567174 0.0406939 0 0.0001815 0 0 0 0 0
0.431 0.22 3.58961 0.0002503 3.345335 0 0 0.20364544 0.0406251 0 0.0002503 0 0 0 0 0
0.342 0.24 2.43884 0.0003454 2.197774 0 0 0.20053388 0.04053 0 0.0003454 0 0 0 0 0
0.264 0.26 1.64856 0.0004779 1.412791 0 0 0.19537501 0.0403975 0 0.0004779 0 0 0 0 0
0.201 0.28 1.11395 0.0006645 0.888518 0 0 0.1852224 0.0402109 0 0.0006645 0 0 0 0 0
0.117 0.3 0.58208 0.000932 0.542133 0 0 0 0.0399434 0 0.000932 0 0 0 0 0
0.022 0.32 0.0988 0.0013255 0.059246 0 0 0 0.0395499 0 0.0013255 0 0 0 0 0
0.015 0.34 0.06084 0.0019298 0.021897 0 0 0 0.0389456 0 0.0019298 0 0 0 0 0
0.013 0.36 0.04655 0.0029317 0.00861 0 0 0 0.0379437 0 0.0029317 0 0 0 0 0
0.013 0.38 0.0394 0.0049034 0.003428 0 0 0 0.035972 0 0.0049034 0 0 0 0 0
0.013 0.4 0.00136 0.0408754 0.001357 0 0 0 0 0 0.0408754 0 0 0 0 0
0.012 0.42 9.54E-05 0.0413088 9.54E-05 0 0 0 0 0 0.0408754 0 0 0 0.00043 0
0.012 0.44 2.29E-05 0.041054 2.29E-05 0 0 0 0 0 0.0408754 0 0 0 0.00018 0
0.012 0.46 5.82E-06 0.0409443 5.82E-06 0 0 0 0 0 0.0408754 0 0 0 6.9E-05 0
0.012 0.48 1.49E-06 0.0409007 1.49E-06 0 0 0 0 0 0.0408754 0 0 0 2.5E-05 0
0.012 0.5 3.77E-07 0.0408843 3.77E-07 0 0 0 0 0 0.0408754 0 0 0 8.9E-06 0
0.012 0.52 9.27E-08 0.0408784 9.27E-08 0 0 0 0 0 0.0408754 0 0 0 3.0E-06 0
0.012 0.54 2.20E-08 0.0408764 2.20E-08 0 0 0 0 0 0.0408754 0 0 0 9.6E-07 0
0.012 0.56 5.00E-09 0.0408757 5.00E-09 0 0 0 0 0 0.0408754 0 0 0 2.9E-07 0
0.012 0.58 1.08E-09 0.0408755 1.08E-09 0 0 0 0 0 0.0408754 0 0 0 8.5E-08 0
0.012 0.6 2.21E-10 0.0408754 2.21E-10 0 0 0 0 0 0.0408754 0 0 0 2.3E-08 0
0.012 0.62 4.23E-11 0.0408754 4.23E-11 0 0 0 0 0 0.0408754 0 0 0 6.0E-09 0
0.012 0.64 7.56E-12 0.0408754 7.56E-12 0 0 0 0 0 0.0408754 0 0 0 1.4E-09 0
0.012 0.66 1.25E-12 0.0408754 1.25E-12 0 0 0 0 0 0.0408754 0 0 0 3.2E-10 0
0.012 0.68 1.88E-13 0.0408754 1.88E-13 0 0 0 0 0 0.0408754 0 0 0 6.4E-11 0
0.012 0.7 2.56E-14 0.0408754 2.56E-14 0 0 0 0 0 0.0408754 0 0 0 1.2E-11 0
0.012 0.72 3.11E-15 0.0408754 3.11E-15 0 0 0 0 0 0.0408754 0 0 0 1.9E-12 0
0.012 0.74 3.33E-16 0.0408754 3.33E-16 0 0 0 0 0 0.0408754 0 0 0 2.8E-13 0
0.012 0.76 3.08E-17 0.0408754 3.08E-17 0 0 0 0 0 0.0408754 0 0 0 3.6E-14 0
0.012 0.78 2.39E-18 0.0408754 2.39E-18 0 0 0 0 0 0.0408754 0 0 0 3.8E-15 0
0.012 0.8 1.52E-19 0.0408754 1.52E-19 0 0 0 0 0 0.0408754 0 0 0 3.4E-16 0
0.012 0.82 7.61E-21 0.0408754 7.61E-21 0 0 0 0 0 0.0408754 0 0 0 2.4E-17 0
0.012 0.84 2.88E-22 0.0408754 2.88E-22 0 0 0 0 0 0.0408754 0 0 0 1.3E-18 0
0.012 0.86 6.97E-24 0.0408754 6.97E-24 0 0 0 0 0 0.0408754 0 0 0 4.4E-20 0
0.012 0.88 0 0.0408754 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0408754 0 0 0 0 0
0.012 0.9 0 0.0408754 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0408754 0 0 0 0 0
Table A.28: Consumer Decomposition Scenario β (pO1 = 0.4, pB2 = 0.2, pO2 = 0.3)
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Cons. Cons. Price Price Price Price Cons. Cons. Cons. Cons. Eff. Eff. Eff. Eff. Profit Profit
Off. On. Off. F1 On. F1 Off. F2 On. F2 Off. F1 On. F1 Off. F2 On. F2 Off. F1 On. F1 Off. F2 On. F2 F1 F2
1 1 0.10006 0.28317 0.10001 0.33647 0.09010 0.47852 0.10933 0.30346 0.99997 0.99996 1 0 0.08765 0.07176
1 20 0.14330 0.23462 0.10001 0.33647 0.12145 4.82199 0.81447 1.45848 0.99990 0.99983 1 0 0.65425 0.34489
1 40 0.16220 0.23603 0.10001 0.33647 0.11147 9.39663 1.61475 2.84174 0.99980 0.99985 1 0 1.28470 0.67200
1 60 0.18984 0.23842 0.10001 0.33647 0.04701 13.83370 2.54234 4.44174 0.99953 0.99961 1 0 1.91818 1.05036
1 80 0.19296 0.23726 0.10001 0.33647 0.04688 18.57544 3.36343 5.86106 0.99959 0.99927 1 0 2.55225 1.38599
1 100 0.22514 0.23845 0.10001 0.33647 0.00263 23.01484 4.41901 7.68838 0.99960 0.99946 1 0 3.18539 1.81811
20 1 0.10005 0.31944 0.10001 0.33647 1.64003 6.25151 1.80469 5.61261 0.99995 0.99992 1 0 1.37181 1.32723
20 20 0.10006 0.28317 0.10001 0.33647 1.80206 9.57032 2.18659 6.06930 0.99997 0.99996 1 0 1.75308 1.43522
20 40 0.10014 0.25574 0.10001 0.33647 1.91788 14.62060 2.61066 6.61174 0.99991 0.99983 1 0 2.27577 1.56350
20 60 0.10012 0.24579 0.10001 0.33647 2.17073 19.46115 3.11822 7.42739 0.99995 0.99995 1 0 2.83704 1.75638
20 80 0.10026 0.23884 0.10001 0.33647 2.39325 24.54501 3.64907 8.29730 0.99995 0.99991 1 0 3.40779 1.96209
20 100 0.10036 0.23683 0.10001 0.33647 2.71774 29.13933 4.20699 9.25803 0.99995 0.99995 1 0 3.98762 2.18928
40 1 0.10009 0.33003 0.10001 0.33647 3.51674 11.86804 3.65513 11.40483 0.99992 0.99991 1 0 2.73001 2.69692
40 20 0.10009 0.30216 0.10001 0.33647 3.44069 15.12378 3.98357 11.69068 0.99997 0.99992 1 0 3.05760 2.76452
40 40 0.10006 0.28317 0.10001 0.33647 3.60411 19.14064 4.37317 12.13860 0.99997 0.99996 1 0 3.50616 2.87044
40 60 0.10012 0.26235 0.10001 0.33647 3.55575 24.73439 4.72806 12.46055 0.99996 0.99990 1 0 4.01511 2.94658
40 80 0.10014 0.25574 0.10001 0.33647 3.83575 29.24120 5.22133 13.22348 0.99991 0.99983 1 0 4.55155 3.12699
40 100 0.10014 0.25117 0.10001 0.33647 4.13531 33.79772 5.73470 14.05594 0.99994 0.99990 1 0 5.10808 3.32385
60 1 0.10009 0.32873 0.10001 0.33647 5.20889 17.87489 5.45697 17.04232 0.99994 0.99990 1 0 4.08843 4.03003
60 20 0.10007 0.30539 0.10001 0.33647 4.95301 21.39971 5.73173 17.16811 0.99996 0.99996 1 0 4.39543 4.05978
60 40 0.10008 0.28708 0.10001 0.33647 4.93263 25.64731 6.05267 17.39418 0.99995 0.99994 1 0 4.79815 4.11324
60 60 0.10006 0.28317 0.10001 0.33647 5.40617 28.71095 6.55976 18.20789 0.99997 0.99996 1 0 5.25924 4.30567
60 80 0.10011 0.27093 0.10001 0.33647 5.46902 33.71501 6.94384 18.62229 0.99994 0.99991 1 0 5.76266 4.40366
60 100 0.10015 0.26113 0.10001 0.33647 5.53299 39.03121 7.35622 19.12567 0.99990 0.99988 1 0 6.28673 4.52270
80 1 0.10008 0.32236 0.10001 0.33647 6.61078 24.48411 7.17960 22.43531 0.99998 0.99994 1 0 5.44477 5.30532
80 20 0.10009 0.31298 0.10001 0.33647 6.74668 26.95722 7.57611 22.94080 0.99991 0.99990 1 0 5.74097 5.42486
80 40 0.10009 0.30216 0.10001 0.33647 6.88139 30.24755 7.96713 23.38137 0.99997 0.99992 1 0 6.11520 5.52904
80 60 0.10006 0.28639 0.10001 0.33647 6.75398 35.13559 8.24352 23.48046 0.99997 0.99996 1 0 6.54918 5.55248
80 80 0.10006 0.28317 0.10001 0.33647 7.20823 38.28127 8.74635 24.27719 0.99997 0.99996 1 0 7.01232 5.74089
80 100 0.10007 0.27618 0.10001 0.33647 7.42021 42.62042 9.17291 24.83420 0.99998 0.99997 1 0 7.50901 5.87261
100 1 0.10008 0.31988 0.10001 0.33647 8.09791 30.90900 8.92180 27.89229 0.99996 0.99993 1 0 6.79650 6.59575
100 20 0.10008 0.31314 0.10001 0.33647 8.28689 33.27884 9.33272 28.43986 0.99998 0.99997 1 0 7.09371 6.72524
100 40 0.10006 0.30447 0.10001 0.33647 8.41953 36.44462 9.72071 28.88161 0.99997 0.99993 1 0 7.45191 6.82970
100 60 0.10013 0.29210 0.10001 0.33647 8.30827 40.86820 10.02053 29.02418 0.99989 0.99987 1 0 7.84657 6.86342
100 80 0.10007 0.28663 0.10001 0.33647 8.61404 44.46680 10.45189 29.61687 0.99997 0.99996 1 0 8.29936 7.00357
100 100 0.10006 0.28317 0.10001 0.33647 9.01028 47.85159 10.93294 30.34649 0.99997 0.99996 1 0 8.76540 7.17611
Table A.29: Scenario 1 (pB2 = 0.10001, pO2 = ˜pO2 ,ξB2 = 1,ξO2 = 0)
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Cons. Cons. Price Price Price Price Cons. Cons. Cons. Cons. Eff. Eff. Eff. Eff. Profit Profit
Off. On. Off. F1 On. F1 Off. F2 On. F2 Off. F1 On. F1 Off. F2 On. F2 Off. F1 On. F1 Off. F2 On. F2 F1 F2
1 1 0.10003 0.40331 0.15908 0.10001 0.22619 0.16620 0.00081 0.72307 1.00000 0.99999 1 0 0.05042 0.00006
1 20 0.25141 0.27790 0.15908 0.10001 0.01779 2.93153 0.00416 9.38242 0.99937 0.99931 1 0 0.52391 0.00034
1 40 0.24867 0.27602 0.15908 0.10001 0.04108 5.91296 0.00759 18.52500 0.99882 0.99868 1 0 1.04567 0.00063
1 60 0.31466 0.27655 0.15908 0.10001 0.06519 8.81578 1.13805 27.70818 0.97618 0.99625 1 0 1.56295 0.06752
1 80 0.23521 0.27770 0.15908 0.10001 0.08176 11.72118 0.00873 36.94310 0.99939 0.99945 1 0 2.09217 0.00089
1 100 0.27239 0.27758 0.15908 0.10001 0.07495 14.68101 0.02202 46.13845 0.99955 0.99960 1 0 2.61883 0.00176
20 1 0.10049 0.47194 0.15908 0.10001 5.14730 1.47121 0.01716 4.66017 0.99999 0.99999 1 0 0.54974 0.00106
20 20 0.10003 0.40331 0.15908 0.10001 4.52383 3.32400 0.01625 14.46135 1.00000 0.99999 1 0 1.00834 0.00110
20 40 0.10003 0.35403 0.15908 0.10001 4.36848 5.91354 0.01470 23.78455 1.00000 0.99999 1 0 1.50238 0.00111
20 60 0.10014 0.29803 0.15908 0.10001 3.77697 10.88037 0.01224 31.51610 0.99998 0.99998 1 0 2.15518 0.00104
20 80 0.10011 0.29987 0.15908 0.10001 4.47457 12.68611 0.01236 41.05609 0.99999 0.99999 1 0 2.53605 0.00114
20 100 0.10010 0.26230 0.15908 0.10001 3.67056 19.16787 0.01082 47.77117 0.99996 0.99994 1 0 3.11107 0.00112
40 1 0.10022 0.47515 0.15908 0.10001 10.45031 2.82628 0.03435 8.77487 1.00000 1.00000 1 0 1.06255 0.00212
40 20 0.10228 0.47241 0.15908 0.10001 10.23053 2.99276 0.03432 19.21753 0.99998 0.99998 1 0 1.13777 0.00222
40 40 0.10003 0.40331 0.15908 0.10001 9.04767 6.64801 0.03249 28.92271 1.00000 0.99999 1 0 2.01668 0.00221
40 60 0.10008 0.41674 0.15908 0.10001 10.10424 6.23542 0.03307 39.81533 1.00000 1.00000 1 0 1.97584 0.00235
40 80 0.10003 0.35403 0.15908 0.10001 8.73695 11.82709 0.02940 47.56909 1.00000 0.99999 1 0 3.00475 0.00221
40 100 0.10005 0.29964 0.15908 0.10001 7.01375 19.57299 0.02458 53.72585 0.99998 0.99998 1 0 3.90787 0.00199
60 1 0.10047 0.46978 0.15908 0.10001 15.30089 4.52057 0.05144 12.87693 0.99999 0.99999 1 0 1.67879 0.00317
60 20 0.10502 0.46715 0.15908 0.10001 13.94344 4.62184 0.05140 23.29192 0.99998 0.99997 1 0 1.76670 0.00327
60 40 0.10005 0.42864 0.15908 0.10001 14.26095 7.55053 0.05022 33.52904 0.99999 0.99999 1 0 2.48211 0.00330
60 60 0.10003 0.40331 0.15908 0.10001 13.57150 9.97201 0.04874 43.38406 1.00000 0.99999 1 0 3.02503 0.00331
60 80 0.10006 0.42957 0.15908 0.10001 15.43712 8.04886 0.05027 54.92413 0.99999 0.99999 1 0 2.65350 0.00352
60 100 0.10006 0.31598 0.15908 0.10001 10.00276 22.05232 0.03913 58.37816 0.99999 0.99999 1 0 4.76340 0.00290
80 1 0.10006 0.47490 0.15908 0.10001 20.94422 5.67092 0.06869 16.99806 1.00000 1.00000 1 0 2.12723 0.00423
80 20 0.10050 0.47380 0.15908 0.10001 21.01920 5.83834 0.06867 27.44864 0.99999 0.99999 1 0 2.19293 0.00433
80 40 0.10228 0.47241 0.15908 0.10001 20.46107 5.98553 0.06864 38.43507 0.99998 0.99998 1 0 2.27554 0.00444
80 60 0.10007 0.43031 0.15908 0.10001 19.30760 9.99498 0.06706 48.31784 0.99999 0.99999 1 0 3.30276 0.00445
80 80 0.10003 0.40331 0.15908 0.10001 18.09533 13.29601 0.06499 57.84542 1.00000 0.99999 1 0 4.03337 0.00442
80 100 0.10002 0.43144 0.15908 0.10001 20.52368 10.43367 0.06713 69.75615 1.00000 1.00000 1 0 3.45843 0.00466
100 1 0.10007 0.47504 0.15908 0.10001 26.18147 7.07419 0.08587 21.11041 1.00000 0.99999 1 0 2.65485 0.00528
100 20 0.10010 0.45033 0.15908 0.10001 24.42330 9.59038 0.08505 31.29997 1.00000 0.99999 1 0 3.36219 0.00534
100 40 0.10008 0.41703 0.15908 0.10001 21.92180 13.56135 0.08269 41.31703 0.99999 0.99999 1 0 4.30100 0.00530
100 60 0.10019 0.46617 0.15908 0.10001 26.57739 8.26838 0.08565 53.38636 1.00000 0.99999 1 0 3.03280 0.00559
100 80 0.10009 0.44516 0.15908 0.10001 25.46733 10.75022 0.08479 63.64005 0.99999 0.99999 1 0 3.71288 0.00565
100 100 0.10003 0.40331 0.15908 0.10001 22.61916 16.62002 0.08123 72.30677 1.00000 0.99999 1 0 5.04171 0.00552
Table A.30: Scenario 2 (pB2 = ˜pB2 , pO2 = 0.10001,ξB2 = 1,ξO2 = 0)
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Cons. Cons. Price Price Price Price Cons. Cons. Cons. Cons. Eff. Eff. Eff. Eff. Profit Profit
Off. On. Off. F1 On. F1 Off. F2 On. F2 Off. F1 On. F1 Off. F2 On. F2 Off. F1 On. F1 Off. F2 On. F2 F1 F2
1 1 0.10016 0.24474 0.10001 0.33647 0.08457 0.28954 0.07401 0.10493 0.99997 0.99996 0 1 0.04192 0.02481
1 20 0.18656 0.25898 0.10001 0.33647 0.31926 4.21812 1.36168 1.79158 0.99989 0.99985 0 1 0.69804 0.42367
1 40 0.18914 0.25561 0.10001 0.33647 0.58947 8.62555 2.53547 3.34846 0.99983 0.99982 0 1 1.39382 0.79183
1 60 0.18980 0.25756 0.10001 0.33647 0.87951 12.77113 3.76048 4.90266 0.99985 0.99977 0 1 2.09016 1.15936
1 80 0.18593 0.25613 0.10001 0.33647 1.28898 17.15089 4.92633 6.45033 0.99964 0.99967 0 1 2.78446 1.52535
1 100 0.19045 0.25681 0.10001 0.33647 1.43725 21.39007 6.14337 8.01157 0.99981 0.99980 0 1 3.48181 1.89455
20 1 0.10010 0.31526 0.10001 0.33647 0.73676 1.41632 0.73551 1.10495 0.99989 0.99988 0 1 0.30487 0.26129
20 20 0.10024 0.24795 0.10001 0.33647 1.72226 5.66781 1.51174 2.12217 0.99995 0.99993 0 1 0.83882 0.50184
20 40 0.12704 0.24893 0.10001 0.33647 2.03101 9.45257 3.77461 5.40496 0.99994 0.99990 0 1 1.46242 1.27814
20 60 0.14959 0.24740 0.10001 0.33647 1.97718 13.86198 5.63318 8.09974 0.99994 0.99989 0 1 2.14088 1.91539
20 80 0.16055 0.25122 0.10001 0.33647 2.17191 17.86620 7.15388 10.11307 0.99983 0.99978 0 1 2.83171 2.39150
20 100 0.16420 0.25279 0.10001 0.33647 2.53015 22.01783 8.45647 11.81267 0.99990 0.99985 0 1 3.52532 2.79341
40 1 0.10004 0.31500 0.10001 0.33647 1.38704 2.73656 1.38373 2.12029 0.99998 0.99997 0 1 0.58841 0.50140
40 20 0.10009 0.26188 0.10001 0.33647 2.27722 6.71249 2.04499 2.83611 0.99997 0.99996 0 1 1.08681 0.67067
40 40 0.10024 0.24795 0.10001 0.33647 3.44452 11.33563 3.02349 4.24435 0.99995 0.99993 0 1 1.67763 1.00369
40 60 0.10238 0.24471 0.10001 0.33647 4.57349 15.68990 4.29201 6.06089 0.99990 0.99985 0 1 2.27972 1.43326
40 80 0.12704 0.24893 0.10001 0.33647 4.06202 18.90513 7.54922 10.80993 0.99994 0.99990 0 1 2.92483 2.55629
40 100 0.14633 0.24812 0.10001 0.33647 3.54149 23.19426 9.95299 14.35480 0.99995 0.99991 0 1 3.59923 3.39456
60 1 0.10003 0.32299 0.10001 0.33647 2.16522 3.91805 2.16478 3.33895 0.99999 0.99998 0 1 0.87374 0.78958
60 20 0.10012 0.27535 0.10001 0.33647 2.93083 7.67469 2.71069 3.74682 0.99993 0.99989 0 1 1.34572 0.88603
60 40 0.10015 0.26068 0.10001 0.33647 4.11497 11.95416 3.66057 5.02148 0.99996 0.99994 0 1 1.92129 1.18746
60 60 0.10026 0.24809 0.10001 0.33647 5.16951 16.98678 4.54132 6.37334 0.99998 0.99997 0 1 2.51681 1.50714
60 80 0.10065 0.24451 0.10001 0.33647 6.36743 21.55037 5.63254 7.94803 0.99992 0.99988 0 1 3.11737 1.87952
60 100 0.11180 0.24444 0.10001 0.33647 6.49015 25.35609 8.19546 11.74142 0.99969 0.99966 0 1 3.72775 2.77656
80 1 0.10003 0.32431 0.10001 0.33647 2.88598 5.16261 2.88790 4.47121 0.99998 0.99997 0 1 1.15813 1.05733
80 20 0.10008 0.29275 0.10001 0.33647 3.80112 8.35204 3.60315 4.95786 0.99996 0.99996 0 1 1.61003 1.17241
80 40 0.10009 0.26188 0.10001 0.33647 4.55444 13.42499 4.08999 5.67222 0.99997 0.99996 0 1 2.17362 1.34134
80 60 0.10015 0.25530 0.10001 0.33647 5.78341 17.76586 5.11150 7.08162 0.99993 0.99990 0 1 2.75914 1.67463
80 80 0.10024 0.24795 0.10001 0.33647 6.88904 22.67125 6.04697 8.48870 0.99995 0.99993 0 1 3.35526 2.00737
80 100 0.10057 0.24342 0.10001 0.33647 8.00121 27.54980 7.07539 10.03348 0.99996 0.99992 0 1 3.95494 2.37268
100 1 0.10006 0.32620 0.10001 0.33647 3.63372 6.37437 3.64482 5.65660 0.99995 0.99995 0 1 1.44200 1.33765
100 20 0.10007 0.29670 0.10001 0.33647 4.45384 9.57443 4.26686 5.95223 0.99997 0.99995 0 1 1.88349 1.40756
100 40 0.10011 0.26919 0.10001 0.33647 5.19930 14.36341 4.74293 6.55343 0.99995 0.99988 0 1 2.43017 1.54973
100 60 0.10008 0.26076 0.10001 0.33647 6.38364 18.71248 5.68076 7.82850 0.99998 0.99999 0 1 3.00862 1.85125
100 80 0.10017 0.25364 0.10001 0.33647 7.50738 23.41235 6.62132 9.19776 0.99999 0.99997 0 1 3.59841 2.17505
100 100 0.10027 0.25259 0.10001 0.33647 8.85036 27.46572 7.77533 10.75395 0.99998 0.99991 0 1 4.19297 2.54305
Table A.31: Scenario 3 (pB2 = 0.10001, pO2 = ˜pO2 ,ξB2 = 0,ξO2 = 1)
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Cons. Cons. Price Price Price Price Cons. Cons. Cons. Cons. Eff. Eff. Eff. Eff. Profit Profit
Off. On. Off. F1 On. F1 Off. F2 On. F2 Off. F1 On. F1 Off. F2 On. F2 Off. F1 On. F1 Off. F2 On. F2 F1 F2
1 1 0.10010 0.34137 0.15908 0.10001 0.10705 0.30838 0.01585 0.50893 0.88288 1.00000 0 1 0.07443 0.00094
1 20 0.66231 0.33558 0.15908 0.10001 0 2.45004 0.42532 10.05393 0.99170 0.98743 0 1 0.57649 0.02523
1 40 0.71083 0.33588 0.15908 0.10001 0.00065 4.89312 0.84707 19.90537 0.98942 0.98833 0 1 1.15286 0.05025
1 60 0.57936 0.33695 0.15908 0.10001 0.00035 7.30751 1.26823 29.78769 0.98497 0.98999 0 1 1.72930 0.07523
1 80 0.64751 0.33639 0.15908 0.10001 0.00005 9.76618 1.70114 39.62547 0.98926 0.98501 0 1 2.30578 0.10090
1 100 0.66360 0.33688 0.15908 0.10001 0.00017 12.18340 2.12648 49.50493 0.98742 0.98977 0 1 2.88223 0.12613
20 1 0.10005 0.38373 0.15908 0.10001 3.21929 2.84011 0.03774 1.25626 0.99995 0.99994 0 1 0.80591 0.00224
20 20 0.10007 0.33146 0.15908 0.10001 3.09779 5.35135 0.41832 10.27826 0.99995 0.99993 0 1 1.23872 0.02482
20 40 0.10010 0.29712 0.15908 0.10001 3.05314 8.64476 0.50760 19.18417 0.99996 0.99994 0 1 1.70425 0.03018
20 60 0.10009 0.29322 0.15908 0.10001 3.60673 11.10255 0.70803 28.45713 0.99999 0.99999 0 1 2.14556 0.04212
20 80 0.10010 0.30202 0.15908 0.10001 4.59722 12.61820 1.10143 38.27767 0.99999 0.99998 0 1 2.54957 0.06546
20 100 0.10018 0.28579 0.15908 0.10001 4.58036 16.39793 1.01918 46.74404 0.99999 0.99998 0 1 3.04737 0.06068
40 1 0.10003 0.46984 0.15908 0.10001 9.46026 2.52751 0.05494 3.10882 1.00000 1.00000 0 1 0.93510 0.00328
40 20 0.10003 0.40872 0.15908 0.10001 8.33355 5.36186 0.70717 12.30043 0.99999 0.99999 0 1 1.65556 0.04190
40 40 0.10007 0.33146 0.15908 0.10001 6.19559 10.70270 0.83663 20.55652 0.99995 0.99993 0 1 2.47744 0.04964
40 60 0.10004 0.32274 0.15908 0.10001 6.64844 13.02739 1.12497 30.00712 0.99998 0.99997 0 1 2.90196 0.06677
40 80 0.10010 0.29712 0.15908 0.10001 6.10629 17.28953 1.01520 38.36834 0.99996 0.99994 0 1 3.40850 0.06036
40 100 0.10008 0.33860 0.15908 0.10001 9.18298 14.81993 2.25015 50.40479 0.99998 0.99998 0 1 3.53665 0.13345
60 1 0.10008 0.46221 0.15908 0.10001 13.78363 4.15256 0.06506 4.23791 1.00000 0.99999 0 1 1.50517 0.00389
60 20 0.10019 0.46757 0.15908 0.10001 14.93051 4.17798 0.71026 14.75635 1.00000 1.00000 0 1 1.53851 0.04211
60 40 0.10007 0.39176 0.15908 0.10001 12.04319 9.66152 1.33067 23.12117 1.00000 0.99999 0 1 2.81966 0.07885
60 60 0.10007 0.33146 0.15908 0.10001 9.29338 16.05405 1.25495 30.83478 0.99995 0.99993 0 1 3.71616 0.07445
60 80 0.10124 0.46180 0.15908 0.10001 17.26995 5.46381 2.79583 47.36805 0.99999 0.99998 0 1 1.99822 0.16566
60 100 0.10008 0.29714 0.15908 0.10001 8.48700 23.74317 1.27078 48.12966 0.99996 0.99994 0 1 4.68110 0.07556
80 1 0.10007 0.38022 0.15908 0.10001 12.45790 11.47609 0.05498 3.39815 0.99999 0.99999 0 1 3.21667 0.00328
80 20 0.10012 0.47078 0.15908 0.10001 19.80751 5.25280 0.71473 16.12616 0.99999 0.99999 0 1 1.94999 0.04239
80 40 0.10003 0.40872 0.15908 0.10001 16.66711 10.72372 1.41435 24.60085 0.99999 0.99999 0 1 3.31112 0.08381
80 60 0.10003 0.40744 0.15908 0.10001 17.63221 11.55916 2.10003 35.06034 1.00000 0.99999 0 1 3.55428 0.12443
80 80 0.10007 0.33146 0.15908 0.10001 12.39117 21.40541 1.67327 41.11304 0.99995 0.99993 0 1 4.95488 0.09927
80 100 0.10008 0.31049 0.15908 0.10001 11.36566 26.05418 1.58309 49.42938 0.99997 0.99996 0 1 5.48479 0.09403
100 1 0.10004 0.34508 0.15908 0.10001 12.39661 17.52836 0.04622 3.18342 0.99998 0.99998 0 1 4.29626 0.00276
100 20 0.10012 0.46068 0.15908 0.10001 23.73719 7.35703 0.74164 17.01667 1.00000 0.99999 0 1 2.65636 0.04399
100 40 0.10152 0.47369 0.15908 0.10001 24.85695 6.46302 1.39138 28.52628 0.99999 0.99999 0 1 2.45307 0.08249
100 60 0.10340 0.47742 0.15908 0.10001 24.94051 6.33138 2.04693 39.72032 0.99999 0.99999 0 1 2.47443 0.12134
100 80 0.10045 0.47573 0.15908 0.10001 27.52518 6.87705 2.70130 50.64724 0.99999 0.99999 0 1 2.59634 0.16011
100 100 0.10007 0.33146 0.15908 0.10001 15.48897 26.75676 2.09158 51.39130 0.99995 0.99993 0 1 6.19360 0.12409
Table A.32: Scenario 4 (pB2 = ˜pB2 , pO2 = 0.10001,ξB2 = 0,ξO2 = 1)
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Cons. Cons Cons. Cons. N-S N-S Ex. Off. F2 On. F2 On. F1 On. Ex. F1 N-S N-S Ex. On. F2 Off. F2 Off. F1 Off. Ex. F1
Off. On. Off. F1 On. F1 Offline Offline Off. F1 Off. F1 Off. F1 Off. F1 Online Online On. F1 On. F1 On. F1 On. F1
1 1 0.09010 0.47851 0.05919 0 0 0.00000 0.01920 0.01172 0.07890 0.04817 0 0.17571 0.17573 0
1 20 0.12087 4.82228 0.01084 0 0 0.00001 0.05221 0.05780 2.18855 2.42290 0 0.10666 0.10418 0
1 40 0.11016 9.39749 0.00598 0 0 0.00003 0.04978 0.05438 4.41908 4.82702 0 0.07783 0.07357 0
1 60 0.03590 13.84193 0.00232 0 0 0.00004 0.01622 0.01732 6.65230 7.10104 0 0.04713 0.04146 0
1 80 0.03431 18.58477 0.00203 0 0 0.00005 0.01549 0.01673 8.89504 9.60646 0 0.04454 0.03873 0
1 100 0.00101 23.01409 0.00057 0 0 0.00007 0.00018 0.00019 11.11197 11.86067 0 0.02346 0.01800 0
20 1 1.63989 6.25162 1.60842 0 0 0.00000 0.02593 0.00554 0.05864 0.01252 0 3.08997 3.09050 0
20 20 1.80204 9.57027 1.18373 0 0 0.00001 0.38391 0.23438 1.57806 0.96341 0 3.51423 3.51457 0
20 40 1.91831 14.61996 0.90955 0 0 0.00003 0.53388 0.47486 3.73353 3.32079 0 3.78253 3.78312 0
20 60 2.17077 19.46098 0.82235 0 0 0.00004 0.67725 0.67112 5.88494 5.83168 0 3.87202 3.87234 0
20 80 2.39322 24.54477 0.76190 0 0 0.00005 0.79080 0.84047 8.09499 8.60349 0 3.92290 3.92339 0
20 100 2.71766 29.13921 0.74369 0 0 0.00007 0.94726 1.02665 10.20747 11.06306 0 3.93404 3.93464 0
40 1 3.51636 11.86847 3.48666 0 0 0.00000 0.02741 0.00229 0.05290 0.00442 0 5.90457 5.90657 0
40 20 3.44064 15.12376 2.79299 0 0 0.00001 0.45940 0.18823 1.36557 0.55953 0 6.59872 6.59994 0
40 40 3.60407 19.14055 2.36745 0 0 0.00003 0.76783 0.46876 3.15612 1.92683 0 7.02846 7.02915 0
40 60 3.55601 24.73400 1.94318 0 0 0.00004 0.88495 0.72784 5.40193 4.44293 0 7.44407 7.44506 0
40 80 3.83663 29.23992 1.81911 0 0 0.00005 1.06775 0.94971 7.46705 6.64158 0 7.56506 7.56623 0
40 100 4.13572 33.79691 1.73739 0 0 0.00007 1.23886 1.15941 9.55635 8.94348 0 7.64808 7.64899 0
60 1 5.20825 17.87569 5.17828 0 0 0.00000 0.02724 0.00273 0.05360 0.00536 0 8.90688 8.90986 0
60 20 4.95285 21.39976 4.30519 0 0 0.00001 0.47128 0.17637 1.32942 0.49752 0 9.78555 9.78727 0
60 40 4.93260 25.64725 3.67640 0 0 0.00003 0.80008 0.45609 3.06945 1.74975 0 10.41323 10.41483 0
60 60 5.40611 28.71082 3.55118 0 0 0.00004 1.15174 0.70315 4.73417 2.89024 0 10.54268 10.54372 0
60 80 5.46929 33.71466 3.16617 0 0 0.00005 1.32694 0.97613 6.84452 5.03498 0 10.91669 10.91847 0
60 100 5.53407 39.02987 2.87715 0 0 0.00007 1.44799 1.20886 9.06607 7.56885 0 11.19641 11.19855 0
80 1 6.61038 24.48427 6.57932 0 0 0.00000 0.02636 0.00470 0.05704 0.01018 0 12.20728 12.20977 0
80 20 6.74618 26.95818 6.10478 0 0 0.00001 0.49766 0.14372 1.24431 0.35935 0 12.67526 12.67926 0
80 40 6.88128 30.24752 5.58598 0 0 0.00003 0.91880 0.37647 2.73114 1.11906 0 13.19744 13.19988 0
80 60 6.75386 35.13550 4.87404 0 0 0.00004 1.19182 0.68795 4.62721 2.67095 0 13.91794 13.91941 0
80 80 7.20814 38.28109 4.73490 0 0 0.00005 1.53566 0.93753 6.31223 3.85365 0 14.05691 14.05830 0
80 100 7.42017 42.62028 4.43981 0 0 0.00007 1.77165 1.20865 8.27370 5.64444 0 14.35041 14.35174 0
100 1 8.09732 30.90937 8.06592 0 0 0.00000 0.02599 0.00541 0.05840 0.01216 0 15.41769 15.42111 0
100 20 8.28659 33.27885 7.64537 0 0 0.00001 0.49825 0.14296 1.24274 0.35657 0 15.83832 15.84122 0
100 40 8.41917 36.44465 7.12317 0 0 0.00003 0.93610 0.35987 2.67912 1.02995 0 16.36666 16.36892 0
100 60 8.30946 40.86848 6.39638 0 0 0.00004 1.26059 0.65245 4.43598 2.29596 0 17.06557 17.07097 0
100 80 8.61392 44.46668 6.10536 0 0 0.00005 1.59302 0.91548 6.15889 3.53940 0 17.38325 17.38516 0
100 100 9.01018 47.85137 5.91863 0 0 0.00007 1.91957 1.17191 7.89029 4.81707 0 17.57114 17.57287 0
Table A.33: Consumer Drift Scenario 1 (pB2 = 0.10001, pO2 = ˜pO2 ,ξB2 = 1,ξO2 = 0)
A
.3
.
D
IG
ITA
L
CA
M
ERA
S
217
Cons. Cons Cons. Cons. N-S N-S Ex. Off. F2 On. F2 On. F1 On. Ex. F1 N-S N-S Ex. On. F2 Off. F2 Off. F1 Off. Ex. F1
Off. On. Off. F1 On. F1 Offline Offline Off. F1 Off. F1 Off. F1 Off. F1 Online Online On. F1 On. F1 On. F1 On. F1
1 1 0.22619 0.16620 0.01814 0.17516 0 0.00045 0.03245 0 0.02311 0 0 0.01027 0.01246 0.12036
1 20 0.01555 2.93346 0.00003 0.00000 0 0.01481 0.00071 0 2.93011 0 0 0.00248 0.00087 0.00000
1 40 0.03160 5.92272 0.00004 0.00000 0 0.02993 0.00163 0 5.91912 0 0 0.00264 0.00096 0.00000
1 60 0.00000 8.84230 0.00000 0.00000 0 0.00000 0.00000 0 8.84169 0 0 0.00055 0.00006 0.00000
1 80 0.07749 11.72529 0.00008 0.00000 0 0.06013 0.01728 0 11.72022 0 0 0.00353 0.00154 0.00000
1 100 0.07159 14.68461 0.00001 0.00000 0 0.07158 0.00001 0 14.68267 0 0 0.00154 0.00040 0.00000
20 1 5.14729 1.47121 0.48377 4.64374 0 0.00032 0.01945 0 0.00580 0 0 0.13182 0.12582 1.20777
20 20 4.52383 3.32400 0.36273 3.50316 0 0.00903 0.64891 0 0.46214 0 0 0.20536 0.24926 2.40725
20 40 4.36848 5.91354 0.26976 2.60525 0 0.02249 1.47098 0 2.01463 0 0 0.25152 0.34223 3.30516
20 60 3.77696 10.88036 0.17545 1.69207 0 0.04264 1.86681 0 5.94788 0 0 0.29223 0.43594 4.20432
20 80 4.47457 12.68610 0.17833 1.72054 0 0.05643 2.51927 0 7.78171 0 0 0.29111 0.43325 4.18004
20 100 3.67054 19.16789 0.12653 1.22111 0 0.08202 2.24088 0 13.69122 0 0 0.31117 0.48500 4.68050
40 1 10.45031 2.82628 0.98091 9.45023 0 0.00032 0.01885 0 0.00537 0 0 0.25669 0.24113 2.32308
40 20 10.23033 2.99283 0.94871 8.89000 0 0.00648 0.38515 0 0.11676 0 0 0.26262 0.25201 2.36145
40 40 9.04766 6.64800 0.72546 7.00631 0 0.01807 1.29782 0 0.92427 0 0 0.41072 0.49851 4.81450
40 60 10.10423 6.23542 0.77608 7.49010 0 0.02547 1.81258 0 1.08745 0 0 0.38296 0.44737 4.31764
40 80 8.73696 11.82707 0.53952 5.21051 0 0.04498 2.94196 0 4.02926 0 0 0.50304 0.68446 6.61032
40 100 7.01377 19.57294 0.35628 3.44003 0 0.07061 3.14686 0 9.74781 0 0 0.58250 0.86741 8.37522
60 1 15.30071 4.52064 1.44123 13.83928 0 0.00033 0.01987 0 0.00609 0 0 0.40247 0.38785 3.72424
60 20 13.94277 4.62206 1.35193 12.18229 0 0.00665 0.40189 0 0.13502 0 0 0.41106 0.40715 3.66884
60 40 14.26094 7.55053 1.23165 11.89218 0 0.01605 1.12106 0 0.57768 0 0 0.53660 0.60403 5.83222
60 60 13.57150 9.97201 1.08819 10.50947 0 0.02710 1.94673 0 1.38641 0 0 0.61608 0.74777 7.22175
60 80 15.43709 8.04886 1.23673 11.94051 0 0.03197 2.22788 0 1.13459 0 0 0.53361 0.59885 5.78181
60 100 10.00276 22.05229 0.61135 5.90254 0 0.06602 3.42286 0 8.16686 0 0 0.84198 1.22417 11.81928
80 1 20.94421 5.67092 1.96396 18.96103 0 0.00032 0.01890 0 0.00539 0 0 0.51445 0.48347 4.66762
80 20 21.01903 5.83840 1.94667 18.68412 0 0.00643 0.38181 0 0.11112 0 0 0.51920 0.49142 4.71666
80 40 20.46067 5.98567 1.89742 17.78000 0 0.01295 0.77030 0 0.23352 0 0 0.52523 0.50401 4.72291
80 60 19.30759 9.99497 1.65413 15.96723 0 0.02389 1.66234 0 0.83884 0 0 0.70831 0.79301 7.65482
80 80 18.09533 13.29601 1.45092 14.01263 0 0.03613 2.59564 0 1.84854 0 0 0.82144 0.99703 9.62901
80 100 20.52368 10.43367 1.66370 16.07087 0 0.03960 2.74950 0 1.36667 0 0 0.70346 0.78459 7.57894
100 1 26.18145 7.07419 2.45580 23.70645 0 0.00032 0.01888 0 0.00538 0 0 0.64230 0.60325 5.82328
100 20 24.42326 9.59039 2.24808 21.69281 0 0.00723 0.47513 0 0.18587 0 0 0.77686 0.81015 7.81751
100 40 21.92178 13.56135 1.94311 18.75533 0 0.01696 1.20638 0 0.72102 0 0 0.95589 1.11568 10.76877
100 60 26.57738 8.26838 2.38048 22.94108 0 0.02005 1.23576 0 0.39521 0 0 0.69043 0.67525 6.50749
100 80 25.46727 10.75024 2.20230 21.25204 0 0.02966 1.98327 0 0.82871 0 0 0.80507 0.85601 8.26045
100 100 22.61916 16.62001 1.81365 17.51578 0 0.04517 3.24456 0 2.31068 0 0 1.02680 1.24628 12.03626
Table A.34: Consumer Drift Scenario 2 (pB2 = ˜pB2 , pO2 = 0.10001,ξB2 = 1,ξO2 = 0)
218
A
PPEN
D
IX
A
.
D
ETA
ILED
TA
BLES
Cons. Cons Cons. Cons. N-S N-S Ex. Off. F2 On. F2 On. F1 On. Ex. F1 N-S N-S Ex. On. F2 Off. F2 Off. F1 Off. Ex. F1
Off. On. Off. F1 On. F1 Offline Offline Off. F1 Off. F1 Off. F1 Off. F1 Online Online On. F1 On. F1 On. F1 On. F1
1 1 0.08456 0.28953 0.01699 0 0 0.04417 0.01231 0.01109 0.10968 0.09874 0 0.00000 0.08111 0
1 20 0.31863 4.21828 0.00087 0 0 0.27347 0.02542 0.01887 2.41437 1.79303 0 0.00000 0.01089 0
1 40 0.58708 8.62597 0.00074 0 0 0.51974 0.03743 0.02917 4.84213 3.77367 0 0.00000 0.01017 0
1 60 0.87597 12.77221 0.00074 0 0 0.76940 0.06020 0.04563 7.25914 5.50311 0 0.00000 0.00996 0
1 80 1.26850 17.15890 0.00086 0 0 1.10616 0.09104 0.07044 9.66808 7.47972 0 0.00000 0.01110 0
1 100 1.43063 21.39166 0.00071 0 0 1.26558 0.09304 0.07129 12.10586 9.27601 0 0.00000 0.00979 0
20 1 0.73655 1.41619 0.64998 0 0 0.04419 0.03574 0.00663 0.08625 0.01600 0 0.00001 1.31393 0
20 20 1.72219 5.66755 0.35042 0 0 0.88279 0.26231 0.22668 2.17747 1.88168 0 0.00001 1.60839 0
20 40 2.02995 9.45231 0.14914 0 0 1.33866 0.29256 0.24959 4.58700 3.91333 0 0.00000 0.95198 0
20 60 1.97596 13.86197 0.06526 0 0 1.50899 0.21478 0.18693 7.10456 6.18339 0 0.00000 0.57402 0
20 80 2.16429 17.86786 0.04498 0 0 1.71367 0.22194 0.18370 9.53718 7.89411 0 0.00000 0.43657 0
20 100 2.52803 22.01725 0.03981 0 0 2.02427 0.25628 0.20766 11.94262 9.67711 0 0.00000 0.39752 0
40 1 1.38686 2.73624 1.30029 0 0 0.04422 0.03565 0.00670 0.08633 0.01622 0 0.00001 2.63367 0
40 20 2.27713 6.71222 0.80993 0 0 0.88405 0.34074 0.24241 2.09904 1.49333 0 0.00001 3.11984 0
40 40 3.44438 11.33510 0.70083 0 0 1.76558 0.52462 0.45335 4.35494 3.76336 0 0.00001 3.21679 0
40 60 4.57185 15.68702 0.63469 0 0 2.59586 0.70573 0.63556 6.61361 5.95603 0 0.00001 3.11737 0
40 80 4.05990 18.90462 0.29828 0 0 2.67731 0.58512 0.49919 9.17400 7.82665 0 0.00001 1.90396 0
40 100 3.53970 23.19427 0.14867 0 0 2.63000 0.40868 0.35235 11.79022 10.16526 0 0.00001 1.23878 0
60 1 2.16483 3.91734 2.07727 0 0 0.04423 0.03881 0.00452 0.08316 0.00969 0 0.00002 3.82448 0
60 20 2.93053 7.67385 1.38000 0 0 0.88370 0.42466 0.24217 2.01512 1.14916 0 0.00002 4.50956 0
60 40 4.11479 11.95342 1.19829 0 0 1.76705 0.66659 0.48286 4.21297 3.05173 0 0.00002 4.68871 0
60 60 5.16937 16.98639 1.05236 0 0 2.64803 0.78868 0.68030 6.53066 5.63327 0 0.00002 4.82244 0
60 80 6.36698 21.54886 1.00166 0 0 3.51755 0.97103 0.87674 8.78809 7.93476 0 0.00002 4.82600 0
60 100 6.46085 25.33043 0.70476 0 0 3.94437 0.95170 0.86002 11.24720 10.16374 0 0.00001 3.91947 0
80 1 2.88547 5.16175 2.79778 0 0 0.04423 0.03934 0.00412 0.08263 0.00866 0 0.00002 5.07044 0
80 20 3.80076 8.35115 2.15594 0 0 0.88410 0.54471 0.21601 1.89507 0.75152 0 0.00002 5.70453 0
80 40 4.55427 13.42445 1.61986 0 0 1.76811 0.68147 0.48482 4.19809 2.98666 0 0.00002 6.23967 0
80 60 5.78302 17.76432 1.51437 0 0 2.65046 0.90772 0.71047 6.41162 5.01838 0 0.00002 6.33429 0
80 80 6.88875 22.67020 1.40167 0 0 3.53115 1.04923 0.90670 8.70989 7.52672 0 0.00002 6.43357 0
80 100 8.00072 27.54872 1.32406 0 0 4.40060 1.18835 1.08771 11.01055 10.07808 0 0.00002 6.46007 0
100 1 3.63300 6.37352 3.54516 0 0 0.04421 0.04009 0.00354 0.08187 0.00723 0 0.00003 6.28439 0
100 20 4.45339 9.57338 2.78997 0 0 0.88421 0.57360 0.20560 1.86618 0.66891 0 0.00003 7.03826 0
100 40 5.19881 14.36188 2.17165 0 0 1.76770 0.77076 0.48869 4.10880 2.60514 0 0.00003 7.64791 0
100 60 6.38337 18.71142 2.00334 0 0 2.65250 1.00231 0.72521 6.31703 4.57061 0 0.00003 7.82375 0
100 80 7.50715 23.41158 1.86148 0 0 3.53378 1.17269 0.93920 8.58644 6.87683 0 0.00003 7.94830 0
100 100 8.84995 27.46428 1.83623 0 0 4.41308 1.43479 1.16585 10.76411 8.74648 0 0.00003 7.95366 0
Table A.35: Consumer Drift Scenario 3 (pB2 = 0.10001, pO2 = ˜pO2 ,ξB2 = 0,ξO2 = 1)
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Cons. Cons Cons. Cons. N-S N-S Ex. Off. F2 On. F2 On. F1 On. Ex. F1 N-S N-S Ex. On. F2 Off. F2 Off. F1 Off. Ex. F1
Off. On. Off. F1 On. F1 Offline Offline Off. F1 Off. F1 Off. F1 Off. F1 Online Online On. F1 On. F1 On. F1 On. F1
1 1 0.10703 0.30839 0.00020 0.07080 0 0 0.03603 0 0.08345 0 0 0.00000 0.00063 0.22431
1 20 0.00000 2.44898 0.00000 0.00000 0 0 0.00000 0 2.44898 0 0 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
1 40 0.00000 4.89182 0.00000 0.00000 0 0 0.00000 0 4.89182 0 0 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
1 60 0.00000 7.30455 0.00000 0.00000 0 0 0.00000 0 7.30455 0 0 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
1 80 0.00000 9.76242 0.00000 0.00000 0 0 0.00000 0 9.76242 0 0 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
1 100 0.00000 12.17783 0.00000 0.00000 0 0 0.00000 0 12.17783 0 0 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
20 1 3.21926 2.84013 0.02767 3.13982 0 0 0.05177 0 0.04756 0 0 0.00000 0.02439 2.76818
20 20 3.09778 5.35131 0.01953 2.21587 0 0 0.86237 0 1.62954 0 0 0.00000 0.03252 3.68925
20 40 3.05311 8.64469 0.01482 1.68095 0 0 1.35734 0 4.38674 0 0 0.00000 0.03721 4.22074
20 60 3.60672 11.10255 0.01434 1.62600 0 0 1.96638 0 6.78734 0 0 0.00000 0.03772 4.27749
20 80 4.59722 12.61817 0.01546 1.75287 0 0 2.82890 0 8.43210 0 0 0.00000 0.03659 4.14949
20 100 4.58034 16.39788 0.01339 1.51849 0 0 3.04845 0 11.98564 0 0 0.00000 0.03858 4.37367
40 1 9.46026 2.52751 0.08225 9.32962 0 0 0.04839 0 0.01473 0 0 0.00000 0.02196 2.49082
40 20 8.33355 5.36186 0.06353 7.20703 0 0 1.06299 0 0.70609 0 0 0.00000 0.04068 4.61508
40 40 6.19555 10.70261 0.03906 4.43175 0 0 1.72475 0 3.25908 0 0 0.00000 0.06503 7.37850
40 60 6.64844 13.02737 0.03659 4.15123 0 0 2.46062 0 5.29308 0 0 0.00000 0.06758 7.66671
40 80 6.10621 17.28937 0.02964 3.36190 0 0 2.71468 0 8.77348 0 0 0.00000 0.07441 8.44148
40 100 9.18299 14.81988 0.04118 4.67047 0 0 4.47134 0 7.61817 0 0 0.00000 0.06294 7.13877
60 1 13.78362 4.15256 0.12004 13.61401 0 0 0.04957 0 0.01665 0 0 0.00000 0.03615 4.09976
60 20 14.93050 4.17798 0.12204 13.83378 0 0 0.97468 0 0.30611 0 0 0.00000 0.03386 3.83801
60 40 12.04318 9.66152 0.08693 9.85971 0 0 2.09654 0 1.73451 0 0 0.00000 0.06928 7.85774
60 60 9.29333 16.05392 0.05859 6.64762 0 0 2.58712 0 4.88862 0 0 0.00000 0.09755 11.06775
60 80 17.26986 5.46383 0.11703 13.19785 0 0 3.95498 0 1.35580 0 0 0.00000 0.03611 4.07192
60 100 8.48688 23.74305 0.04449 5.04747 0 0 3.39492 0 10.96422 0 0 0.00000 0.11165 12.66718
80 1 12.45788 11.47610 0.10843 12.29803 0 0 0.05142 0 0.04948 0 0 0.00000 0.09986 11.32676
80 20 19.80743 5.25282 0.16472 18.67826 0 0 0.96445 0 0.29038 0 0 0.00000 0.04338 4.91907
80 40 16.66711 10.72372 0.12706 14.41407 0 0 2.12598 0 1.41219 0 0 0.00000 0.08136 9.23017
80 60 17.63221 11.55916 0.12622 14.31848 0 0 3.18751 0 2.15256 0 0 0.00000 0.08220 9.32440
80 80 12.39111 21.40523 0.07812 8.86349 0 0 3.44949 0 6.51816 0 0 0.00000 0.13006 14.75700
80 100 11.36555 26.05410 0.06632 7.52330 0 0 3.77594 0 9.81981 0 0 0.00000 0.14186 16.09243
100 1 12.39654 17.52842 0.10792 12.24255 0 0 0.04608 0 0.07153 0 0 0.00000 0.15254 17.30435
100 20 23.73717 7.35703 0.19881 22.54282 0 0 0.99554 0 0.34127 0 0 0.00000 0.06133 6.95443
100 40 24.85693 6.46303 0.20206 22.75354 0 0 1.90133 0 0.56147 0 0 0.00000 0.05195 5.84961
100 60 24.94035 6.33143 0.19686 21.94577 0 0 2.79772 0 0.80665 0 0 0.00000 0.04912 5.47566
100 80 27.52511 6.87707 0.20785 23.53113 0 0 3.78612 0 1.07407 0 0 0.00000 0.05081 5.75219
100 100 15.48889 26.75653 0.09765 11.07937 0 0 4.31187 0 8.14770 0 0 0.00000 0.16258 18.44625
Table A.36: Consumer Drift Scenario 4 (pB2 = ˜pB2 , pO2 = 0.10001,ξB2 = 0,ξO2 = 1)
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Appendix B
Questionnaire
B.1 Internet Usage
1. Wo nutzen Sie das Internet?
 zu Hause
 Bu¨ro / Arbeit
 Schule / Universita¨t
 an o¨ffentlichen Orten (z.B. Internet-Cafe)
 unterwegs
 nie
2. Wie wu¨rden Sie Ihren Internetzugang beschreiben?
 Schmalband (Telefonmodem, ISDN, ...)
 Breitband (Kabelmodem, ADSL, ...)
 keinen
3. Wie viel Zeit sind Sie pro Tag etwa online?
 0-15 Minuten
 16-59 Minuten
 1-2 Stunden
 2-4 Stunden
 4 und mehr Stunden
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4. Wie oft haben Sie im letzten Jahr im Internet eingekauft?
 noch nie
 1-5 Mal
 6-10 Mal
 11-20 Mal
 21 Mal und o¨fter
B.2 Shopping Behaviour
5. Wie viel Zeit verwenden Sie durchschnittlich unter der Woche fu¨r das
Einkaufen (Samstag und Sonntag ausgenommen), sowohl im traditionellen
Handel als auch online (Lebensmittel ausgenommen)?
 0-15 Minuten
 16-59 Minuten
 1-2 Stunden
 2-4 Stunden
 4 und mehr Stunden
6. Wie viel Zeit verwenden Sie durchschnittlich am Wochenende (nur Sam-
stag und Sonntag) fu¨r das Einkaufen im traditionellen Handel und online
(Lebensmittel ausgenommen)?
 0-15 Minuten
 16-59 Minuten
 1-2 Stunden
 2-4 Stunden
 4 und mehr Stunden
7. Wie hoch scha¨tzen Sie Ihre verfu¨gbare Freizeit unter der Woche (ohne Sam-
stage und Sonntage) ein, d.h. alle freie Zeit, die zum Einkauf genutzt wer-
den kann?
 0-1 Stunde
 2-5 Stunden
 6-10 Stunden
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 11-20 Stunden
 21 und mehr Stunden
8. Wie hoch scha¨tzen Sie Ihre verfu¨gbare Freizeit am Wochenende (nur Sam-
stag und Sonntag) ein, d.h. alle freie Zeit, die zum Einkauf genutzt werden
kann?
 0-1 Stunde
 2-5 Stunden
 6-10 Stunden
 11-20 Stunden
 21 und mehr Stunden
9. Wo haben Sie bereits folgende Produkte gekauft?
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Bu¨cher    
Kleidung    
Parfums    
Versicherungen    
Digitalkamera    
Urlaubsreisen    
Schmuck / Uhren    
B.3 Personality Traits
10. Nun folgen einige Fragen zu Ihrer Perso¨nlichkeit. Bitte beachten Sie, dass
es bei diesen Fragen kein Richtig oder Falsch gibt. Versuchen Sie spontan
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zu antworten.
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Ich bin eher ruhig, reserviert     
Ich bin begeisterungsfa¨hig und kann andere
leicht mitreißen
    
Ich bin eher der ”stille Typ”, zuru¨ckhaltend     
Ich gehe aus mir heraus, bin gesellig     
Ich erledige Aufgaben gru¨ndlich     
Ich bin bequem, neige zur Faulheit     
Ich bin tu¨chtig und arbeite flott     
Ich habe nur wenig ku¨nstlerisches Interesse     
Ich werde leicht deprimiert, niedergeschlagen     
Ich bin entspannt, lasse mich durch Stress
nicht aus der Ruhe bringen
    
Ich mache mir viele Sorgen     
Ich werde leicht nervo¨s und unsicher     
Ich bin vielseitig interessiert     
Ich bin tiefsinnig, denke gerne u¨ber Sachen
nach
    
Ich habe eine aktive Vorstellungskraft, bin
phantasievoll
    
Ich scha¨tze ku¨nstlerische und a¨sthetische
Eindru¨cke
    
Ich kann mich unzuga¨nglich und distanziert
verhalten
    
Ich neige dazu, andere zu kritisieren     
Ich schenke anderen leicht Vertrauen, glaube
an das Gute im Menschen
    
Ich mache Pla¨ne und fu¨hre sie auch durch     
Ich kann mich schroff und abweisend anderen
gegenu¨ber verhalten
    
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B.4 Purchase Behavior
The following questions will be asked for each product individually. Therefore,
only the “Book”-questions are presented.
11. Wie viel geben Sie typischerweise bei einem einzelnen Kauf von Bu¨chern
inklusive der Lieferkosten aus (in ganzen Euro)?
Texteingabe
12. Wie oft kaufen Sie Bu¨cher im Jahr?
 0-2 Mal
 3-5 Mal
 6-10 Mal
 11-20 Mal
 21 Mal und o¨fter
13. Wann haben Sie das letzte Mal Bu¨cher gekauft?
 heute
 gestern
 innerhalb der letzten drei Tage
 innerhalb der letzten Woche
 innerhalb des letzten Monats
 innerhalb des letzten halben Jahres
 vor mehr als einem halben Jahr
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14. Bewerten Sie bitte folgende Fragen zum Kauf von Bu¨chern (um . . . Preis).
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Wenn ich Bu¨cher kaufe, ist die Marke fu¨r mich
wichtig
    
Ich kann die Qualita¨t von Bu¨chern anhand der
Informationen aus dem Internet bestimmen
    
Die Informationen aus dem Internet sind ausre-
ichend, wenn ich Bu¨cher kaufe
    
Attribute (z.B.: Fu¨hlen, Riechen, Struktur), die
ich nicht via Internet pru¨fen kann, sind beim
Kauf von Bu¨chern wichtig
    
Ich fu¨hle einen großen Unterschied zum tradi-
tionellen Handel, wenn ich Bu¨cher im Internet
kaufe
    
Bu¨cher sind mir wichtig     
Bu¨cher bedeuten mir im Vergleich zu anderen
Produkten sehr viel
    
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15. Welche Aussagen gelten typischerweise fu¨r den Einkauf von Bu¨chern (um
. . . Preis)?
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Qualita¨t ist das Wichtigste     
langfristige Anlage (Investition)     
vor dem Kauf erscho¨pfende Informationssuche
notwendig
    
zum Kauf Beratung von Verka¨ufern notwendig     
Bu¨cher braucht man     
kaufe immer das Gleiche, ohne zu Suchen     
geringer Preis     
la¨ngere Suche und Vergleich     
gezielter Einkauf     
Bu¨cher nehme ich einfach mit     
Bu¨cher du¨rfen auch etwas mehr kosten     
Kauf von Bu¨chern macht Spaß     
Bu¨cher braucht man nicht wirklich     
Bu¨cher kaufe ich, um mich selbst zu belohnen     
u¨blicherweise sehr teuer     
Kauf von Bu¨chern geht schnell und einfach vor
sich
    
zum Kauf Empfehlungen von Freunden /
Bekannten notwendig
    
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16. Wichtig beim Kauf von Bu¨chern (um . . . Preis) ist
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Bequemlichkeit     
Eine hohe Anzahl von Alternativen (große
Auswahl)
    
Entspannung     
Preis des Produkts     
Marke     
Kosten des Einkaufs (inklusive Fahrtkosten
etc.)
    
Qualita¨tspru¨fung vor Ort durch mich     
Schnelligkeit der Auswahl     
Symbolik des Produkts (”Was will ich damit
ausdru¨cken?”)
    
Service (beispielsweise Ru¨ck-
gabemo¨glichkeiten)
    
Zahlungsmo¨glichkeiten     
Eigene Erfahrungen mit dem Produkt     
Eigene Erfahrungen mit dem Gescha¨ft / Onli-
neshop
    
Beratung durch Verka¨ufer / Berater     
Name des Gescha¨fts / Onlineshops     
Anonymita¨t     
Spaß / Unterhaltung beim Einkauf     
Sicherheit     
Daru¨ber denke ich nicht nach     
17. Warum haben Sie sich entschieden, Bu¨cher (um . . . Preis) im Internet anstatt
im traditionellen Handel zu kaufen?
Texteingabe
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18. Reihen Sie folgende Attribute nach ihrer Wichtigkeit, weswegen Sie Bu¨cher
(um . . . Preis) im Internet gekauft haben
 Lieferzeit
 Bequemlichkeit (Bestellung von zu Hause, Lieferung)
 Benutzerfreundlichkeit (Navigation, Ladezeiten) der Website
 Lieferungsoptionen (Ort, Versicherung)
 Suche / Information (Vielfalt, Genauigkeit)
 Sicherheit (Zahlung)
 Privatspha¨re / Anonymita¨t
 Bekanntheitsgrad der Website / des Onlineha¨ndlers
 Interaktivita¨t (Forum, FAQ-Listen und andere Auswahlhilfen)
 Ru¨ckgabemo¨glichkeiten
 Qualita¨t des Produkts
 Gro¨ße der Produktauswahl
 Klientel, soziale Einkaufsgruppe (Wer kauft dort sonst noch ein?)
19. Reihen Sie folgende Attribute nach ihrer Wichtigkeit, falls Sie Bu¨cher (um
. . . Preis) im traditionellen Handel kaufen wu¨rden
 Verfu¨gbarkeit, sofortige Mitnahmemo¨glichkeit
 Bekanntheitsgrad des Gescha¨fts / des Ha¨ndlers
 Atmospha¨re im Shop
 Beratung durch Personal
 Gro¨ße der Produktauswahl
 Bequemlichkeit (Parkmo¨glichkeiten, Erreichbarkeit)
 Service (Lieferung, Ru¨ckgabemo¨glichkeiten)
 Klientel, soziale Einkaufsgruppe (Gesellschaftsschicht der anderen Kun-
den)
 Qualita¨t des Produkts
 Sicherheit (Zahlung)
 Privatspha¨re
 Pru¨fungsmo¨glichkeit vor dem Kauf (Fu¨hlen; Riechen; Sehen; Anpro-
bieren; ich weiß, was ich bekomme)
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20. Welchen Preis du¨rfen Bu¨cher (um . . . Preis im Internet) im traditionellen
Handel haben, damit Sie dort kaufen?
Texteingabe
21. Warum haben Sie sich entschieden, Bu¨cher (um . . . Preis) im traditionellen
Handel anstatt im Internet zu kaufen?
Texteingabe
22. Reihen Sie folgende Attribute nach ihrer Wichtigkeit, weswegen Sie Bu¨cher
(um . . . Preis) im traditionellen Handel gekauft haben
 Verfu¨gbarkeit, sofortige Mitnahmemo¨glichkeit
 Bekanntheitsgrad des Gescha¨fts / des Ha¨ndlers
 Atmospha¨re im Shop
 Beratung durch Personal
 Gro¨ße der Produktauswahl
 Bequemlichkeit (Parkmo¨glichkeiten, Erreichbarkeit)
 Service (Lieferung, Ru¨ckgabemo¨glichkeiten)
 Klientel, soziale Einkaufsgruppe (Gesellschaftsschicht der anderen Kun-
den)
 Qualita¨t des Produkts
 Sicherheit (Zahlung)
 Privatspha¨re
 Pru¨fungsmo¨glichkeit vor dem Kauf (Fu¨hlen; Riechen; Sehen; Anpro-
bieren; ich weiß, was ich bekomme)
23. Reihen Sie folgende Attribute nach ihrer Wichtigkeit, falls Sie Bu¨cher (um
. . . Preis) im Internet kaufen wu¨rden
 Lieferzeit
 Bequemlichkeit (Bestellung von zu Hause, Lieferung)
 Benutzerfreundlichkeit (Navigation, Ladezeiten) der Website
 Lieferungsoptionen (Ort, Versicherung)
 Suche / Information (Vielfalt, Genauigkeit)
 Sicherheit (Zahlung)
 Privatspha¨re / Anonymita¨t
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 Bekanntheitsgrad der Website / des Onlineha¨ndlers
 Interaktivita¨t (Forum, FAQ-Listen und andere Auswahlhilfen)
 Ru¨ckgabemo¨glichkeiten
 Qualita¨t des Produkts
 Gro¨ße der Produktauswahl
 Klientel, soziale Einkaufsgruppe (Wer kauft dort sonst noch ein?)
24. Welchen Preis du¨rfen Bu¨cher (um . . . Preis im traditionellen Handel) im
Internet haben, damit Sie dort kaufen (inklusive Lieferkosten)?
Texteingabe
25. Wo kaufen Sie Bu¨cher am liebsten ein?
 Onlineshop
 Traditioneller Handel
26. Warum kaufen Sie Bu¨cher (um . . . Preis) lieber im Internet anstatt im tradi-
tionellen Handel?
Texteingabe
27. Warum kaufen Sie Bu¨cher (um . . . Preis) lieber im traditionellen Handel
anstatt im Internet?
Texteingabe
28. Reihen Sie folgende Attribute nach ihrer Wichtigkeit, weswegen Sie Bu¨cher
(um . . . Preis) lieber im traditionellen Handel kaufen
 Verfu¨gbarkeit, sofortige Mitnahmemo¨glichkeit
 Bekanntheitsgrad des Gescha¨fts / des Ha¨ndlers
 Atmospha¨re im Shop
 Beratung durch Personal
 Gro¨ße der Produktauswahl
 Bequemlichkeit (Parkmo¨glichkeiten, Erreichbarkeit)
 Service (Lieferung, Ru¨ckgabemo¨glichkeiten)
 Klientel, soziale Einkaufsgruppe (Gesellschaftsschicht der anderen Kun-
den)
 Qualita¨t des Produkts
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 Sicherheit (Zahlung)
 Privatspha¨re
 Pru¨fungsmo¨glichkeit vor dem Kauf (Fu¨hlen; Riechen; Sehen; Anpro-
bieren; ich weiß, was ich bekomme)
29. Reihen Sie folgende Attribute nach ihrer Wichtigkeit, weswegen Sie Bu¨cher
(um . . . Preis) lieber im Internet kaufen
 Lieferzeit
 Bequemlichkeit (Bestellung von zu Hause, Lieferung)
 Benutzerfreundlichkeit (Navigation, Ladezeiten) der Website
 Lieferungsoptionen (Ort, Versicherung)
 Suche / Information (Vielfalt, Genauigkeit)
 Sicherheit (Zahlung)
 Privatspha¨re / Anonymita¨t
 Bekanntheitsgrad der Website / des Onlineha¨ndlers
 Interaktivita¨t (Forum, FAQ-Listen und andere Auswahlhilfen)
 Ru¨ckgabemo¨glichkeiten
 Qualita¨t des Produkts
 Gro¨ße der Produktauswahl
 Klientel, soziale Einkaufsgruppe (Wer kauft dort sonst noch ein?)
30. Welchen Preis du¨rfen Bu¨cher (um . . . Preis im Internet) im traditionellen
Handel haben, damit Sie dort lieber kaufen?
Texteingabe
31. Welchen Preis du¨rfen Bu¨cher (um . . . Preis im traditionellen Handel) im
Internet haben, damit Sie dort lieber kaufen (inklusive Lieferkosten)?
Texteingabe
B.5 Demographic
32. Alter in Jahren
 0-15 Jahre
 15-19 Jahre
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 20-24 Jahre
 25-29 Jahre
 30-39 Jahre
 40-49 Jahre
 50-59 Jahre
 60-69 Jahre
 70-79 Jahre
 80 Jahre und a¨lter
33. Geschlecht
 ma¨nnlich  weiblich
34. Ho¨chste abgeschlossene Ausbildung
 Pflichtschule
 Lehre
 Fachschule
 AHS / BHS (Matura, Abitur)
 Hochschule (Universita¨t, Fachhochschule)
35. Stellung im Beruf
 Schu¨lerinnen und Schu¨ler / Studentinnen und Studenten
 Lehrling
 Angestellte / Freier Dienstnehmer
 Arbeiterinnen und Arbeiter
 ¨Offentlich Bedienstete
 Selbststa¨ndig ohne Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeiter
 Selbststa¨ndig mit Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeiter
 Pension
 Arbeitslos
36. Wieviele Personen leben sta¨ndig in Ihrem Haushalt, Sie selbst und Kinder
eingeschlossen?
Texteingabe
37. Wie viele Kinder unter 18 Jahren leben in Ihrem Haushalt?
Texteingabe
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38. Familienstand
 ledig
 verheiratet / Lebensgemeinschaft
 geschieden / verwitwet
39. Wohungsumfeld
 la¨ndlicher Raum
 kleinsta¨dtischer Raum
 Großstadt
40. Besitzen Sie ein Auto?
 Ja  Nein
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Sourcecode
1 rm ( l i s t = l s ( ) )
3 z= r e q u i r e ( p l o t r i x )
z= r e q u i r e ( s t a t s )
5 z= r e q u i r e ( m c l u s t )
z= r e q u i r e (MASS)
7 # d e p l o y on d i f f e r e n t machines
l i b r a r y ( e1071 )
9 t a s k i d =as . i n t e g e r ( Sys . getenv ( ”SGE TASK ID ” ) ) # j e d e r k n o t e n
11
# −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
13 # −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
# S I M U L A T I O N S E T U P
15 # −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
# −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
17
# s e t t h e m a r k e t i n g r a n k i n g
19 # f o r a c e r t a i n p r o d u c t
MARKETING = . . .
21
23
DEBUG=TRUE
25 MARKETING NAMES ONLINE=c ( ” l i e f e r z e i t ” , ” b e q u e m l i c h k e i t ” , ” u s a b i l i t y ” , ” l i e f e r o p t i o n e n ” ,
” suche / i n f o ” , ” s i c h e r h e i t ” , ” p r i v a t s h a e r e ” , ”name shop ” ,
27 ” i n t e r a k t i v i t a e t ” , ” r u e c k g a b e m o e g l i c h k e i t ” , ” q u a l i t a e t ” ,
” auswahl ” , ” k l i e n t e l ” )
29 MARKETING ONLINE LEN= l e n g t h (MARKETING NAMES ONLINE)
MARKETING NAMES OFFLINE=c ( ” mitnahme o f f ” , ” name g e s c h a e f t o f f ” , ” a t m o s p h a e r e o f f ” ,
31 ” b e r a t u n g o f f ” , ” auswahl o f f ” , ” b e q u m l i c h k e i t o f f ” ,
” s e r v i c e o f f ” , ” k l i e n t e l o f f ” , ” q u a l i t a e t o f f ” ,
33 ” s i c h e r h e i t o f f ” , ” p r i v a t s h a e r e o f f ” ,
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” p r u e f u n g s m o e g l i c h k e i t e n o f f ” )
35 MARKETING OFFLINE LEN= l e n g t h (MARKETING NAMES OFFLINE )
# sum on ALL m a r k e t i n g a k t i v i t i e s must n o t exeed 1 ( b u d g e t c o n s t r a i n t )
37 MARKETING NAMES=c (MARKETING NAMES OFFLINE ,MARKETING NAMES ONLINE)
names (MARKETING)= c (MARKETING NAMES OFFLINE ,MARKETING NAMES ONLINE)
39 MARKETING OFFLINE=MARKETING[ c ( 1 :MARKETING OFFLINE LEN ) ]
MARKETING ONLINE=MARKETING[ c ( (MARKETING OFFLINE LEN+ 1 ) :
41 (MARKETING OFFLINE LEN+MARKETING ONLINE LEN ) ) ]
MARKETING LEN= l e n g t h (MARKETING)
43
# t o c a l c u l a t e m a r k e t i n g e f f i c i e n c y
45 MARKETING OFFLINE MULTI=MARKETING[ c ( 1 :MARKETING OFFLINE LEN ) ]%*%
MARKETING[ c ( 1 :MARKETING OFFLINE LEN ) ]
47 MARKETING ONLINE MULTI=MARKETING[ c ( (MARKETING OFFLINE LEN+ 1 ) :
(MARKETING OFFLINE LEN+MARKETING ONLINE LEN ) ) ]%*%
49 MARKETING[ c ( (MARKETING OFFLINE LEN+ 1 ) :
(MARKETING OFFLINE LEN+MARKETING ONLINE LEN ) ) ]
51
# w e i g h t o f m a r k e t i n g e f f i c i e n c y on s w i t c h i n g d i s t r i b u t i o n
53 MARKETING SHAPEWEIGHT=4
# w e i g h t o f c h a n n e l p r e f e r e n c e s
55 MARKETING OFFSETWEIGHT=0.2
57 RESERV OFF=c ( o f f p [ 1 ] , o f f p [ 2 ] )
RESERV ON=c ( onp [ 1 ] , onp [ 2 ] )
59
SWITCH ON OFF= l i s t ( ) ; SWITCH OFF ON= l i s t ( )
61 SWITCH ON OFF [ [ 1 ] ] = c ( o n o f f [ 1 ] , o n o f f [ 2 ] ) ;
SWITCH OFF ON[ [ 1 ] ] = c ( o f f o n [ 1 ] , o f f o n [ 2 ] )
63 SWITCH ON OFF [ [ 2 ] ] = c ( o n o f f [ 1 ] , o n o f f [ 2 ] )
SWITCH OFF ON[ [ 2 ] ] = c ( o f f o n [ 1 ] , o f f o n [ 2 ] )
65
# o f f s e t . p e c u n i a r y advan tage o f a c h a n n e l
67 # w i t h i n a f i r m ( i n t r a f i r m )
SWITCH INTRA OFFSET= l i s t ( )
69 SWITCH INTRA OFFSET [ [ 1 ] ] = c ( o f f l i n e compet , o n l i n e compet )
SWITCH INTRA OFFSET [ [ 2 ] ] = c ( o f f l i n e compet , o n l i n e compet )
71
# s w i t c h i n g be tween f i r m 1 and f i r m 2
73 # e q u a l p r i c e s show no e f f e c t
SWITCH F OFF OFF= l i s t ( ) ; SWITCH F ON ON= l i s t ( )
75 SWITCH F OFF OFF [ [ 1 ] ] = c ( 4 , 4 ) ; SWITCH F ON ON[ [ 1 ] ] = c ( 4 , 4 )
SWITCH F OFF OFF [ [ 2 ] ] = c ( 4 , 4 ) ; SWITCH F ON ON[ [ 2 ] ] = c ( 4 , 4 )
77 SWITCH F OFF ON= l i s t ( ) ; SWITCH F ON OFF= l i s t ( )
SWITCH F OFF ON[ [ 1 ] ] = c ( o f f o n [ 1 ] , o f f o n [ 2 ] )
79 SWITCH F ON OFF [ [ 1 ] ] = c ( o n o f f [ 1 ] , o n o f f [ 2 ] )
SWITCH F OFF ON[ [ 2 ] ] = c ( o f f o n [ 1 ] , o f f o n [ 2 ] )
81 SWITCH F ON OFF [ [ 2 ] ] = c ( o n o f f [ 1 ] , o n o f f [ 2 ] )
83 # o f f s e t : p e c u n i a r y advan tage o f a c e r t a i n c h a n n e l
237
# be tween d i f f e r e n t f i r m s
85 SWITCH OFF OFF OFFSET=c ( 0 , 0 )
SWITCH ON ON OFFSET=c ( 0 , 0 )
87 SWITCH OFF ON OFFSET=c ( o f f l i n e compet , o f f l i n e compet )
SWITCH ON OFF OFFSET=c ( o n l i n e compet , o n l i n e compet )
89
# consumer o f f l i n e / o n l i n e
91 CONS=c ( 1 0 0 0 0 ,1 0 0 0 0 )
93 # o f f l i n e / o n l i n e ma rg i n a l c o s t s
COSTS= l i s t ( )
95 COSTS [ [ 1 ] ] = c ( 0 . 1 , 0 . 1 )
COSTS [ [ 2 ] ] = c ( 0 . 1 , 0 . 1 )
97
# e v o l u t i o n a r y s t r a t e g i e s − parame te r
99 ES MU=1000
ES LAMBDA=ES MU * 3
101 ES MUTATIONRATE=0.4
# m u t a t i o n = + /− s t d d e v *ES MUTATIONRANGE
103 ES MUTATIONRANGE=0.5
ES CROSSOVERRATE=0.15
105 # min imal change from one g e n e r a t i o n t o nex t−> i f l ower : s t o p
ES THRESHOLD=0.0001
107 # maximal number o f g e n e r a t i o n i f h i g h e r −> s t o p
ES MAX GENERATIONS=1500
109 # min p r i c e i f p r i c e o f an e l e m e n t u n d e r c u t s 0
ES MINPRICE=0.00001
111 # max p r i c e i f p r i c e o f an e l e m e n t e x c e e d s 1
ES MAXPRICE=0.99999
113
MARKETING MAX INVESTMENT=matrix ( rep ( c (MARKETING OFFLINE ,MARKETING ONLINE ) , ES MU) ,
115 nco l =MARKETING LEN, byrow=T )
MARKETING MAX INVESTMENT2=matrix ( rep ( c (MARKETING OFFLINE ,MARKETING ONLINE ) , ES MU* 4 ) ,
117 nco l =MARKETING LEN, byrow=T )
119 s e t . s e ed ( 2 0 3 9 1 )
121 # ###############################################################################
#
123 # F U N C T I O N S
#
125 # ###############################################################################
# n o r m a l i z e m a r k e t i n g i n v e s t m e n t s t o meet b u d g e t c o n s t r a i n t
127 n o r m a l i z e M a r k e t i n g = f u n c t i o n ( gen ) {
# n o r m a l i z e v a l u e s
129 mark=gen [ , c (MARKETING NAMES) , drop=F ]
mark=mark / ( apply ( mark , 1 , sum ) )
131 # t r u n c o v e r i n v e s t m e n t s ( o v e r i n v e s t m e n t s are LOST )
mark=pmin (MARKETING MAX INVESTMENT[ c ( 1 : dim ( mark ) [ 1 ] ) , ] , mark )
133
238 APPENDIX C. SOURCECODE
gen [ , c (MARKETING NAMES) ] = mark
135 re turn ( gen )
}
137
# c a l c u l a t e consumer base due t o p r i c i n g and m a r k e t i n g
139 ca lcConsumer = f u n c t i o n ( pb , po , pb c , po c , s w i t c h i n g , f i r m ) {
. nno1 = 0 ; . nnb1 =0;
141 . nno2 = 0 ; . nnb2 =0;
. nnb1 c = 0 ; . nno1 c=0
143 . nnb2 c = 0 ; . nno2 c=0
f i r m c= i f e l s e ( f i r m ==1 ,2 ,1 )
145
. o f f l i n e i d =pb<pb c
147 . nnb2= i f e l s e ( . o f f l i n e id ,CONS[ 1 ] *(1−pbeta ( pb , RESERV OFF [ 1 ] , RESERV OFF[2 ] ) ) −
CONS[ 1 ] *(1−pbeta ( pb c , RESERV OFF [ 1 ] , RESERV OFF [ 2 ] ) ) , 0 )
149 . nnb1= i f e l s e ( . o f f l i n e id , ( CONS[ 1 ] *(1−pbeta ( pb c , RESERV OFF [ 1 ] , RESERV OFF [ 2 ] ) ) ) / 2 ,
(CONS[ 1 ] *(1−pbeta ( pb , RESERV OFF [ 1 ] , RESERV OFF [ 2 ] ) ) ) / 2)
151 . nnb1 c= i f e l s e ( . o f f l i n e id , ( CONS[ 1 ] *(1−pbeta ( pb c , RESERV OFF [ 1 ] , RESERV OFF [ 2 ] ) ) ) / 2 ,
(CONS[ 1 ] *(1−pbeta ( pb , RESERV OFF [ 1 ] , RESERV OFF [ 2 ] ) ) ) / 2)
153
. o n l i n e i d =po<po c
155 . nno2= i f e l s e ( . o n l i n e id ,CONS[ 2 ] *(1−pbeta ( po , RESERV ON[ 1 ] , RESERV ON[2] ) ) −CONS[ 2 ] *
(1−pbeta ( po c , RESERV ON[ 1 ] , RESERV ON[ 2 ] ) ) , 0 )
157 . nno1= i f e l s e ( . o n l i n e id , ( CONS[ 2 ] *(1−pbeta ( po c , RESERV ON[ 1 ] , RESERV ON[ 2 ] ) ) ) / 2 ,
(CONS[ 2 ] *(1−pbeta ( po , RESERV ON[ 1 ] , RESERV ON[ 2 ] ) ) ) / 2)
159 . nno1 c= i f e l s e ( . o n l i n e id , ( CONS[ 2 ] *(1−pbeta ( po c , RESERV ON[ 1 ] , RESERV ON[ 2 ] ) ) ) / 2 ,
(CONS[ 2 ] *(1−pbeta ( po , RESERV ON[ 1 ] , RESERV ON[ 2 ] ) ) ) / 2)
161
# p r o b a b i l i t i e s o f NOT−SWITCHING ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
163 . s w i t c h o f f o n =(1−pbeta ( ( pb−po )+ s w i t c h i n g [ [ f i r m ] ] [ [ ” i n t r a o f f s e t ” ] ] [ , ” o f f l i n e ” ] ,
s w i t c h i n g [ [ f i r m ] ] [ [ ” o f f on ” ] ] [ , 1 ] , s w i t c h i n g [ [ f i r m ] ] [ [ ” o f f on ” ] ] [ , 2 ] ) )
165 . s w i t c h o n o f f =(1−pbeta ( ( po−pb )+ s w i t c h i n g [ [ f i r m ] ] [ [ ” i n t r a o f f s e t ” ] ] [ , ” o n l i n e ” ] ,
s w i t c h i n g [ [ f i r m ] ] [ [ ” on o f f ” ] ] [ , 1 ] , s w i t c h i n g [ [ f i r m ] ] [ [ ” on o f f ” ] ] [ , 2 ] ) )
167 . s w i t c h f o f f o f f =1
. s w i t c h f o f f o n =(1−pbeta ( ( pb−po c )+ s w i t c h i n g [ [ f i r m ] ] [ [ ” o f f on o f f s e t ” ] ] ,
169 s w i t c h i n g [ [ f i r m ] ] [ [ ” f o f f on ” ] ] [ , 1 ] , s w i t c h i n g [ [ f i r m ] ] [ [ ” f o f f on ” ] ] [ , 2 ] ) )
. s w i t c h f o n o n =1
171 . s w i t c h f o n o f f =(1−pbeta ( ( po−pb c )+ s w i t c h i n g [ [ f i r m ] ] [ [ ” on o f f o f f s e t ” ] ] ,
s w i t c h i n g [ [ f i r m ] ] [ [ ” f on o f f ” ] ] [ , 1 ] , s w i t c h i n g [ [ f i r m ] ] [ [ ” f on o f f ” ] ] [ , 2 ] ) )
173
# opponen t
175 . s w i t c h o f f o n c=(1−pbeta ( ( pb c−po c )+ s w i t c h i n g [ [ f i r m c ] ] [ [ ” i n t r a o f f s e t ” ] ] [ , ” o f f l i n e ” ] ,
s w i t c h i n g [ [ f i r m c ] ] [ [ ” o f f on ” ] ] [ , 1 ] , s w i t c h i n g [ [ f i r m c ] ] [ [ ” o f f on ” ] ] [ , 2 ] ) )
177 . s w i t c h o n o f f c=(1−pbeta ( ( po c−pb c )+ s w i t c h i n g [ [ f i r m c ] ] [ [ ” i n t r a o f f s e t ” ] ] [ , ” o n l i n e ” ] ,
s w i t c h i n g [ [ f i r m c ] ] [ [ ” on o f f ” ] ] [ , 1 ] , s w i t c h i n g [ [ f i r m c ] ] [ [ ” on o f f ” ] ] [ , 2 ] ) )
179 . s w i t c h f o f f o f f c=1
. s w i t c h f o f f o n c=(1−pbeta ( ( pb c−po )+ s w i t c h i n g [ [ f i r m c ] ] [ [ ” o f f on o f f s e t ” ] ] ,
181 s w i t c h i n g [ [ f i r m c ] ] [ [ ” f o f f on ” ] ] [ , 1 ] , s w i t c h i n g [ [ f i r m c ] ] [ [ ” f o f f on ” ] ] [ , 2 ] ) )
. s w i t c h f o n o n c=1
183 . s w i t c h f o n o f f c=(1−pbeta ( ( po c−pb )+ s w i t c h i n g [ [ f i r m c ] ] [ [ ” on o f f o f f s e t ” ] ] ,
239
s w i t c h i n g [ [ f i r m c ] ] [ [ ” f on o f f ” ] ] [ , 1 ] , s w i t c h i n g [ [ f i r m c ] ] [ [ ” f on o f f ” ] ] [ , 2 ] ) )
185
. nb = . nnb1 * . s w i t c h o f f o n * . s w i t c h f o f f o f f * . s w i t c h f o f f o n +
187 . nnb2 * . s w i t c h o f f o n +
. nnb1 c * . s w i t c h o f f o n c * (1− . s w i t c h f o f f o f f c ) * . s w i t c h f o f f o n c +
189 . nno1 c * . s w i t c h o n o f f c * . s w i t c h f o n o n c * (1− . s w i t c h f o n o f f c ) +
. nno1 * (1− . s w i t c h o n o f f ) * . s w i t c h f o n o n * . s w i t c h f o n o f f +
191 . nno2 * (1− . s w i t c h o n o f f )
193 . no = . nno1 * . s w i t c h o n o f f * . s w i t c h f o n o n * . s w i t c h f o n o f f +
. nno2 * . s w i t c h o n o f f +
195 . nno1 c * . s w i t c h o n o f f c * (1− . s w i t c h f o n o n c ) * . s w i t c h f o n o f f c+
. nnb1 c * . s w i t c h o f f o n c * . s w i t c h f o f f o f f c * (1− . s w i t c h f o f f o n c )+
197 . nnb1 * (1− . s w i t c h o f f o n ) * . s w i t c h f o f f o f f * . s w i t c h f o f f o n +
. nnb2 * (1− . s w i t c h o f f o n )
199
# r e t u r n s one f i r m only , s i n c e opponent ’ s p r i c e s are mean−v a l u e s !
201 re turn ( cbind ( . nb , . no ) )
}
203
# c a l c u l a t e t h e e f f i c i e n c y o f m a r k e t i n g i n v e s t m e n t s
205 c a l c M a r k e t i n g E f f i c i e n c y = f u n c t i o n ( marke t ing , c h a n n e l ) {
i f ( c h a n n e l ==1)
207 re turn (1 /MARKETING OFFLINE MULTI*MARKETING OFFLINE%*%m a r k e t i n g )
e l s e
209 re turn (1 /MARKETING ONLINE MULTI*MARKETING ONLINE%*%m a r k e t i n g )
}
211
# a l t e r s w i t c h i n g p r o b a b i l i t i e s due t o m a r k e t i n g
213 a l t e r P r o b a b i l i t i e s = f u n c t i o n ( gen1 , gen2 ) {
anz t u p e l =dim ( gen1 ) [ 1 ]
215 mark=gen1 [ , c (MARKETING NAMES ONLINE ) , drop=F ]
o p t i m a l o n l i n e 1 =apply ( mark , 1 , c a l c M a r k e t i n g E f f i c i e n c y , 2 )
217 # r e f i n e f o r >1 or NaN
o p t i m a l o n l i n e 1 [ o p t i m a l o n l i n e 1 >1]=1
219
mark=gen1 [ , c (MARKETING NAMES OFFLINE ) , drop=F ]
221 o p t i m a l o f f l i n e 1 =apply ( mark , 1 , c a l c M a r k e t i n g E f f i c i e n c y , 1 )
o p t i m a l o f f l i n e 1 [ o p t i m a l o f f l i n e 1 >1]=1
223
mark=gen2 [ , c (MARKETING NAMES ONLINE ) , drop=F ]
225 o p t i m a l o n l i n e 2 =apply ( mark , 1 , c a l c M a r k e t i n g E f f i c i e n c y , 2 )
o p t i m a l o n l i n e 2 [ o p t i m a l o n l i n e 2 >1]=1
227
mark=gen2 [ , c (MARKETING NAMES OFFLINE ) , drop=F ]
229 o p t i m a l o f f l i n e 2 =apply ( mark , 1 , c a l c M a r k e t i n g E f f i c i e n c y , 1 )
o p t i m a l o f f l i n e 2 [ o p t i m a l o f f l i n e 2 >1]=1
231 MY FRACTION=1
233 s w i t c h i n g = l i s t ( )
240 APPENDIX C. SOURCECODE
s w i t c h i n g [ [ 1 ] ] = l i s t ( )
235 s w i t c h i n g [ [ 1 ] ] [ [ ” o f f on ” ] ] = matrix ( rep ( cbind (SWITCH OFF ON[ [ 1 ] ] [ 1 ] ,
SWITCH OFF ON[ [ 1 ] ] [ 2 ] ) , anz t u p e l ) , nrow=anz t u p e l , byrow=T )
237 s w i t c h i n g [ [ 1 ] ] [ [ ” on o f f ” ] ] = matrix ( rep ( cbind (SWITCH ON OFF [ [ 1 ] ] [ 1 ] ,
SWITCH ON OFF [ [ 1 ] ] [ 2 ] ) , anz t u p e l ) , nrow=anz t u p e l , byrow=T )
239 s w i t c h i n g [ [ 1 ] ] [ [ ” i n t r a o f f s e t ” ] ] = matrix ( rep ( cbind (SWITCH INTRA OFFSET [ [ 1 ] ] [ 1 ] ,
SWITCH INTRA OFFSET [ [ 1 ] ] [ 2 ] ) , anz t u p e l ) , nrow=anz t u p e l , byrow=T )
241 colnames ( s w i t c h i n g [ [ 1 ] ] [ [ ” i n t r a o f f s e t ” ] ] ) = c ( ” o f f l i n e ” , ” o n l i n e ” )
# changes due t o m a r k e t i n g
243 s w i t c h i n g [ [ 1 ] ] [ [ ” o f f on ” ] ] = s w i t c h i n g [ [ 1 ] ] [ [ ” o f f on ” ] ] +
cbind ( o p t i m a l o f f l i n e 1 ,1− o p t i m a l o f f l i n e 1 ) *MARKETING SHAPEWEIGHT
245 s w i t c h i n g [ [ 1 ] ] [ [ ” on o f f ” ] ] = s w i t c h i n g [ [ 1 ] ] [ [ ” on o f f ” ] ] +
cbind ( o p t i m a l o n l i n e 1 ,1− o p t i m a l o n l i n e 1 ) *MARKETING SHAPEWEIGHT
247 s w i t c h i n g [ [ 1 ] ] [ [ ” i n t r a o f f s e t ” ] ] = s w i t c h i n g [ [ 1 ] ] [ [ ” i n t r a o f f s e t ” ] ] +
cbind ((− o p t i m a l o f f l i n e 1 + o p t i m a l o n l i n e 1 ) /MY FRACTION ,
249 ( o p t i m a l o f f l i n e 1 −o p t i m a l o n l i n e 1 ) /MY FRACTION) *MARKETING OFFSETWEIGHT
251 s w i t c h i n g [ [ 1 ] ] [ [ ” f o f f o f f ” ] ] = matrix ( rep ( cbind (SWITCH F OFF OFF [ [ 1 ] ] [ 1 ] ,
SWITCH F OFF OFF [ [ 1 ] ] [ 2 ] ) , anz t u p e l ) , nrow=anz t u p e l , byrow=T )
253
s w i t c h i n g [ [ 1 ] ] [ [ ” f o f f o f f ” ] ] = s w i t c h i n g [ [ 1 ] ] [ [ ” f o f f o f f ” ] ] +
255 cbind ( o p t i m a l o f f l i n e 1 ,1− o p t i m a l o f f l i n e 1 ) *MARKETING SHAPEWEIGHT
257 s w i t c h i n g [ [ 1 ] ] [ [ ” o f f o f f o f f s e t ” ] ] = rep ( cbind (SWITCH OFF OFF OFFSET [ 1 ] ) , anz t u p e l )+
((− o p t i m a l o f f l i n e 1 + o p t i m a l o f f l i n e 2 ) /MY FRACTION) *MARKETING OFFSETWEIGHT
259
s w i t c h i n g [ [ 1 ] ] [ [ ” f on on ” ] ] = matrix ( rep ( cbind (SWITCH F ON ON[ [ 1 ] ] [ 1 ] ,
261 SWITCH F ON ON[ [ 1 ] ] [ 2 ] ) , anz t u p e l ) , nrow=anz t u p e l , byrow=T )
s w i t c h i n g [ [ 1 ] ] [ [ ” f on on ” ] ] = s w i t c h i n g [ [ 1 ] ] [ [ ” f on on ” ] ] +
263 cbind ( o p t i m a l o n l i n e 1 ,1− o p t i m a l o n l i n e 1 ) *MARKETING SHAPEWEIGHT
s w i t c h i n g [ [ 1 ] ] [ [ ” on on o f f s e t ” ] ] = rep ( cbind (SWITCH ON ON OFFSET [ 1 ] ) , anz t u p e l )+
265 ((− o p t i m a l o n l i n e 1 + o p t i m a l o n l i n e 2 ) /MY FRACTION) *MARKETING OFFSETWEIGHT
267 s w i t c h i n g [ [ 1 ] ] [ [ ” f o f f on ” ] ] = matrix ( rep ( cbind (SWITCH F OFF ON[ [ 1 ] ] [ 1 ] ,
SWITCH F OFF ON[ [ 1 ] ] [ 2 ] ) , anz t u p e l ) , nrow=anz t u p e l , byrow=T )
269 s w i t c h i n g [ [ 1 ] ] [ [ ” f o f f on ” ] ] = s w i t c h i n g [ [ 1 ] ] [ [ ” f o f f on ” ] ] +
cbind ( o p t i m a l o f f l i n e 1 ,1− o p t i m a l o f f l i n e 1 ) *MARKETING SHAPEWEIGHT
271 s w i t c h i n g [ [ 1 ] ] [ [ ” o f f on o f f s e t ” ] ] = rep ( cbind (SWITCH OFF ON OFFSET [ 1 ] ) , anz t u p e l )+
((− o p t i m a l o f f l i n e 1 + o p t i m a l o n l i n e 2 ) /MY FRACTION) *MARKETING OFFSETWEIGHT
273
s w i t c h i n g [ [ 1 ] ] [ [ ” f on o f f ” ] ] = matrix ( rep ( cbind (SWITCH F ON OFF [ [ 1 ] ] [ 1 ] ,
275 SWITCH F ON OFF [ [ 1 ] ] [ 2 ] ) , anz t u p e l ) , nrow=anz t u p e l , byrow=T )
s w i t c h i n g [ [ 1 ] ] [ [ ” f on o f f ” ] ] = s w i t c h i n g [ [ 1 ] ] [ [ ” f on o f f ” ] ] +
277 cbind ( o p t i m a l o n l i n e 1 ,1− o p t i m a l o n l i n e 1 ) *MARKETING SHAPEWEIGHT
s w i t c h i n g [ [ 1 ] ] [ [ ” on o f f o f f s e t ” ] ] = rep ( cbind (SWITCH ON OFF OFFSET [ 1 ] ) , anz t u p e l )+
279 ((− o p t i m a l o n l i n e 1 + o p t i m a l o f f l i n e 2 ) /MY FRACTION) *MARKETING OFFSETWEIGHT
281 s w i t c h i n g [ [ 2 ] ] = l i s t ( )
s w i t c h i n g [ [ 2 ] ] [ [ ” o f f on ” ] ] = matrix ( rep ( cbind (SWITCH OFF ON[ [ 2 ] ] [ 1 ] ,
283 SWITCH OFF ON[ [ 2 ] ] [ 2 ] ) , anz t u p e l ) , nrow=anz t u p e l , byrow=T )
241
s w i t c h i n g [ [ 2 ] ] [ [ ” on o f f ” ] ] = matrix ( rep ( cbind (SWITCH ON OFF [ [ 2 ] ] [ 1 ] ,
285 SWITCH ON OFF [ [ 2 ] ] [ 2 ] ) , anz t u p e l ) , nrow=anz t u p e l , byrow=T )
s w i t c h i n g [ [ 2 ] ] [ [ ” i n t r a o f f s e t ” ] ] = matrix ( rep ( cbind (SWITCH INTRA OFFSET [ [ 2 ] ] [ 1 ] ,
287 SWITCH INTRA OFFSET [ [ 2 ] ] [ 2 ] ) , anz t u p e l ) , nrow=anz t u p e l , byrow=T )
colnames ( s w i t c h i n g [ [ 2 ] ] [ [ ” i n t r a o f f s e t ” ] ] ) = c ( ” o f f l i n e ” , ” o n l i n e ” )
289 # m a r k e t i n g
s w i t c h i n g [ [ 2 ] ] [ [ ” o f f on ” ] ] = s w i t c h i n g [ [ 2 ] ] [ [ ” o f f on ” ] ] +
291 cbind ( o p t i m a l o f f l i n e 2 ,1− o p t i m a l o f f l i n e 2 ) *MARKETING SHAPEWEIGHT
s w i t c h i n g [ [ 2 ] ] [ [ ” on o f f ” ] ] = s w i t c h i n g [ [ 2 ] ] [ [ ” on o f f ” ] ] +
293 cbind ( o p t i m a l o n l i n e 2 ,1− o p t i m a l o n l i n e 2 ) *MARKETING SHAPEWEIGHT
s w i t c h i n g [ [ 2 ] ] [ [ ” i n t r a o f f s e t ” ] ] = s w i t c h i n g [ [ 2 ] ] [ [ ” i n t r a o f f s e t ” ] ] +
295 cbind ((− o p t i m a l o f f l i n e 2 + o p t i m a l o n l i n e 2 ) /MY FRACTION ,
( o p t i m a l o f f l i n e 2 −o p t i m a l o n l i n e 2 ) /MY FRACTION) *MARKETING OFFSETWEIGHT
297
s w i t c h i n g [ [ 2 ] ] [ [ ” f o f f o f f ” ] ] = matrix ( rep ( cbind (SWITCH F OFF OFF [ [ 2 ] ] [ 1 ] ,
299 SWITCH F OFF OFF [ [ 2 ] ] [ 2 ] ) , anz t u p e l ) , nrow=anz t u p e l , byrow=T )
s w i t c h i n g [ [ 2 ] ] [ [ ” f o f f o f f ” ] ] = s w i t c h i n g [ [ 2 ] ] [ [ ” f o f f o f f ” ] ] +
301 cbind ( o p t i m a l o f f l i n e 2 ,1− o p t i m a l o f f l i n e 2 ) *MARKETING SHAPEWEIGHT
s w i t c h i n g [ [ 2 ] ] [ [ ” o f f o f f o f f s e t ” ] ] = matrix ( rep ( cbind (SWITCH OFF OFF OFFSET [ 2 ] ) ,
303 anz t u p e l ) , nrow=anz t u p e l , byrow=T)+((− o p t i m a l o f f l i n e 2 + o p t i m a l o f f l i n e 1 ) /
MY FRACTION) *MARKETING OFFSETWEIGHT
305
s w i t c h i n g [ [ 2 ] ] [ [ ” f on on ” ] ] = matrix ( rep ( cbind (SWITCH F ON ON[ [ 2 ] ] [ 1 ] ,
307 SWITCH F ON ON[ [ 2 ] ] [ 2 ] ) , anz t u p e l ) , nrow=anz t u p e l , byrow=T )
s w i t c h i n g [ [ 2 ] ] [ [ ” f on on ” ] ] = s w i t c h i n g [ [ 2 ] ] [ [ ” f on on ” ] ] +
309 cbind ( o p t i m a l o n l i n e 2 ,1− o p t i m a l o n l i n e 2 ) *MARKETING SHAPEWEIGHT
s w i t c h i n g [ [ 2 ] ] [ [ ” on on o f f s e t ” ] ] = rep ( cbind (SWITCH ON ON OFFSET [ 2 ] ) , anz t u p e l )+
311 ((− o p t i m a l o n l i n e 2 + o p t i m a l o n l i n e 1 ) /MY FRACTION) *MARKETING OFFSETWEIGHT
313 s w i t c h i n g [ [ 2 ] ] [ [ ” f o f f on ” ] ] = matrix ( rep ( cbind (SWITCH F OFF ON[ [ 2 ] ] [ 1 ] ,
SWITCH F OFF ON[ [ 2 ] ] [ 2 ] ) , anz t u p e l ) , nrow=anz t u p e l , byrow=T )
315 s w i t c h i n g [ [ 2 ] ] [ [ ” f o f f on ” ] ] = s w i t c h i n g [ [ 2 ] ] [ [ ” f o f f on ” ] ] +
cbind ( o p t i m a l o f f l i n e 2 ,1− o p t i m a l o f f l i n e 2 ) *MARKETING SHAPEWEIGHT
317 s w i t c h i n g [ [ 2 ] ] [ [ ” o f f on o f f s e t ” ] ] = rep ( cbind (SWITCH OFF ON OFFSET [ 2 ] ) , anz t u p e l )+
((− o p t i m a l o f f l i n e 2 + o p t i m a l o n l i n e 1 ) /MY FRACTION) *MARKETING OFFSETWEIGHT
319
s w i t c h i n g [ [ 2 ] ] [ [ ” f on o f f ” ] ] = matrix ( rep ( cbind (SWITCH F ON OFF [ [ 2 ] ] [ 1 ] ,
321 SWITCH F ON OFF [ [ 2 ] ] [ 2 ] ) , anz t u p e l ) , nrow=anz t u p e l , byrow=T )
s w i t c h i n g [ [ 2 ] ] [ [ ” f on o f f ” ] ] = s w i t c h i n g [ [ 2 ] ] [ [ ” f on o f f ” ] ] +
323 cbind ( o p t i m a l o n l i n e 2 ,1− o p t i m a l o n l i n e 2 ) *MARKETING SHAPEWEIGHT
s w i t c h i n g [ [ 2 ] ] [ [ ” on o f f o f f s e t ” ] ] = rep ( cbind (SWITCH ON OFF OFFSET [ 2 ] ) , anz t u p e l )+
325 ((− o p t i m a l o n l i n e 2 + o p t i m a l o f f l i n e 1 ) /MY FRACTION) *MARKETING OFFSETWEIGHT
327 re turn ( s w i t c h i n g )
}
329
# c a l c u l a t e s a l e s , p r o f i t
331 c a l c S a l e s = f u n c t i o n ( gen1 , gen2 , f i r m ){
. s w i t c h i n g = a l t e r P r o b a b i l i t i e s ( gen1 , gen2 )
333 . consumer= ca lcConsumer ( gen1 [ , ” o f f l i n e ” ] , gen1 [ , ” o n l i n e ” ] , gen2 [ , ” o f f l i n e ” ] ,
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gen2 [ , ” o n l i n e ” ] , . s w i t c h i n g , f i r m )
335 . s a l e s = . consumer [ , 1 ] * gen1 [ , ” o f f l i n e ” ] + . consumer [ , 2 ] * gen1 [ , ” o n l i n e ” ]
. p r o f i t = . consumer [ , 1 ] * ( gen1 [ , ” o f f l i n e ”]−COSTS [ [ f i r m ] ] [ 1 ] ) +
337 . consumer [ , 2 ] * ( gen1 [ , ” o n l i n e ”]−COSTS [ [ f i r m ] ] [ 2 ] )
. df= l i s t ( )
339 . df $ consumer = . consumer
. df $ s a l e s = . s a l e s
341 . df $ p r o f i t = . p r o f i t
re turn ( . df )
343 }
345
347 # ###############################################################################
#
349 # E V O L U T I O N A R Y S T R A T E G I E S
#
351 # ###############################################################################
353 # ############## m u t a t i o n #######################################################
# new o n l i n e and o f f l i n e p r i c e s a f t e r c r o s s o v e r
355 # r e t u r n muta t ed c h i l d r e n
doMuta t ion = f u n c t i o n ( genpoo l ) {
357 anz t u p e l =dim ( genpoo l ) [ 1 ]
anz param=dim ( genpoo l ) [ 2 ]
359 # m u t a t i o n p r o b a b i l i t i e s
. m u t a t i o n row= r u n i f ( anz t u p e l , 0 , 1 )
361 m u t a t i o n row = . m u t a t i o n row
# t h e s e c h i l d r e n mu t a t e
363 m u t a t i o n row [ . m u t a t i o n row<ES MUTATIONRATE]=1
m u t a t i o n row [ . m u t a t i o n row>=ES MUTATIONRATE]=0
365
m u t a t i o n matrix=round ( matrix ( rep ( m u t a t i o n row , anz param ) , nco l =anz param ) , 4 )
367
# choose v a l u e t o mu t a t e
369 m u t a t i o n c o l =matrix ( r u n i f ( anz t u p e l * anz param , 0 , 1 ) , nrow=anz t u p e l )
m u t a t i o n matrix= m u t a t i o n matrix * m u t a t i o n c o l
371
m u t a t i o n c o l max=apply ( m u t a t i o n matrix , 1 , max )
373 m u t a t i o n c o l max [ m u t a t i o n c o l max==0]=1
m u t a t i o n c o l matrix=matrix ( rep ( m u t a t i o n c o l max , anz param ) , nco l =anz param , byrow=F )
375
m u t a t i o n matrix [ m u t a t i o n matrix == m u t a t i o n c o l matrix ]=1
377 m u t a t i o n matrix [ m u t a t i o n matrix <1]=0
379 m u t a t i o n v a l u e =apply ( genpool , 2 , var )
m u t a t i o n v a l u e =ES MUTATIONRANGE* s q r t ( m u t a t i o n v a l u e )
381 m u t a t i o n matrix= m u t a t i o n matrix * m u t a t i o n v a l u e
m u t a t i o n d i r e c t i o n = r u n i f ( anz t u p e l , 0 , 1 )
383 m u t a t i o n d i r e c t i o n [ m u t a t i o n d i r e c t i o n <0.5]=−1 # s t d d e v −
243
m u t a t i o n d i r e c t i o n [ m u t a t i o n d i r e c t i o n >=0.5]=1 # s t d d e v +
385
m u t a t i o n matrix= m u t a t i o n matrix * m u t a t i o n d i r e c t i o n
387
genpoo l = genpoo l + m u t a t i o n matrix
389
# remove o u t l i e r
391 genpoo l [ genpool <0]=ES MINPRICE
genpoo l [ genpool >1]=ES MAXPRICE
393 re turn ( genpoo l )
}
395
# ############## c r o s s o v e r ######################################################
397 # new o n l i n e and o f f l i n e p r i c e s a f t e r c r o s s o v e r
# g e n e r a t e c h i l d r e n : ES LAMBDA c h i l d r e n + p a r e n t s = r e s u l t
399 d o C r o s s o v e r = f u n c t i o n ( genpool , m a t i n g p o o l ) {
# randomize m a t i n g p o o l ( m a t i n g p o o l c o n t a i n s i n d i c e s ! )
401 mat poo l r and1 =sample ( sample ( m a t i n g p o o l ) )
# i n i t i t a l c h i l d r e n
403 genpoo l o f f s p r i n g 1 = genpoo l [ c ( mat poo l r and1 ) , ]
mat poo l r and2 =sample ( sample ( m a t i n g p o o l ) )
405 genpoo l o f f s p r i n g 2 = genpoo l [ c ( mat poo l r and2 ) , ]
# c r o s s o v e r
407 anz t u p e l =dim ( genpoo l o f f s p r i n g 1 ) [ 1 ]
anz param=dim ( genpoo l o f f s p r i n g 1 ) [ 2 ]
409 # c r o s s o v e r p r o b a b i l i t i e s
. c r o s s o v e r row= r u n i f ( anz t u p e l , 0 , 1 )
411 c r o s s o v e r row = . c r o s s o v e r row
# t h e s e c h i l d r e n c r o s s o v e r
413 c r o s s o v e r row [ . c r o s s o v e r row<ES CROSSOVERRATE]=1
c r o s s o v e r row [ . c r o s s o v e r row>=ES CROSSOVERRATE]=0
415
c r o s s o v e r matrix=round ( matrix ( rep ( c r o s s o v e r row , anz param ) , nco l =anz param ) , 4 )
417
# s e l e c t c r o s s o v e r p o i n t
419 c r o s s o v e r c o l =matrix ( r u n i f ( anz t u p e l * anz param , 0 , 1 ) , nrow=anz t u p e l )
c r o s s o v e r matrix= c r o s s o v e r matrix * c r o s s o v e r c o l
421
c r o s s o v e r c o l max=apply ( c r o s s o v e r matrix , 1 , max )
423 c r o s s o v e r c o l max [ c r o s s o v e r c o l max==0]=1
c r o s s o v e r c o l matrix=matrix ( rep ( c r o s s o v e r c o l max , anz param ) , nco l =anz param )
425
c r o s s o v e r matrix [ c r o s s o v e r matrix == c r o s s o v e r c o l matrix ]=1
427 c r o s s o v e r matrix [ c r o s s o v e r matrix <1]=0
c r o s s o v e r matrix= t ( apply ( c r o s s o v e r matrix , 1 , cumsum ) )
429 genpoo l o f f s p r i n g p a r t 1 = genpoo l o f f s p r i n g 1 * c r o s s o v e r matrix
genpoo l o f f s p r i n g p a r t 2 = genpoo l o f f s p r i n g 2 * ( ! c r o s s o v e r matrix )
431
new genpoo l = genpoo l o f f s p r i n g p a r t 1 + genpoo l o f f s p r i n g p a r t 2
433
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re turn ( rbind ( genpool , new genpoo l ) )
435 }
437 # ############## s t o c h a s t i c u n i v e r s i a l sa mp l i n g #################################
# r e t u r n s i n d e x o f s u r v i v i n g i t e m s ( f i t n e s s based s e l e c t i o n )
439 s e l e c t F i t t e s t P a r e n t s = f u n c t i o n ( p a r e n t s , . l e n g t h ) {
x i d =order ( p a r e n t s , d e c r e a s i n g = TRUE)
441 x order=rbind ( p a r e n t s ) [ , x i d ]
x cum=cumsum ( x order )
443 mat s t a r t = r u n i f ( 1 , 0 , 1 / . l e n g t h )
mat s e l = seq ( mat s t a r t , by=1 / . l ength , l e n g t h . o u t = . l e n g t h )
445 x s e l =rep ( 0 , . l e n g t h )
x cum=x cum / x cum [ l e n g t h ( x cum ) ]
447 x s e l =( mat s e l <x cum [ 1 ] )
x s e l [ x s e l ==TRUE]= x i d [ 1 ]
449
f o r ( i i n c ( 2 : l e n g t h ( p a r e n t s ) ) ) {
451 z =( mat s e l <x cum [ i ] & mat s e l >=x cum [ i −1])
z [ z==TRUE]= x i d [ i ]
453 x s e l =x s e l +z
}
455 # r e t u r n i n d i c e s
re turn ( x s e l )
457 }
459
461 # ###############################################################################
#
463 # C A L C U L A T E
#
465 # ###############################################################################
# a t t h i s p o i n t o n l y p a r t s o f t h e code are p r o v i d e d
467 # da ta f e t c h i n g and s t o r a g e seem t o be u n e s s e n t i a l
#
469
# ############## s c e n a r i o loop ##################################################
471 f o r ( s c e n a r i o C n t i n c ( 1 : 8 ) ) {
# s e t up t h e c o m p e t i t o r and t h e consumers
473 # f e t c h da ta from t h e d a t a b a s e t o e s t i m a t e d i s t r i b u t i o n s and m a r k e t i n g demand
# s e t up t h e opponen t ( p r i c i n g , m a r k e t i n g )
475 # i n i t i a l i z e genpoo l f o r f i r m 1
whi le ( g e n e r a t i o n C n t < ES MAX GENERATIONS) {
477
g e n e r a t i o n V a l u e s 1 = c a l c S a l e s ( genpool1 , genpool2 , 1 )
479 g e n e r a t i o n V a l u e s 2 = c a l c S a l e s ( genpool2 , genpool1 , 2 )
481 # s t a r t s e l e c t i n g new g e n e r a t i o n
mat poo l1 = s e l e c t F i t t e s t P a r e n t s ( g e n e r a t i o n V a l u e s 1 $ p r o f i t , ES LAMBDA)
483 new genpoo l1 = d o C r o s s o v e r ( genpool1 , mat poo l1 )
245
new genpoo l1 = n o r m a l i z e M a r k e t i n g 2 ( new genpoo l1 )
485 new genpoo l1 = doMuta t ion ( new genpoo l1 )
new genpoo l1 = n o r m a l i z e M a r k e t i n g 2 ( new genpoo l1 )
487 . r ep1 =which ( new genpoo l1 [ , ” o f f l i n e ”]<COSTS [ [ 1 ] ] [ 1 ] )
new genpoo l1 [ . rep1 , ” o f f l i n e ” ]=COSTS [ [ 1 ] ] [ 1 ]
489 . r ep1 =which ( new genpoo l1 [ , ” o n l i n e ”]<COSTS [ [ 1 ] ] [ 2 ] )
new genpoo l1 [ . rep1 , ” o n l i n e ” ]=COSTS [ [ 1 ] ] [ 2 ]
491
# s e l e c t f i t t e s t t o be n e x t s t e p p a r e n t s
493 tmp gen2=matrix ( rep ( genpoo l2 [ 1 , ] , ES LAMBDA+ES MU) , nrow=ES MU+ES LAMBDA, byrow=T , )
colnames ( tmp gen2 )= colnames ( genpoo l2 )
495 s a l e s 1 = c a l c S a l e s ( new genpool1 , tmp gen2 , 1 )
497 s u r v i v i n g 1 = s e l e c t F i t t e s t P a r e n t s ( s a l e s 1 $ p r o f i t , ES MU)
genpoo l1 =new genpoo l1 [ s u r v i v i n g 1 , ]
499 }
}
